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
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THE
BOSTON QUARTERLY REVIEW.

VOLUME I.



BOSTON:
PUBLISHED BY BENJAMIN H. GREENE,
124, WASHINGTON STREET,
1838.

CAMBRIDGE PRESS:
METCALF, TORRY, AND BALLOU.

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THE
BOSTON QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1838.

ART. I. — INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

IN adding another to the numerous periodicals of our country, I have not much to say by way of introduction, and nothing by way of apology. I undertake the present publication, with a deep feeling of responsibility, and with the hope of contributing something to the moral pleasure and social progress of my countrymen.

Had I consulted my ability to conduct a periodical as I would see one conducted, or had I listened to the counsels of some of my warmest and most judicious friends, I had not engaged in my present undertaking. But I seem to myself to be called to it, by a voice I dare not and even cannot disobey if I would. Whether this voice, which I have long heard urging me to the work, be merely an illusion of my own fancy, the promptings of my own vanity and self-esteem, or whether it be an indication of Duty from a higher Source, time and the result must determine. It speaks to me with Divine authority, and I must obey.

No man is able to estimate properly the value of his own individual experience. All are prone to exaggerate, more or less, the importance of what has happened to themselves. This it is altogether likely

is the case with me. Yet in my own eyes my experience possesses some value. My life has been one of vicissitude and trial. My mind has passed through more than one scene of doubt and perplexity. I have asked in the breaking up, as it were, of my whole moral and intellectual being, What is the Destiny of Man and of Society? Much of my life has been spent — wasted perhaps — in efforts to decipher the answer to this question. In common with others, I have tried my hand at the riddle of the Sphinx; and in common with others too, I have, it may be, faith in my own explanation. In seeking to solve the problem which has pressed heavily on my heart, as well as on my mind, I have been forced to appeal from tradition and authority to the Universal Reason, a ray of which shines into the heart of every man that cometh into the world; and this, which has been forced upon me, I would force upon others. The answer, which I have obtained and which has restored peace and serenity to my own soul, I would urge others to seek, and aid them to find. For this purpose I undertake this Review.

I have not sought to solve the problem of the Destiny of Man and of Society, without thinking for myself. By thinking for myself, I have found myself a solitary being, in a great measure shut out from communion with my race. Whoever thinks for himself, will find himself thinking differently from the majority around him, and by this fact he will be alone in their midst. He will find few who can sympathize with his soul, recognise his voice, or comprehend his language. However his heart may yearn towards his brethren, and however affectionately he would fold them in his bosom, he must submit to be regarded as a stranger, as an alien. He cannot speak to them and make them acquainted with what is concealed within him, through popular organs, or the established channels of communication. Those channels, though readily opened to others, are closed to him. They, who have it in their power to open them to whom they will, and shut them to whom they will,

are afraid of him; they are ignorant of the value of what he would utter, and they see no mark by which they can even guess what it will pass for in the market. His thoughts have not been through the mint of public opinion, and therefore must be debarred from general circulation. In this case he must have his own medium of communication, organs of his own through which he can speak, or else he must remain silent. Perhaps the world would lose nothing were he to remain silent; but silence, when one's thoughts are pressing hard for utterance, when they are even rending one's bosom, and resolving they will out and to the world, is a thing not entirely at one's command. There are times when I experience something like this, and when, do what I will, hold my peace I cannot. I must and will speak. What I say may be worth something, or it may be worth nothing, yet say it I will. But in order to be able to do this, I must have an organ of utterance at my own command, through which I may speak when and what I please. Hence, the Boston Review.

I ought in justice to the periodical press of the country to say, that it has always been at my service as far as I have sought to use it. With one or two insignificant exceptions, I have never asked the privilege of inserting an article, which has not been granted. The Christian Examiner, a periodical for freedom and freshness unsurpassed in the world, has always been open to me; and, for aught I have reason to think, still would be; but that removes not the difficulty. There is a possibility of refusal. The editor's imprimatur must be obtained. The censorship may be indulgent, liberal, obliging, yet it is censorship, and that is enough. The oracle within will not utter his responses, when it depends on the good will of another whether they shall to the public ear or not. The evil of the thing does not consist in the refusal to publish what is written, but in hindering one from writing what he otherwise might. This is after all a small affair; but who is there that is not disturbed by small affairs more than by great?

I undertake this Review, then, for myself; not because I am certain that the public wants it, but because I want it. I want it for a medium through which I may say to those who may choose to listen to my voice, just what I wish to say, and through which I may say it in my own way and time. This is the specific object for which I undertake it. I cannot say whether what I shall utter will be for the public good or not. What is for the public good? Who knows? I do not. This or that may seem to me to-day for the public good, and to-morrow's eve proves me mistaken; and yet how know I that? That, which I shall to-morrow's eve account a public evil, may turn out to have been a public blessing. Man seeth not the end, and knoweth not the termination of events. He cannot say which is the blessing or which is the curse. All that is for him is, what his hand findeth to do, to do it, and the word which is pressing for utterance, to utter it, and leave results to God, to whom alone they belong. I am not wise enough to say dogmatically what is or what is not for the public good; but I know what I think, what comes to me as truth; and as a watchman I would tell what I see, or seem to see, and let them of the city treat it as they will. Man is a seer and it is each man's duty to declare simply what he sees, without attempting to fix its precise value, and without allowing himself to be disturbed because others may not rate its value precisely as he does.

I would not, however, leave it to be inferred from this, that I am indifferent to the welfare of my fellow-men. Perhaps their interest is dear to me; and it may be that I would do them good; but I dare not say that this or that *is* for their good, and that they must do as I bid them. Once in my life I set up to be a Reformer, a bold Innovator, but not now. I would aid a reform, it is true, but I dare not say, that what I may propose, or what seems to me as desirable, ought to be adopted, and must be adopted, in order to obtain that greater good, after which Humanity

yearns and struggles. All I can do, all I have a right to do, is to throw my opinion into the common mass of opinion, and let it go for what it is worth. It may be worth something, as is every man's independent opinion, but it cannot be worth much. No man's opinion is worth much, except to himself. Men themselves, in the great movements of Humanity, count for less than they imagine. There is a Power above man, call it Fate, Necessity, or God, that carries all things along as they should and must go, without any deference to individuals, and without any aid from human volitions. What a man wills, says, and does, is of grave import, as concerns himself, his own moral character, his acquittal or condemnation before the august tribunal of conscience; but it alters not the fate of nations, and neither hastens nor retards the progress of Humanity. The Power above achieves his own work with or without human coöperation in his own way and time, and in my humble belief, makes all things at last turn out for the best. With this belief my mind rests easy as to the final result. With this belief I come forward merely to play my part, utter my word, do my duty, and then pass off, satisfied if I have executed my mission, whatever it may be, to the acceptance of my Master, I would say, my Father, that I need not be at all uneasy about the consequences.

It may easily be inferred from what I have said, that I have no very definite objects to accomplish. I establish no journal to carry this or that proposed measure, to give currency to this or that doctrine, to support this or that party, this or that class. I belong to no party under Heaven, to no sect on earth, and swear allegiance to no creed, to no dogma. I have no wish to build up one party or to pull down another, to aid one sect or to depress another, or to recommend this school in preference to that. I would discourse freely on what seem to me to be great topics, and state clearly and forcibly what I deem important truths;—push inquiry into all subjects of general

interest, awaken a love of investigation, and create a habit of looking into even the most delicate and exciting matters, without passion and without fear. This is all.

I own, however, that I am desirous of contributing something to the power of the great Movement Party of mankind, or rather of showing that I have the will, if not the ability, to aid onward the great Movement commenced by Jesus of Nazareth, and which acquires velocity and momentum in proportion as it passes through successive centuries, and which is manifesting itself now in a manner that makes the timid quake, and the brave leap for joy. With this Movement, whether it be effecting a reform in the Church, giving us a purer and more rational theology; in philosophy seeking something profounder and more inspiring than the heartless Sensualism of the last century; or whether in society demanding the elevation of labor with the Loco foco, or the freedom of the slave with the Abolitionist, I own I sympathize, and I thank God that I am able to sympathize. I sympathize with the progress of Humanity wherever I see it; and it is my life and my delight to contemplate and try to aid it.

But I am growing too egotistical; what I have said will disclose the character of this Review as far as it needs to be disclosed in an introduction. I will only add, that it will probably be very heretical, and show a fellow feeling for heretics of every name and nature. All, who are afraid of heresy, who want the nerve to look even the most arch-heresy in the face, had better not patronize it, nor even undertake to read it. It is not designed for them, and will by no means do them any good. It is addressed only to those who love truth, and are willing to follow wherever her light may lead, to those only who are willing to "prove all things" and have the desire to "hold fast that which is good." How many such there be I know not; perhaps I shall not find out; but I venture to say that they are three times more numerous than most people think, and their number is every day increasing.

One word as to the name I have selected. I call it a Review, because that term is indefinite, and allows me to discourse on any thing I please. Moreover it has nothing in it offensive like the name "New Views," which I was sometime ago so foolish, not to say presumptuous, as to give to a little work I thought worth the publishing, though hardly any body seems to have thought it worth the reading.

I add the epithet Boston, both to designate the place whence it is published, and to pay a sort of compliment to this goodly city. Boston is, of all the cities in the Union, the one in which thought is freest and boldest, and in which progress finds its warmest and most enlightened friends. I may say this, for I am not a Bostonian. I know Boston is called an aristocratic city, and I know also that democracy is a word for which it has no slight aversion; but in point of fact, it has less aristocracy than any other of our cities, and is more truly democratic in its practice. One may indeed see now and then the representative of a by-gone generation, walking the streets with an antique air and dress, but he is, after all, one who makes us doubt whether we have advanced much on our fathers. True, there is here and there a purse-proud *parvenu*, and a poor worshipper of Fashion, but even these it has been conjectured, and not without reason, have souls, and even hearts * which may with proper applications be made to beat with something like sympathy with Humanity, and admiration of a generous sentiment or a heroic deed. Boston is, say what you will of it, the city of "notions," and of new notions too; and in the progress of liberal ideas in this country, it ever has and ever will take the lead. Elsewhere there may be more bustle, more pretence, more profession of liberty, of reform, of progress, of democracy; but when it comes to the reality, Boston need not blush in the presence of any of her sisters. This being the case, it is proper that I should

* Sartor Resartus.

call my Review the *Boston Review*, intimating thereby that it contains in some sort *Boston* notions; and sure am I that in Boston shall I find for it the most sympathy and its best friends.

In conclusion, I merely add that, as this Review is the organ of no party, nobody but its Editor, and those of his friends who may contribute to its pages, must be at all implicated in its sins and heresies. It is a free Journal. It will be open to the discussion of all subjects of general and permanent interest, by any one who is able to express his thoughts — providing he has any — with spirit, in good temper, and in good taste.

THE EDITOR.

ART. II.—CHRISTIANITY NOT AN ORIGINAL REVELATION
WITH JESUS, NOR A SYSTEM OF THEOLOGICAL DOCTRINES,
PROPERLY SO CALLED.

CHRISTIANITY is generally, at least extensively, taken to be an original revelation, a set of moral and religious doctrines communicated to mankind for the first time by Jesus of Nazareth. Two controversies have thence arisen, which have not been without their effect on the faith and prosperity of the Church. The first has been among professed Christians themselves, and has had for its object to ascertain and settle the precise doctrines Jesus revealed. The other has sprung up in modern times between professed Christians and Unbelievers.

Unbelievers, raking together a modicum of erudition, have attempted, by an appeal to the records of antiquity, to show that all the doctrines and precepts contained in the New Testament were known in the world long before the time of Jesus. Some of the defenders of the faith have denied this, and set them-

selves at work to find out the doctrine or the precept which was peculiar to Jesus, and of which there is no historical trace anterior to the Christian era. But in this, so far as I am informed, they have not succeeded. At one time they have claimed one doctrine, at other times another; now this moral precept and now that. Some have insisted upon it that the command to forgive or to love one's enemies is the original and peculiar revelation; others have claimed the doctrine of the resurrection, or the immortality of the soul; and others, that of a future retribution; and others still, the doctrine of the ultimate holiness and happiness of all mankind. But none of these are peculiar to the Gospel. Plato, as well as Jesus, teaches the forgiveness of enemies; and all antiquity believed in a future life; and all the views which now obtain in regard to that life were prevalent long before Jesus lay in his manger-cradle. Indeed, if the truth of Christianity depended on the fact that it was an original revelation with Jesus, we should be obliged to give it up. Nothing is more evident to them who have investigated the subject, than that all the doctrines and precepts of the New Testament were known in the world at least many hundred years before the time of Jesus; and they who contend to the contrary do great disservice to the Christian cause, besides exposing themselves to a certain and even shameful defeat.

On the other hand, the controversy among professed Christians themselves, as to the precise doctrines Jesus taught, is very far from being ended, and does not seem likely to be brought very soon if ever to a satisfactory termination. Each party appeals to the Bible; but, little is done save to pit text against text and commentary against commentary. Each, according to its own reading, finds the Bible expressly in its own favor, and pointedly against its opponent; and each may fight on, and fight on, with no danger of exhausting its ammunition. For nearly two thousand years the wordy war has been waged, and for aught we can see it may be waged for two thousand years to come,

without any prospect of peace or even of a temporary cessation of hostilities. The truth is,—and we may as well own it as not,—that it is very nearly if not quite impossible to settle definitely, to the satisfaction of all concerned, what are the precise doctrines taught or implied in the New Testament. The book itself is none of the clearest, and its language, on most occasions, is far from being definite. And then it was written long ago, amidst peculiar circumstances, by peculiar men, and in an idiom altogether different in its genius and complexion from ours. Its exact meaning, it appears to me, must forever remain a matter of doubt and dispute to the ablest philologists and the most experienced critics. Each interpreter, notwithstanding his most strenuous efforts to the contrary, will interpret it according to the peculiar cast and biases of his own mind; and as these vary in each interpreter, each must necessarily interpret it differently from the other.

Now it strikes me that both of these controversies are needless and uncalled for. Christianity, according to its usual interpretation, that is, as a particular set of moral and theological doctrines, is not an original revelation with Jesus, and when interpreted as it should be, it is not the revelation of any specific doctrines or dogmas at all.

All truth is immutable and eternal. There is no new truth; there is no old truth. Relatively to us, truth may indeed be new or old, but not in itself. It is from everlasting to everlasting, the same yesterday, to-day, and forever. It is not made, not created, but is, ever was, and ever will be. We may be ignorant of it; that is, it may be unrevealed to us; but it exists not the less, is the same, just as much the truth before as after we become acquainted with it. The time when, or the individual by whom it is made known do not affect it. The age in which it is first revealed can add nothing to its truthfulness, and the individual who first declares it can add nothing to its legitimate authority. The truth of Christianity can,

then, in no way, be made to depend on the time when or the individual by whom it was first taught. Say it was taught thousands of years before Jesus, by nobody knows whom. What then? If true, it is not the less true on that account. If it be not true, the fact, that it was taught about eighteen hundred years ago by Jesus of Nazareth, cannot make it true. In order to determine whether it be true or not, it is needless to inquire when or by whom it was first taught. The teacher does not make the truth; he but teaches that which is as true without him as with him. Grant then to the unbeliever, that all the doctrines of the New Testament were known to the world long before the age of Jesus, you grant him nothing to the detriment of Christianity.

But in point of fact, the New Testament writers, and even the early fathers do not profess to regard Christianity as an original revelation with Jesus. Several of the early fathers stated expressly in their Apologies for Christianity, that it was no new religion; that they did not consider themselves as teaching any new faith or philosophy, but merely that which had been embraced by the sages, patriarchs, and philosophers of old. Paul, in his Epistle to the Galatians, assures us that he was teaching no new religion; "for the scriptures, foreseeing that God would justify the heathen through faith, preached before the Gospel unto Abraham." And he contends earnestly that they who believe are justified with "faithful Abraham;" that is, as I interpret it, on the same ground, by the same faith or religion as that on or by which Abraham was justified. Jesus himself says to the Jews, "Abraham rejoiced to see my day; and he saw it and was glad." The Jews say unto him, "Thou art not yet fifty years old; and hast thou seen Abraham?" "Before Abraham was, I am," was his reply. The New Testament writers all teach us, so far as they teach us any thing on this point, that the "Lamb of God which taketh away sin," was "the Lamb slain from the foundations of the world." Indeed, had they not

regarded the doctrines they were teaching as having been previously taught, how could they, with the least show of propriety, have made the use they did of previous writings? Whenever they preach or address themselves to the Jews, they appeal to Jewish writings, and undertake to prove from them that what they were preaching was not only in harmony with, but actually contained in "the law and the prophets." Paul, when he preaches to the Gentiles, quotes or refers to Gentile writings, apparently for the purpose of proving to them that he was but teaching what had already been taught by their own poets, wise men, and philosophers. Whence the propriety of this, if they were the teachers of a new, original, and peculiar revelation?

Now these considerations satisfy me that neither Jesus nor his Apostles ever pretended to teach a new religion, that they did not regard themselves as setting forth doctrines essentially different from those which had long been entertained, and perhaps widely diffused. They laid no claims to originality. They appeared to themselves to be but reviving the faith which had been from the beginning. They were reformers, but not innovators. And this has in reality been the uniform belief of the great majority of the Christian world. In ascertaining the doctrines of the Gospel, until quite lately, at least, the Christian world has considered the Old Testament of equal authority with the New.

But in the next place, I contend that Christianity, understanding it as Jesus and his Apostles seem to have understood it, is not a system of moral and religious doctrines. It was not the doctrines Jesus and the Apostles preached, as we usually understand the word doctrines, that produced the Christian Movement, the Christian Revolution; but the life they lived, the spirit and disposition they displayed. The doctrines they preached had been preached before, and by others, but without the effect Jesus and his Apostles produced. The simple preaching of those doctrines never could have revolutionized the world.

The new power they seemed to acquire was the power of a new life. Not they, but the new life arrested men's attention, moved men's hearts, changed their dispositions, commanded their assent, and made them new creatures. The power of Jesus to live and die for man as man, of the Apostles to endure hardships, and perils, and death, in the cause of Humanity, was the moving power, the creator of that mighty change in the face of the moral world effected by preaching the Gospel.

This is the view which all the New Testament writers seem to me to take of Christianity. They never, if I rightly recollect, represent the Gospel as a proposition for the intellect to grapple with. They always propound it to the heart; never, I believe, to the understanding. It is the faith indeed, but the faith of the heart, not of the head. It is a life. It is spirit and an influence. Contrasted with Judaism, which the New Testament writers frequently designate as the flesh and as the world, it is spirit, the power of God, and the kingdom or reign of God. It is the spirit of power, of love, and a sound mind; God dwelling in the soul, presiding over the inner man, and guarding all the issues of life. It is the word of God, but not a mere doctrinal proposition which God reveals, for it is "quick and powerful, sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and of the joints and marrow, and is a discernor of the thoughts and intents of the heart." The same view is taken by Paul, when he says to the Corinthians, "We preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling-block and unto the Greeks foolishness. But unto them who are called, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God."

Jesus speaks of himself as a way, and as the life. "I am the way and the truth—the resurrection and the life." "He that believeth on me shall never die," and "the dead, who hear my voice, shall live." "That," says John, "which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our

eyes and looked upon, which our hands have handled of the word of life, that declare we unto you ; for the life was manifested, and we have seen it, and do bear witness, and show unto you that eternal life, which was with the Father and which was manifested unto us." Now it is evident from the whole tenor of this first Epistle of John, that this "word of life," this "life," this "eternal life, which was with the Father," is not an intellectual but a spiritual life. John did not call Christianity a life, because by believing it one would be entitled to life and immortality in the world to come, but because it was life in itself, an endless life, the only life acceptable and well pleasing to God the Father.

We are exhorted to come to Jesus. "Come unto me," says Jesus, "all ye who are weary and heavy laden, and I will give you rest." "Ye will not come to me that ye may have life." In order to be what God requires us to be, we must "receive the Son,"—"believe on the Son,"—"eat his flesh and drink his blood ;" and we are assured that if we do not, we have "no life in us,"—"have not eternal life,"—"are dead,"—"condemned,"—with the "wrath of God abiding on us." Paul teaches us the same thing by the phrases, being in Christ, and Christ in us, which he so frequently uses. "There is therefore now no condemnation to them who are in Christ Jesus."—"If any man be in Christ Jesus he is a new creature."—"If a man have not the spirit of Christ he is none of his."—"If Christ be in you the body is dead."—"Christ liveth in me."—"Of whom I travail in birth again until Christ be formed in you."—"That Christ may dwell in your hearts."—"Christ who is our life." Now all this, and much more like it, is explained to my understanding, by the exhortation, "Let this mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus." We are taught by it, that in order to be a Christian ; to have true, spiritual, eternal life ; to be a saint ; to be saved ; accepted with God ; one must have that mind in him, which was in Jesus, be filled with the spirit with which

he was filled; in a word, be what he was, a son of God, as he was a son of God, a joint-heir with him of the kingdom of heaven. That, by virtue of which one becomes a true Christian, must of course be Christianity; and nothing is more certain than that one becomes a true Christian according to the New Testament, by living and only by living the life which Jesus lived,—not by believing what he may have taught, but by being what he was, righteous as he was righteous.

Now nothing is more evident, than that the life which Jesus lived was the life of pure, disinterested love, manifesting itself, on the one hand, in warm and unaffected piety towards God, and, on the other hand, in an abiding and all-enduring friendship for man—a friendship which led him to taste death on the cross for the human race. All his divine worth and exalted virtues are integrated in pure, disinterested love. He therefore is able to sum up all his commands in that simple declaration, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind; and thy neighbor as thyself.” Or more simply still in that new commandment he gave to his disciples, that “they should love one another as he had loved them.” They who observed this commandment were his disciples, and by observing it they were to be known as such. The simple fact, of loving one another as Jesus loved them, was to be a proof unto all men of their discipleship. “By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one towards another.”

If this be accepted, and I see not how it can be avoided, it is certain that Christianity is not a system of theological doctrines, a set of propositions propounded to the understanding, but a life, the life of pure, disinterested love. This conclusion to which I have arrived, if duly considered, will carry us much further, and perhaps help us to solve several important and oftentimes troublesome problems.

The possession of the love which Jesus manifested proves one to be a true disciple. A true disciple is

unquestionably a true Christian, one who has true, spiritual, eternal life, and is a subject of the kingdom of God. By possessing this love, then, one becomes precisely what he would be, by coming to Christ, receiving the Son, possessing the Son, by being in Christ, or by having Christ in him. The Christ, the Son, and love, then, are identical. The Christ which sanctifies, the Son which gives life, and the love which proves discipleship are, then, one and the same thing; and the three terms are only so many different terms for expressing the same spirit, power, influence, state, or disposition of the inner or spiritual man.

Now this fact implies a distinction which is sometimes overlooked, a distinction between Jesus and the Christ. Jesus, it is true, is called Christ, the Christ, but I apprehend only by that figure of speech by which the attribute is put for the subject, the character, office, or endowment for the individual. The term Christ was applied to Jesus, because it was supposed that he answered to the Jewish prophecies of a Messiah. But the Jewish Messiah, in strictness, was not a person, but an impersonation of an idea, principle, or power. This I think will readily appear to all who will study the Jewish prophets carefully and without prejudice.

The Jewish prophets were dissatisfied with the state in which they found their nation and the world. In their view, the earth was abandoned to tyranny and oppression, to ignorance and gross idolatry. Darkness covered the land, and gross darkness the people. The nations sat in the region and shadow of death. Justice and judgment were not executed; truth and holiness had no dominion, and peace no dwelling-place. Men knew not God, and loved not one another. But this could not last forever. By the Holy Spirit with which they were inspired, they foresaw that the period must come round when this state of things would cease to exist. They saw in that distant Future into which God gave them to look, and from which they derived wherewithal to cheer

their drooping spirits, that there was an unattained good in reserve for poor, suffering, struggling, down-trodden Humanity; that the night would run out, a glorious morning dawn, a new sun arise with healing in his beams, to dispel the darkness and dry up pollution; that the sword and spear would be broken, the tyrant overthrown, the captive set free, wrongs and oppressions ended, the true God universally known and worshipped, and the whole earth filled with love and peace.

But how is this God-sent vision to be realized? The movement towards its realization, whether it be of the Jewish or Gentile world, will need a leader, some one who may guide it to the end desired. Hence the conception of the Messiah, of a personage one day to appear, God-anointed, consecrated, commissioned to achieve the universal Palingenesia of man and society. The Messiah of the prophets was a Deliverer, a Renovator, the Father of the age, the new order of things, which they foresaw, would in its appointed time be introduced. At one time they regard him as a prince of the line of David, far surpassing his renowned ancestor, a wise and judicious king reigning in righteousness, the father of his people, caring for the poor and needy; at another time, as a conquering hero, taking vengeance on the enemies of the Jewish nation, breaking the rod of the oppressor, and subjecting the heathen by his might in battle to the Jewish dominion; then again, as a priest, a prophet, an inspired teacher of truth and righteousness, converting the world by moral and spiritual means to the worship of the true God. But these are only the different forms which their fancy, their wants, or prejudices, as individuals or as Jews, necessarily led them to give, if I may be allowed the expression, to the Messianic Idea. Divested of these forms, which are accidental and not necessary to the Idea, the real Messiah of the prophets was the spirit, power, or agency by which the new order of things, in which they believed, was to be introduced and established.

Now if we can determine what is the spirit, power, or agency, which really introduces and establishes this new order of things, we can at once determine who or what is the real Christ. Whatever may have been the opinions of the Jewish prophets, the expectations of the Jewish people, or early notions of the disciples themselves, we know well to-day what it is. It is love, pure, disinterested love of God and Humanity. Nothing but love is able to achieve a work so vast and so glorious. Nothing but love can make the wolf and the lamb lie down together, dethrone the tyrant, break the chains of the captive, unbar the prison door, beat the sword into the ploughshare and the spear into the pruning-hook, wipe the tears from off all faces, and fill the earth with gladness and peace. Love, then, is the true Messiah, the real Christ. And this is what I have before proved.

But Jesus is not love. He was an individual, and is no more to be called love, or the Christ, than Socrates is to be called philosophy, Demosthenes eloquence, or Washington patriotism. The term Christ applies to him merely as the term eloquent to the great orator, or as we call the man, most eminent for oratory, the orator. Jesus in strictness was not the Messiah, the Christ; but he possessed the Christ; he was the individual who possessed, and in the most eminent degree of any of the sons of men, that which brings in the new age, and effects the regeneration which the prophets foresaw and foretold. This is why he is called the Christ. The Christ was in him, and without measure. This distinction between the individual Jesus and the Christ explains, if I mistake not, the mystery of the two natures which have been attributed to Jesus. The Scriptures plainly teach us that Jesus was a man, but they also seem to teach that he was more than man, that he was divine, if not God. Understand all that is said of Jesus Christ as a man, as applying to the individual Jesus, and what is said of him which seems to imply that he was more than man, as applying to the Christ that was in him, and you will have no difficulty.

By means of this distinction, we can easily dispose of the difficulty concerning the alleged preëxistence and Deity of Jesus. Jesus was a man, and no more existed before he was born than other men. In a certain sense, preëxistence may be affirmed of all men. In this sense, it may be affirmed of Jesus, but in no other. But the Christ preëxisted and was divine. The Christ, I have proved, is love; but love existed long before Jesus was born. The Christ existing in Jesus was love incarnated, or made flesh, or manifested by one in the flesh. But God is love. The Christ being love, then, must be one with God. The Christ being, as I have shown, identical with the Son, it follows also that the Son is one with the Father, with this difference merely, that the Son is love incarnate, and the Father is love universal, constituting the ground and being of all that is. Christ, the Son, is then literally and truly God, only God under accident, God revealing himself in and through Humanity. The Christ was in Jesus. Jesus loved; therefore God was in him. He dwelt in love; therefore he dwelt in God and God in him; as John says, "He that dwelleth in love dwelleth in God, and God in him."

This distinction enables us to understand what Jesus meant, when he said, "Before Abraham was, I am." He did not mean that he, the literal man, the man after the flesh, was before Abraham, for that was not true; but that the Christ, the Divine Love, which was in him, and in whose name he spoke, whose words he was uttering, and for which he was suffering reproach, was that by virtue of which Abraham had been raised to the dignity of being called the friend of God; that in which Abraham rejoiced, which he saw, though it may be but through a glass darkly, and in which he was glad. This Christ was before Abraham; it was eternal; it was in the beginning with God, and was God. And Jesus, by the passage referred to, would also teach the Jews, that what he was urging upon them, the love he was urging them to possess and show forth, had been before Abraham,

even from the beginning, the only savior of men, the only way of life, the only sacrifice, all-sufficient sacrifice, for sin, and the only means of justification and acceptance with God. The way of salvation is the same in all ages of the world. It is now what it ever was, and ever will be. No man is accepted with God, till he is reconciled to him, at one with him; and what, but the possession of love, can reconcile or make us at one with a God who is love? Love only can make at one with love.

It is easy to see now why Jesus and his Apostles gave the world no new religion. There had been good men before Jesus. But goodness, or that by virtue of which one is good, is the same in all ages and in all countries of the world, and in all individuals too. They, who had been good before Jesus, had been good in the same sense, though it may be not in the same degree, in which he was good. There is none good, absolutely considered, but one, and that is God. Men at best are only relatively good, and good only as they approach or partake of God. God is love; consequently men become good in proportion, and only in proportion, as they love or are filled with love.

Of the millions who had lived before Jesus, had none ever loved? Shall we say none of them had ever known any thing of that love which was manifest in Jesus? If we may not say so, then Christianity was no new religion. It revealed no new truth; for every man, who had loved, had experienced and known its truth. To that truth Jesus may have given a fuller meaning; he may have developed and quickened the life of love, as it never had been before; but the truth he taught had always been in the world, and borne witness to by every man, in whose heart love had found a resting-place.

If I am right, I gain this important conclusion; to wit, a man's creed does not constitute his Christianity. He who fears God and works righteousness, that is, loves, is accepted with him, whatever be his creed, sect, nation, or mode of worship. The man who loves

the Divinity with all his heart and soul, and his neighbor as himself, be he Jew or Moslem, be he Pagan or a professed Christian, is a Christian in the highest and only worthy sense of the term. He is a member of the true Christ's Church, and is one in the unity of his love with the good of all ages and nations, one with Jesus, and one with God. Thank God, there is and there never was but one church, and all who love are its members, and are brethren of the same religion, and will one day come together, however they may be separated now.

ART. III. — *Poems written during the progress of the Abolition Question in the United States, between the years 1830 and 1838.* By JOHN G. WHITTIER. Boston: Isaac Knapp. 1837. 16mo. pp. 104.

NOT yet can justice be done to those philanthropic men and women, who have taken the lead in the effort to abolish Negro Slavery. They disturb too many prejudices, interfere with too many interests, and stir up insurrection in too many consciences, to be able to find at once their true place in the love and reverence of their countrymen. But they need not be disheartened. Humanity will not forget them. The very children of those, who now call them madmen and fanatics, who treat them with scorn and contumely, with "brickbats and stones," will vie with one another in building their tombs or garnishing their sepulchres.

Slavery — whatever opinion we may form of the ultimate effects of Abolition movements on the destiny of the Negro race, — slavery is doomed, its days are numbered, and as recedes the primitive forest before the advancing emigrant, so must it recede before the onward march of modern civilization. It is not in

any human power to save it. Go it must and will; and they who think it can be retained are ignorant of the age in which they live, and of the influences at work around them. They, who would wish to retain it, are strangers in their generation, and worthy of being studied as the last representatives of an order of things, of which we are beginning to know nothing save through the uncertain medium of hoary Tradition. They should be labelled, numbered, and arranged in the cabinets of the curious, as genuine specimens of the antique. In that inviting Future which draweth nigh, the patriarchal relation of master and slave, and even that of employer and employed, will find no admittance; for in that Future man is to be man, and nothing more and nothing less.

When that Future has become the Present, and man stands up by the side of man, in the native dignity of manhood, and in the image of his Maker, they, who now weep and yearn, toil and struggle, suffer reproach and persecution, for the rights of man, will be owned as the true nobility of their day, the God-sent benefactors of mankind. In that day the author of this little volume of poems will not be forgotten. He will then stand out as one who cared for the poor and needy, — who was prompt to save him who was ready to perish, and as one in whose heart lived and burned the genuine love of Humanity. That distinguishing honor awaits him, and that, if we have not wholly mistaken his character, is the honor he is the most ambitious to receive. His reputation as a literary man, as a poet, is not that which lies nearest his heart. He does not make it his vocation to write, nor his end to sing. He feels that God has given him a higher mission, a nobler calling, that of breaking the chains of the bound, abolishing tyranny and oppression, and raising universal man to universal freedom and virtue.

Nevertheless, Mr. Whittier is a poet, and a poet of a high order too. He is a living answer to the accusation, that this country can produce no genuine poet. In the volume before us there is poetry, as true, and

of its kind, as lofty, as ever burst from the soul of man. Poetry is the outspeaking, the overflowing of a soul, filled and more than filled with a great and quickening Idea. The poet is always inspired. God moves in him, and he speaks not because he wills to speak, but because he must speak; in numbers, not because he seeks them, but because they come. His words are words of fire. His song kindles. The God in him wakes up the God in those who listen — fills them with lofty thoughts, gives them noble impulses, and makes them feel that they can do, dare, suffer any thing and every thing in the cause of truth, liberty, justice, religion, country or Humanity. Tried by this standard, Mr. Whittier is a poet. His subject is the greatest that can engage the thoughts or the sympathies of the human mind or heart. He sets us on fire and makes us burn as he burns. As we listen, the slave becomes a man; he becomes a brother; his chains rust into our flesh, eat into our souls, and we concentrate ourselves in one mighty effort to break, and to break them forever.

Mr. Whittier is a poet; and what we love him for is, that he is an American poet. We mean not merely that he was born and lives in the United States. The word American means more than this to us; and our countryman is far other than he who may chance to have been born on the same soil with ourselves. Where freedom is, there is America; where the free-man is, there is our countryman. We call Mr. Whittier an American poet, because his soul is filled and enlarged with the American Idea; the Idea which God has appointed the American people to bring out and embody; the Idea of universal freedom to universal man; the great doctrine that man equals man the world over, and that he who wrongs a man wrongs his equal, his brother, himself, a child of God. This is the American Idea. The mission of the American people is to realize this Idea, and to realize it for the world. He who is not inspired by this Idea, and who embodies it not in his song, is no American poet.

He may be a poet, he may even have been born in America, he may sing her rivers and lakes, her woodlands and mountains, the fertility of her soil, the wildness and beauty of her scenery, the exuberant life of her spring, or the gorgeousness of her autumnal sunsets; but he must surrender all claim as an American poet, if his soul be not on fire with love of freedom, and if his verse do not breathe eternal hostility to every form of slavery or oppression. He may even deal in all the phrases of a vulgar patriotism, he may even kindle up enthusiasm for national independence, make the farmer, the mechanic, and the merchant rush to the battle field to protect or enlarge her territory, and still be infinitely removed from an American poet. The American poet is the poet of Liberty.

The American poet is not only the poet of Liberty, but of Liberty in a new and enlarged sense, in a sense the world has never yet comprehended it, and in which it never has, and out of this country never could have had a poet. Liberty, in the American sense of the word, is not national independence, is not the power to choose our own form of government, to elect our own rulers, and through them to make and administer our own laws; it is not, as Miss Martineau and some pseudo-democrats imagine, the liberty of the majority to govern, and to make the interests of the few bend to those of the many; but the realization of justice and love in the case of each individual member of the human race. It is the liberty which surrounds even the minutest right of the obscurest and most insignificant man, with the bulwarks of sanctity, and secures to every man, whether white, red, or black, high or low, rich or poor, great or small, the free exercise of all the rights and faculties, which God has given, and in the precise order in which the Creator designed them to be exercised. It is the "perfect law of liberty," developed and universally applied and obeyed. It is liberty in this sense he must sing, who would be an American poet.

In this sense, Mr. Whittier is an American poet. It is in this sense, that he understands the word *liberty*. Negro slavery is the occasion on which he strikes his lyre, but universal justice and love to man, and to man as man, is the spirit of his song. The song is an outburst of a soul sympathizing with man, simply as man, filled with a lively sense of his wrongs, and burning with the desire to make him free, virtuous, and happy. Nowhere else do we find a poet of equal powers singing this ennobling song. Körner, to whom the editor of the poems before us compares their author, is a poet inspired with a theme altogether different. He sings liberty, it is true, but it is the liberty of Germany, not of man. Elliot pours out no small share of good old English indignation at taxes and corn laws, but the conception of liberty, as the result of the universal practice of justice and love, seems never to have entered his mind, nor to have warmed his heart. Béranger was inspired more by recollections of the Republic and hatred of the Bourbon dynasty, than by genuine love of true liberty. Shelley is the only poet we are acquainted with, who has sung liberty in the broad and deep sense, in which we have defined it. Shelley loved Humanity. Human freedom was the God of his worship; and it rescued him from Atheism, even after he had ceased to worship or to believe in any other. But Shelley was more of the metaphysician than the poet; he lost himself in the region of abstractions, and his strains were only a prelude to the universal song of freedom. Whittier is the truer poet of the two; and freedom is more living in him than it was in Shelley. In Shelley it was a matter of speculation; in Whittier it is a life. In one it was the result of reflection, and was sung after it had been demonstrated to be worthy of a song; in the other it is the spontaneous expression of his very soul, the outpouring of his inner and higher life. In one it was a philosophy, in the other it is a religion.

Of Mr. Whittier's merits as a poet in other re-

spects, as to the strength of his genius, the structure of his verse, his skill in the art of verse-making, we have nothing to say. Whether in these respects he be above or below many others whom we delight to honor, we do not ask, and we have no wish, even if we had the ability, to answer. It is not our humor to raise one man by depressing another. The world has no great and good men to spare. All that concerns us in the present case to know or to state, is that Mr. Whittier strikes the lyre with a bold and skilful hand, and that he strikes it in a noble, an American, and a Christian cause. If others can strike it more effectually and give us richer and more thrilling music; if they can wake us to a more earnest struggle for a loftier end, then, in God's name, and in Humanity's name, let them do it. We shall not object, and we are sure Mr. Whittier will not.

Some regret that Mr. Whittier so seldom gives us a song. We do not. When the God within moves, the oracle will give forth his responses; and it is only then that they are worth the hearing. No man should speak in prose or verse, unless he have a word lying heavy on his heart and pressing for utterance. When he has a word so lying and pressing, let him out with it; it cannot fail to be a word fit to be spoken. When Mr. Whittier, in the language of the class of Christians with which he is associated, feels "the spirit move," he will sing to us again; and whenever that may be, he will find us waiting and in the attitude to listen.

Our limits do not allow us to justify our remarks by large quotations. But this is no cause of regret. It will not be in the power of our Review to make Mr. Whittier's poems more extensively known than they are. They have already gone infinitely farther than this notice will ever go. Yet we cannot forbear to enrich our pages with a few extracts. We begin with the stanzas, "Our Fellow Countrymen in Chains!" which we copy entire, except the last two stanzas, which, though very fine, are necessary

to prevent Abolitionists from being misinterpreted, rather than to complete the poem. If a man can read these stanzas, and not feel that he could joy to be a martyr in the cause of Freedom, he can do more than we can; or if he can read them, and not call them poetry, we must say his judgment and ours in poetical matters do not coincide.

“ Our fellow-countrymen in chains!
Slaves — in a land of light and law?
Slaves — crouching on the very plains,
Where rolled the storm of Freedom's war!
A groan from Eutaw's haunted wood —
A wail where Camden's martyrs fell —
By every shrine of patriot blood,
From Moultrie's wall and Jasper's well!

By storied hill and hallowed grot,
By mossy wood and marshy glen,
Whence rang of old the rifle-shot,
And hurrying shout of Marion's men!
The groan of breaking hearts is there —
The falling lash — the fetter's clank!
Slaves — SLAVES are breathing in that air,
Which old De Kalb and Sumter drank!

What ho! — *our* countrymen in chains!
The whip on *woman's* shrinking flesh!
Our soil yet reddening with the stains,
Caught from her scourging, warm and fresh!
What! mothers from their children riven!
What! God's own image bought and sold!
AMERICANS to market driven,
And bartered as the brute for gold!

Speak! shall their agony of prayer
Come thrilling to our hearts in vain?
To us, whose fathers scorned to bear
The paltry *menace* of a chain;
To us, whose boast is loud and long
Of holy liberty and light,
Say, shall these writhing slaves of Wrong,
Plead vainly for their plundered Right?

What! shall we send, with lavish breath,
Our sympathies across the wave,
Where manhood, on the field of death,
Strikes for his freedom, or a grave?
Shall prayers go up — and hymns be sung
For Greece, the Moslem fetter spurning —
And millions hail with pen and tongue
Our light on all her altars burning?

Shall Belgium feel, and gallant France,
By Vendôme's pile and Schoenbrun's wall,
And Poland, grasping on her lance,
The impulse of our cheering call?
And shall the SLAVE, beneath our eye,
Clank o'er *our* fields his hateful chain?
And toss his fettered arms on high,
And groan for freedom's gift, in vain?

Oh say, shall Prussia's banner be
A refuge for the stricken slave;
And shall the Russian serf go free
By Baikal's lake and Neva's wave;
And shall the wintry-bosomed Dane
Relax the iron hand of pride,
And bid his bondmen cast the chain,
From fettered soul and limb, aside?

Shall every flap of England's flag
Proclaim that all around are free,
From "farthest Ind" to each blue crag
That beetles o'er the Western Sea?
And shall we scoff at Europe's kings,
When Freedom's fire is dim with us,
And round our country's altar clings
The damning shade of Slavery's curse?

Go — let us ask of Constantine
To loose his grasp on Poland's throat —
And beg the lord of Mahmoud's line
To spare the struggling Suliote.
Will not the scorching answer come
From turban'd Turk, and fiery Russ —
"Go, loose your fettered slaves at home,
Then turn, and ask the like of us!"

Just God! and shall we calmly rest,
The Christian's scorn — the heathen's mirth —
Content to live the lingering jest
And by-word of a mocking earth?
Shall our own glorious land retain
That curse, which Europe scorns to bear?
Shall our own brethren drag the chain,
Which not even Russia's menials wear?

Up, then, in Freedom's manly part,
From gray-beard eld to fiery youth,
And on the nation's naked heart,
Scatter the living coals of Truth!
Up — while ye slumber, deeper yet
The shadow of our fame is growing!
Up — while ye pause, our sun may set
In blood, around our altars flowing!

Oh rouse ye — ere the storm comes forth —
The gathered wrath of God and man —
Like that which wasted Egypt's earth,
When hail and fire above it ran.
Hear ye no warnings in the air?
Feel ye no earthquake underneath?
Up — up — why will ye slumber where
The sleeper only wakes in death?" — pp. 36-39.

The "Stanzas for the Times," that is, for the times of a certain meeting in Faneuil Hall, and of a certain *gentlemanly* mob, in this city, are bold, spirited, and such as the occasion demanded; but as the principal actors in that meeting, and in that mob, probably do not now care to remember the part they took, we pass them by. "The Song of the Free," is worthy of a New Englander, and such as a descendant of the Pilgrims should ever have a voice to sing. "Clerical Oppressors," is too bad. Mr. Whittier ought to have some mercy on the clergy. They have not, it is true, gone in a body for Abolition; but they can hardly be blamed. The people have not hired them, as ministers of religion, to free the slaves, but to make sermons and say their prayers. The poem addressed to Governor M'Duffie of South Carolina is a compliment, which his Excellency richly merited for his defence of slavery. We give the first five stanzas.

“ ‘ *The Patriarchal Institution of Slavery.* ’ — Gov. M'DUFFIE.

King of Carolina ! — hail !
 Last champion of Oppression's battle !
 Lord of rice-tierce and cotton-bale !
 Of sugar-box and human cattle !
 Around thy temples, green and dark,
 Thy own tobacco-wreath reposes —
 Thyself, a brother Patriarch
 Of Isaac, Abraham, and Moses !

Why not ? — Their household rule is thine —
 Like theirs, thy bondmen feel its rigor ;
 And thine, perchance, as concubine,
 Some swarthy prototype of Hagar.
 Why not ? — Like those good men of old,
 The priesthood is thy chosen station ;
 Like them thou payest thy rites to gold —
 And Aaron's calf of Nullification.

All fair and softly ! — Must we then,
 From Ruin's open jaws to save us,
 Upon our own free working men
 Confer a master's special favors ?
 Whips for the back — chains for the heels —
 Hooks for the nostrils of Democracy,
 Before it spurns as well as feels
 The riding of the Aristocracy !

Ho ! — fishermen of Marblehead ! —
 Ho — Lynn cordwainers, leave your leather,
 And wear the yoke in kindness made,
 And clank your needful chains together !
 Let Lowell mills their thousands yield,
 Down let the rough Vermonter hasten,
 Down from the workshop and the field,
 And thank us for each chain we fasten.

SLAVES in the rugged Yankee land ?
 I tell thee, Carolinian, never !
 Our rocky hills and iron strand
 Are free, and shall be free forever.
 The surf shall wear that strand away,
 Our granite hills in dust shall moulder,
 Ere Slavery's hateful yoke shall lay
 Unbroken, on a Yankee's shoulder ! ” — pp. 54, 55.

The spirited piece addressed to George Bancroft proves, that Mr. Whittier's notions of liberty are not restricted to liberty for the black man only. The piece is a noble tribute, paid by one noble soul to another. Mr. Bancroft is able to appreciate it; and in his History of the United States he is proving that he both comprehends and loves true liberty. "Lines written on the Passage of Mr. Pinckney's Resolution in the House of Representatives, and of Mr. Calhoun's 'Bill of Abominations,' in the Senate of the United States," are equal to any thing in the language. They are so well known to all our readers, that we must pass them by. They will not be unknown, till the love of Freedom dies out of the Yankee heart.

But it is time that we bring this notice to a close, and we do so by copying entire the following tribute,

"TO THE MEMORY OF THOMAS SHIPLEY,

President of the Pennsylvania Abolition Society, who died on the 17th of the 9th mo. 1836, a devoted Christian and Philanthropist.

Gone to thy heavenly Father's rest —
The flowers of Eden round thee blowing!
And, on thine ear, the murmurs blest
Of Shiloah's waters softly flowing!
Beneath that Tree of Life, which gives
To all the earth its healing leaves —
In the white robe of angels clad,
And wandering by that sacred river,
Whose streams of holiness make glad
The city of our God forever!

Gentlest of spirits! — not for thee
Our tears are shed — our sighs are given:
Why mourn to know thou art a free
Partaker of the joys of Heaven?
Finished thy work, and kept thy faith
In Christian firmness unto death:
And beautiful, as sky and earth,
When Autumn's sun is downward going,
The blessed memory of thy worth
Around thy place of slumber glowing!

But, wo for us! who linger still
With feebler strength and hearts less lowly,
And minds less steadfast to the will
Of Him, whose every work is holy!
For not like thine, is crucified
The spirit of our human pride:
And, at the bondman's tale of wo,
And, for the outcast and forsaken,
Not warm like thine, but cold and slow,
Our weaker sympathies awaken;

Darkly upon our struggling way
The storm of human hate is sweeping;
Hunted and branded, and a prey,
Our watch amidst the darkness keeping!
Oh! for that hidden strength which can
Nerve unto death the inner man!
Oh! for thy spirit tried and true,
And constant in the hour of trial —
Prepared to suffer, or to do,
In meekness and in self-denial.

Oh, for that spirit meek and mild,
Derided, spurned, yet uncomplaining —
By man deserted and reviled,
Yet faithful to its trust remaining.
Still prompt and resolute to save
From scourge and chain the hunted slave!
Unwavering in the Truth's defence,
Even where the fires of Hate are burning,
The unquailing eye of innocence
Alone upon the oppressor turning!

Oh — loved of thousands! to thy grave,
Sorrowing of heart, thy brethren bore thee!
The poor man and the rescued slave
Wept as the broken earth closed o'er thee —
And grateful tears, like summer rain,
Quickened its dying grass again!
And there, as to some pilgrim-shrine,
Shall come the outcast and the lowly,
Of gentle deeds and words of thine,
Recalling memories sweet and holy!

Oh for the death the righteous die!
 An end, like Autumn's day declining,
 On human hearts, as on the sky,
 With holier, tenderer beauty shining:
 As to the parting soul were given
 The radiance of an opening heaven!
 As if that pure and blessed light,
 From off the Eternal altar flowing,
 Were bathing in its upward flight
 The spirit to its worship going!" — pp. 58 – 60.

ART. IV. — *Address of the Democratic State Convention of Massachusetts, holden at Worcester, September 20, 1837.*

WE have introduced this Address, because it gives us an opportunity for expressing ourselves on the vexed and sometimes vexatious question of Democracy. In common with the great body of our countrymen, we are sturdy democrats; and, do what we can to prevent it, democracy will more or less tincture all that we write. But in order to avoid all just occasion of offence to those — if such there be — in whose minds the word *Democrat* calls up unpleasant associations, and to save ourselves from being misapprehended or misinterpreted, we design, in this article, to give as clear and as satisfactory an exposition, as we can, of what we understand by democracy, and of the sense in which we consider ourselves and wish others to consider us democrats.

1. We may understand by Democracy a form of government under which the people, either as a body or by their representatives, make and administer their own laws. This is the original and etymological sense of the word; and in this sense, a Democrat is one who believes in, or contends for a popular form of government. All, or nearly all Americans are democrats in this sense of the word. We have estab-

lished a democratic government, both for the Confederacy and for the several States ; and there are few among us, if any, who would exchange it for another. Some may have less faith than others in the utility or permanence of this form of government ; here and there one, perhaps, may be found with an individual preference for a limited monarchy ; but virtually the whole people are seriously and honestly bent on preserving the institutions the wisdom of our fathers adopted. There may be those who question the propriety of this or that public measure, who object to this or that law, but none who object very strenuously to the form of the government itself. The American people are not revolutionists. They are conservatives, and to be a conservative in this country, is to be a democrat.

2. By the word *Democracy* we may designate the great body of the people, the unprivileged many, in opposition to the privileged few. In this sense of the word, a Democrat is one who sympathizes with the masses, and who contends that all political and governmental action should have for its end and aim the protection of the rights and the promotion of the interests of the poorest and most numerous class. The whole, or nearly the whole American people are democrats also in this sense of the term. There may be differences of opinion, as to the means of promoting the good of the many, as to what constitutes their good, and as to the amount of good God has made them capable of receiving, obtaining, or enjoying, but none as to the principle that the government is bound to seek "the greatest good of the greatest number."

3. The term *Democracy* may also be applied, as it is applied in this country, to a certain political party. There is a political party in this country called the Democratic party. It sprang up on the adoption of the Federal Constitution, to which it was opposed, and which it refused to accept without some important amendments. It came into power with Mr. Jefferson, in 1801, and has had at least the nominal control of

the General Government ever since, though it has seldom had a majority in all the States. Its first party appellation was that of Anti-Federalist; in 1798 it was called the Republican party; since 1812, especially since 1825, it has assumed the name of the Democratic Republican or Democratic party. When we use the word *democracy* to designate this party, we call an adherent of this party a democrat. A democrat in this sense, however, does not imply so much the one who believes in the general doctrines of the Democratic party, and who countenances its principal measures, as the one who enters its ranks, puts on its livery, submits to its rules and usages, and feels himself bound by his duty to his party to vote for its candidates and to support its policy, whether he like them or not. He must be a good man and true, one on whom the party can count, and who will not disturb it by any obstinate adherence to the convictions of his own understanding, or the dictates of his own conscience. In the sense of a member of this party, a considerable number of the American people are not democrats. Some are not democrats because they disapprove the doctrines and measures of the Democratic party; others, because they have a very great aversion to being swallowed up in a multitude that goes hither and thither, just as some irresponsible will directs. We are of the latter class. We do not call ourselves democrats in a party sense, because we have a great dislike to party tyranny, and because, wherever we are, we must speak according to our own convictions, and act as seemeth to us good, without asking the leave of a party. In a party sense, we are nothing. There is no party that can count on our fidelity. In politics, as in morals, theology, and philosophy, we are eclectics, and hold ourselves free to seek, accept, and support truth and justice wherever we can find them. No party is always wrong; no one is always right. We agree with all parties where they agree with us; but where they do not agree with us, we cannot and will not

surrender our own convictions, for the sake of agreeing with them or with any one of them.

4. The word *Democracy*, in the last place, may be taken as the name of a great social and political doctrine, which is now gaining much in popularity, and of a powerful movement of the masses towards a better social condition than has heretofore existed. In this sense the word is used in England and on the continent of Europe, though not often in this country. A democrat, in this sense of the word, is rather a philosophical, than a party democrat. He takes the word, not in a party and historical sense, but in a broad, philosophical sense. He distinguishes between party democracy as it exists in this country, and philosophical democracy, or democracy as it should be. With the first we do not concern ourselves. In the second, we take a deep interest, both as a man and as a citizen; and this Review will ever be found its fearless and untiring advocate.

But, what is philosophical democracy? or the social and political doctrine, which may be called, not in an historical and party sense, but in a philosophical sense, the Democratic Doctrine? This is not a question without significance. It is a question it behooves every American citizen to ask, and, as far as he can, to answer. It needs a deliberate answer, such an answer as it has never yet, to our knowledge, received. Not a few of those who call themselves democrats are entirely ignorant of what democracy is, and wholly unable to legitimate the doctrines or the measures they support. Notwithstanding the much that has been said and written about democracy, it is yet more of an instinct, an impulse, a sentiment, than an idea. The masses feel its power and yield to its direction, but they see not whither they are going, and they comprehend not wherefore they ought to suffer themselves to be borne along on its current. They go, perhaps, where they ought to go, but they go blindly, without legitimating or being able to legitimate their course. It will not be useless

then to attempt to seize this vague sentiment, this democratic instinct, and to do something to present it in a form that shall enable men to perceive what it is, and what are the grounds on which it may be legitimated.

Democracy, in the sense we are now considering it, is sometimes asserted to be the sovereignty of the people. If this be a true account of it, it is indefensible. The sovereignty of the people is not a truth. Sovereignty is that which is highest, ultimate; which has not only the physical force to make itself obeyed, but the moral right to command whatever it pleases. The right to command involves the corresponding duty of obedience. What the sovereign may command, it is the duty of the subject to obey.

Are the people the highest? Are they ultimate? And are we bound in conscience to obey whatever it may be their good pleasure to ordain? If so, where is individual liberty? If so, the people, taken collectively, are the absolute master of every man taken individually. Every man, as a man, then, is an absolute slave. Whatever the people, in their collective capacity, may demand of him, he must feel himself bound in conscience to give. No matter how intolerable the burdens imposed, painful and needless the sacrifices required, he cannot refuse obedience without incurring the guilt of disloyalty; and he must submit in quiet, in silence, without even the moral right to feel that he is wronged.

Now this, in theory at least, is absolutism. Whether it be a democracy, or any other form of government, if it be absolute, there is and there can be no individual liberty. Under a monarchy, the monarch is the state. "*L'Etat, c'est Moi*," said Louis the fourteenth, and he expressed the whole monarchical theory. The state being absolute, and the monarch being the state, the monarch has the right to command what he will, and exact obedience in the name of duty, loyalty. Hence absolutism, despotism. Under an aristocracy, the nobility are the state, and consequently,

as the state is absolute, the nobility are also absolute. Whatever they command is binding. If they require the many to be "hewers of wood and drawers of water" to them, then "hewers of wood and drawers of water" to them the many must feel it their duty to be. Here, for the many, is absolutism as much as under a monarchy. Every body sees this.

Well, is it less so under a democracy, where the people, in their associated capacity, are held to be absolute? The people are the state, and the state is absolute; the people may therefore do whatever they please. Is not this freedom? Yes; for the state; but what is it for the individual? There are no kings, no nobilities, it is true; but the people may exercise all the power over the individual, that kings or nobilities may; and consequently every man, taken singly, is, under a democracy, if the state be absolute, as much the slave of the state, as under the most absolute monarchy or aristocracy.

But this is not the end of the chapter. Under a democratic form of government, all questions, which come up for the decision of authority, must be decided by a majority of voices. The sovereignty, which is asserted for the people, must, then, be transferred to the ruling majority. If the people are sovereign, then the majority are sovereign; and if sovereign, the majority have, as Miss Martineau lays it down, the absolute right to govern. If the majority have the absolute right to govern, it is the absolute duty of the minority to obey. We who chance to be in the minority are then completely disfranchised. We are wholly at the mercy of the majority. We hold our property, our wives and children, and our lives even, at its sovereign will and pleasure. It may do by us and ours as it pleases. If it take it into its head to make a new and arbitrary division of property, however unjust it may seem, we shall not only be impotent to resist, but we shall not even have the right of the wretched to complain. Conscience will be no shield. The authority of the absolute sovereign extends to

spiritual matters, as well as to temporal. The creed the majority is pleased to impose, the minority must in all meekness and submission receive; and the form of religious worship the majority is good enough to prescribe, the minority must make it a matter of conscience to observe. Whatever has been done under the most absolute monarchy or the most lawless aristocracy, may be reënacted under a pure democracy, and what is worse, legitimately too, if it be once laid down in principle that the majority has the absolute right to govern.

The majority will always have the physical power to coerce the minority into submission; but this is a matter of no moment in comparison with the doctrine which gives them the right to do it. We have very little fear of the physical force of numbers, when we can oppose to it the moral force of right. The doctrine in question deprives us of this moral force. By giving absolute sovereignty to the majority, it declares whatever the majority does is right, that the majority can do no wrong. It legitimates every possible act, for which the sanction of a majority of voices can be obtained. Whatever the majority may exact, it is just to give. Truth, justice, wisdom, virtue can erect no barriers to stay its progress; for these are the creations of its will, and may be made or unmade by its breath. Justice is obedience to its decrees, and injustice is resistance to its commands. Resistance is not crime before the civil tribunal only, but also *in foro conscientia*. Now this is what we protest against. It is not the physical force of the majority that we dread, but the doctrine that legitimates each and every act the majority may choose to perform; and therefore teaches it to look for no standard of right and wrong beyond its own will.

We do not believe majorities are exceedingly prone to encroach on the rights of minorities; but we would always erect a bulwark of justice around those rights, and always have a moral power which we may oppose to every possible encroachment. The majority, we

believe, always leave the minority in possession of the greater part of their rights, not however as rights, but as favors. It is to this we object. We cannot, and will not, consent to receive as a boon, what we may demand as a right. Our liberties belong to us as men; and we would always feel that we hold them as our personal property, of which he who despoils us is a thief and a robber.

The effects of this doctrine, so far as believed and acted on, cannot be too earnestly deprecated. It creates a multitude of demagogues, pretending a world of love for the *dear* people, lauding the people's virtues, magnifying their sovereignty, and with mock humility professing their readiness ever to bow to the will of the majority. It tends to make public men lax in their morals, hypocritical in their conduct; and it paves the way for gross bribery and corruption. It generates a habit of appealing, on nearly all occasions, from truth and justice, wisdom and virtue, to the force of numbers, and virtually sinks the man in the brute. It destroys manliness of character, independence of thought and action, and makes one weak, vacillating,—a time-server and a coward. It perverts inquiry from its legitimate objects, and asks, when it concerns a candidate for office, not, who is the most honest, the most capable? but, who will command the most votes? and, when it concerns a measure of policy, not, what is just? what is for the public good? but, what can the majority be induced to support?

Now as men, as friends to good morals, we cannot assent to a doctrine which not only has this tendency, but which declares this tendency legitimate. That it does have this tendency needs not to be proved. Every body knows it, and not a few lament it. Not long since it was gravely argued by a leading politician, in a Fourth of July Oration, that Massachusetts ought to give Mr. Van Buren her votes for the presidency, because, if she did not, she would array herself against her sister states, and be compelled to stand

alone, as the orator said with a sneer, "in solitary grandeur." In the access of his party fever, it did not occur to him that Massachusetts was in duty bound, whether her sister states were with her or against her, to oppose Mr. Van Buren, if she disliked him as a man, or distrusted his principles as a politician or a statesman. Many good reasons, doubtless, might have been alleged why Massachusetts ought to have voted for Mr. Van Buren, but the orator would have been puzzled to select one less conclusive, or more directly in the face and eyes of all sound morals, than the one he adduced. The man who deserves to be called a statesman never appeals to low or demoralizing motives, and he scorns to carry even a good measure by unworthy means. There is within every man, who can lay any claim to correct moral feeling, that which looks with contempt on the puny creature who makes the opinions of the majority his rule of action. He who wants the moral courage to stand up "in solitary grandeur," like Socrates in face of the Thirty Tyrants, and demand that right be respected, that justice be done, is unfit to be called a statesman, or even a man. A man has no business with what the majority think, will, say, do, or will approve; if he will be a man, and maintain the rights and dignity of manhood, his sole business is to inquire what truth and justice, wisdom and virtue demand at his hands, and to do it, whether the world be with him or against him,—to do it, whether he stand alone "in solitary grandeur," or be huzzaed by the crowd, loaded with honors, held up as one whom the young must aspire to imitate, or be sneered at as singular, branded as a "seditious fellow," or crucified, as was Jesus, between two thieves. Away then with your demoralizing and debasing notion of appealing to a majority of voices! Dare be a man, dare be yourself, to speak and act according to your own solemn convictions, and in obedience to the voice of God calling out to you from the depths of your own being. Professions of freedom, of love of liberty, of devotion to her

cause, are mere wind when there wants the power to live, and to die, in defence of what one's own heart tells him is just and true. A free government is a mockery, a solemn farce, where every man feels himself bound to consult and to conform to the opinions and will of an irresponsible majority. Free minds, free hearts, free souls are the materials, and the only materials, out of which free governments are constructed. And is he free in mind, heart, soul, body, or limb, he who feels himself bound to the triumphal car of the majority, to be dragged whither its drivers please? Is he the man to speak out the lessons of truth and wisdom when most they are needed, to stand by the right when all are gone out of the way, to plead for the wronged and down-trodden when all are dumb, he who owns the absolute right of the majority to govern?

Sovereignty is not in the will of the people, nor in the will of the majority. Every man feels that the people are not ultimate, are not the highest, that they do not make the right or the wrong, and that the people as a state, as well as the people as individuals, are under law, accountable to a higher authority than theirs. What is this Higher than the people? The king? Not he whom men dignify with the royal title. Every man, by the fact that he is a man, is an accountable being. Every man feels that he owes allegiance to some authority above him. The man whom men call a king, is a man, and inasmuch as he is a man, he must be an accountable being, must himself be under law, and, therefore, cannot be the highest, the ultimate, and of course not the true sovereign. His will is not in itself law. Then he is not in himself a sovereign. Whatever authority he may possess is derived, and that from which he derives his authority, and not he, in the last analysis, is the true sovereign. If he derive it from the people, then the people, not he, is the sovereign; if from God, then God, not he, is the sovereign. Are the aristocracy the sovereign? If so, annihilate the aristocracy, and

men will be loosed from all restraint, released from all obligation, and there will be for them neither right nor wrong. Nobody can admit that right and wrong owe their existence to the aristocracy. Moreover, the aristocracy are men, and as men, they are in the same predicament with all other men. They are themselves under law, accountable, and therefore not sovereign in their own right. If we say they are above the people, they are placed there by some power which is also above them, and that, not they, is the sovereign.

But if neither people, nor kings, nor aristocracy are sovereign, who or what is? What is the answer which every man, when he reflects as a moralist, gives to the question, Why ought I to do this or that particular thing? Does he say because the king commands it? the aristocracy enjoin it? the people ordain it? the majority wills it? No. He says, if he be true to his higher convictions, because it is right, because it is just. Every man feels that he has a right to do whatever is just, and that it is his duty to do it. Whatever he feels to be just, he feels to be legitimate, to be law, to be morally obligatory. Whatever is unjust, he feels to be illegitimate, to be without obligation, and to be that which it is not disloyalty to resist. The absolutist, he who contends for unqualified submission on the part of the people to the monarch, thunders, therefore, in the ears of the absolute monarch himself, that he is bound to be just; and the aristocrat assures his order that its highest nobility is derived from its obedience to justice; and does not the democrat too, even while he proclaims the sovereignty of the people, tell this same sovereign people to be just? In all this, witness is borne to an authority above the individual, above kings, nobilities, and people, and to the fact too, that the absolute sovereign is justice. Justice is then the sovereign, the sovereign of sovereigns, the king of kings, lord of lords, the supreme law of the people, and of the individual.

This doctrine teaches that the people, as a state,

are as much bound to be just, as is the individual. By bounding the state by justice, we declare it limited; we deny its absolute sovereignty; and, therefore, save the individual from absolute slavery. The individual may on this ground arrest the action of the state, by alleging that it is proceeding unjustly; and the minority has a moral force with which to oppose the physical force of the majority. By this there is laid in the state the foundation of liberty; liberty is acknowledged as a right, whether it be possessed as a fact or not.

A more formal refutation of the sovereignty of the people, or vindication of the sovereignty of justice is not needed. In point of fact, there are none who mean to set up the sovereignty of the people above the sovereignty of justice. All, we believe, when the question is presented, as we have presented it, will and do admit that justice is supreme, though very few seem to have been aware of the consequences which result from such an admission. The sovereignty of justice, in all cases whatsoever, is what we understand by the doctrine of democracy. True democracy is not merely the denial of the absolute sovereignty of the king, and that of the nobility, and the assertion of that of the people; but it is properly the denial of the absolute sovereignty of the state, whatever the form of government adopted as the agent of the state, and the assertion of the absolute sovereignty of justice. Still, we are not insensible to the fact, that the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people marks an immense progress in political science, and in the sense in which they, who assert it, mean to assert it, it is no doubt true.

Sovereignty may be taken either absolutely or relatively. When taken absolutely, as we have thus far taken it, and as it ought always to be taken, especially in a free government, it means, as we have defined it, the highest, that which is ultimate, which has the right to command what it will, and which to resist is crime. Thus defined it is certain, that neither people, nor

kings, nor aristocracies are sovereign, for they are all under law, and accountable to an authority which is not theirs, but which is above them, and independent on them.

When taken relatively, as it usually is by writers on government, it means the state, or the highest civil or political power of the state. The state, we have seen, is not absolute. It is not an independent sovereign. It is not, then, in strictness, a sovereign at all. Its enactments are not in and of themselves laws, and cannot be laws, unless they receive the signature of absolute justice. If that signature be withheld they are null and void from the beginning. Nevertheless social order, which is the indispensable condition of the very existence of the community, demands the creation of a government, and that the government should be clothed with the authority necessary for the maintenance of order. That portion of sovereignty necessary for this end, and, if you please, for the promotion of the common weal, justice delegates to the state. This portion of delegated sovereignty is what is commonly meant by sovereignty. This sovereignty is necessarily limited to certain specific objects, and can be no greater than is needed for those objects. If the state stretch its authority beyond those objects, it becomes a usurper, and the individual is not bound to obey, but may lawfully resist it, as he may lawfully resist any species of injustice, — taking care, however, that the manner of his resistance be neither unjust in itself, nor inconsistent with social order. For instance, the state assumes the authority to allow a man to be seized and held as property; the man may undoubtedly assert his liberty, his rights as a man, and endeavor to regain them; but he may not, in doing this, deny or infringe any of the just rights of him who may have deemed himself his master or owner. The Israelites had a right to free themselves from their bondage to the Egyptians, but they had not the right to rob the Egyptians of their jewelry.

Now this qualified, limited sovereignty, which in the last analysis, as we have said, is no sovereignty at all, is the sovereignty which has been asserted for the people, and to this sovereignty they are undoubtedly entitled. This sovereignty, which is the sovereignty of the state, may be vested in one man, and then the government is a monarchy; it may be vested in a few, and then the government is an aristocracy, or an oligarchy; it may be vested in the priesthood, and then the government is a hierarchy, or a theocracy, as it is more frequently called, because the priesthood never claim the sovereignty in their own name, but in the name of God, the priestly name for justice, the absolute sovereign; or, in fine, it may be vested in the people, and then it is a democracy, and a democracy, although the exercise of authority be in fact assigned to one man, or to a few nobles, if the one man, or the few nobles are held to derive their authority to govern from the people. France, in theory, was a democracy under Napoleon, although the exercise of authority was delegated to one man, and made hereditary in his family.

If the question come up, which of these various forms of government is the best, we answer unhesitatingly, that which vests sovereignty in the people. One thing may be affirmed of all forms of government. Wherever the supreme power of the state is lodged, they who are its depositaries always seek to wield it to their own exclusive benefit. Government is, whatever its form, invariably administered for the good of the governors. Theorists, indeed, tell us that government is instituted for the good of the governed; but that they are wrong is proved by the experience of six thousand years. Some have thought that governments were made for the good of the people; they who think the people were made for the good of governments, think more conformably to fact. They who have the power invariably seek to derive the greatest profit possible from it for themselves. Thus, in a monarchy, all things must be held subordi-

nate and subservient to the interests and glory of the monarch; in a theocracy, all succumbs to the priesthood; in an aristocracy, the few must ride, though the many trudge on foot; in a democracy, the many are cared for, though the few be neglected. Without claiming any peculiar merit for the governing class in a democracy, we say, therefore, that a democracy is the best form of government for Humanity, — as much better as it is that the many shall be well off, though the few suffer, than it is that the few should be clothed in purple and fine linen, and fare sumptuously every day, while the many lie at their gates, covered over with the rags and bruises of poverty and abuse, begging to be fed with the few crumbs which may chance to fall from their tables. So far, then, as sovereignty is to be affirmed of the state, we say let it be affirmed of the people. If we be told that the people are incapable of using it to their own good, we say, let them use it to their own hurt then. They will have a hard time of it, even with a good share of infernal aid to boot, to govern themselves worse than kings, nobilities, and hierarchies have hitherto governed them.

We suppose all that any body really means by the sovereignty of the people is, that the highest civil or political power in the state is the people; and that all officers of the government, whether bearing royal, patrician, or plebeian titles, are to be regarded, not as the governors or rulers of the people, but as the simple agents of the people, to whom they are directly accountable for their official conduct. This we hold to be a truth; and the fault we find with them who assert the sovereignty of the people is, not with the doctrine they seem to themselves to be setting forth, but with their neglect of the obvious limitations of that sovereignty. The advocates of popular sovereignty have taken good care to limit the authority, to circumscribe and define the powers of the government, so as to keep it in due subordination to the people, from whom it derives its existence; but they

have not taken as good care to guard the people, as individuals, against the people, as a body politic. They have limited the government, which is a creature of the body politic, but they have left the body politic itself in possession of unlimited sovereignty. In denying the sovereignty of the people, we mean to deny to the body politic unlimited authority, or the right to act at all, in any way, or by any agents whatever, on any except certain specific objects, indispensable to the maintenance of social order, and, if the phrase will be taken strictly, the common weal.

But the doctrine of the popular sovereignty, whatever its unsoundness or dangerous tendency, when asserted without any qualifications, has had an important mission to execute, and it has done no mean service to Humanity. From the moment it was first asserted, up to the present, it has been the rallying point of the friends of freedom and progress; and, as things have heretofore been, neither freedom nor progress were possible to be attained without it. It is not for nothing, then, that the friends of freedom and progress, in this and other countries, cling to the sovereignty of the people; and we are not to be astonished, if they now and then stretch it somewhat beyond its legitimate bounds, and continue to defend it, even after its mission is perfected. We do not willingly let go a doctrine which has stood us in good stead in our days of darkness and trial; nor is it an easy matter for us to determine with precision the exact amount of good it has done, or may yet do us. Moreover, we are slow to learn that in contending for the same form of words, we are not always contending for the same doctrine, and that in giving up an old form of words, we do not necessarily give up the old truth we had loved. Words ever change their import as change the circumstances amid which they are uttered. The form of words, which yesterday contained the doctrine of progress, to-day contains a doctrine which would

carry us backward. The watchword of liberty under one set of circumstances becomes under another set of circumstances the watchword of tyranny. It is the part of the wise man to note these changes, and to seek out new watchwords as often as the old ones lose their primitive meaning.

So long as the sovereignty of the people was the denial of the sovereignty of kings, hierarchies, and nobilities, it was true, and was the doctrine of progress. The assertion of the sovereignty of the people was necessary to legitimate popular liberty. In every human heart, there is a more or less lively sense of legitimacy. Men revolt from one authority, not because it oppresses them, or restrains them in the free use of their persons or property, but because they regard it as illegitimate, as a usurper; they submit to another authority and uphold it, although it impose severe burdens, take the fruits of their labors to squander on its pleasures, their daughters for its debaucheries, and their sons for its battles, because they hold it to be legitimate, the rightful sovereign, which they are bound in conscience to obey. To uphold the first, or to resist the last, would in their estimation be alike disloyal. This sense of legitimacy meets us every where throughout the whole of modern history. It has made the people sustain a corrupt and demoralizing hierarchy, cling to old forms of government, and fight for old abuses, long after the reformer has appeared to demand meliorations from which they could not fail to profit. It is so deeply rooted in modern civilization, — indeed, in human nature itself, — that to eradicate it is impossible. In point of fact, we ought not to eradicate it even if we could; for at bottom, it is one of the noblest attributes, we may say, the distinguishing attribute, of man himself, that, without which man would cease to be man. It is, in the last analysis, identical with the sense of right, the correlative of the sense of duty. Take it away, and right and wrong would be empty names, man could acknowledge no sovereign, feel no obligation,

and never be made to comprehend the fact that he has rights. The principle in itself is good, and must be retained, if man is to be preserved. But it depends almost entirely on circumstances, whether the sense of legitimacy shall be combined with a truth, or with a falsehood. If the individual be enlightened so as to discern the true sovereign, then this sense of legitimacy makes him invincible in the support or defence of the right, of freedom, of progress; but if he be darkened by ignorance or warped by prejudice, so as to mistake the true sovereign for the one who is no sovereign, then does it make him equally invincible in the support and defence of the wrong, the bitter and untiring foe of freedom and progress.

Now at that period of modern history, when the popular movement began to manifest itself, legitimacy was almost exclusively attached to the hereditary monarch, and passive obedience was the order of the day. Opposition to the monarch was revolting to the general sense of right; and yet, the cause of the people could not advance without opposing him, and in some instances not without dethroning and even decapitating him. The monarch was held to be sacred and inviolable; but so long as he was so held, the cause of the people must sleep. The people must desist from their efforts to meliorate their condition, unless they could discover some means by which opposition to the hereditary monarch should become sacred and venerable in the eyes of conscience. To act against their sense of right, is what the people never do. A mob may be excited; and, in the intoxication of the moment, it may trample on justice and humanity; but the people are always serious, conscientious in what they do. Long ages will they endure the most grievous wrongs and the most grinding oppression; but to relieve themselves at the expense of what they conceive to be justice, — that will they do never. Knowingly, intentionally, they never do wrong. When they have laid it down or found it laid down, in their conscience, that the hereditary monarch is the legiti-

mate sovereign, they gather round each, the smallest even of his prerogatives, and defend it at the sacrifice of their lives.

Here, we perceive, was a serious difficulty to be removed. The physical power was on the side of the people; but physical power is as chaff before the wind, whenever it has to encounter spiritual might. The people had numbers and the physical strength to gain their freedom, but they dared not. Conscience disarmed them. They felt that they were bound to obey the monarch, and they had no courage to resist him. The stoutest and bravest are children and cowards in a war against conscience. What could be done? How could opposition to the monarch be made to appear justifiable to those, who had been taught and long accustomed to hold him sacred and inviolable? Assuredly, by denying his absolute sovereignty, that is, his legitimacy. But this alone was not enough. Sovereignty must be somewhere. There must be a sovereign; we feel that there is somewhere an authority we are bound to obey. Where is it? If the monarch be not sovereign, who or what is? Had this question been asked at Runnymede, it might have been answered that the nobles were sovereigns; but Louis XI. in France and the Tudors in England had rendered such an answer invalid. The old feudal chiefs had succumbed to the lord paramount, and ceased to be regarded as legitimate sovereigns by the people. If the question had been asked of Hildebrand, he might have said, that God is the legitimate sovereign; but this, at the time of which we speak, would only have been reasserting the supremacy of the Church, which Protestantism had denied. The philosopher might have answered it, as we have answered it to-day, in favor of justice; but the people were not philosophers then, and to have told them to submit to justice, would only have been to tell them to obey the laws, which again would only have been telling them to obey the monarch from whom the laws emanated.

Under these circumstances it is evident, that the

legitimacy of the monarch could be denied only in favor of the people. The people was the only competitor of the king for the throne that it was possible to set up. The people, not the king, is the legitimate sovereign, was the only answer the question admitted. All government is for the good of the people, and every government, which fails to effect the good of the people, is by that fact rendered illegitimate, and may be lawfully opposed. Kings are crowned to protect the rights and promote the interests of the people, and are, therefore, answerable to the people for the use they make of the power given them. The people, in fine, are superior to kings and may judge them. The people then are the sovereign authority. "The people are sovereign;" what words, when first they were uttered! The moment they were uttered, the people sprang into being and were a power,—a power clothed with legitimacy and capable of imparting sanctity and inviolability to its adherents. The people could now legitimate their opposition to the hereditary monarch. In opposing him, they were but calling its servant to an account of his stewardship. They were not contending against just authority, for license, for disorder, but for order, for liberty, for the legitimate sovereign against the usurper. They were able, therefore, to shelter the Reformer, and to save him from those compunctions of conscience with which, otherwise, he would have been visited for opposing an authority he had been taught to reverence and long accustomed to obey. The doctrine of the sovereignty of the people made their cause a legitimate, a holy cause, and gave men the right and made it their duty to assert and maintain it.

In this way, the doctrine of the popular sovereignty has wrought out deliverance for the people. It has made the people kings and priests, and declared it sacrilege to touch the least of their prerogatives. This is its victory for Humanity. In the Old World, where the masses are trodden down by the privileged orders, it may still have a mission. There it may not

have ceased to be the doctrine of progress, and may yet need its soldiers, battles, and martyrs. But here its mission is ended, and its work done. Here it is the doctrine of yesterday and not of to-morrow. To assert it, is not to deny the sovereignty of kings, hierarchies, and nobilities ; for kings, hierarchies, and nobilities, thank God ! are not at home on American soil ; and, if by some mischance they should be transplanted hither, they would not thrive, they would soon droop, die, and be consumed in the fires of freedom, every where burning. The assertion of the sovereignty of the people with us, can be only the assertion of the right of the majority to tyrannize at will over the minority, or the assertion that the people, taken individually, are the absolute slaves of the people, taken as a whole. No ; the sovereignty of the people, has achieved its work with us, and the friends of freedom and progress must anoint a new king. Democracy to-day changes its word, and bids its sentinels require of those who would enter its camp, not "The sovereignty of the people," but "The sovereignty of Justice."

Democracy, as we understand it, we have said, is, on the one hand, the denial of absolute sovereignty to the state, whatever the form of government adopted, and on the other hand, the assertion of the absolute sovereignty of Justice. It therefore commands both the people and the individual to be just. It subjects both to one and the same law ; and, while it commands the citizen to obey and serve the state with all fidelity, so long as it keeps within its legitimate province, it takes care not to forget to remind the state, that it must leave the citizen, as a man, free to do or to enjoy whatever justice permits, commands, or does not forbid.

According to our definition of it, democracy reconciles conflicting theories, and paves the way for the universal association of the human race. By enthroning justice it accepts and explains the leading ideas of theories apparently the most contradictory. Every

theory, which obtains or ever has obtained currency, embraces some essential element of truth. He, who has yet to learn that the human mind never does, never can believe unmixed falsehood, has no reason to boast of his progress in philosophy. The monarchist has a truth. His truth is that sovereignty is necessarily absolute, one and indivisible. This truth the democrat accepts. In declaring justice the sovereign, he declares the sovereign to be absolute, one and indivisible. The authority of justice is unbounded, and there are not two or more justices, but one justice,—one God. The error of the monarchist is in confounding the absolute sovereign, in practice at least, with the man whom men call a king. This error the democrat escapes.

The theocrat has a truth, a great truth. His truth is that the Highest and Best,—God, is the sovereign. The democrat asserts the same thing. Justice is the political phasis of God, it is identical with God, and in asserting its sovereignty, the democrat asserts precisely the same sovereignty as does the theocrat. The error of the theocrat is in making the priesthood the symbol of this sovereignty and the authoritative expounders of its decrees. This error the democrat escapes by adopting no symbol of sovereignty, but the universal Reason which is ever shining in the human soul, and in making the people in a few instances, and the individual in all the rest, the only authoritative expounders of its decrees.

The truth of the aristocrat is that some men are greater and better than others, and that the greatest and best should govern; that is, that wisdom and virtue, not vice and folly should rule. This truth the democrat by no means rejects. He believes as strongly as any aristocrat, that there are diversities and even inequalities of gifts, that in all communities there are a few men, God-patented nobles, who stand out from the rest, the prophets of what all are one day to be; and he contends that these are the natural chiefs of the people, and that they ought to govern.

In asserting that justice is sovereign, he necessarily asserts that they in whom justice is most manifest, in whom God dwells in the greatest perfection, should have the most influence, the most power; but at the same time, he asserts as a necessary consequence of this, that their power should be moral, spiritual, not physical. The error of the aristocrat is in looking for these God-patented noblemen in a particular class, in an hereditary order, or in a special corporation; and in seeking to give them in addition to the superior power with which they are naturally endowed, the physical power of the state and the factitious authority of an established régime. This error the democrat avoids. He proclaims equal chances to equal merit, and leaves every man free to find the place and to wield the authority for which nature — God — has fitted him.

The old-fashioned democrat's truth is, that there shall be no political authority in the state which does not emanate from the people, and which is not accountable to the people; that where there must be state action, it shall be the action of the whole people, not of one man, or of a few men, who may have an interest directly hostile to the interests of the great body of the people. His error is in the fact, that he does not take sufficient care to mark the bounds of the people's authority, and to preserve to the citizen his rights as a man. The democrat, in our sense of the word, accepts the truth, and avoids the error.

It may be seen from these few examples, that democracy accepts and explains all. It is not monarchy, it is not aristocracy, it is not theocracy, in the sense in which the word has been appropriated, nor is it democracy as some would teach us to understand it, but it is a sort of chemical compound of them all. It is a higher and a broader truth than is contained in any one of these systems, one which comprehends and finally absorbs them all.

Democracy is the doctrine of true liberty. The highest conception of liberty is that which leaves every man free to do whatever it is just to do, and not free

to do only what it is unjust to do. Freedom to do that which is unjust according to the laws of God or, — which is the same thing, — the law of nature, is license, not liberty, and is as much opposed to liberty, as lust is to love. "A free government," say the Old English lawyers, "is a government of laws," and they say right, if law be taken absolutely, and not merely as the enactment of the human legislature. Where there is an arbitrary will above the law, be it the will of the one, the few, or the many, there is, in theory at least, absolutism, and the room for pure despotism. A free government must be a government, not of the will of one man, nor of the will of any body of men, but a government of law; not of a law which a human authority may make or unmake, but of that which is law in the very nature, constitution, and being of this system of things to which we belong. Under a government of law in this sense, where authority may never do, command, or permit, only what the immutable law of justice ordains, men are free; they live under the "perfect law of liberty," and may attain to the full and harmonious development of all their faculties.

Governments have not yet been brought under this law. Hitherto, they have all been more or less arbitrary, and have sought to make the law, rather than to discover and publish it. They have, therefore, often declared that to be law which is not law, imposed burdens on the individual, for which nature — God — never designed him, and attempted to do what they have no capacity to do, what ought not to be done at all, or if done, to be done by the individual. Forgetful of their legitimate province, transcending the bounds which nature had marked out for them, they have created an artificial state of society, disturbed the natural relations between man and man, invaded the individual's rights in all directions, and cursed the human race with the unutterable woes of tyranny and oppression. The democrat enlightened by the study of past ages, and still more by the study

of human nature as it unrolls itself to the observer, in the consciousness of the individual, comes forward to-day, and summoning all governments,—whatever their forms,—to the bar, tells them in the name of God and Humanity, that they have no law-making power, that they must limit their legislative functions to the discovery and promulgation of the law, that they must lay aside the robe and diadem, the sceptre and the sword, and sit down at the feet of Nature, as simple disciples; that they must study to conform their enactments to the enactments of God, which are written in God's book, the universe, and especially in the universe in man; and that they must deem it their duty and their glory, to leave man and society free to achieve the destiny to which God hath appointed them. It will be long before this lesson will be heard or regarded. The mania for governing has become too universal to be speedily cured. But we need not despair. The world rolls on, and becomes wiser with each revolution. Governments are meliorating themselves. The doctor of medicine begins to admit that, notwithstanding the efficacy of his drugs, nature is the best physician; and the time may not be so far distant as our fears would indicate, when the doctor of laws shall own that nature is the best and only lawgiver. That time must come. The human and divine laws must become identical, the Son must be one with the Father, and the God-Man be realized.

Democracy takes care not to lose the man in the citizen. In the free states, or rather free cities, of antiquity, there were rights of the citizen, but no rights of man. As a citizen, the individual might use his personal influence and exertions in making up the decision of the city; but when the decision was once made up, he was bound in conscience, as well as compelled by physical force, to yield it, whatever it might be, the most unqualified submission. He had no rights sacred and inviolable, beyond the legitimate authority of the city. In a question between the city and himself, he could demand nothing as his right. The city

was in no way responsible to him ; but he owed it every thing he had, even to his life. Athens condemns Socrates to death, and sends him to prison to await his execution. His friends provide the means, and urge him to escape. No ; Socrates is a conscientious man. He knows his duty. Athens has condemned him to die, and he is bound, as a good citizen, to submit to her sentence. He drinks, therefore, the hemlock at the appointed time, of his own accord, and dies in discharge of his duty to the laws of the city of which he acknowledged himself a citizen. As a citizen of Athens, Socrates knew he could not save his life, without incurring the guilt of disloyalty. He had no rights as a man, that he might plead. He felt himself as much the slave of Athens, as the Persian was of the "Great King." His rights as a man were sunk in those of the citizen, and those of the citizen were sunk in those of the city.

Here was the great defect of ancient democracy. In Athens, in any of the ancient republics, there was no personal liberty. One individual might indeed call in the city to maintain his rights, in a dispute with another individual ; but beyond this, he had no rights. There was municipal liberty, but no individual liberty. The city could bind or loose the individual at its will, declare him a citizen, or degrade him to a slave, just as she deemed it most expedient. The city differed in no respect from an absolute monarchy, save in the fact, that the absolute sovereignty, in the case of the city, was supposed to be vested in the majority of the citizens, instead of being vested in one man, as in the monarchy. But she was as absolute, and in case she could get a majority of voices, she might go as far, and play the tyrant to as great an extent, as the king of Persia himself. Her democracy was then by no means liberty. It was liberty, if you will, for the city, but none for the individual man. The individual man was not recognised as an integer ; he was, at best, only a fraction of the body politic. He was, in truth, merely a cypher ; without inherent value, augment-

ing the value of the city, indeed, if placed at her right hand, but counting for nothing if placed at her left hand. But, thanks to the feudal system, and still more to Christianity, an element is introduced into the modern city, which was unknown in the ancient, the element of Individuality, by virtue of which the individual man possesses an intrinsic value which he retains in all positions, and instead of a fraction, becomes a whole.

Modern democracy, therefore, goes beyond the ancient. Ancient democracy merely declared the people the state; the modern declares, in addition, that every man, by virtue of the fact that he is a man, is an equal member of the state,—universal suffrage, and eligibility, two things the ancients never dreamed of,—and that the state is limited by justice, or, what is the same thing, the inalienable Rights of Man. These inalienable rights of man are something more than the rights of citizenship, or certain private rights, the rights of one man in relation to another, which the state is bound to protect; they stretch over nearly the whole domain of human activity, and are, in the strictest sense of the word, rights of the individual in relation to the state, rights of which the state may not, under any pretence whatever, deprive him, and to whose free exercise it may, in no case whatever, interpose any obstruction. In the ancient democracies the individual, if a member of the ruling race, was a citizen with duties; in the modern, he adds, in theory, to the citizen with duties, the man with rights. Democracy, as we understand it, does not give all the rights to the state, and impose all the duties on the individual. It places the state under obligation to the citizen, in the same manner, and to the same extent, that it places the individual under obligation to the state.

This, if we mistake not, is a novelty. The old doctrine, and the one yet prevalent, recognises in the state nothing but rights, and in the individual nothing but duties. We hear not a little of the responsi-

bility of citizens to the state. Patriotism, although not recognised in the Christian code, is made one of the cardinal virtues. Men must love their country, support its government, give it their time, their talents, their property, and, if need be, their lives. But what may they claim in return; that is, demand as their right? The privilege of paying taxes and — a grave. The responsibility of society to the individual sounds as a strange doctrine in our ears. Few admit it, and fewer still comprehend it. The state, we deny not, owns that it is bound to act the part of judge, between man and man, and to vindicate him whose rights a brother invades; but it owns no obligation, in a question between itself and the individual man. It may take all he hath, and give him nothing in return, unless it please. If he trespass on its rights, it may send him to the tread-mill, the galleys, the dungeon, the scaffold, or the gibbet; but he has no right to do aught in his own defence against its invasions. He has no rights which he may hold up, and in the name of God and of Humanity, command it to respect. However rudely authority may treat him, grossly invade what in truth are his rights, however insupportable the burdens it may lay on his shoulders, he must not even protest. It can do no wrong. But happily this old doctrine is giving way. Governments are beginning to comprehend that they are not created merely for the purpose of laying and collecting taxes, that they are servants, or rather agents, and not masters, and that it is their mission merely to see that what eternal justice ordains, be respected and obeyed alike by themselves and the individual.

Democracy declares that the state, as well as the individual, has rights and duties. Where the rights and duties of the individual begin, there end those of the state; where those of the state begin, there end those of the individual. Where is this point? This is the great political problem of our epoch. The conciliation of individual with social, and of social with

individual rights, and the subordination of all social and individual action to the laws of justice, the law of nature, or the law of God, is the mission of the moralist and politician throughout Humanity's whole future.

Something in reference to the first of these problems has been attempted in all countries, which have adopted constitutional governments. In this work, England claims precedence of all other nations. She has been the first, we believe, to establish a constitutional government. She has done more than any other nation for the extension of the practice of individual liberty, though, it must be admitted, she has done less than some others to enable the world to legitimate that liberty as a right. Her citizens have a large share of practical freedom; but, in theory, they hold it not as a right, but as a grant. And they defend it not by an appeal to the rights of man, but by an appeal to certain parchment rolls, carefully preserved in the archives of state. Magna Charta is not an enumeration of natural rights, but a grant,—a forced grant, if you will,—of certain specified privileges. Her bill of rights, drawn up in 1688, is the same. Her Parliament assembles by virtue of a writ from the king, not by virtue of the right of the people of England to be represented. Her liberty, in a word, is an admirable thing as a fact, but totally indefensible on the only ground, on which liberty is defensible at all, that of natural right. Of this the Englishman has an instinctive sense at least, for he never calls his liberty by the broad name of the natural liberty of man, but *English* liberty; and the English nation, while it has everywhere contended for liberty as a grant, has spared neither money nor blood to suppress it, wherever it has been asserted as a right. English liberty rests solely on compact, and is defended solely by an appeal to charters and precedents. Hence, the contempt with which all English statesmen speak of "abstract right," and their uniform practice of legitimating their measures, not by

justice, but by precedent. The minister of state entrenches himself behind a wall of precedents; the member of parliament asks for precedents; the lawyer alleges precedents in favor of his client; the judge decides according to the precedents; and no one thinks of inquiring what is right, but what are the precedents? This is all in perfect keeping. An Englishman has no business to inquire for justice; for his liberty is a precedent and not a right, founded on precedent not on justice; though it must be said in his favor, that his precedents are often coincident with justice.

France, if we mistake not, has taken a step beyond England. We do not mean to say that France has more liberty than England, as a fact, but she has more as a right. The king has ceased to *octroyer* the charter; he accepts it, and in theory, it emanates from the people. The French people are therefore the sovereign of the king. This is much; it is at least the entering wedge to freedom. The old monarchy of Louis XIV. is abolished, the old feudal nobility is extinct, and the *Bourgeoisie*, or middle class, is now on the throne. This class is the one in every community the most praised; and it is always accounted the most virtuous. Perhaps it is so. It certainly has some very respectable virtues. It is composed of merchants, bankers, manufacturers, lawyers, large farmers, in a word of the stirring, business part of the community. It has no affection for hereditary nobility, and none for the doctrine of equality. It has no objection to levelling down to itself those who are above it, but it has an invincible aversion to levelling up to itself those who are below it. It demands a laboring class to be *exploited*, but it loves order, peace, and quiet. These, however, it knows are incompatible with the existence in the community of an ignorant, vicious, and starving populace; it, therefore, will attend to the wants of the lower classes, up to a certain point. It will build them, if need be, churches, and establish ministries for the especial purpose of

teaching them to be quiet ; it will furnish them with the rudiments of education, see that they are fed, clothed, maintained in a good working condition, and supplied with work. All this it will do for those below itself ; and this, though not enough, is more than a little ; and when this is done more will be undertaken. This is the first step ; and when the first step is taken, the rest of the way is not difficult. The *prolétaires* soon disappear, and the *canaille* become men and citizens. We are, therefore, far from deprecating, with some of our friends, the "monarchy of the middle classes." We believe its reign in a certain stage of social progress, not only inevitable, but desirable. We believe no worse calamity could at this moment befall France, than the overthrow of the present dynasty of the *Bourgeoisie*. Its reign will and must be salutary, however far short it may come of satisfying the wishes, or the views of the ardent friends of liberty. It has a mission to execute, and when it shall have executed its mission, it will then give way to the monarchy, not of a class, not of an order, but of Humanity, of justice. France appears to us to be on the route to freedom. May she obtain it ! With her fine social qualities, and after all her toils, and struggles, and sacrifices, she deserves it.

But it is to our own country, that we must look for constitutional government, in the worthiest sense of the word. In the bills of rights which precede several of our constitutions, we have attempted to draw up an inventory of the natural rights of man, rights, which authority must ever hold sacred, and which the people, in their associate capacity, can neither give nor take away, in no shape or manner, alter or abridge. In the constitution of the United States, and in those of the several states, we have attempted to define the natural boundaries of the state, to fix its authority, and to determine the modes of its action. These constitutions and these bills of rights may be very imperfect ; they may not enumerate all the rights of the individual, and they may not ac-

curately define the powers of the people in their capacity as a state; but if so we may perfect them at our leisure. They recognise the great principle for which we contend, that the people are not absolute, that the individual has rights they cannot alter or abridge, and which it is the duty and the glory of authority to preserve untouched, and which it may neither invade nor suffer to be invaded. They teach us that if society has powers the individual must obey, the individual has rights society must respect; that if the people as a body politic may do some things, there are some things they may not do; and that if majorities may go to a certain length, there is a line they may not pass. They teach us then what we have denominated the great democratic doctrine, and they prove that doctrine to be the doctrine of the American people, however far short they may fall of its perfect realization.

There may, indeed, be some among us, who, affected by their reminiscences of English Whiggism, regard our constitutions and bills of rights, not as attempts to enumerate the natural rights of man, and to define the natural powers of government, but as compacts between the people as individuals, and the people as a state, or, more properly, as declarations of what the people in convention assembled have willed to be the rights of individuals, and have ordained to be the powers of government. According to these persons, our liberties are not, in the strict sense of the word, rights, but grants. They are not grants from what is technically called the government, but from the people in convention assembled. They are not limitations of the supreme authority of the state, but favors which that authority is pleased to confer on its subjects. The people in convention assembled might have willed, had they chosen so to do, that the powers of government should be more or less than they now are, or that our rights should be different from what they are now declared to be. They were competent to draw the boundary line between the authority of

the state and the rights of the individual where they pleased. By meeting again in convention, they may unmake all our present rights, and make such new ones as seems to them good.

But this view of our bills of rights and constitutions, we are not prepared to admit. It implies the absolute sovereignty of the people, a doctrine we have denied and refuted. The people, neither in convention nor out of it, can make or unmake rights. If they can, if they may bind or unbind as they please, then are we, as we have already shown, absolute slaves as individuals to the will of the majority. If we allow that the people make the rights of the individual, we deny the validity of his rights, and deprive him of every thing to oppose to the tyranny of the many. Bills of rights and constitutions can avail him nothing when it is a question, not between him and the ministers of state, but between him and the state itself. They limit the action of his majesty's ministers, but not of his majesty himself. But this is not the fact. If these bills of rights and constitutions enumerate on the one hand all our natural rights, and recognise nothing to be a right which is not a right by decree of justice; and if they on the other hand accurately define the powers of government, they are unalterable, and are as much binding on the people in convention, as they are on the people's ministers of state, or on the individual. In denying sovereignty to the people, we deny that the people can make or unmake rights, bind or unbind; we limit their functions to the discovery and promulgation of the law, as it is in justice, which is anterior and superior to all conventions. Consequently our rights, in truth, are the same before as after the sitting of the convention. If we had no rights before, we have none now.

It is true that, in the form of our bills of rights and constitutions, there are some things which would seem to authorize this English interpretation of them; and no doubt many statesmen, and most lawyers, have so

interpreted them, and done it very honestly too; but in reality our institutions are fundamentally distinct from the English, based on an entirely different idea; and instead of interpreting our bills of rights as grants, we ought to interpret them as an attempted inventory, more or less exact, of the natural rights of man; and our constitutions, instead of compacts, should be regarded as attempts to determine and fix the legitimate powers of government. They are shields interposed between the minority and the majority, between the individual and the people. The people say to the individual, and the majority say to the minority, by these instruments, not merely that they *will* exercise their authority according to the rules herein specified, but that, errors excepted, they have no *right* to exercise it according to any other rules. Constitutions are not needed by majorities; they are needed merely as a moral force by the minority, who want the physical force to protect themselves against the aggressions of the majority. They are not needed, as some suppose, to constitute the people a body politic. The people are as much a body politic, before assembling in convention and adopting a constitution as afterwards. Bodies politic, rights of societies or of individuals, are not things to be created by a few arbitrary slopes, curves, and angles on parchment. Right and wrong, for governments, individuals, and societies, for cities and citizens, are eternal and immutable.

For ourselves, we have no patience with the notion that we hold our liberties as grants. We do not like to be sent to rummage in the dark and dusty cabinets of old state papers, and to decipher old worm-eaten parchments, in order to find out what our liberties are, and what is the authority by which we may legitimate them. The charter, by virtue of which we legitimate our rights, is no charter engrossed on parchment, but one which God Almighty has engrossed on the human heart. The Magna Charta, to which we appeal, is no grant forced from king John, king Edward, king Har-

ry, king William, nor any other king, from no hierarchy, no aristocracy, from no democracy or conventions of the people, but that which God gave us, when he made us men, and by virtue of which we are men. We consult no constitution to learn what our rights and duties are, but the constitution of human nature itself. And all constitutions which do aught but faithfully transcribe that, we declare null and void from the beginning. We are free, not because the king wills, not because it is the good pleasure of the nobility, not because the priesthood grants permission, not because the people in convention ordain, but because we are men. It is not a privilege of American citizenship, but a right of universal Humanity.

By assuming this position, democracy gains a vantage ground for Humanity. If we hold our rights not by virtue of compacts, grants, or decrees of conventions, then we hold them by virtue of our human nature. Our rights and duties belong to us as men, as human beings. Then all who are men, human beings, have the same rights and duties. If all have the same rights and duties, then, in matter of right and duty, all men are equal. Hence, the grand, the thrilling, tyrant-killing doctrine of EQUALITY,—THE DOCTRINE THAT MAN MEASURES MAN THE WORLD OVER. Men may be diverse in their tastes, dispositions, capacities, and acquirements; but so long as they all have the same rights and the same duties, so long it may be affirmed of them with truth, that they are equal one to another, in all respects in which equality does not tend to lose itself in identity. This doctrine will not remain unfruitful.

If all men have equal rights and duties as individuals, then is society bound to treat them as equals. If she exalt one or depress another, confer a favor on this one and not on that, place one in a more favorable position for the enjoyment of his rights or the performance of his duties than another, then is she partial, and therefore unjust, therefore illegitimate; then does she disturb the original equality, which God

established between man and man, and therefore does she become an usurper, to be driven back to her legitimate province. This rule is broad; it reaches far, but society will one day observe it.

No government or society has ever yet respected this equality. In the Grecian and Roman city, the individual, as we have seen, counted for nothing. There were municipal rights, but no rights of man. The city might do what it pleased. The same remark may be made of all aristocratic and monarchical governments. All, like the English parliament, have called themselves omnipotent, have usurped all the rights of man, and claimed them, as their own property. Claiming, as their own property, all possible rights susceptible of being exercised by individuals, they have claimed, as a natural consequence of this, the right to parcel out the exercise of these rights to individuals or to corporations, as they pleased. Hence **PRIVILEGE**, a private law, by which authority confers a special favor, or grants to an individual or a corporation, the right to do what he or it had not the right to do before, or exempts him or it from a duty, which was previously obligatory. Authority, under the character of a privilege, confers on this man the exclusive right of baking all the bread for a given number of people, upon that one the right to distil corn into whiskey, upon this company the exclusive right to buy and sell slaves, and upon that one the right to traffic at a certain place in certain kinds of foreign productions, upon this one the right to wear a certain ribbon or garter, and of receiving the income of certain lands or offices. We need not be particular on this head. Society is and ever has been filled, and covered over, with privileges of every name and nature.

Our first emotion, on contemplating this immense system of privilege, which has grown up through successive ages, is that of indignation. We go even so far as to rail at the privileged, and to charge the whole to their selfishness and rapacity. But after

a while, after having penetrated more deeply into the matter, we calm ourselves, and suppress our wrath and indignation. The evil lies not at the door of the privileged alone. Few, at least not many, of the unprivileged would have refused to accept these privileges, had they been offered them. Of those who declaim against privilege now, not the smallest half do it somewhat on the principle that the fox declaimed against the grapes. The error is not in the privileged, the evil is not in the fact that one set of men rather than another enjoy the privileges; but in the fact that authority ever presumed to have any privileges to grant, any favors to confer. The evil lies not in the fact that privileges have been conferred, but in the fact that governments have been allowed to usurp, and hold as its own, all the rights of the people as individuals. Having usurped these rights, having robbed them from individuals, governments could, perhaps, do no better than to parcel them out under the name of privilege. It was only under this name, only by favor, that individuals could get back some portion of that of which authority had robbed them. Unequal as this must necessarily be, in its bearing on the whole mass of individuals, it was nevertheless better to get back something in this way, than to be left entirely destitute. He, who has been robbed of his all by the highwayman, can sometimes do no better than to accept back part of the contents of his purse as a present.

It is true that what was granted as a favor, should, if granted at all, have been granted as a right; but every favor granted weakened, in the end, the government which granted it, and did something towards raising it up a successful rival. Every individual who became one of the privileged, became one who would not easily be reduced to slavery again. When the crisis came between him and authority, he would claim his privilege as his right, and defend it with his life. Paradoxical as it may seem, modern liberty is the natural, if not the legitimate, child of privilege.

These special grants and monopolies, which are so abhorrent to democracy, have been the means, or one of the means, by which the mighty *Demos* has broken himself loose from the grasp of the monarch, and become strong enough, and wise enough, to demand, as his right, what he had formerly been proud and most thankful to receive as a boon. These special grants and monopolies have, in reality, been victories gained by the people over their masters, so many provinces wrested from the dominion of the usurper. The system of privilege, therefore, though founded on usurpation, and unjust and unequal in its bearing, has been the means, or one of the means, under God, of carrying onward the progress of society, and of restoring to individuals, in some measure, the exercise of rights of which authority had violently dispossessed them.

But while we admit all this, while we admit and even contend, that during the past under the circumstances which existed, privilege was one of the means by which individual freedom was to be obtained, we contend that Democracy is right, to-day, and in this country, in asserting herself, as she does in the Address before us, as "equality against privilege." For a time privilege was to be resorted to, as we sometimes resort to one evil to cure another; but it needs no argument to prove that that time has gone by, and that the doctrine of privilege has ceased to be the doctrine of progress. Humanity demands to-day her rights; she has ceased to solicit favors. She makes no war upon the privileged few; for, aside from their character as the privileged, they are her children and equally as dear to her heart as any of the other members of her vast family; but she proclaims in a voice which all must hear and shall respect, that all which any one may, in obedience to justice, enjoy, he may demand as a right, and that he needs no patent from human authority, to empower him to do whatever is right in the sight of God, and that all the patents in the world cannot make it just for him to do what in the sight of God it is wrong for him to do.

Democracy, we repeat it, does not declaim against men for having accepted privileges when it was admitted that governments had them to bestow; but it tells governments, and the people in this country, as the only government we acknowledge, that they have no privileges to grant, no favors to confer. They have nothing to deal out to individuals. If they have favors to bestow, will they be good enough to tell us where they got them. Did they take them from individuals? Then have they no right to them. What belongs to the individual can never become the rightful property of the government. If it was ever the property of individuals, it is now, and individuals may possess it without asking permission of the government. If the powers in question be not individual rights, the property of individuals, then has government no right to confer them, and the individual no right to receive them. Governments can confer on individuals no powers which God has not given them; and, if individuals claim, by authority, that which is not theirs by Divine right, or do, under cover of man-made law, what is not authorized by God's law, they are guilty, and must be condemned, if not in the civil court, at least in the court of conscience. Governments have, therefore, no privileges to confer, and individuals have no right to ask or to receive them. The government can confer on one individual only what it has robbed from him or from another. Has it a right to rob one individual for the sake of enriching another? or is it desirable that it should first rob a man of his rights, and then give them back to him in the form of a present, or a privilege? Whenever governments forbid this man to do what he has a natural right to do, or authorize that man to do what he has not a natural right to do, it assumes the power to readjust the regulations of Infinite Wisdom, and to recast the handy work of God. We know of no governments that have the right to assume so much. We have a profound respect for the wisdom and governmental skill, manifested by those who are charged

with the management of our state and national governments; but we very much distrust their capacity to enter the courts of heaven as cabinet ministers to the All-Wise. It is enough for even our enlightened governments, in this most enlightened country, to sit down at the feet of Great Nature, as humble disciples, content to learn and obey what God ordains.

The great error of government, in all ages of the world, has been, that of counting itself the real owner and sovereign disposer of the individual, — that of disfranchising all individuals, and then pretending to redistribute individual rights, according to its own caprice, interests, or necessities. To put an end to this system of privilege is now the great aim of Democracy. Its object is to restrict governments, whether royal, aristocratical, or popular, to their legitimate province, and individuals to their natural rights, and to teach both to perform those duties, and those duties only, which everlasting and immutable Justice imposes. To this it steadily makes its way; for this it struggles; and this it will ultimately achieve.

The reduction to practice of the theory we have now imperfectly, but we hope distinctly set forth, will demand great changes, and more changes, perhaps, than any one can foresee; and changes, too, which can be introduced at once, in no country, without violence, and probably not without bloodshed and great suffering. He who pleads for justice will not be anxious to promote violence, bloodshed, or suffering. There may be times when the kingdom of heaven must be taken by violence, and when a people should rise up and demand its rights, at whatever sacrifice it may be. But there is and there can be, in this country, no occasion for any but orderly and peaceful measures, for the acquisition of all we have supposed. We must not dream of introducing it all at once. We must proceed leisurely. Let the men of thought speculate freely, and speak boldly what comes to them as truth; but let the men of action, men who have more enthusiasm than reflection, great-

er hearts than minds, and stronger hands than heads, guard against impatience. Practical men, men of action, are, after all, the men who play the most mischief with improvements. Our principle is, no revolution, no destruction, but progress. Progress is always slow, and slow let it be; the slower it is the more speed it makes. So long as we find the thinkers busy canvassing all great matters, discussing all topics of reform, and publishing freely to the world the result of their investigations, we have no fears for the individual, none for society. Truth is omnipotent. Let it be uttered; let it spread from mind to mind, from heart to heart, and in due season be assured that it will make to itself hands, erect itself a temple, and institute its worship. Set just ideas afloat in the community, and feel no uneasiness about institutions. Bad institutions, before you are aware of it, will crumble away, and new ones and good ones supply their places.

We hold ourselves among the foremost of those who demand reform, and who would live and die for progress; but we wish no haste, no violence in pulling down old institutions or in building up new ones. We would innovate boldly in our speculations; but in action we would cling to old usages and keep by old lines of policy, till we were fairly forced by the onward pressure of opinion to abandon them. We would think with the Radical, but often act with the Conservative. When the time comes to abandon an old practice, when new circumstances have arisen to demand a new line of policy, then, we say, let no attachments to the past make us blind to our duty or impotent to perform it. All we say is, let nothing be done in a hurry, and let no rage for experiments be encouraged.

We are far from being satisfied with things as they are. We have had, perhaps, our turn with many others, of mourning over the wide discrepancy there is between the American theory and the American prac-

tice, and days and nights have given to the question, How shall the evil be remedied? The only answer, we can give, is one, perhaps, that will show little more than how ineffectually we have inquired. All we can answer is simply, Let each man keep at work freely and earnestly in his own way; let all labor together, to raise the standard of thought, to give a higher, freer, and fresher tone to American literature; more purity and rationality to our theology; more depth and soundness to our philosophical speculations; to embody less of expediency and more of Christ in our systems of morality; and withal, let there be fervent prayer for more faith in God, in Truth, in Justice, in Humanity, and then, — let things take pretty much their own course. The whole that can be done may be summed up in the words, Let reformers do all in their power to EDUCATE THE PEOPLE, AND THROUGH THE PEOPLE THE GENERATION TO COME.

ART. V. — *Poems* by WILLIAM THOMPSON BACON. Boston: Weeks, Jordan, & Co. 1837. 12mo. pp. 134.

THIS little volume is the first offering of a young graduate of Yale College. He has just come out from the academic grove, and he brings with him his best. The songs he has dearly loved to warble by himself, or with his friends, he now flings out before the wide world, to see what echoes they will fetch. We have been won by his frankness, and somewhat inspired by his spirit; and therefore welcome the new-comer, though others may deem him forth-putting. He is a stranger to us until now, and his theory of poetry not altogether a favorite one of ours; so that whatever good word we say of him is more than the cheap praise with which we put men off that importune us. There is something in the boldness of his position, coming forward as he does, and in a seeming egotism

of manner, especially in his notes, where "*I think*," and "*my opinion*" occur quite too often, which would dispose us to greet him with a stare of irrecognition, did we not find on further acquaintance, that he is honest in this, and that he really feels something within him, and a child's confidence in the world to whom he utters it. These poems are mostly confessions; they are too uniformly personal; while he aspires to the highest, he never quite loses *himself* in it. This is a fault, which he vindicates in his note, but which we trust he will not always have to vindicate. If the true spirit be in him, a little acquaintance with the world will soon rid him of such morbid self-consciousness. He seems to speak what he has first felt, and then thought of and approved, and to speak it simply, though not always strongly. In this there is much hope. A genial reception should await all who write from a genuine impulse, and with a clear understanding. If the beauty, with which he seeks to charm, be that wherewith his own heart has glowed; if the noble truths, which he proclaims, be truths in which he himself has faith, to whose workings he bears the testimony of his own experience here in song, then let him write, in God's name. We will not quarrel with any little weaknesses, or crudities, or affectations, if there is only something genuine in the midst of them. The critics, who censure "*ex cathedrá*," have made more of these faults in young authors, than they have cured. They have always warred with what is simple, and therefore of marked individuality; they have frightened the whole world into affectation of the world; they have let nothing grow freely into its natural fair proportions. One *must* be somewhat forth-putting and egotistical to resist the influence.

Mr. Bacon has studied a good model. He owns himself much beholden to Wordsworth for his inspiration, and, in a long note upon the poetical prospect of our country, prophesies that our only hope for poetry is in the spirit which responds to him. In this

he does well, in seeing that there is a fervor not of passion, and a poetry richer than the dreams of a sick fancy. The influence of the example is very obvious in his own poems. It has given them a freshness, and a simplicity, often homely, but interesting. The tone of sentiment is high. His is the doctrine, which contains all, *Faith in Man* ; and his the ethics which may be all summed up in *Love*. And yet something, we know not what, makes us ever and anon suspect that he is not yet at home among these great ideas. He reasons too much about them. The Poet, as such, *lives in* his cherished sentiments; he does not preach them. The Poet differs from the Philosopher in this, that he holds the highest truth, without proclaiming it, often without knowing it. He does not discourse much about high matters and abstract ideas; but he *feels* them all the while he is talking about little casual things; a holy light goes forth from his heart over all around him; a holier glow is in his words. The Poet is known, not by what he talks about, but by the way in which he talks *about any thing*. What in the philosopher is thought, in him is feeling.

Our objection to Mr. Bacon's theory of poetry is this. He seems to underrate poetry in comparison with reflection. He speaks of it as hardly a solid thing, as the mere ornament, where reason is the substance. He denies its universal power over the common mind; and seems to hint that the decay of poetry, (though he does not fear any such decay,) would be a comparatively small evil to society. We cannot agree with the following passage from the note above mentioned :

"The poets can never wield the nation: he who thought that, give him the making of the songs of a nation, and he would thereby mould its character, was a Utopian in theory, and would have been found worse than that in practice. There is *a set of principles* to be elucidated, and sent abroad among the gifted and powerful spirits of the day, and there diffused, that they may work themselves gradually into the

economy of society, *with which poets have nothing to do. Poetry is too volatile in spirit, and delicate in substance, to affect the common mind to any considerable degree, where the philosopher has not previously been, and succeeded in laying a deep and broad foundation.*" — p. 129.

Now we believe that Poetry is a very substantial thing; a thing deep and eternal as the spirit of Man; one of the primeval forces of the moral universe. It is earlier than Philosophy or Ethics, and is the foundation of them. Man, as philosopher, can only reflect on what Man, as poet, has felt. Philosophy, in itself, has no power at all, until it is *lived* and becomes poetry. Certainly *feeling* is the *substance* of life; *ideas* are only the *forms*. In desiring poetry to be wedded to a sound philosophy, which shall save it from passion, and make it pure and universal, true to the instincts of all men, our poet goes too far, and forgets that in true poetry the germ of the highest philosophy is contained. He thinks that philosophy is to work out the needed revolutions in society; and that when the "solid columns of the superstructure" are already reared upon the basis of accurate knowledge, then "the poet may step in and think to give it the decorations." But shall poetry have no part in the revolution? Does not it always help to mould characters and institutions? Much is due to Wordsworth for showing how much poetry gains by its union with pure philosophy. But this writer exaggerates the theory of Wordsworth, when he places the poetic element so low. "*A set of principles with which poets have nothing to do*"! — How can this be said by a disciple of Wordsworth, whose ideal of a bard, is of one "who loves all things"?

We admire the noble sentiments which breathe through this volume of poems. But considered as poetry, we think the poetic element does not predominate in them. It may be doubted whether Wordsworth is the fairest specimen of what may be distinctively called the poet. We should rather point to Burns; or to Byron, though, perhaps, corrupt as a

man; or to Schiller, though philosophizing gradually spoiled the simplicity of his native poetry. Our author seems to have a poet's heart, and a poet's eye; he finds his world of beauty every where; he aspires to full communion with the highest; he sighs for lost childhood; he reverences the simple, loving, trusting child as the prophet of Humanity;—only would he were not quite so didactic! Must the lyric wholly disappear from poetic literature? The most cherished sentiments of the poet seem to be uttered in the last piece in his volume, a Valedictory Poem on leaving College. We extract the following:

“Man is a gifted being. There is that
In the eternal temper of his mind,
Which showeth his affinity to Heaven!
And greatness sits upon him naturally!
And goodness—when the bad world is shut out,
And virtue—when the heart lives in itself,
And sweetness—when its sweet streams are all free:
And woman gives him her warm heart to keep,
And children climb his knee and lisp his name,
And widows call down blessings on his head,
And orphans steep his ashes in their tears,
And he is that bright being Heaven designed!
—But in him is another principle
God-like and great, and in his hours of ease,
It cometh with a voice of witchery,
And giveth his strong spirit to the world.
It is Ambition! and upon his heart,
Robing itself like a fallen child of light,
It sits and breathes a madness in his ears.
Around his brow it wreathes a band of fire,
Within his grasp a sceptre, and his foot
Treads proudly over graves and dead men's skulls.
Virtue is all forgotten; all his dreams,
Distempered by the madness of his heart,
Are foul, and his great thoughts are thoughts of blood.
Peace is his discord; the soft slavery
Of the domestic circle is despised,
And woman is the plaything of his lust,
And virtue is a thing that hath no name.
And so it leads him on, till, tearing out,
One after one the virtues from his heart,

It sends him to the grave — without one tear."

* * * * *

"This is the lesson — *love, love all the world!*

He wrongs his nature who has learned to hate.
 God hath made nothing man should *dare* despise.
 The fountains, and the feelings, and the thoughts
 That make up virtue, He hath so advised,
 Shall only bring the heart true happiness,
 And he but starves himself who turns away.
 The natural passion of the heart is virtue,
 Its streams flow backward when hate centers there;
 It lives in its affections, and the man
 With a warm bosom may look down on kings!
 The world has more of truth in 't than appears.
 He's but half villain who seems wholly so.
 Nero was all a villain, yet one heart
 Loved him, and strewed fresh garlands on his grave.
 And at this parting hour, should truth have weight.
 Sorrow is most forgiving, and to be
 Made humble by its true nobleness.
 Forgiveness is true happiness, and he
 Is happiest most who shall the most forgive.
 And happiness is holiness, for he
 Can only holy be whose heart is love.
 So live — and, trust me, a long life is yours!
 So live — and ye shall proudly walk with men!
 The great man with you shall forget his greatness,
 The good shall come to you and call you theirs,
 And she, to whom man's slavery is no sin,
 Why even she shall lay aside her pride,
 And come to you and tell ye of her love.
 And when that last, dread, parting hour comes on,
 And the bright sky, and the bright world around
 With all it hath of beauty and of sweetness,
 With all it hath of poetry and life,
 With all it hath to elevate, and purify,
 And make men's natures noble; when all these
 Fade from thy vision, and thy hold on life
 Is frail and feeble, then lift up thine eye,
 And where the star of faith hangs in the heavens,
 Look! and go hence — rejoicing." —

pp. 118, 119, 124, 125.

The following is a professed imitation of Wordsworth. It is graceful, and musical, and simple; and

contains some deep philosophy in the form of deep feeling.

“THE FOUNTAIN.

“WHAT is there in a fountain clear,
What is there in a song,
That I should sit and ponder here,
And sit and ponder long?

The wave wells beautiful, 't is true,
And sparkles in the sun, —
But that 's what other fountains do,
And sparkle as they run.

The wave wells beautifully, and
Sings as it pours along, —
But every fountain of the land,
Runs, murmuring a song.

Then what is it that keeps me here,
Beside this fountain's brink?
Why is it that, a worshipper,
I sit me here and think?

The robin whistles in the sky,
The squirrel's in the tree, —
Yet here I sit me moodily,
My gun upon my knee.

And sporting round the openings
Of yonder forest green,
The golden light of glancing wings
At intervals is seen.

And forms and things to catch the eye,
And sounds of grove and grot,
They pass uninterruptedly —
They move, yet move me not.

My hound, besides, the fit has caught;
For, looking in my face,
He sees his master thinks of nought
So little as the chase.

Then what is it that keeps me here
Beside this fountain's brink?

Why is it that, a worshipper,
I sit me here and think?

The wave runs round, the wave runs bright,
The wave runs dancing free,
As if it took a strange delight,
A dancing wave to be.

And down the vale it goes, a brook,
Over a golden pave;
And from the brink the crosses look,
And dally with the wave.

And every hue of leaf and sky,
And forms and things are caught,
Which dance, and glance, and glitter by,
As rapid as a thought.

As now the sun drops down the west,
And Hesper shines afar,
When lo! upon the fountain's breast,
Sparkles a mimic star.

And soft the reflex, glimmering out,
Is cut a thousand ways,
As there the bubbles whirl about,
And revel in the blaze.

And far along the sky of even,
The clouds, in golden dress,
Have painted here a little heaven
With added loveliness —

With every light and shade so true
And exquisitely wrought,
As fancy never, never drew,
As fancy never taught.

And now the woods and sky are one,
And up the orient driven,
The crescent moon hangs off upon
The canopy of heaven.

And round her come a troop of stars,
And round her comes the night;
And o'er her face, the clouds in bars
Are braided by the light.

And on her beams the Oreads sail
 And revel as they go,
 And little warriors clad in mail,
 And Gnomes — a faery show !

And every other combination
 With poetry agreeing,
 That nonsense and imagination
 E'er conjured into being.

Odd fancies! — yet, they came to me,
 A solitary child ;
 A lover of the waters free,
 A lover of the wild !

And here, I were a traitor vile,
 If — though I mix with men —
 I could not lose the man awhile,
 And play the boy again.

Then ask you *why*, I sit me here,
 Beside this fountain's brink ?
 And ask you *why*, a worshipper,
 I sit me here and think ?" — pp. 82–85.

We had marked further extracts, but we are obliged to omit them for want of room. But the extracts we have given will serve to exhibit some of his characteristic traits. They certainly are not without promise. They breathe a noble spirit, and show an early and a resolute determination to shun the faults upon which so many geniuses have gone to wreck. Mr. Bacon would profit by a rigid verbal criticism. His style is too diffuse. There is often a slovenly confusion of incongruous images, an awkward phrase, or a violation of grammar, which mars its beauty. For instance, on page 54, we read :

"True to its nature — to the *impress* *graved*
 Upon it by the hand of Deity."

Here are other instances of faulty expression :

"A chaplet *wove* of oak and rue." — p. 65.

"Pictures he bought, and statues, *such as where*
 The soul speaks from the marble," &c. — p. 105.

“And he who scribbles verses knows (and no one knows but him.) — p. 81.

We did not know that the little word “but” had force enough to rule a pronoun into the objective case. But these are trifles; and the poet is not so poor in higher qualities, but that he can afford to have these defects pointed out.

ART. VI. — *The Christian Examiner*, No. LXXXIII. November, 1837, Article II., *Locke and the Transcendentalists*.

WE have read with some interest an article in the *Christian Examiner* for November last, on Locke and the Transcendentalists. The article is written with spirit, in a sincere and earnest tone, and, for style and language, it deserves more than ordinary commendation. It is obviously the production of a mind somewhat given to philosophizing, although we should think of a mind which has not yet grappled, very closely, with the real problems of metaphysics. Its author appears to us a young writer, whose philosophical views are a little vague and fluctuating; but at the same time a writer who, if he duly apply himself, may yet do himself great credit, and exert a salutary influence on the literature and philosophy of his country.

So far as we can judge from the article before us, we differ widely from the present philosophical tendency of its author; but we nevertheless welcome him into the philosophical field, and are glad to find him disposed to be one of its cultivators. We may from time to time take an account of his labors, but we will assure him, that we shall not quarrel with him, because he may chance to labor in a direction different from the one we have marked out for ourselves. They

who cultivate philosophy must labor in peace. They must not call one another hard names, and seek to render one another odious to the public. Into all philosophical subjects we must carry calmness of mind, a catholic spirit, and a respect for every man's honest opinions. We must carry with us a disposition to seek for truth under the forms of gross error even, and that love for man and all that is human, which will prevent us from harboring, for one moment, a single intolerant feeling, and which will prevent a single harsh word from ever escaping us. We may subject, we ought to subject, all opinions to the most rigid investigation, not for the sake of triumphing over adversaries, not for the sake of proving others in the wrong; but for the purpose of discovering the truth, and quickening our love and reverence for mankind.

No greater evil can befall us, than that of entering into a career of angry disputes, and of passing from the calm and rational inquiry after truth, to the violent and passionate crimination of individuals. In philosophizing, we ought to make an abstraction of individuals and their motives. Men honestly differ in their views. The views of all are more or less partial, and therefore defective, and therefore erroneous; and no one, therefore, has the right to condemn another. The philosopher, instead of complaining of men, charging them with folly, or with evil intentions, and seeking to render their views odious or suspicious, sets himself down to collect, quietly, the partial views of each, and to mould them into one systematic and harmonious whole. We insist on this point. A philosophical epoch for our country begins, and we would not have it disgraced by wrath and bitterness, by personal contentions, railings at individuals or systems. We would have every man, who enters the field of philosophy, enter it with a heart at peace with mankind, and solicitous only for the truth. Let every one guard against the trammels of a school, and the pride of system. Let him beware how he

adopts a darling theory, which he shall be ambitious to make prevail. Let him beware how he looks on his fellow laborers as the disciples of another school, and therefore enemies to be fought and vanquished. Let him wed himself to the truth, and give it an uncompromising support; but let him, at the same time, expect truth in all theories, and be willing to receive it, let it come to him from what quarter it may.

We young Americans, who have the future glory of our country and of Humanity at heart, who would see our country taking the lead in modern civilization, and becoming as eminent for her literature, art, science, and philosophy, as she now is for her industrial activity and enterprise, must ever bear in mind the greatness and the sanctity of our mission. We must set an example worthy of being followed by the world. We must feel the dignity and immense reach of the work to which we are called. Into all our discussions we must carry a free, lofty, and earnest spirit; we must purge our hearts of all low ambition, of all selfish aims, of all wish for personal triumph. We must fix our eyes on the True, and aspire to the Holy. We must be invincible in our dialectics, but still more so in our love of truth, and in our sympathy with Humanity in all its forms. A great and a glorious work is given us; may we be equal to it, and worthy of achieving it!

We say we have read this article in the Examiner, with some interest, and so we have; but not altogether on account of its intrinsic merit. It interests us mainly as one of the signs of the times, as an indication of a change which has been silently taking place among us, on philosophical matters, and as a proof that our countrymen are beginning to lose some portion of their hereditary contempt for abstract thought, and that they are preparing themselves to raise hereafter the study of metaphysical science to the rank it deserves. It proves to us, that the day for philosophical discussion is ready to dawn on our

it retained at the commencement of the seventeenth century, was completely overthrown by those two fathers of modern philosophy, Des Cartes and Bacon. The Scholastics were defunct in all the world — unless Oxford offers an exception — long before Locke began his philosophical career.

But these are small matters. The article, we are examining, appears to us to assume, that the metaphysician should always restrict himself to what may be called common sense modes of thought and expression, and that the highest philosophy may be so announced as to be comprehended at once, by any one of ordinary capacity, whether accustomed to philosophize or not. The article, it is true, does not expressly state the doctrine here implied; but it appears to us to proceed on the supposition of its truth, and we are unable to legitimate its reasonings without assuming it. Through the whole article, there seems to us to be a striking want of clear discernment of the difference between philosophy and common sense. The writer evidently wishes to reconcile common sense and philosophy, which is laudable; but he sees no way by which this can be done, save by reducing philosophy to common sense. He asks, "what is common sense, but the highest philosophy, applied to the usual purposes of practical life? And what is philosophy, but common sense, employed in abstract investigations?" Do not these questions confound philosophy with common sense? or rather, instead of reconciling philosophy with common sense, do they not sink philosophy in common sense? To us they betray no slight confusion in the mind of him who puts them in earnest, and they are a very good proof that he does not discern clearly, if any difference at all, the difference there is between knowledge and philosophy, two things as far asunder as intuition and reflection.

But this writer is not the only one who does not discern distinctly the difference between common sense and philosophy, in whose mind the limits and

precise characteristics of each are not determined. We trust, therefore, that we shall not be doing a needless work, if we undertake, in what follows, to aid our readers to draw the line between common sense and philosophy, and to determine what is the precise object of philosophy. Moreover, something of this is necessary, to serve as a sort of introduction to a series of articles on metaphysics, which we propose to lay before our readers in our future numbers.

The term *common sense* may be applied to what Hobbes calls the *cognitive faculty*, or faculty of knowing, which is common to all human beings. It is by this faculty, and only by this faculty, that we know either in the ordinary affairs of life or in abstract science. The faculty, by means of which we are capable of acquiring knowledge, is the same in all cases. Knowledge then admits of no other divisions than those of the subjects with which we may seek to become acquainted. This is what the writer of the article, we are reviewing, probably meant to assert. But knowledge is not philosophy; and though it is indispensable to philosophy, it can and does, in most men, exist without philosophy.

But the term *common sense* is also used to designate the common or universal beliefs of mankind, the simple spontaneous beliefs of Humanity. These beliefs may be true, they may be acted on; but with the multitude they are taken on trust, adopted without being legitimated. Philosophy is not a contradiction of these beliefs, a substitution of something else for them, but an explanation and verification of them. This is the precise object of philosophy.

Philosophy and common sense are not opposed to one another. There is no discrepancy between them. Common sense furnishes the philosopher all his knowledge, all the data from which he reasons. His sole mission is to clear up and legitimate the universal beliefs of mankind, or the facts of common sense. The common sense man is not in the wrong; he does not err; he has the truth, but he does not know that

he has it. He believes the truth, but he does not comprehend what he believes, nor wherefore he believes. He cannot tell how he came to believe what he does believe; he knows not what right he has to believe it; and when asked, why he believes it, he can only answer, he believes it because he does believe it. The philosopher believes precisely the same things, as the common sense man, but he knows what he believes, and he can tell wherefore he believes. The common sense man believes, but does not comprehend; the philosopher comprehends, and therefore believes.

We may easily bring up to our minds the common sense man, by recalling our childhood and youth. In early life, faith is strong and implicit. We believe. We are conscious of no difficulties. We are conscious of no thoughts and feelings too big for words, and which cannot be easily communicated to all who will give us their attention. We see no mysteries in nature, in man, or in God. All things appear to us open and plain. Things are to us what they seem. The primrose is a primrose, and nothing more. The sun and stars are beautiful, and the rain-bow is pleasant to look upon; but they contain no dark, perplexing mystery we are dying to wring out. Day and night, summer and winter, spring and fall, sickness and health, life and death, are alternations to be welcomed, or not welcomed, but they are not mysteries. They are not a book we would learn to read; hieroglyphs we would be able to decipher. We see all. The outward, the sensible, sufficeth us. Common sense satisfies curiosity, and prevents inquiry from becoming doubt. This, which is a description of the childhood and youth of all, is also a description of the greater part of men through their whole lives. All who come under this description are common sense men.

But childhood and youth, with their ready answers to all inquiries, their open brow and laughing cheek and trusting heart, for whom life is all one holiday,

and all things are but their morris-men, do not abide with us all forever. Some of us grow old, and lose the light which plays around our heads in our younger days. One day, one hour perhaps, never to be forgotten, a sudden darkness spreads over the universe, and we no longer see where we are, or what we are. The bright sun is extinguished; the stars no longer glimmer in the firmament, and the beacon-fires, which the philanthropic few had kindled here and there to cheer, to warn, or to guide the solitary traveller, are gone out. Friends drop away; we stand among the dead, by the graves of those we loved, surrounded by the ghosts of affections unrequited, hopes blasted, joys cut short, plans defeated; and — there are mysteries. The universe becomes to us a scroll, a book, like that which John saw in the right hand of Him who sat on the throne, sealed with seven seals. Every object we make out in the darkness is a hieroglyph, big with a meaning of fearful import, which we can divine not; we are to ourselves a riddle we can rede not; and in tumult of soul, perplexity of mind, and sorrow of heart, we find ourselves standing face to face with the dread Unknown.

A change has come over us. Childhood and youth are gone forever. We have broken with the whole past. We stand alone; yet not alone, for the awful Mystery of the Universe is round, about, and within us. For a time our courage forsakes us; we can stand up no longer; we sink down, weak, helpless, forlorn. But this weakness passes away. After a while, in a sort of desperation, we draw ourselves up into ourselves, and bid the monster in whose presence we are, a "grim, fire-eyed defiance." Little by little, we become inured to the obscurity, and able to discern the outline of things in the dark. By straining, by recollecting, by comparing, by reflecting, we become able to spell out, here and there, one of these fearful hieroglyphs, till we obtain the word of the universe — God. Then the darkness rolls back; things become plain again; conviction supplies the place of lost

faith; and foresight makes amends for the inspiration of hope which returns no more forever. A change has indeed come over us. We are no longer in the trustiness of common sense. We have become philosophers. We have looked beneath the surface, beyond the shadows of sense; in the visible we have found the invisible; in the mutable, that which changes not; in the dying, the immortal; in the evanescent, the abiding and the eternal. We have seen the world of childhood and youth vanish in the darkness of doubt; but we have found a new world, the world of truth, a new universe which is really a universe. We see and comprehend the hidden sense of that of which we saw at first only the form, the shadow. We now know what we believe, and wherefore we believe it, and are able to legitimate our belief. He who has been through this scene of darkness, doubt, perplexity, grief, and has attained to a well grounded conviction of the great truths comprised in the universal beliefs of mankind, is a philosopher.

Now, between this man whom we have pointed out as the philosopher, and the one we called the mere common sense man, is there no difference? and can they converse together with perfect ease? Can they utter themselves by means of the same symbols? Or, which is more to our purpose, will the same symbols have the same significance to them both?

Suppose a man, over whose mind and heart has passed the change of which we have spoken, a man truly born again, who has been able to see that there are mysteries, and who sees a little way into them, and who looks on man, nature, God, with other eyes and other feelings too, than those of childhood and youth; has he nothing within him, no thoughts, no spiritual facts, of which the mere common sense man knows nothing, has dreamt nothing; and which, therefore, he has not named; and which, therefore, are untranslated into his vocabulary? Can this man utter himself in the language of the market, in terms, the full import of which can be easily seized by them

in whom no such change has been wrought? Would you talk with a blind man of colors? Couch his eyes. Will the miser comprehend you, when you speak to him of the pleasures of benevolence? Can you, by any possible form of words, make the meaning of the word love obvious to him, whose heart has never thawed in presence of sweet and gentle affection? Whoever has had some little acquaintance with the world, knows to his sorrow, that he often fails to make himself understood, even when he adopts the commonest and simplest forms of speech. The words a man utters are not measured, in the minds of those to whom he speaks, by his experience, but by theirs. Words are meaningless, save to those who have, in their own experience, a significance to give them. Be they as full of meaning as they may, in the mouth of him who utters them, they fall as empty sounds on the ears of those who listen, unless they who listen have the same inward experience as he who speaks. How different is the import of the same words to different minds. How different is the import of that word death, when, with our childish simplicity and curiosity, we look from our mother's arms into the coffin to see the baby-corpse, from what it is in after life, when, one by one, all our early associates and friends and companions have dropped away, and we stand alone by the new-made grave of the last, the best loved one! And how different, too, is the meaning of that same word death, to him who looks upon the grave as the end of life, and sees buried, in its darkness and silence, all that which is to him but the dearer and lovelier and more beloved part of himself, from what it is to him who regards the grave merely as the door of entrance, through which we pass from this world of trial, sin, and suffering, to our everlasting Home, where is repose and joy and blessedness forever and ever! No matter what are the words one uses, nor what is the meaning he seems to himself to be conveying. If that particular fact, he would communicate, be not a fact of the experience of

him to whom he would communicate it, let him be assured that to him it is incommunicable. No matter with what wisdom we speak, we can impart no more than they, to whom we speak, are prepared to interpret by what they have thought, felt, joyed, or sorrowed in themselves.

The darkness, we sometimes complain of in men's speech and in books, is not unfrequently the darkness of our own minds. To say of a book, that it is unintelligible, is seldom any thing more than to say, that we are aware of nothing in our experience, by which it can be interpreted. A wise man, especially a modest man, is slow to infer, from the fact that he does not comprehend a book, that it contains nothing to be comprehended. We often fancy, too, that we understand an author, when we have not the remotest suspicion of his meaning. His words are so common, his manner is so familiar, he talks so much like one of our old friends, that we never think of asking ourselves, whether we understand him or not. One day we shall read him, and be startled at the new and unthought-of meaning we discover in his words, and we shall be filled with wonder that we did not see it before. We rarely understand one another. Only they who have a common experience are mutually intelligible. This is the reason why we are so estranged one from another. Two men meet for the first time, they converse together, understand each other, and they are friends forever. Let men but understand one another, and all strife, hatreds, contentions, wars, are at an end ; and of this they seem to have a secret consciousness, for this is what they imply, whether they know it or not, when they say of two or more persons, "there is a good understanding between them."

They, who, like Nicodemus, sneer at the New Birth, have made as little proficiency in philosophy as in theology. No man, who has not been born again, been born spiritually as well as naturally, can see the kingdom of God, in a philosophical, any more than in

a religious sense. There are some things which the natural man may understand, and there are some things which he cannot, for they are spiritually discerned. Spiritual things, be they expressed in what language they may, can be discerned only by spiritual men. Spiritual things are foolishness to the natural man, and the common sense man laughs outright at the profound words of the philosopher. When the natural man becomes a spiritual man, he finds that what he had called foolishness, are the deep and unsearchable things of God, and the common sense man, when he becomes a philosopher, stands in awe of that at which he had laughed. Let no man laugh at what he understands not, for the day may come when he shall weep at his folly; when he shall bitterly condemn himself, for his previous want of spiritual discernment.

We know no help for this difficulty, on the part of the unregenerate, to understand the regenerate. No matter what terms are used; the most common household words will be as dark, as unmeaning, as are said to be the most abstruse, the most far-fetched terms ever adopted by the most hopeless Germanizing Transcendentalist. Admitting then that Locke did write on metaphysical subjects in a sort of common sense phraseology, we cannot esteem it a very great merit. We have sometimes thought that, by studying to adapt his style and language to the apprehension of the unlearned and the superficial, he retarded instead of accelerating the progress of metaphysical science. It is true, that the manner in which he treated metaphysics made his "Essay" somewhat popular, and secured it a much larger number of readers, than it probably would have had, if he had written more in the manner of the scholar; but we very much doubt whether he by this means added at all to the number of metaphysicians. He became popular because nobody found anything in his "Essay," which made any body a whit the wiser. People read him and called themselves philosophers, without hav-

him to withhold his condescension. Let him forget that the masses are below him; let him speak from his own full heart and strong convictions, to the universal heart and mind of Humanity, in his own natural tones, with all the power and depth and sublimity of thought and feeling he can command. Let him speak to all men as his equals, and speak out his ripest thoughts, his profoundest reflections, and have no fear that he will speak in vain.

Assuredly we would not seek obscure modes of expression; we would ever be as transparent as possible; but we cannot consent to sacrifice depth for the sake of clearness, to dilute our thoughts for fear that they may be too strong for the intellects of our readers. We will take no pains to supersede the necessity of severe thinking on the part of those, for whom we write. If we aid them, it is not by thinking for them, but by compelling them to think for themselves. There is no such thing as one man's thinking for another. The real difficulty in the way of acquiring a knowledge of a given science, does not consist, and never did consist, in the language adopted by its cultivators. There are difficulties which lie deeper than words, and which no form of words can remove. Set all the world a-talking metaphysics, and nothing is gained, unless the real metaphysical problems be clearly seen, and the bearings of the proffered solutions fully comprehended; and these problems—state them in what words you will—are not perceived, and these solutions—express them in the simplest terms you can—are not and cannot be appreciated, without severe mental discipline, without long, patient, and profound thought. And thought is one's own act. It cannot be imparted from one mind to another. It is impossible to form a tunnel out of common sense phraseology, by means of which, thought may be poured from one mind into another, as we pour wine into a demijohn. Knowledge, in its higher and nobler sense, is ever the mind's own creation. It is wrought out in the mind by the mind

We trust that the design of these remarks will not be misinterpreted. We have no wish to dress up philosophy in the garb of the old Schoolmen. We are advocates for no technical phraseology, for no unintelligible jargon. We set our faces, as much as any one, against all affected or far-fetched modes of speech. We ask for naturalness and simplicity. We ask every man to make it a matter of conscience, to speak and write as intelligibly to even the undisciplined mind, as the nature of his subject will admit. But we insist upon it, that the interests of science, literature, philosophy, are never to be sacrificed for the sake of adapting ourselves to the apprehension of men of no spiritual experience. We need not "bring philosophy down from its high places, in order to add to its usefulness." This is a sort of levelling which is uncalled for. Bring the masses up, if you will, enable them to comprehend the highest philosophy, if you can; but never talk of bringing philosophy down to vulgar capacities. We have heard too much, in our day, about the necessity of "adapting ourselves to the capacity of the common people," and about the danger of "shooting over the heads of the people." We have no patience with this left-handed democracy. We have no patience with men who talk of letting themselves down. There has been quite too much letting down. We would not bring the great gods down to earth, even if we could; but we would raise men to heaven, and enable them to hold fellowship with the Divinity. Philosophy is not, and never was, too high; but the people are, and ever have been, too low. Let him, who would "enhance the dignity of philosophy by adding to its usefulness," set himself seriously and earnestly at work, to elevate the people. Let him, if his heart throb with genuine love of man, and his soul burn to augment the sum of human well-being, let him study to elevate the masses, to quicken their dormant energies, to create within them a craving for the loftiest range of thought, and to make them feel that they may aspire to it. But we pray

We shall, if we seek, often find those who have the inward experience required, among those who have been to no school but Nature's, and had no instructors but the internal whisperings of God's Spirit. Whoever has doubted, whoever has really sorrowed that there was no man found to open the book of God's providence, and read him the Destiny of Man and Society, is prepared to hear and to comprehend the philosopher.

Nor let it be supposed that we would debar the people at large from the truths the philosopher professes to have demonstrated. These truths are not the peculiar possession of the philosopher. They are the truths of the universal reason, and are the property alike of all men. They are taught to all men by the spontaneous reason, which is the same in kind in every man. These truths are not the philosophy. Philosophy is the explanation and verification of them. The masses, who see nothing mysterious in these truths, and who have never thought of questioning them, do not wish to have them explained or verified. The explanation and verification, which is philosophy, are unintelligible to them. But the truths themselves, are not unintelligible to them. Whoever proclaims to the masses these truths, which the philosopher has demonstrated, cleared up, and legitimated, is sure to be heard and believed and followed.

The fact is, the great mass of mankind are not, as to their beliefs, in so sad a condition, as schoolmen sometimes imagine. The educated, the scientific are prone to look upon the masses as possessing no ideas, as having no knowledge but that which they obtain from human teachers. This is peculiarly the case with Locke and his followers. According to them, the child receives no patrimony from his father; he is born into the world naked and destitute in soul as well as in body, and with no innate power to weave himself a garment. His mind is a *tabula rasa*, on which others indeed may write what they will, but upon which he himself can write nothing, save the

summing up of what others have written thereon. Evil as well as good, falsehood as well as truth, may be written thereon. It depends wholly on the external circumstances, the quality of the masters secured, whether the mind's blank sheets shall be written over with truth or falsehood. The masses, after the flesh, it must be admitted, are surrounded with unwholesome influences, and provided with most wretched teachers. They must then be filled with evil thoughts and false notions. Their beliefs, their hopes and fears, likes and dislikes, are deserving no respect. Hence, on the one hand, the contempt of the masses manifested by so large a portion of the educated, even in democratic America, and, on the other hand, the pity and commiseration, the great condescension, and vast amount of baby-talk, which equally characterize another, but more kind-hearted, portion of the more favored classes. Of this last division, we presume, is the writer on whom we are remarking. He is not a man to look with contempt on human beings; he feels that we ought to labor to benefit the masses; but we presume he has no suspicion that the masses have any correct beliefs, but such as they receive from the favored and superior few. Hence his strong desire that all men, who write, should write in a simple style, and so let themselves down, that they will not be above the capacities of the many. He would not, we presume, think of learning from them, or of verifying their beliefs; but merely of teaching them what they ought to believe. We bring not this as a charge against him. It speaks well for his goodness of heart, and proves him to be as good a democrat as a follower of Locke consistently can be.

But in point of fact, the masses are not so poor and destitute as all this supposes. They are not so dependent on *us*, the enlightened few, as we sometimes think them. We need not feel that, if we should die, all wisdom would die with us, and that there would be henceforth no means by which the millions would be able to come at truth and virtue. Reason is the

true light, and it enlighteneth every man who cometh into the world. It is, as we have said, the same in all men, and therefore it is that no man is left in darkness. The reason has two modes of activity, one the spontaneous, the other the reflective. In the great majority of men, the reflective reason, which gives philosophy, is never awakened, and consequently but a small minority of mankind ever become philosophers. But the spontaneous reason develops itself in all men, in the highest and the lowest, in the uneducated as well as in the educated. This reason, the spontaneous reason, furnishes the universal beliefs of mankind, which are termed common sense. It furnishes all the ideas we ever have; teaches us all the truths we ever know. As this reason is the same in all men, it gives to all men the same ideas, furnishes them with the same truths, the same beliefs. These masses then, on which we look down with contempt or with pity for their weakness and ignorance, have all the truths we who look down upon them have; they have the same ideas, and the same beliefs. They are not so destitute then as the Lockeites thought them; they are not so erroneous then as the self-complacent aristocrat judged them, nor so dependent on their betters, as *great* men have generally counted them. Their views, beliefs, hopes, fears, likes, dislikes, are worthy to be examined, are to be respected. The masses are not to be pitied then, but respected, and herein is laid the foundation of true philanthropy.

But we are controverted. We are met by men who have no confidence in the masses, no respect for their beliefs, and who regard them as blind, infatuated, bent on evil, and only evil, and that continually. Here comes then the doubt; common sense is suspected, and put on trial. We may ourselves doubt. That is, we may, in looking in upon ourselves, doubt the legitimacy of those beliefs we have had in common with the rest of mankind, or, looking abroad upon the immense masses of human beings, following blindly their instincts, we may seriously doubt whether they are

going in the right direction. There is a problem now in our minds. The reflective reason awakes, and we reflect on this problem, and seek its solution. This is to philosophize; and here is seen the utility of philosophy. We did not seek philosophy for the sake of instructing those masses; we do not need it, that we may communicate it to them; we merely desire to know whether their beliefs be well founded, whether relying, as they do, on common sense, following, as they do, the teachings of the spontaneous reason, they are safe, or not. Shall we pity, or reverence them? War against them, or become their allies? This is the problem. Philosophy is merely the solution we arrive at by reflection.

Well, what is this solution? Is common sense a liar? Are the teachings of the spontaneous reason false? Is Humanity doomed to everlasting and universal error? So says the skeptic, so say Locke and his followers, or so they must say, if faithful to the principles they avow. But so say not we. Different from this is the solution we have obtained. We cannot now undertake to prove that our solution is the true one; but the reflective reason has with us legitimated the teachings of the spontaneous reason, legitimated common sense, assured us that it is the voice of the spontaneous reason, and that the spontaneous reason is the voice of God. True and holy for us then are the instincts of the masses; true and holy for us then are the universal beliefs of mankind. We no longer pity the many, we no longer apologize for their conduct, no longer labor to change their faith. We stand in awe of them, and apply ourselves to the work of enabling them to march to the glorious destiny God hath appointed them, and to which his own hand is leading them.

Philosophy, as it is a solution of the problem which doubt has placed in the mind, can be understood only by those in whose minds the problem has been placed. By this fact the philosopher is, and must be, separated from the great mass of his brethren; but since the

truths he has demonstrated, and which he believes, are precisely the truths of the spontaneous reason, precisely the universal beliefs of mankind, he is also connected with his race, and, by all the truth he believes, intimately bound to the humblest, as well as to the proudest, member of the human family. No stranger then is he to Humanity. Not with contempt does he look on the masses, not with scorn does he treat their instincts. Nothing that is human is foreign to him. He reverences in each human being the human nature, he reverences in himself, and in each human being he finds all the elements of that truth and virtue, his own reason and conscience bid him believe and obey.

Philosophy is not needed by the masses : but they who separate themselves from the masses, and who believe that the masses are entirely dependent on them for truth and virtue, need it, in order to bring them back, and bind them again to universal Humanity. And they need it now, and in this country, perhaps as much as ever. The world is filled with commotions. The masses are heaving and rolling, like a mighty river, swollen with recent rains, and snows dissolving on the mountains, onward to a distant and unknown ocean. There are those among us, who stand awe-struck, who stand amazed. What means this heaving and onward rolling ? Whither tend these mighty masses of human beings ? Will they sweep away every fixture, every house and barn, every mark of civilization ? Where will they end ? In what will they end ? Shall we rush before them and attempt to stay their progress ? Or shall we fall into their ranks and on with them to their goal ? "Fall into their ranks ; be not afraid ; be not startled ; a Divine Instinct guides and moves onward that heaving and rolling mass ; and lawless and destructive as it may seem to you, ye onlookers, it is normal and holy, pursuing a straight and harmless direction on to the union of Man with God." So answers philosophy, and this is its glory. The friends of Humanity

need philosophy, as the means of legitimating the cause of the people, of proving that it is the right, and the duty, of every man to bind himself to that cause, and to maintain it in good report and in evil report, in life and in death. They need it, that they may prove to these conservatives, who are frightened almost out of their wits at the movements of the masses, and who are denouncing them in no measured terms, that these movements are from God, and that they, who war against them, are warring against truth, duty, God, and Humanity. They need it, that they may no longer be obliged to make apologies for their devotion to the masses, their democratic sympathies and tendencies. They who are persecuted for righteousness' sake, who are loaded with reproach for their fidelity to truth and duty, who are all but cast out of the pale of Humanity, because they see, love, and pursue Humanity's true interests,—they need it, that they may comprehend the cause of the opposition they meet, forgive their enemies, silence the gainsayer, and give to him that asks it a reason for the hope that is in them. The friends of progress, here and everywhere, need it, that, having vindicated, legitimated progress, as philosophers, they may go into the saloons, the universities, the halls of legislation, the pulpit, and abroad among the people, and preach it, with the dignity and the authority of the prophet.

It will be seen from this, that our philosophy, notwithstanding certain aristocratic airs, is by no means wanting in its democratic tendencies. Its aim is not utility, but the establishment of truth, and that not for the many, but for the few ; nevertheless the truth established, always benefits the world, and the truth established in this case, is the truth which every body is interested in. We by no means reject common sense ; we love, we obey it, because we have legitimated its right to be loved and obeyed. All true philosophy accepts, and explains, and legitimates, the instinctive beliefs of mankind. Philosophy there-

fore, though it is not common sense, is in perfect harmony with it.

Will the respect, the writer in the Examiner has for common sense, carry him as far as this? Does he credit common sense? Does he believe the instinctive beliefs of mankind are true, worthy to be trusted? If so, we pray him to legitimate those beliefs on the ground of Locke's philosophy. If he does not believe them true, if he denies them, we ask him, what right he has to require philosophical writers to respect common sense? Moreover, if common sense, the universal beliefs of mankind, the instinctive beliefs of Humanity, the teachings of the spontaneous reason, be discredited, as they must be by a disciple of Locke, we ask, how it is possible to establish the certainty of any thing whatever? We ask those who rail against Humanity, and look upon the instinctive beliefs of the masses with contempt, how they will save us from universal Skepticism?

ART. VII. — *An Oration delivered before the Phi Beta Kappa Society, at Cambridge, August 31, 1837,* by RALPH WALDO EMERSON. Boston. James Munroe & Co. 8vo. pp. 26.

WE have been not a little amused and somewhat edified by the various criticisms on this address, which we have seen and heard of all kinds, from kindling admiration to gaping wonder, shrewd caviling, sneering doubt, and even offended dignity. We wish, for ourselves, to express our hearty thanks to the author, to disburden our minds of a small load of censure, and utter some thoughts on the subject-matter of the address.

There are writers whom we should designate as in the twilight state, walking ever in an opposite direc-

tion to the motion of the earth — following with long-
 ing admiration the descending glory of the past —
 delighting in each tall peak, each floating cloud, which
 reflects the lustre of a fading day. To them the pres-
 ent is weary and worn, and the darkness and vapors
 steam up from the sunken vales of common life.
 There is a second class, in the midnight season of
 thought, lone and abstracted — watching the truths
 of eternity as they smile through far space on a dark-
 ened world. To them the present is the gleaming
 lights, the snatches of music, the distasteful clamor
 of foolish revelry, breaking harshly in upon their hour
 of rapt and solemn meditation. There is a third
 class, in morning wakefulness. Their gaze is on the
 brightening orient. They stand as *muezzins* on the
 mosques, as watchmen on the towers, summoning to
 prayer and work; — for the streaks of the dawning,
 and the golden flushes, are heralding the sun. The
 present is bright to them with hope; and the dewy
 incense promises fruitfulness, and the rising race are
 going forth to husband the garden of life. There is
 a fourth class, in the noonday and sunny cheerfulness,
 and clear light, of God's providence in the present
 time, on whose useful toil the *spirit of the age* shines
 down to ripen and to bless.

When we read a former production by the author
 of this address, we feared from its tone of somewhat
 exclusive and unsympathising contemplativeness, that
 he was of the second class. But we hail him now as
 one of the youthful expectants of a coming brighter
 hour of social life. Shall we not indeed say, that in
 his industry, and the unreserved communication of his
 best nature, as a preacher and lecturer, we gratefully
 recognise him as one of the working men of this gen-
 eration? And yet would we see him more fully
 warmed with the great social idea of our era, — the
 great idea, which he has hinted at in this very ad-
 dress — of human brotherhood, of sonship to God.
 We have full faith that in this land is this idea to be
 manifested in individual character, in social life, in

art, in literature, as for the last eighteen hundred years it has been in religion. We echo with joy the language of the orator.

"Who can doubt that poetry will revive and lead in a new age, as the star in the constellation Harp which now flames in our zenith, as astronomers announce, shall one day be the pole-star for a thousand years.—p. 1. And again, "This confidence in the unsearched might of man belongs by all motives, by all prophecy, by all preparation to the American Scholar.—p. 25. And again, "A nation of men will for the first time exist, because each believes himself inspired by the Divine Soul which also inspires all men."—p. 26.

Why did Providence veil our land till the fulness of time, and then gather upon it an elect people from all nations of the earth, under institutions the most favorable to individual development, if not, that in a recovered Eden of freedom, love and peace, the products of all by-gone civilization, might blossom together? And shall not such a social state of Humanity utter itself, and is not that utterance a Literature?

We see, in Mr. Emerson, many traits befitting an American, that is, a Christian, free writer. He has deep faith in a heavenly Father of souls, reverence for each brother as a child of God,—respect for his own reason as a divine inspiration,—too much love for men to fear them,—a conscientious hungering and thirsting for truth,—and a serene trust in the triumph of good. He seems to us true, reverent, free, and loving. We cheerfully tolerate therefore any quaint trappings, in which a peculiar taste may lead him to deck his thoughts; and we pity the purists, who cannot see a manly spirit through a mantle not wholly courtly. At the same time we will freely express our regret that Mr. Emerson's style is so little a transparent one. There are no thoughts which may not be simply expressed. Raphael's pictures with their profound beauty are simple as a family group in a peasant's cottage, or a crowd in a market place. The author of this address, we feel assured, does not

willingly hide his thoughts from the poor vanity of being understood only by the initiated; and we have no doubt endeavors to be intelligible. He loves truth and respects man too well for such folly. His faith that man's very holy of holies enshrines no ideas too pure for popular worship, is thus beautifully expressed :

"The orator distrusts at first the fitness of his frank confessions, — his want of knowledge of the persons he addresses, — until he finds that he is the complement of his hearers; — that they drink his words because he fulfils for them their own nature; the deeper he dives into his privatest, secretest presentiment, — to his wonder he finds, this is the most acceptable, most public, and universally true. The people delight in it; the better part of every man feels, this is my music: this is myself." — p. 18.

Why then should he not open himself freely, simply? We think he means to do so. He cordially welcomes us to his high summits of speculation, and to the prospect they command, in full faith that our sight is keen as his. But he forgets that he has not pointed out the way by which he climbed. His conclusions are hinted, without the progressive reasonings through which he was led to them. Perhaps he does not come at them by any consecutive processes. They rather come to him unasked. To use his own language,

"The new deed is yet a part of life, — remains for a time immersed in our unconscious life. In some contemplative hour, it detaches itself from the life, like a ripe fruit, to become a thought of the mind." — p. 13.

There are no developments of thought, there is no continuous flow in his writings. We gaze as through crevices on a stream of subterranean course, which sparkles here and there in the light, and then is lost. The style is in the extreme aphoristic. But again, another cause of his obscurity is a fondness for various illustration. He has a quick eye for analogies, and finds in all nature symbols of spiritual facts. His

figures are occasionally so exquisitely felicitous, that we have hardly the heart to complain of this habit of mind, though, we confess, that not seldom we are attracted from the feature of his thoughts to the splendid jewelry of their attire, and yet oftener annoyed by the masquerade of rural or civic plainness, in which they see fit to march.

The subject of this Address is "The American Scholar," his training, duties, and prospects; and we cannot but wish that there had been more unity and order observed in treating it. The division is good—and the thoughts are apparently cast in a form. But the truth is, there is no progress, no onward stream. The best thoughts are not the leading but the incidental ones, and their arrangement might be varied without much altering the effect of the whole. But then these thoughts are fine ones, and there is a mass of them. And they might easily be run into shape, or rather built into a beautiful composition; or yet again grow naturally forth from the root of his central idea. This idea is variously expressed:

"There is One Man—present to all particular men only partially; you must take the whole of society to find the whole man." "Man is one." "It is one soul which animates all men." "In a century—in a millennium one or two men; that is to say, one or two approximations to the right state of every man. All the rest behold in the hero or the poet their own green and crude being ripened." "A man rightly viewed comprehendeth the particular natures of all men. Each philosopher, each bard, each actor, has only done for me as by a delegate what I can one day do for myself." "The one thing of value in the world is the active soul,—the soul free, sovereign, active." "A nation of men, because each believes himself inspired by the Divine Soul which also inspires all men."

This fundamental truth, which Jesus felt, uttered, and lived as no disciple has ever faintly dreamed of, our author has apprehended with awe. It is a thought to open the fountains of the soul. As the orator says,

"No men are now perfect. Each is part only of a man, and in this distribution of the functions the scholar is the del-

egated intellect. In the right state he is *Man Thinking*.
 "Him nature solicits, with all her placid, all her monitory pictures. Him the past instructs. Him the future invites." The scholar's first teacher is nature. "What is nature to him? There is never an end to the inexplicable continuity of this web of God, but always circular power returning into itself." "Classification begins; and what is classification but perceiving that all objects have a law, which is also a law of the human mind?" Thus to this "school-boy" is suggested that "nature and he both proceed from one root. And what is that root? Is not it the soul of his soul?" "He shall see that nature is the opposite of the soul, answering to it part for part. One is seal and one is print. Its beauty is the beauty of his own mind. Its laws are the laws of his own mind."

The next teacher of the scholar is "the mind of the Past." "The scholar of the first age received into him the world around; brooded thereon; gave it the new arrangement of his own mind, and uttered it again. It came into him—life; it went out from him—truth. It came to him—short lived actions; it went out from him—immortal thoughts. It came to him—business; it went out from him—poetry. It was—dead fact; now, it is quick thought." "But the transmutation is not perfect; no artist can entirely exclude the conventional, the local, the perishable from his book." "Hence arises a mischief. The sacredness which attaches to the act of creation,—the act of thought,—is transferred to the record. The poet chanting was felt to be a divine man. Henceforth the chant is divine also." "Instantly, the book becomes noxious. Colleges are built on it. Books are written on it by thinkers, not by *Man Thinking*. Meek young men grow up in libraries, believing it their duty to accept the views which Cicero, which Locke, which Bacon, have given, forgetful that Cicero, Locke, and Bacon were only young men in libraries when they wrote these books." "Books are good only to inspire. I had better never see a book than to be warped by its attraction clean out of my own orbit, and made a satellite instead of a system." "The soul active sees absolute truth; and utters truth, or creates. In this action, it is genius; not the privilege of here and there a favorite, but the sound estate of every man. Genius looks forward. Man hopes. Genius creates." "Books are for the scholar's idle times. When he can read God directly, the hour is too precious to be wasted in other men's transcripts of their readings." "One must be an inventor to read well. There is then creative reading, as well as creative writing." "Of course, there is a portion of reading

quite indispensable to a wise man. History and exact science he must learn by laborious reading. Colleges, in like manner, have their indispensable office, — to teach elements. But they can only highly serve us, when they aim not to drill, but to create."

The third teacher of the scholar, is action. "Action with the scholar is subordinate, but it is essential. Without it, he is not yet man. Without it, thought can never ripen into truth. Only so much do I know, as I have lived." "He, who puts forth his total strength in fit actions, has the richest return of wisdom." "If it were only for a vocabulary the scholar would be covetous of action. Life is our dictionary." "The final value of actions, like that of books, and better than books, is, that it is a resource." "The mind now thinks; now acts; and each reproduces the other." "Character is higher than intellect. Thinking is the function. Living is the functionary." "Time shall teach him that the scholar loses no hour which the man lives." "There is virtue yet in the hoe and spade, for learned as well as unlearned hands."

The scholar then is educated "by nature, by books, and by action. It remains to say somewhat of his duties." "They may be all comprised in Self-trust. The office of the scholar is to cheer, and to guide men by showing them facts amidst appearances. He plies the slow, unhonored, and unpaid task of observation." "In silence, in steadiness, in severe abstraction, let him hold by himself; add observation to observation; patient of neglect, patient of reproach, and bide his own time." "Free should the scholar be, — free and brave." "The day is always his, who works in it with serenity and great aims."

The orator now passes from this abstraction of the scholar, to what he has to say of nearer reference to the time and this country. "I look upon the discontent of the literary class as a mere announcement of the fact, that they find themselves not in the state of mind of their fathers, and regret the coming state as untried." "If there is any period one would desire to be born in, is it not the age of Revolution?" "One of the auspicious signs of coming days is the fact, that the same movement which effected the elevation of what was called the lowest class in the state, assumed in literature as benign an aspect. Instead of the sublime and beautiful, the near, the low, the common, was explored and poetised." "The literature of the poor, the feelings of the child, the philosophy of the street, the meaning of household life, are the topics of the time." "Give me insight into to-day, and you may

have the antique and future worlds." "Show me the sublime presence of the highest spiritual cause lurking, as always it does lurk, in these suburbs and extremities of nature." "Man is surprised to find that things near are not the less beautiful and wondrous than things remote." "This perception of the worth of the vulgar, is fruitful in discoveries." "Another sign of the times, also marked by an analogous political movement, is the new importance given to the single person." "The scholar is that man who must take up into himself all the ability of the time, all the contributions of the past, all the hopes of the future." "If there should be one lesson more than another which should pierce his ear, it is, The world is nothing, the man is all." "We have listened too long to the courtly muses of Europe. The American freeman is already suspected to be timid, imitative, tame. Public and private avarice make the air we breathe thick and fat." "The scholar is decent, indolent, complaisant. There is no work for any but the decorous and the complaisant." "What is the remedy? If the single man will plant himself indomitably upon his instincts, and there abide, the huge world will come round to him. Patience — patience; with the shades of all the good and great for company; and for solace, the perspective of your own infinite life; and for work, the study and communication of principles, the making those instincts prevalent, the conversion of the world." "We will walk on our own feet, brothers and friends; we will work with our own hands; we will speak our own minds."

Now to our thinking this is high doctrine — timely, and well put. We trust all who have heard or read will lay it to heart, and go forth in the brightening day of a Christian, free literature with solemn purpose, patient resolve, cheerful hope, and forgiving tolerance; filled with the thought that, "God is working in them to will and do of his good pleasure;" and greeting each brother heir of immortality with a reverence and a benediction.

We have endeavored to give a skeleton of this, to us deeply interesting address, and now would proceed to remark upon the subject-matter itself. The theme proposed by the orator is the "AMERICAN SCHOLAR." Why did he not say *AUTHOR*? Every man is or should be a "student," "man thinking."

On every mind Nature, the Past, and Action, pour their influences. Some of the most active souls — the freest, bravest thinkers of our time and country, communicate their observations, make their instincts prevalent, embody their highest spiritual vision; but it is only in their lives — their manners — their public acts — their social talk. They fill up the idea of the orator's "scholar." But they are not authors; they do not utter the spirit that is in them. They are the seers, but not the poets — the teachers, but not the artists of the time. Their influence is falling on the mountains and in the vales, instilling through the mass of the universal mind the waters of life, which one day shall well forth in crystal gleams and musical trillings to swell the stream of a truly American literature, and pour along a fertilizing stream of thought. When and how shall our *Authors* be formed? They are forming. When the idea of human brotherhood, of sonship to God — of eternal reason in each human soul — of respect for man — shall be assimilated and organized in our social frame, then shall American Literature go forth in vigor, symmetry, and graceful action. Men will utter when they are filled with the spirit. Our manners, our tone of life, our habits of thought, our social garniture, are a worn out casing, and the new robes of nature's handiwork to clothe a higher form of life as yet but imperfectly grown. Many a poet is walking now our green hill sides, toiling in our mechanic shops, ay, bartering in the bustling mart, even jostling in the caucus and voting at the polls, living a poem in the round of professional duties and the ever fresh romance of quiet homes. And wherever they are, the forms — the castes — the trappings — the badges — the fashion and parade of life, are seen by them as thin disguises, and the purity and vigor of the soul in each brother, the true spiritual experiences of man beneath God's sky upon God's earth, are the only things of worth. When shall they utter the music which swells sweetly in the chambers of their own spirits? When the stand-

ard of man's measure is changed, and persons are prized for what they *are*, not for what they *have*. And whenever and however any one is filled to overflowing with this grand idea of God in the soul of man, he will utter it—he must utter it. He will be an American Author. He may prophesy from the pulpit, at the Lyceum, in the schoolhouse, in the daily press, in books, in public addresses. But the burden of the prophecy will be the same: “Man measures man the world over:” Man's spirit is from God: We are brethren.

In speaking therefore of the training of American authors—we should place first, second, and third, action, or rather *Life*. A man to utter the American spirit, which is now in embryo, and will sooner or later be born into life, should walk in the noonday brightness of the great Idea of our era and land, till he is quickened by its beams. The great author is he who embodies in language the spirit of his time. The great American author will be he who lives out the American idea—the Christian—the Divine idea of *Brotherhood*.

He must study “Nature.” Yes! open his inmost soul to this beautiful smile of God's perfections, that the spirit of God may abide in him as a temple. But nowhere does nature respond to the call within, nowhere do the floods of being answer to the floods of will, as in the form and presence, the ways and deeds and will of man; nowhere, as in the mighty social movement, which ever sweeps along through a silent eternity the ever new present age. The nature of man, and the cycle of that nature, which even now is revolving, is God's voice to us,—a new-born creation which angels hymn.

The author must study the “Past.” Yes! For every genius, every martyr, every hero, every living soul, has been a hue of promise, which Humanity has caught from the day-spring from on high. And silently through the tide of roving hordes and the storms of desolating revolutions—in calm hours of bright

prosperity — and the wide hush of peaceful eras — in the uprising of down trodden millions — and the fervent hopings and prayers of philanthropy, has the present time been slowly preparing — the aloes sometime to bloom.

And the Author must "act." Yes! but chiefly, not "subordinately." He must throw himself heartily into the moving army of the time, and serve an unnoticed private or a followed leader, as his strength may be — willing to be trampled down, so the powers of good triumph. And he must go out into life too, not to build up himself and complete his being only; not to gain wisdom, to gather raw material only — not to stock a vocabulary, not to recreate only — but from a deep insight into the sublimity of daily, hourly, common life, from awe of the force of Providence stirring in the deep springs of the present generation. Not as a scholar, not with a view to literary labor, not as an artist, must he go out among men — but as a brother man, all unconscious that he has uttered any thing, all purposeless of future utterance till it is given. We rejoiced with sympathetic joy when we read that sentence in this address, "I ask not for the great, the remote, the romantic, what is doing in Italy or Arabia; what is Greek Art or Provençal Minstrelsy; I embrace the common, I explore and sit at the feet of the familiar, the low." A distinguished sculptor was asked, "where when the gods had returned to Olympus, and the iconoclastic spirit of the time had overturned the Madonnas and the martyrs, he would look for subjects for his chisel?" "To the grace and poetry of the simple acts of life," was his answer. The greatest painter of the age has breathed his purest ideal beauty through the unpicturesque attire, the easy attitude, the homely plainness, of peasant girlhood. And perfectly true is it, as our orator says, that this idea has inspired the genius of the finest authors of our day. A man must live the life of Jesus, according to his power, would he be a truly American author; yes! he must live a self-forgetting minister to men, in the

charities of home and acquaintance—in thankless and unnoticed sympathy,—in painful toil amid great enterprises,—among interests of the day—sacrificing notoriety, relinquishing unfavorable tastes, penetrated through his habitual thoughts with the prayer, that the kingdom of God may come—the kingdom of truth, love, beauty, and happiness—of fresh minds and warm hearts and clear consciences, the kingdom of brother souls in their Father's mansion. And he must do this because he feels the worth of man as man—because he sees the infinite in the finite—the spiritual in the material—the eternal in the present—the divine in man. When his heart is tuned to unison with every chord that vibrates through the moral universe, and responds to the music of love through his whole being, let him pour out the joy of a spirit communing with the All Holy, of an Immortal stepping onward hand in hand with growing spirits on a brightening pathway to heaven.

All this may seem extravagant and enthusiastic. We say it with the calmest conviction. We look for a high-toned literature in this Christian, free land, where the vine of truth is not overgrown with the weeds of past civilization. We fully expect to see *American* authors. And yet more, we feel sure they will form a most numerous class, or rather be *so numerous as not to form a class*. The benefits of the existence of a literary caste have been vaunted. We have no faith in them. The change which has for years been going on, by which more and more minds have been incited to produce their store for the public good—in reviews, miscellanies, essays, fictions, lectures, is we believe auspicious. Literature has become less monkish, more manly. The days of astrology and alchemy in the world of books is over; and those of its astronomy and chemistry have come; and our bark of life will ride the safer, and our comforts be multiplied by the change. Literature should be the reflection of an age upon itself, the self-converse of the race, and the more expressions of its conscious-

ness, the better; or again literature should be the challenge and answer of "all's well," as each generation takes its stand in time. The more minds that light up their tapers, the better. All men have genius, if they will be true to the inward voice. Let them serve God and not men, and bear what testimony they can. We cannot spare them. Literature will thus assume a more conversational, a heartier tone; and no man will be ashamed, afraid, or vain, or proud, to be an author. The age is superficial, it is said — the attention is dissipated by variety — there is a slipshod style in vogue — thinkers are rare. We doubt much the justice of all this. The energy of the time, perhaps the genius of the time, is chiefly turned to the business of life. But never, we believe, was there a period of healthier intellectual action. The people — the public, crave thought. They passionately follow a strong man who utters his deepest self healthily, naturally; the higher, the purer his message, the better prized by them. And compare the thoughts and style of expression too of our reviews, yes even of light novels, and of newspaper pieces, dashed off as they are by ordinary minds, with what was written by the select few of earlier time, and do they not prove really a wonderful development of the thinking faculties? All writers are to some degree thinkers, if not thinking men. For their own sakes, composition is salutary; it reveals to themselves what force they have in them. The next stage will be the casting off of authority; yes, even that of public opinion which now enslaves, and the rising up of an immense class of independent thinkers, to declare what they too have seen of heavenly light through the telescopes in high observatories, or with the naked eye on the bare hills. We sometimes think that the profusion, with which the knowledge of the most interesting facts, laws, and phenomena of nature, of the great miracles of art and invention, of the mighty events of history, of the original characters who have made history, — that the profusion, we say with which a knowledge of these

has been diffused to readers and hearers — though done merely to amuse, will produce a fine result. Men seek novelties, something to animate and awake ; where will they find them, if not in the infinity of their own spiritual natures and experiences, — in the marvels and wonders of the quite familiar and common ? The crowd of authors even now has broken down the aristocracy of literature. Men are no longer notorious for being writers. Poor vanity no longer, or in a less degree, impels fools to ape sages. But yet the instinct of utterance remains. And we need not fear, that minds, which through the deep caverns of their own spirit have passed to Elysian fields, will be hindered from declaring their bright visions, because the air is full of the murmur of voices. Literature must become what it ought to be, the *best* thoughts of *all*, given out in the grand school room, debating hall, and conversazione of the world, rather let us say in the grand family group of God's children. Inspired prophets and apostles of truth will easily be recognised, — and listened to all the more eagerly by those, to whom all past utterances are familiar, and who seek something new. No Paul will be neglected at Athens. And the temptation lessens every day for a man to desert the field which heaven appointed him to till, by running into the mart to speculate in buying up popular applause. The public are tired of parrots. They want men. We feel convinced that our best minds and all minds, instead of being frittered away and dissipated by chasing the butterflies, and hunting the bright shells, and gathering the choice flowers of thoughts, to amuse or be amused with, will confine themselves more and more to laborious working in their own peculiar mines ; that our public lectures will lose their desultory and take a systematic character ; that private teachers will appear of higher and higher branches of knowledge. And this will prepare the way for independent, thorough, original action of the American mind. And we long to see what will be produced in that democratic age of literature, where no clan of Authors are tolerated longer

as the dictators of fashion and the judges of caste in the world of books, but where appeal is only to the spirit of truth; where the court garment is always sincerity's work-day dress.

But we must bring these remarks to a close. We look, we say, for an American literature. We feel as if the old strata of thought, in the old world, had been broken up, with the old manners which clothed them and grew out from them; and as if the fused and melted mass had settled here to form a new world of higher beauty. And the rock basis of a new era will be a philosophy, which recognises the divinity of reason in every soul; which sees the identity of reason and faith, and honors common sense as the voice of truth; which feels the mystery of moral freedom in every man of that perfect liberty of the entire obedience to right, and which bows with awe before the conviction that God is in each human soul, that never is the individual so entirely himself as when at one with the indwelling Spirit. And the life, which will pervade this new world of thought, will be a poetry of love and sympathy for the commonest familiar feeling, as well as the higher and holier, and for every human tie and relation. Science is always liberal, for nature is no respecter of persons or of forms. She will speak to the humblest or highest of her children through the light which covers the heavens, as with a canopy for angels, through the swift flashes which rend the mountain, or the unseen influence which follows down the string of the paper kite. And shall not it be, is the world never to see a system of social manners too, growing out from this Christian idea of brotherhood, which shall embody the principles of this philosophy—the spirit of this poetry? Our manners will ever be the leaves to clothe with beauty the trunk and branches of our faith; but through them it must imbibe from the sun of God's love, and the atmosphere of human kindness, a purifying, a vital influence. We shall never have a healthy American Literature, unless we have an American Spirit, an American Manner of Life.

LITERARY NOTICES.

Ernest Maltravers. By the Author of "Pelham." New York: Harper & Brothers. 1837. 2 vols. 12mo. — We have heard this last work of Mr. Bulwer's spoken of in disparaging terms, and represented as the least interesting of the numerous productions of its author. For ourselves, we must say that we have seldom risen from the perusal of a novel which has delighted us more, and never from the perusal of one of Mr. Bulwer's, that has delighted us so much.

The two volumes which are published constitute only the first part of the whole work, but, if the remaining volumes, which we are informed are to be forth-coming, answer at all to the expectations raised by these, we risk nothing in saying that Ernest Maltravers will be the most enduring monument the author has yet erected to his fame. It may be less exciting *as a story* than some of his other novels, it may be less interesting to those who read but to while away the time, to minister to morbid feelings, or merely to forget what they read; but it is a work that betokens a riper intellect, a more thorough insight into the human heart, and which breathes a truer and deeper pathos, than anything else he has produced. The author seems to us to be describing what he has *felt*, and to be setting down in his pages, what he has *lived*. He does not play with passion; he does not sport with our sensibilities; he writes in earnest, and appears to be giving utterance to the fulness of his own heart.

Mr. Bulwer has designed this work as a survey of the Philosophy of Human Life. He has not written it for the purpose of producing a work of fiction, which may be in vogue for a day, and then be forgotten. He has written it with a high aim and a solemn intent. It may not deserve high praise as a philosophical work; but it bears full proof that its author is an acute and accurate observer of man and of men, and that he is able to represent them very much as they are. His pictures are from the life. His creations are not merely life-like, but living.

As it is our intention, when we receive the remaining volumes, to return to this work, and to attempt something of an estimate of Mr. Bulwer's merits and defects, as a writer and as a novelist, we shall enter into no minute criticism at this time. We can say of Ernest Maltravers, that it is a book from the perusal of which a reader may rise a soberer and a wiser man. Its tone is serious, but not melancholy, and by no means misanthropic. It paints life with its shades as well as its lights, and these are often dark, but upon the whole not too dark. Beneath the vainest, the worldliest, and the most selfish exterior, we are shown a human heart, small, it may be, and seldom brought into play, but nevertheless a human heart, through which course sometimes the streams of genuine human feeling. Men are never clean gone in iniquity. Wicked they may be, and often

are, but they always retain something which may be loved, and on which the ardent philanthropist may build his hopes. Women may be vain, and carried away in the vortex of a fashionable life, and yet not lose entirely their nobler nature; they may be frail, and yet one false step not plunge them into the abyss of moral pollution. There may be virtue in both men and women who transgress in thought and in deed, the arbitrary rules of an artificial society.

We owe our thanks to Mr. Bulwer, for representing to us the English Aristocracy in a light less revolting than most novelists have done of late. We believe his account of that Aristocracy is worthy of altogether more credit, than those accounts which represent them as utterly heartless and selfish, as wholly sunk in sensuality and vice. There must necessarily be much vice and depravity, glossed over with external refinement and politeness, in every aristocracy based on the privileges of birth, or wealth; but we ought never to believe any numerous body of our brethren can become wholly corrupt. The Divine Image, in which man was originally created, cannot be obliterated entirely, even in an hereditary aristocracy. The Diviner elements of human nature will even there sometimes manifest themselves, and that in no slight degree. To be virtuous in the midst of an aristocracy, like the English, we regard as no easy matter. It is hard for him who is born a member of it, to rise to the true dignity of manhood, and fulfil the great purposes for which man was made, and for which God gives him intellect and affections; nevertheless some can succeed, and do succeed in doing it. The difficulties which a noble soul, richly endowed, born to great wealth, and in possession of all society has to give, must necessarily encounter, are well exhibited in the volumes before us, both as it concerns man, and as it concerns woman. We cannot conceive more unfavorable circumstances in which one can be born, than those amidst which he is born, who has no prize before him, apparently no object of a true and noble ambition. Obligated to make no effort, to struggle for neither wealth nor honors, able at once to take his stand on as high a round in the social ladder, as he can ever hope to attain, what shall quicken his spirit, waken his heart, call forth the power that is in him to be great and to do good? There is a work for him, but he is not likely to see it, or to feel its influence. In a society where great inequality prevails, we believe, from our heart, they who are in the lowest rank are cursed less than they who are in the highest. If any doubt the justness of our belief, let them read Ernest Maltravers.

A great struggle between the aristocratic and democratic elements of society has commenced in England and in this country. It is raging, and with more fierceness every day. The result cannot be doubtful. The democratic element will prevail the world over. But it is a fearful struggle. Strongly as we sympathize with the democracy, and unshaken as is our confidence in the fact, and the right, of its ultimate success, we do

not survey this struggle with a perfectly quiet pulse. We would moderate its fierceness, and lessen the bitterness of one party towards the other. In order to do this, we would labor to bring out the virtues of each party. The aristocrat must be made to see that the great unprivileged many are his own "kith and kin," that they have minds and hearts as great and as richly endowed as his own; and that in this struggle they are right, and must, if there be justice in heaven, obtain the victory. On the other hand, the democrat must bear in mind that the aristocracy are his brethren, made with a nature like his own, that they have their sufferings, their trials and temptations, and also their lofty aspirations, and their love of Humanity. Let him not war against them in wrath; let him love them as his brothers, and hold their interests, as men, though not as a class, as dear as his own. We would that the system of privilege could be done away, and that of equal rights adopted, established in all countries, without a war of the two elements. But in England, we do not believe the thing is possible. In this country, for aught we can see, it is possible. We may proceed here, if we will keep down all unholy passions, peaceably, and harmoniously. The aristocracy here has little external support. It is in the main a reminiscence of England, and may easily be overcome, so far as it needs to be overcome, by the silent but all-powerful working of public opinion. We have but to speak out, proclaim the true dignity of man, and what true greatness is; we have but to weave into our literature the true doctrine of Christ, and instil it into the hearts of our children, in order to effect all the triumph for democracy that can be wished.

Review Française. — The first number of a new Review with this name was published in Paris, in June last, several copies of which we have recently received. It is intended, in some respects, to take the place of the old *Review Française*, which was brought to a close just before the Revolution of July, 1830. It professes to be devoted to no party, but pledged to an independent course in politics, philosophy, religion, and literature. Among the principal contributors, we notice the names of Rossi, Villemain, Jouffroy, Ballanche, Michelet, Buchon, with several others who are less known in this country. The introductory article, which, we presume, is from the pen of M. Rossi, presents a judicious and well-written view of the actual state of opinion in France, on the principal points of human inquiry. Its tone is encouraging, in the highest degree, to the believers in the progress of man.

The following allusion to the literature of America may be interesting to our readers. It is taken from a short article referring to the interest manifested in this country, in the literature of Foreign nations.

"Of all known countries, North America is the one whose future condition may be previously announced, with the greatest confidence. A

country, still new, young, without history, it presents to the observer a creation, which is not only the result of the social instincts of man and of an unforeseen combination of events, but the deliberate work of the human will, a social and political system applied on a virgin soil, by men who knew what they were about, and who meant to do precisely what they have done. The elements of this system are known, its principles determined, its premises distinctly laid down; hence, the consequences which it contains within its bosom must necessarily be displayed, with a sort of mathematical exactness. The errors of men, their passions, and external events may undoubtedly derange the regular progress of the country, may retard and modify the logical development of the American system; but these causes of perturbation are themselves less difficult to be foreseen and calculated in a country, which does not present the varieties, the complicated interests, the contrasts, that make the solution of political and social problems an affair of such difficulty in our aged Europe. By reason of their geographical situation and of the principles of their government, the United States are at the same time less exposed than any other civilized State to the influence of foreign politics: the future prospects of the Union depend entirely on itself, on the elements of its own political and social condition.

"Thus it was easy to foresee that the Americans, occupied at first with their establishment, their material organization, and their fortune, and without many individuals who had secured a social position, and obtained the enjoyment of leisure, would not for a considerable time apply their talents and energy to the department of science and literature.

"This first period now seems to be drawing to a close; new wants cannot fail to make themselves felt; the material world no longer exclusively occupies the strength of America. But the transition to an intellectual life, original, national, and vigorous, is never made at one bound. Besides America is the offspring of Europe; the languages which she speaks are European; American literature must needs have its starting-point on the old continent. In this second period, America must study, imitate, and comment upon the literary and scientific productions of Europe. It is almost in the same condition in which the old Continent was placed in relation to antiquity, at the epoch of the Revival of Letters.

"The third period will open whenever the social condition of America shall have experienced the ulterior modifications which are already foreseen by every attentive observer."

The fact stated in the closing paragraph of the above extract is generally admitted, and begins to be generally complained of. Our dependence on foreign literature is made our reproach. We are accused of following servilely in the track that is marked out by the writers of the old world. For ourselves, however, we are persuaded that the charge would be more just if it were directed against our exclusive tastes, our narrow prejudices with regard to the literature of other nations. We follow the thinkers of England, with too little respect either for our own thoughts, or for those of the mightier intellects of the Continent. A more thorough, wise, and discriminating acquaintance with the great writers in the literature of the Continent, would tend to redeem us from the undue influence of the English mind, and quicken the germs of a vigorous life within our own bosoms. On all questions relating to social progress, political rights, and human culture, the modern literature of

France and Germany is far richer than that of aristocratic England. Our young republicans are fully aware of this, and we shall yet see the fruits of their conviction.

The United States' Magazine and Democratic Review. Vol. I. No. I. Washington, D. C. : Langtree & O'Sullivan. 8vo. pp. 142. — We have read with much interest the first number of this Magazine which is to be published monthly at the seat of our National Government. It is full of promise, and can hardly fail to be creditable to our rising Literature. It is to be devoted to the interests of the Democratic party, and will explain and defend its doctrines and measures. But it also proposes to itself a higher, and, in our judgment, a far more praiseworthy aim. It avows its design to give, as far as it may be able, a democratic tone and character to American literature. It is in relation to this design, that we greet its appearance with a cordial welcome. If it faithfully pursue this design, enlisting, as it will, the best writers in our country, it must necessarily do great good. With this design we have full sympathy.

A literature cannot be a national one, unless it be the exponent of the national life, *informed* with the national soul. It must be based on the great Idea of the nation, and be cemented together by the national instincts. Otherwise it will, whatever its merits in other respects, remain foreign to the people for whom it is intended ; and whatever talents, beauty, taste, refinement, it may display, be counted powerless, tame, and servile. The national soul of America is democracy, the equal rights and worth of every man, as man. This is the American Idea. That writer who neglects or rejects it, however amiable, learned, and talented he may be, must relinquish all hopes of being counted an American writer. This Idea is the only element of life that American literature can possess. Our literary men, if they wish to be living men, and aid in the production of a living literature of our country, must accept it, and make it the soul of their soul. Ours must be a democratic literature.

The Magazine before us is intended to aid in calling forth a democratic literature. Its exclusive party character, by restraining its freedom, will be a great drawback on its influence ; but nevertheless it will do much, and prove no mean blessing to the country. The first number is cheering. It appears, as in fact it was, to have been prepared in haste ; but it breathes a good spirit and betokens ability. The Introduction, though somewhat vague and unfinished as an exposition of democracy, we have read with much pleasure. It proves that the democracy of its editors, in its doctrinal character, is of the right sort. It embraces the genuine sentiment of Humanity, and the idea of progress. It recognises, and we rejoice that it does, the identity of the great democratic movements of modern times, with the movement commenced by the Great Reformer of Nazareth. The identity of the true democratic spirit with the Christian

spirit is a great and a kindling truth, which ere long will be generally, if not universally, admitted. We have also read the article on De Tocqueville's Democracy in America, with much interest. It is deserving attention.

We have spoken of the party character of the United States Magazine. We have not done this because it espouses the interests of the so-called democratic party, but because we believe the men who are to create our literature must be free from party shackles. They must be above party, and instead of being the instruments of party they must be the judges of party. We would have no literary man avoid party questions, in politics, religion, or philosophy; but we would have every man who loves Humanity and craves progress, discuss those questions as a judge, not as a pleader. We, for ourselves, belong to no party, but we shall never hesitate to express our views of any or of all parties. Since our article on Democracy was written, the Whigs have gained some triumphs. Had these triumphs been gained before that article was written, we should have omitted the censure we cast by implication on the Democratic party. There is a possibility that the Whigs may come into power for a short time. We fear if they do, it will be the triumph of the moneyed interests of the country, of the mercantile, banking, and manufacturing interests, over the agricultural and mechanical interests. We hope that we shall be deceived, and that the Whigs will turn out to be Reformers; but we assure them, if so, they will look forwards and not backwards.

Histoire des Doctrines Morales et politiques des trois derniers siècles, par M. J. MATTER. Paris, 1836 et 1837. 3 Tomes. 8vo. — M. Matter is a voluminous and withal a writer of considerable merit. He has given the world several useful publications, the best of which, in our judgment, is his "Critical History of Gnosticism." He strikes us as a man of great industry, extensive and various reading, good sense, good feeling, but as by no means remarkable for depth and originality. We find him frequently common-place, occasionally dull, and usually deficient in true method. He has nothing of the *Artiste*. He has no creative power, and of course never produces a whole. All his works, which have come under our notice, read like articles designed for the pages of a Review. Nevertheless they contain much useful information, and may be read by most persons with profit.

The work before us, a History of moral and political doctrines during the last three centuries, is on an interesting and a very important subject, and one on which it would be difficult for a man of ordinary talents and information to write a worthless book. M. Matter has not written a worthless, but very valuable book. We know not where else there is a work, in which the reader can find, in the same compass, so full and so

just an account of the moral and political doctrines of the last three centuries, as he will find in these volumes. They take the true point of sight, and may be in general safely trusted.

The history contained in these volumes is not a history of the moral and political doctrines, put forth by a few speculators or philosophers in the schools, at least only incidentally; but a history of the moral and political doctrines which obtained currency in the world, which were advocated by statesmen, embraced by monarchs, and acted upon by governments and people. The progress of these doctrines, their influence, their reactions, victories, and defeats, the good and the evil they did, constitute the subject-matter of these volumes, and are treated, not profoundly, nor in all cases satisfactorily, but, in general, fairly and justly.

The work though professedly historical, is written evidently, if not avowedly, for political effect. Its design is to teach a certain lesson, which is summed up, in what the author is pleased to call the axiom, "*That no political progress is desirable, that none is possible even, which is not brought about naturally and necessarily by a moral progress.*" This is a favorite position with the author. It is the burden of his work, *De l'Influence des Mœurs, sur les Lois et de l'influence des Lois sur les Mœurs*, a work whose want of character may be inferred from the fact that it received the extraordinary prize of 10,000 francs. But this position is not tenable. If it were, it would be fatal to all progress, and be most heartily pleasing to all tyrants. The plain English of it is, perfect the individual before you undertake to perfect society; make your men perfect, before you seek to make your institutions perfect. This is plausible, but we dislike it, because it makes the perfection of institutions the end, and that of individuals merely the means. Perfect all your men, and no doubt, you could then perfect easily and safely your institutions. But when all your men are perfect, what need of perfecting your institutions? And wherein are those institutions, under which all individuals may attain to the full perfection admitted by human nature, imperfect? Institutions are perfect or imperfect only as they do or do not contribute to the perfection of the individual man. The only motive for changing social institutions is, that they do not, or that they may, aid moral or individual progress. M. Matter, however, means to be a real friend to progress. He has learned by experience that institutions to have a good influence must harmonize, to a certain extent, with the genius of the people on whom they are to act, and we are willing that he should insist upon this fact. But let him beware of becoming too exclusive. Moral progress and social progress should never be separated. The friends of the one should always be the friends of the other. The end is moral progress, and to this all things should contribute. Social progress is to be regarded as a means of moral or individual progress, and therefore never to be attempted only under such circumstances, and to such an extent, as will most likely contribute to this end.

History of the French Revolution. By THOMAS CARLYLE.—Messrs. Little & Brown of this city have just issued an American edition of the above work, by the author of *Sartor Resartus*. We have not yet read it; but from the extracts we have seen in Reviews, and from the character of its author, we venture to recommend it as a work of intense interest, which may be read with equal pleasure and profit. Every body, we presume, for some time to come, will betray symptoms of a *Carlylomania*. But no matter; it is a kind of mania which after all betokens a good constitution and rich endowments.

The Americans in their Moral, Social, and Political Relations. By FRANCIS J. GRUND. Boston. Marsh, Capen & Lyon. 1837.—We have read this work with some interest. It is written with ability; and, with some errors, contains many correct statements, just views, and valuable observations. We had intended a review of it for this number, but have been obliged to defer it till our next.

New System of Paper Money. By A CITIZEN OF BOSTON. Boston. I. R. Butts. 1837. 8vo. pp. 20.—We commend this unpretending pamphlet to the attention of all who are interested in saving the country from financial embarrassments, similar to the one we are now passing through. It contains, if we mistake not, a sound principle, which must form the basis of every system of paper money, which can be adopted with anything like safety to the public.

Messrs. HILLIARD, GRAY & Co., of this city, have in press, and will publish about the first of March, two volumes of "*Philosophical Miscellanies*," translated, with introductions and notes, from the French of Cousin, Jouffroy, and Benjamin Constant, by Rev. George Ripley of this city. These two volumes are intended to constitute the first of a series of translations, which Mr. Ripley, aided by some of the first scholars in the country, proposes to bring out under the title of "*Specimens of Foreign Standard Literature*."

*. We now present our first number to the public. It has been hastily prepared, and with very little assistance from our friends. But such as it is we send it forth to make, or not to make, its fortune. It must speak for itself and rest on its own merits. We apprehend nothing much worse in our future numbers, and can promise nothing much better. If the public like it and want it, they will support it, and if they do not,—then of course they will not.

THE
BOSTON QUARTERLY REVIEW.

APRIL, 1838.

ART. I.—THE CHARACTER OF JESUS AND THE CHRISTIAN
MOVEMENT ORIGINAL AND PECULIAR.

FROM the fact, that in a previous Essay* I undertook to set forth that the Christ was in the world before Abraham, and had been the only savior of men from the beginning, I would by no means leave it to be inferred that I see nothing peculiar in the character of Jesus, or original in the movement he commenced,—in the moral, religious, and social order to which he has given his name. The character of Jesus was, in truth, strikingly original and peculiar; and the movement he commenced, and to which his death gave such a mighty impulse,—like his character, from which it proceeded,—was alone of its kind, original and peculiar, with no prototype in the previous history of the world.

But in what consisted the originality and peculiarity of his character? And wherein does the Christian movement differ from other important movements of Humanity? These are the questions which I propose to answer.

* See Boston Quarterly Review, No. I., ART. II.

I. In what consisted the originality and peculiarity of the character ascribed by the New Testament writers to Jesus? I answer,

1. Not in his nature. If we may regard at all the reasoning of my previous Essay, on this subject, or place any reliance on what seem to be the plain declarations of the writers of the New Testament, Jesus was in no respect distinguished, by his nature, from mankind in general. He did not belong to a separate order of being, but to common Humanity. The Christ was not manifested in a superior nature, in a super-angelic, nor in an angelic, nature, but in a human being, in a man, made like unto other men, subject to all the infirmities of other men, sin alone excepted. It behooved him to be made like unto his brethren, otherwise he could not have properly sympathized with them, and been an example unto them of what they might and should be, in order to be followers of God as dear children.

2. The originality and peculiarity of Jesus do not consist in the fact that he taught any new and peculiar truths, that he disclosed to the world any intellectual truth before unknown, nor in the fact that he pointed out any new method, or created any new means, by which men may be justified in the sight of God. This I have proved, by showing, as I think I have done, that the Christ, the only savior of men, the only redeemer of lost sinners, was before Abraham, was, in fact, the lamb slain from the foundation of the world, and that by virtue of which the wise and the good of all ages and nations had been justified. The way of salvation, the means of redemption and sanctification, were, after the coming of Jesus, precisely what they had been before his coming. Men were before Jesus just and holy in the sight of God only on the condition that they possessed the Christ, and they can be just and holy under the Christian dispensation only on the same condition. The conditions of salvation never change. Men must be holy, before they can be accounted holy, by Him

who is not deceived by appearances ; and holiness is possessed only by dwelling in love, and by love dwelling in us, — dwelling in God, and God dwelling in us.

3. Nor was Jesus original and peculiar, because the Christ was in him and manifested through him. The Christ, I have proved, at least, think I have proved, is nothing but pure, disinterested Love. Now Jesus was not the first that loved, nor was he alone in the fact of manifesting pure, disinterested love. Thousands before him had loved, and with as much purity and intensity as he did. His love was strong, was intense, and able to endure neglect, ridicule, persecution, and death ; but in this he was by no means singular. Others had been able to endure all he endured, and to submit to as great, if not even greater, sacrifices than he did. His personal sacrifices were great ; but, according to the record, they were by no means remarkable, nor are they difficult to be matched in any age or nation of the world. His death on the cross strikes me in no wise as remarkable ; and it loses much of its merit too, if we suppose that he foresaw that it was to be only a temporary suspension of existence, and that he should be alive again and well after the third day. Who of us would not joyfully consent to be crucified, if we could foresee that our crucifixion would result in the regeneration of the world, and that in three days we should be alive and well, walking about, meeting our friends, eating and drinking, and knowing that we were henceforth to die no more, but to rise at once into inconceivable glory and blessedness ?

4. Nor was Jesus separated from all who went before him by the fact that he died a martyr to principle, or to convictions of Duty. Socrates long before him had set an illustrious example of a noble martyrdom to principle, and Abraham had been ready to offer up his son Isaac at the command, or supposed command, of Duty, which, I must believe, cost him altogether more than it would have cost him to lay

down his own life. And shall we suppose that truth, principle, duty, love, had no martyrs in the countless generations which had passed on and off the earth before the coming of Jesus? Shall we so wrong our common nature, do such injustice to the patriarchs, sages, and prophets, and saints, who the writer to the Hebrews says, "had trial of cruel mockings and scourgings, of bonds and imprisonment, who wandered about in sheep-skins and goat-skins, in deserts, in mountains, in dens and caves of the earth, destitute, afflicted, tormented, stoned, sawn asunder, or slain with the sword?" Never since the human race began its endless career of progress, has truth, science, love, faith, principle, duty, wanted martyrs, and martyrs too whose corporal and mental agonies suffer not in comparison with those of Jesus. It was noble in Jesus to die rather than be false to his mission; but this fact does not separate him from his race. Humanity is rich in martyrs, and the fact that Jesus was one, does but admit him into a numerous and a glorious company. Every page of human history is written in the precious and life-giving blood of martyrs; and the blood of martyrs is too honorable to Humanity to be called the distinguishing glory of one alone. A goodly company, an august assembly was that, composed of the martyrs of all ages, which the apocalyptic John saw in the visions of his spirit, almost in the very days of Jesus, gathering round the throne of the Ancient of Days, and striking their harps to the triumphal song of Moses and the Lamb. Let no man wish to snatch the crown from one of their heads, or the palm from one of their hands, for the sake of elevating any one of their number above his equals.

But if Jesus was distinguished neither by his nature, nor the truths he taught or revealed, nor the means of man's justification which he pointed out or created, nor the strength and intensity of his love, nor by his personal sacrifices and his martyr death on the cross, in what then did the originality, the

peculiarity of his character consist ? It consisted in the fact that in him the Christ attained to Universality, and that his love was no longer the love of family, caste, tribe, clan, or country, but a love of Humanity ; it was no longer mere piety, nor patriotism, nor friendship, but it was PHILANTHROPY.

I will try to explain and verify this statement. Love had existed, and been as pure, as intense, as all-unconquerable, in thousands who had preceded Jesus, as it was in him ; but in none of them had it taken the form of philanthropy, or love of mankind. Take the case of Abraham, the father of the Jewish people. The Christ was in Abraham ; the principle, or sentiment, which I have called love, was strong and abiding in him ; but it was partial, it wanted freedom and universality ; and it manifested itself in no remarkable degree, save in its religious aspect. The effort to give up his son Isaac, must, I have said, have cost him more than it would to have sacrificed himself, and could have been made only through the force of the strongest religious principle. But you see nothing of the human side of Abraham's love. The Christ in him was not the God-Man, the union of the love of God and the love of Man. Faithful to God, he was often wanting in his duty to Man. In his human relations, he was false, tyrannical, and in no way distinguished from ordinary chieftains of a nomade tribe. He lived by pasturage, and perhaps by carrying on a predatory warfare, as do the Bedouin Arabs to-day. So far as history gives us any account of him, it does not appear that he ever dreamed of loving or serving mankind. He was, so far as he is known to us, the true type of the Jewish people. That people was of an earnest race, full of noble qualities, capable of the firmest principles, the most exalted sentiments, and the loftiest deeds ; but it was an Oriental race. Its brow was expanded but not elevated. It equals, if it do not surpass, all others on the religious side of our nature ; but it comprehends nothing, feels nothing of the sentiment

of Humanity. The fulness of its heart overflows towards God, but never towards man. From the depths of its being, rise perennial springs of piety, but not of philanthropy. In the same breath it pours forth the most kindling strains of devotion, and utters the most horrid imprecations upon its enemies.

Moses and David, the two most eminent names, after Abraham, of the race, partake of the same noble qualities, and are marked by the same defects. Moses was a great man. Antiquity boasts few greater names than his. The Christ was in him; but unable to attain to a symmetrical development. His love was strong, intense, all-enduring, but it was love only in its religious and patriotic, or more properly, clannish phases. Piety was his breath. He saw God at all times, and in all things; and he bowed down with profound awe before the Divine Presence. He recognised God as the only rightful sovereign of the universe, and he would have no king in Israel, but Jehovah. His love for his tribe, or, if you please, for his people, was strong, generous, and strikingly verified. Though brought up as the adopted son of Pharaoh's daughter, and by his education, talents, genius, and position, capable of becoming virtually the first man in the kingdom, he chose to adhere to his people, a proscribed race in Egypt, to suffer reproach and affliction with them, and, if need were, to die for them. This was to him far more desirable than all the wealth, honors, pleasures, and power that Egypt had to give. But his love did not extend beyond his people. They were the whole earth to him. They were the only mankind he knew. He was willing to rob the Egyptians to enrich them, and he could command them to extirpate with fire and sword the Canaanites, even to helpless women and innocent babes. So strong is his hatred even of other nations, that he surrounds his people with laws and institutions designed to keep them forever a separate, distinct, and peculiar people. I will not say that all this, considering the age in which Moses lived, and

the designs of Providence, was wrong. Nothing can come but in its time; and the time for the universal brotherhood of Humanity was not yet. Moses doubtless was as perfect as his age and people admitted or demanded. All I would say is, that he was not a *whole* man, that he manifested the Christ only in its religious and patriot phases. This was much, but was not all. It was enough for his time, but not for all time.

The same, in some respects at least, may be said of David. David was a second Moses, really inferior by many degrees to the first, in himself, but in some measure compensating that disadvantage by living some centuries later. He was a poet and a warrior, a prophet and a man of blood. He was remarkable for his piety, and the strength and freshness of his devotional feelings. Even to this day, religious people can find no better medium for expressing their devotional sentiments, than his really inspired Psalms. I can conceive no language so adequate to the utterance of our religious feelings, as those astonishing Hebrew Odes of his. I read them always with fresh wonder and awe. But no sooner does David sink, as it were, the priest and the prophet in himself, and withdraw his eyes from the dazzling glories of Jehovah's chariot, than he breaks forth in the most intolerant rage against all who are not of his Israel. Some of his Psalms are nothing but imprecations upon his enemies. Spite, contempt, disdain, wrath, hatred, revenge, ring forth in a sort of hellish harmony, and would seem to partake enough of the infernal to make hell's monarch himself applaud. He loved his tribe, and through the aid or intrigues of the priesthood he made it the ruling tribe. He loved his family and left it the throne, of which it retained possession for many generations. But no recognition of human brotherhood ever escaped him; no gleam of philanthropy ever broke in upon the obscure night, as to the relations of man to man as man, in which he lived, and in which he died. All the nations of the earth,

save the Jews, were his and Jehovah's enemies, and could be favored only by bowing their necks to his yoke. So was it with all his successors, whether among the bards and minstrels, or prophets and kings, unless an exception be made in favor of Solomon, who seems, in the latter part of his life, to have relaxed somewhat from the rigid national bigotry of his countrymen, and to have felt that other nations besides his own were worthy of regard and even of imitation. Perhaps a slight exception ought also to be made in the case of Isaiah, for though he was a Jew, a stern, unrelenting Jew, and doubtless held all other nations in suitable abhorrence, he does seem to have had some dream or dim presentiment, that the time would come at least, when the Gentiles would enjoy a share of Jehovah's regard, though probably, in his mind, only by being converted to Judaism.

If from the Jews, we pass to the Greeks and Romans, albeit we find a difference, we shall still find the Christ only partially formed. The religious aspect of the Christ is less striking; the love of country suffers no diminution, and that of Science, and in the case of the Greeks, that of the Beautiful, are super-added. But we do not find the sentiment of Humanity. No precept betrays it, no life reveals it. There is certainly a greater approximation towards universal brotherhood, than with the Jews. You meet a more human and cosmopolitan spirit. Still the Greek looks with a sort of contempt upon all races but his own. The Roman deems liberty, freedom, the especial property, or deserving to be the especial property, of the Roman citizen alone. In either country, there is no want of men who can die for family and friends, and especially for country; but there are none to die for Humanity. Instances of the most striking devotion to one's country meet us at every step. Rome up to the epoch of the Empire was always full of men ready to immolate themselves for the safety or glory of the City; but I have found no instance, recorded in her history, of a man who immolated himself for mankind.

She furnished heroes and patriots, but not philanthropists.

Socrates, as Plato has given him to us, is in my judgment the greatest of the predecessors of Jesus, and the only one of them that may with any propriety be brought into comparison with him. History presents me in none of her favorites, before Jesus, a single individual who comes up so near to my conception of a complete man, as Socrates; and yet he has nothing of the completeness we perceive in Jesus. He has a strong devotional spirit. The religious phase of the Christ was, perhaps, as striking in him as in Jesus. He had equal sincerity, modesty, firmness, and moral courage, though less warmth and earnestness. But he was an Athenian; the greatest of the Athenians, the noblest race of antiquity, but he was not great enough for Humanity. Great as he was, it is questionable whether his love stretched beyond his native Athens, at most beyond the Hellenic race. His life and his death was a noble homage to virtue and truth and philosophy, but not a homage to philanthropy. He did not submit to death because he loved the human race, but because he loved wisdom; not because he was a philanthropist, but because he was a philosopher.

Now all these whom I have mentioned, and to whom my remarks naturally refer though I have not given their names, did much, and did nobly. They prepared the way for Jesus; but he is distinguished from them all by a broad line. His originality and his peculiarity consist in the fact that he was not the man of a clique or coterie, of a tribe, or a people, that he was not a patriot nor a philosopher; but a philanthropist. In him, if we may credit history, the Christ for the first time leaped the narrow enclosures of the Temple, the priesthood, the school, the sect, the family, the clan, the country, and bounded forth, with a free step and a joyous heart, over the immense plains of Humanity. Then, for the first time, there was a MAN on the earth; one who might, in the significant idiom of

the Hebrews, call himself the Son of Man; and who was a type of the universal man, the man of all ages, and countries, the man formed not by conventions, but by the free, full, and harmonious development of human nature itself.

I cannot say how much the prejudices of a theory, or of education, may have blinded my eyes and biased my judgment, but I think every intelligent reader of the Gospels, must admit that Jesus was singularly free from every thing merely local and temporary. He has no feature of the conventional or artificial man. Though born and brought up a Jew, there is nothing Jewish in the genius and complexion of his mind. There is nothing in his character by which you can determine the age, or people, to which he belonged, nor the circumstances amid which he had grown up. Indeed it is difficult for us to conceive of his character as ever having been formed. We are almost compelled to look upon it as a spontaneous production, as coming into the world all ready formed, perfected and finished by the Creator's hand at one stroke. It is this completeness, and this fidelity to universal human nature, that enable him to commend himself to all men of all times, nations, sects, and creeds. Eighteen hundred years have rolled away since he was on the earth. Mighty revolutions have changed more than once the face of the moral and intellectual world; his countrymen have been scattered to the four winds of heaven; the empires which in his day were in the pride of their strength and the zenith of their glory, have passed beneath the sway of the conqueror, fallen to pieces and mouldered to dust; new tribes and new peoples have issued forth from the depths of the forest, passed on and off the stage, and been succeeded by others still; new sciences, new arts, new laws, new thoughts, new feelings, new languages, new forms of government, new religions, and new modes of life, have sprung up; and yet his character is as young, as fresh, as modern, if I may so speak, as though he had been the playmate

of our childhood, and the companion of our youthful studies,—is as faithful a type of human nature as it is developed to-day in this Western world and in this free republic, as it was of human nature as it was developed in the multitudes that thronged to hear him, as he went preaching through the cities of Judea and Galilee. Through the lapse of ages, and all the changes that time works in the things of this world, it has not been outgrown, has acquired nothing of the antique, the superannuated, the obsolete. Here is a proof of the universality of his nature. He was no Sadducee, no Pharisee, no Jew, no Gentile; HE WAS A MAN, true to universal human nature. The elements of his mind and heart, were the elements of all minds and hearts. Herein was his peculiarity. He was peculiar in that he was not peculiar, in his entire freedom from all idiosyncrasy, in being marked by nothing which does not belong to the universal mind and heart of Humanity.

With this character we may readily predict that his love will not be confined to his family and friends, to the individuals of a particular caste, class, sect, party, or country; but that it will be free, impartial, and universal. His sympathy will be awakened by man and by man only. All the factitious distinctions of Society will disappear before him; kings, priests, nobles, patricians, plebeians, thrones, sceptres, diadems, and mitres, all will vanish away, and there will stand before him only men, human beings in their moral strength or moral weakness, in their beauty, or their deformity. Man and men, not tribes and nations, man and men, not classes, orders, or estates, he will see, love, and die to redeem. This is his glory. This gives him the title, more honorable than any nobility ever bore, of the SON OF MAN. This makes him the savior of mankind. This endears him to simple Humanity throughout all time and space, establishes his empire over the universal mind and heart, builds the temples which bear his name, and tunes the millions of voices which on each successive sabbath day, throughout all

the earth, shout forth his praise in glad and loud hosannas.

In this, I see the originality and the peculiarity of Jesus. He was the first of our race in whom the sentiment of the universal brotherhood of the human race was developed; the first who had died a martyr to his love of mankind. His life was the earliest revelation of philanthropy, and he was the first who, sinking all considerations of father, mother, sister, brother, friend, country, creed, school, sect, party, tribe, people, order, class, estate, could let the fountains of his love overflow for simple Humanity, who could die for man as man. He was the first whose love begat Humanity; and through him the human race is installed; and the good man directed henceforth to find his household and friends and countrymen in Humanity; and a neighbor in whomsoever needs his kind offices. With him philanthropy, love, to man as man, was born; and well did Heaven's hosts shout at his birth, "Peace on earth and good will to man," as well as "Glory to God in the highest."

II. Having ascertained wherein consisted the originality, the peculiarity of the character of Jesus, there can be no difficulty in seizing the peculiar traits of the Christian Movement. The Christian Movement sprung from the life of Jesus; and as that life was the life of philanthropy, the Christian Movement must needs be a movement in the direction of love to mankind. It was not a movement in behalf of piety, of patriotism, nor of art and science, but of Humanity. Its end was to reconcile men to one another and to God, to bring together in Christ, all the members of the human family, however widely estranged, and to integrate them all in the unity of the spirit of Love. In this consists what it may claim of the original and peculiar.

The Jewish Movement, commenced by Abraham, continued by Isaac and Jacob, of which Moses was the lawgiver, Joshua the hero, David the poet, and

Solomon the philosopher, was essentially a religious movement, using the word religion, as I now do, in its most restricted sense. Its main-spring was piety, the worship of God, not the weal of man; and its mission was to bring out the religious element of human nature, and to institute the worship of a spiritual Divinity. This was the end of that movement, and to this end was limited the mission of the Jewish people. To this mission, God, in his providence, had called the Jewish people; and this is wherefore they were denominated the chosen people of God. They were God's chosen people, in an especial sense, because it was their especial work to bring out the idea of God, of piety. This work, as far as, when taken exclusively, it can be accomplished, they did accomplish. When the time had come for religion to be transferred from the Jews to Humanity, to be brought out of the temple at Jerusalem and placed in the temple of the universal human heart, the Jewish nation died, as die all nations, and all individuals too, when their work is done, their mission fulfilled.

Had Jesus been sent merely to effect a religious movement, he would have been only the continuator of Abraham and Moses. In this case he would have had nothing original and peculiar in his character, nor in his mission. Christians would have been called merely to engage in the work which had been assigned to the Jews, which work was finished when the veil of the Temple was rent in twain, and the Holy of Holies laid open to the gaze of the profane. The Christian Movement would have had no aim peculiar to itself; it could only have tended to achieve a work already achieved.

So far as it concerns the religious element of human nature, taken as an exclusive element, I must needs believe the Jews had done all for its development that can be done. In respect to piety, Christians can make no advance on the Jews; nor do they essentially differ from the Jews. They and the Jews worship one and the same spiritual Divinity. The

most religious of to-day find the Hebrew Odes, as I have said, the best interpreters of their religious feelings. Whoever would sing the praises of God, extol his providences, or speak forth his glory and majesty, might and dominion, strikes the harp of David and pours out his soul in a Hebrew song. On the religious side of our nature, Jews and Christians are the same. In a strictly religious sense, then, Christianity adds nothing to Judaism. The Christian Movement is not original and peculiar, under its religious aspect.

But however perfect Judaism may have been, as a development of the religious element of our nature, as it concerns a sense of man's duty to God, it is extremely deficient in relation to other essential elements of Humanity, and especially in relation to a sense of man's duty to man. The Jew was defective on what may be called the human side of his character. He had no love for man, as man, for the simple fact of his being a man. He held all nations but his own in abhorrence, and if he loved a single human being, it was because that human being superadded to his claims as a man, those of countryman or kindred, of a benefactor, or a dependent, a friend, a companion, or an acquaintance. He never conceived of the love of simple, naked Humanity. This was his great defect. This defect Christianity supplies. To the Jew's piety it adds philanthropy, the love of man, as man, for his human nature, without reference to anything else. It does not take from the Jew, it simply adds to what he had. Jesus did not come to destroy Judaism, but to fulfil, perfect, complete it, to supply its deficiencies. The tendency of the movement he commenced was not to make us love God less, but man more. This was its grand characteristic. By its philanthropic tendency it was distinguished by a broad line from Judaism, and became and should be considered something more than a continuation of Judaism.

The Christian Movement may also be as clearly

distinguished from the Greek Movement. Greece was the land of art and science, the home of the beautiful and the true. The Jews had no art, no science, and, properly speaking, no philosophy. But Greece had them all, and in a high degree of perfection. God called the Greeks to the work of developing art, science, philosophy, in like manner as he had called the Jews to that of developing religion. If Christianity were a movement in the direction of the arts and sciences, if its object were to realize the true and the beautiful, it would be merely a continuation of the Greek Movement, it would be identified with that movement, and would therefore have nothing original and peculiar to itself.

In point of fact, that element of human nature which creates Art, whether under the form of literature, poetry, eloquence, or under the form of music, painting, sculpture, and architecture, has received no extraordinary developments from the Christian Movement. We study most of the fine arts at Athens to-day, as we did before the coming of Jesus. The Greek historians, poets, tragedians, orators, sculptors, architects, are still our masters in their respective spheres, as the Jewish prophets are in what relates to the worship of God. Christianity has done something. It has embodied in its painting and in its Gothic architecture, the beauty of Sentiment, a species of beauty unknown to the ancient world, and which could be developed only by a religion of Love. The Greeks embodied in their works of art only the beauty of form and of idea. In science we have advanced on Greece, but always in the direction of Greece. We have continued and improved Greece. In philosophy we have agitated no questions which were not agitated at Athens, and we probably must continue to agitate the same problems for ages to come, without obtaining solutions which may be regarded as definitive. However much we may have surpassed the Greeks, either in art or science, in the cultivation of the true and the beautiful, we can claim little originality. We cannot

say that the world is at all indebted to Christianity, or to the Christian Movement, for art, science, and philosophy, though it may be indebted to it in some degree for the progress they have made.

The Christian Movement is distinguished also from the Roman Movement. The Roman world is nothing but the complement of the Grecian world. It stands out for its contributions to patriotism and jurisprudence. Its mission was to found the State, and to teach the world to live under law. Law is truly a Roman element. Christianity has extended it, and contributed much to the improvement of legislation, both in its spirit and in its forms, but it is not the originator of law.

But there is one aspect under which the Christian world, by the side of Greece and Rome, must strike us as original and peculiar. Neither Greece nor Rome, in any of their movements, in any of their creations, ever realized the love of man, as man. They give us no example of philanthropy. The word is indeed Greek, but the thing is purely of Christian origin and growth. Penetrate the Grecian and Roman city, you shall find there no institution that recognises, no law that reveals, a love for man, as man. The duty of the citizen is in no case the duty of the philanthropist. You find men with philanthropic souls, with humane feelings, men who are chaste, continent, generous, brave, heroic, but the end prescribed them, by the order of civilization to which they belong, is never the welfare of Humanity, but always the glory of the City. To improve, enrich, and embellish the City, to extend its conquests and dominion, to preserve or confirm its empire, is the great end prescribed to the individual. For this he toils, studies, sings, creates, faces danger, meets the enemy and death in battle. He does not live for himself alone. Far from it. Selfishness is not the *primum mobile*. Sacrifice is enjoined. The individual must be ready to give up ease, wealth, reputation, life, and that too without a murmur — but for what? For the city, the state, not for Humanity.

Greek and Roman civilization advanced far beyond selfishness, and beyond the mere love of family and friends; but it attained only to love of country. It could obtain the sacrifice of all the tender affections of the heart, all the endearments of home, all the pleasures of life, and life itself, at the call of Duty, but merely at the call of duty to the city or state, not at the call of duty to man. The citizen rushed forth to battle, and left his bones at Thermopylæ, at Marathon, Platea, Sardis, Arbela, Memphis, Carthage, in Spain, Gallia, Germany, or the Isles of the Britons, but not at the voice of Humanity; it was always at the voice of Sparta, Athens, or Rome.

I say not that Humanity has gained nothing by Greek and Roman wars. The interests of the human race were in them all, and were debated at Thermopylæ, at Marathon, at Platea, at Salamis, on the Granicus and the Nile, at Arbela and Philippi, in Pontus, Parthia, Spain, Gallia, and the British Isles; but the motive which moved the Grecian phalanx, or the Roman legion, was not a sense of duty to man, as man, but to the Grecian or the Roman state. Man, as man, claimed as yet no regard, and never did in the Grecian and Roman civilization. To promote the interests and glory of the city, was the highest moral end ever imposed by that civilization. He who was conscious of fidelity to the state, was acquitted of all sin in the eyes of his conscience, and felt that he had done all that Gods or men could demand of him.

This civilization, therefore, did not repel slavery. It had no conception of human brotherhood, of man's equality to man. It recognised distinctions of class, and had its nobles, patricians, plebeians, its populace, its *prolétaires*, its helots and its slaves. Sparta kept a whole nation in servitude, and if they became too numerous, hunted them down as we do wild beasts. Athens had slaves in abundance, and Rome to several times the amount of her free population. This fact of itself proves that there was no recognition of the rights of man, no love of simple Humanity. For he

who sees in others the same Humanity he loves and reverences in himself, who loves his fellow men simply as men, because they are men, will not, cannot degrade them to a lower round of the social hierarchy than he is willing to occupy himself, will certainly never consent to reduce them to slavery.

Hence, again, this civilization did not repudiate war. In fact, it was almost purely a military civilization. Its main business and its chief glory, were war and conquest. But had it been penetrated with a love of Humanity, had it seen a brother in the foreigner, a fellow man to be loved, it could not but have condemned war in principle, even if it had tolerated it in practice. But no. The same word served it to designate an enemy and a foreigner. All out of the pale of the city, were out of the pale of its love.

You see, then, wherein consisted the defectiveness of the Greek and Roman civilization. It probably was far behind the Jewish in its religious phase, but it far surpassed it in art, literature, science, philosophy; yet like the Jewish, it was wanting in the love of man, as man. This love of man, as man, wanting in both the Jewish and the Greek and Roman civilizations, in the Oriental world and in the Occidental world, is precisely that which Jesus came to supply, and which constitutes the originality and peculiarity of the Christian Movement.

The Christian Movement does not tend to develop piety, as did the Jewish; it does not tend, so exclusively, to perfect the state, to bring out art, science, philosophy, jurisprudence, the sense of law and love of country, as did the Greek and Roman; but it tends to the development of genuine philanthropy. In this tendency it proves itself original and peculiar. It does not destroy piety, art, science, philosophy, nor even patriotism; but it aims to shed over them a purer light, to diffuse through them a freer and a richer sentiment, and to make them all harmonize with, and contribute to, the freest and fullest development of human nature, man's highest possible perfection.

The love of man, as man, is Christianity's point of departure, and its point of arrival too. From this it starts, and to this it comes round. By making this its starting-point, it teaches us that our duty to God, to our country, to relatives, family, and friends, is discharged in the true love of Humanity, that all our duties, of whatever nature, are integrated in the love of man, in the service of mankind.

Under Judaism every thing was subordinated to religion, or the worship of God. The city or the state existed only for the purpose of maintaining the priesthood and the temple-service. All human interests were sacrificed. Art could not flourish, literature could have no existence, science and philosophy no toleration. Religion must reign without a rival, and by so doing it became exclusive, despotic, tyrannical. It lost its primal character, lost sight of its legitimate end, and from a reverence for the true and spiritual, a love of the beautiful and good, it degenerated into a long, fatiguing ritual, a mass of unmeaning rites and ceremonies, as unacceptable to God as burdensome and debasing to man. Religion, when separated from our other duties, when erected into a separate, a distinct duty of itself, or even when regarded as capable of being so erected, becomes a deep and withering curse upon Humanity, and inevitably awakens abhorrence, and the most unrelenting hostility in the bosom of every genuine Son of Man. Religion should be to us as the light, a medium through which we see all that we do see, but which itself remains forever unseen.

Man ought to learn, and if he studies the Christian Movement he will learn, that it is folly to think of doing anything for God. God stands in no need of help from man. He dwelleth not in temples made with hands, nor is he served with men's hands as though he needed anything. He is the universal Being, self-subsisting, and self-sufficing. He is above and beyond, albeit near and within us. He asks no vain oblations, no offerings of sweet incense and

I have neither the space nor the ability, to sketch even the faintest outline of the mighty progress of this Movement. I stand in awe before it, and bow down in gratitude to God for it. It has been sweeping on for two thousand years, and I can hardly credit the changes it has already wrought. It has swept away Judaism and Greek and Roman civilization, as exclusive states of society; it has tamed and humanized the ruthless Barbarian, softened national hostilities, subdued national prejudices, demolished the military nobility, put an end to the hereditary nobility in the spiritual society, and struck it with death in the temporal society. It is substituting the order of merit for the order of birth, and supplanting the artificial aristocracy by that of nature, by the aristocracy of talent and virtue. It has destroyed all distinctions of caste, and of master and slave, in principle at least, and will soon do it in practice. It proclaims the kindling doctrines of liberty and equality; it is preparing a system of universal education; it is carrying on an exterminating warfare against privilege, in whatever name or shape it may appear; it is raising up the poor and neglected, the low and oppressed; it is everywhere infusing into the human heart a deep reverence for human nature, a regard for everything human, and it issues its decree, Let not man, ever again, be counted vile or vulgar in the eyes of man.

They who manifest a true love for man, as man, who labor to meliorate the condition of man, who seek to obtain a greater amount of good for man, even for him who is at the foot of the social ladder, as well as for him who is at its summit, are affected by the Christian Movement. They who sympathize with man, and labor for his elevation, whether it be by reforming theology or philosophy, church or state, schools or jurisprudence, by improving art or science, by infusing morality into the transactions of the business world, unmasking the pretensions of a self-styled aristocracy, or imparting dignity to the me-

chanic arts, and to honest though ill requited labor, whether called heretics, perfectionists, loco focos, transcendentalists, colonizationists, abolitionists, temperance reformers, or moral reformers, are affected by the Christian Movement, and do show forth more or less of the Christ dwelling within them.

In order to be Christians, we must take a deep interest in whatever concerns man, as man, and each in his own sphere, according to his light and strength, must do his best to elevate the human soul and enlarge its sum of good. What can be done, and what ought to be done, each must determine for himself. It may be the mission of one, the mother, to attend solely to household affairs, to develope in the soul of her son the principles of the Gospel, to quicken his mind, and form his heart to virtue, to fit him for the love and achievement of grand and lofty deeds. It may be the duty of another, merely to prepare her own mind and heart for the duties which may await her as a wife and a mother. This one may be called merely to provide for the little ones committed to his care; that one will confine himself to the proper education of the young immortals confided to his wisdom and guardianship; this one may call out in a loud and thrilling voice to the masses, and seek to awaken the many to self-respect, to their rights, and to efforts for their melioration; that one may be commanded to thunder rebuke in the ears of a corrupt and indolent priesthood, to demand a reformed theology, a higher philosophy, a broader and more thorough education, a more equal, and therefore a more just, state of society; and another may have it in charge, to bring out the beautiful, to improve the fine arts, and adorn the world. There is a diversity of gifts, and of occupations, but the same spirit. Let each be true to the mission God has given; and dare neither live nor die without contributing something to make the world the wiser, the better, or the happier. We should all so live and so act that, when the moment comes in which we must leave these scenes which now know

us and which shall know us no more, we can say in truth, man is the better for our having lived. Then shall we follow or be carried along by the Christian Movement, and be able to die with the comfortable assurance that we are true Christians, and that we do but leave the society of our fellow men on earth to mingle with the spirits of the just made perfect in heaven.

ART. II. — *An Oration delivered before the Inhabitants of the Town of Newburyport, at their request, on the Sixty-first Anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1837.* By JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.

AN old statesman is likely to be a moral hack. There is something in the strifes of party, through which he has passed, so destructive to the moral sensibilities; something in the habits of office so ungenial to the more generous developments of character; something in the exercise of power in government, so opposite to that quality of mind, which seeks for the justification of authority, in principle, and not in established law, that he is a moral wonder, who has come out of politics at the age of seventy, unchanged from the confiding spirit with which youth enters the arena of political life. He has been accustomed to use his fellow men for his purposes, and to direct them in masses. They have become to him instruments to work with, and to be worked upon. He has forgotten to reverence the image of God in every human being, and to comfort himself in the brotherhood of Humanity. He looks upon the past and the present, but rarely to the future. The *Now* is his all important period in the line of time, and the "*all hail hereafter*," little else than nothing. He regards man as a political animal. He defines him to

be "an animal created to be governed." To speculate upon his destiny as a moral, a religious, a progressive, an immortal being; to delight himself in the prospect of his ultimate attainment to a more perfect condition, does not belong to his matter-of-fact province. He is apt to scout all this as theoretical and utopian, to set his face, as flint, against it, and rejoice in calling himself a *practical* man. He is one who says, "all this may do well enough for the contemplations of the student, and the dreams of the philanthropist; but I must take men as they are. This world is not Paradise. Men are not angels." You would not look for reformers among statesmen.

But you find no such practical hack in the veteran statesman, whose name stands at the head of this article. A fresher enthusiasm, a more cordial trust in man, a more glowing and intense sympathy in his prospective attainments, are not to be found in the compositions of a young optimist, just bursting from the visions of the closet upon the theatre of active life, than you read in the last dozen pages of Mr. Adams's Oration at Newburyport. They are resplendent with hope and promise. They are full both of unction and eloquence, and burn with all the fiery inspiration of a prophet; and you drop the book, at its close, to sit for hours, rejoicing in the future, into which the venerable orator has borne you from the present, delighted away.

He anticipates the time, he believes in the time, as yet to come, when wars are to cease, and be known no longer throughout all the civilized world. He does not, with the poets, go back to the past for the golden age; but with the prophets and the wise men, he seeks it in the future. There religion places it. There philosophy teaches it must be, if anywhere. The race is progressive. There never was a time, since the creation, when the fabled poetical perfection of the human state could have existed upon the earth. It never has been. It is historically false to believe it has been. It is intrinsically impossible that

it ever could have been. History shows man ever advancing. Originally, he is a savage; and by arts and letters and the heaven-born influences of religion, from age to age, he rises from the savage, step by step, to the civilized state; and thence, onward through every stage of improvement, to the last attainable bourne of his nature, where he emerges from the Human, (as the past has defined that word,) and passes into the earthly resemblance of the Divine. The golden age is not past,—it is to come,—it is in the future. We run back to the origin of the race; we trace man's constant advancement, from the beginning, upwards; we deduce thence the *law of progress*, and wait patiently, undoubtingly, the result of that law upon every evil institution. Men are mortal, but this law is immortal. Generations may die in the midst of evil; but the law survives, for the redemption of the race. It shall never die. While the world stands, it shall govern the course of God's intelligent creatures; and when this earth shall be stricken from its sphere, and time shall be no longer, this law of progress shall still regulate our spiritual being. In the triumphal march of this law, wars shall end, and the world yet be blessed with universal peace.

A master trait in the philosophy of our age, is its thorough confidence in the advancement of our race. There is nothing in its view of human nature, low, or narrow, or grovelling; but everything in it is expansive and soaring. In the true Christian spirit, it hopes too much to doubt; it loves too much to fear. It does not, by a false standard of admeasurement, limit the capacity of mankind for progression to what they have already done, but wisely refrains from computing the infinite, by the rules of a narrow experience. It sits at the feet of the Past, to gather lessons of wisdom, and then turns its back upon its instructor, to apply his lessons to the direction of the present, in full view of the future. It does not blindly worship antiquity, but reverences its own destiny.

In the records of that destiny the total extinction of war in Christendom is written, not more legibly to the eye of faith than to that of reason. Who is there, understanding the spirit of the Christian system, who does not believe that it shall fulfil the proclamation of its advent, — “peace on earth, and good will to men”? And who is there, versed in the history of the world, who can stand on the vantage ground of the nineteenth century, and looking back over the line of two thousand years, and say that the prevalence of universal peace within the next five centuries, is not more probable to the judgment, than the advancement of the nations, which has actually taken place since the commencement of our era?

It has always given us the deepest regret to find that the great name of Professor Cousin could be quoted as authority against the possibility of so glorious a prospect. In his “Introduction to the History of Philosophy,” he contends for the necessity of war. This doctrine is there stated and illustrated by him with his usual eloquent expansion. The point of the argument, by which he sustains his views, is as follows: “The root of war is inherent in the very nature of the ideas on which the existence of different nations is founded, — for these ideas, being necessarily partial, bounded, and exclusive, are necessarily hostile, aggressive, and tyrannical.” Hence war is necessary; that is, it must always exist. This argument we propose to examine, to see if there be in it a strength proportioned to the boldness of its statement.

War is not necessary for the reason assigned. The argument proves too much. If it be necessary among nations, then it is so among communities, towns, villages, individuals; for the ideas on which the existence of *these* is founded, are necessarily partial, bounded, and exclusive, and there is an end of all civil government, and social order. Every nation must be made up by the harmonious union of these

separate parts, which are all in their nature, tyrannical and discordant. Supposing the argument to be a good one, we have not at this moment, and never have had, and to the end of time, never can have, a single organized state in the world. The kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland is no longer one kingdom, but is England, and Scotland, and Ireland, — nay, it is the different local divisions of England, Scotland, and Ireland, and we are carried back beyond the days of the Saxon Heptarchy. And so of every other country made up of what were once separate sovereignties, as is the case with all Europe and America, — and the people, though existing united in nations, *in fact*, have no national existence in *Professor Cousin's philosophy*. But happily,

“There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamed of in your philosophy.”

The kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland *is* the kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, — and France *is* France, and not Burgundy, and Normandy, and Brittany, and the other provinces, — and the United States *are* the United States, in spite of logic and philosophy. If the argument were good, the whole world would now be in a condition of original barbarism, in which each family of savages (no, not each family of savages, but each savage, there could be no such thing as a family) lived, and hunted, and fought by itself. The idea of every individual man is quite as selfish, aggressive, hostile, and tyrannical, as that of every nation, — the root of selfishness is inherent in individuality, and grows and flourishes in it as in its natural soil. But in the advance of human nature, the social state springs out of the savage; society breaks down and subdues the selfishness, the hostility, the tyranny of the single barbarian, and submits them to the authority of law. And out of this system, in process of time, springs up a nation. Who shall prescribe limits to the process of association? Who shall say that nations shall not come to

obey the same laws of justice among themselves, which the individuals composing them acknowledge ?

Cousin not only argues that war is necessary, but following out his principle that every nation is the representative of certain opinions and institutions, which he calls "the idea of a nation," he undertakes a justification of war, and an exhibition of its benefits, on the ground that the victory brings about "the predominance of the idea of the conquering nation." But war in general has no such object. Take all the wars, as many as you can recount, from the time when man first raised his hand against his brother, and they had no other object but ambition, revenge, or the gratification of some selfish passion, (with a very few exceptions,) and had nothing to do with the predominance of an idea. They had to do with the predominance of *men*, not *ideas*. And what palliation shall we undertake to invent for an institution, which has commonly had its origin in the worst motives in princes, and leaders, and which fosters the worst passions in the people ; which works by murder and every mortal suffering ; which does not contemplate good as an object ; which, in the main, does not produce good, but terrible evil ; and which, where good is its aim, might, and ought to be superseded by better means ?

And supposing the purpose of war to be what Cousin represents it, namely, "the predominance of the idea of a nation ;" (which it certainly is not in most cases ;) and supposing it to be beneficial, and worthy the countenance of a good man ; (which it is not ;) still war is not the best means of answering this purpose. There are now other and far better means. Whatever it might once have been, it is not now necessary to answer this object. Commerce, mutual, familiar intercourse, such as exists at this day among the civilized nations, the interchange of literature, and public opinion, and the thousand reciprocal national relations of this most favored era, can accomplish this end much more safely and surely, much

more for "the glory of God, and the relief of man's estate." Did Great Britain, after she had abolished the slave trade for herself, go to war with France and Spain and Portugal to compel them to abolish it? And yet that blessed cause is carried, — the predominance of this *idea of the British nation* over its neighbors is accomplished without a battle, by the peaceful process of negotiation, now most triumphantly successful in similar cases. Apply this fanciful theory of war to the relations which existed two years ago between this country and the French people. Suppose France and the United States had then gone to war upon the causes of quarrel which then existed between them, and France had been victorious, would she have made faithlessness to treaties predominant? or had the United States prevailed in the contest, would they have made forbearance under injuries and insults predominant? No. War is now recognised among the civilized nations as an institution to be justified and called into use, only as an arbiter of disputes; in a word, as a trial for ascertaining an issue, resulting in no predominance, — and any people, who should now adopt it for the latter purpose, would be put down by all the rest, leagued together in a common cause.

Well may the Mahometan claim the art of war as his agent of predominance, but not a Christian philosopher. Would Cousin recommend to us to exterminate Brahmanism by the sword, and so to establish the predominance of the idea of the Christian nations? Or to take up arms against Mahometanism, or idol worship, or inhuman and brutalizing rites of religion of any kind? Would he counsel us to make war against every evil national influence, out of the borders of Christendom, in order to make our civilized creed and arts and institutions predominant? Our instruments in this work are noiseless, bloodless, yet most mighty reformers, — national intercourse, example, generous competition, and the benevolent ministrations of a gospel of peace. There is no

philosophy, no religion, no humanity, no heart, in such a justification of war. It springs from a misapprehension of the spirit of our time, and belongs to the policy of barbarians, and the history of other ages. Our heroism, the heroism of this our period, is in a scientific, an intellectual, a moral, a religious, a manly, a godly warfare. We fight the powers of evil. Our expeditions are fitted out in the love of God, and of his creature, our fellow-man, and led against the armies of Belial, among benighted nations. We send forth our missionary forces, Christian warriors, having on the helmet of salvation, grasping the sword of the spirit, and their feet shod with the preparation of the gospel of peace. We send our Howards to invade the dungeons and prisons where misery and guilt dwell together, to relieve and bless them. Our Parks, Ledyards, Denhams, and Clappertons, our Parrys, Rosses, and Backs, go out to explore new regions of the globe, and new channels for the all-pervading course of human enterprise. And our Franklins, our Davys, our Watts, and our Fultons vanquish the forces of nature, and wrest the elements from their ancient seats. Such is the warfare with which we bring about the predominance of our ideas. These are our heroes. This our chivalry. This our glory. Let other ages boast of their exploits on the field of battle, their victories, their conquests, and send us down embalmed in history, and oratory, and poetry the names of their "man-killers," as Dryden calls heroes. We live in a different age, and for other destinies.

Cousin seems charmed with war, because, as he says, "an absence of it is a state of absolute immobility." Then such is the present state of the Christian world. Profound peace reigns between all the nations. But is immobility the condition of the times? On the contrary, *was* it not such, during the almost continual wars of Europe, from the reign of the emperor Charles V. to the fall of Napoleon? And is it anything but peace which has changed this

immobility to motion, rapid motion, and motion *forward*? Is there no virtue in the thousand impulses of an intensely active and excited public spirit, in philanthropy, in the communication of opinion and literature, in gaining and getting, and a generous but pacific rivalry among states, to keep the wheels of human affairs from standing stock still, in a state of "absolute immobility"? Will nothing keep them in motion, but a perennial, rushing stream of human blood?*

When the application of the magnetic properties of iron to the purposes of navigation was discovered, then its power as an instrument of destruction was on its way to a sure decline and fall. The compass came into use, and the sword ceased to be the efficient agent of national predominance; and commerce assumed its office. This has thrown the affairs of the civilized world into a new orbit, to which war is an antagonist and disturbing force. Attraction is now the law of the nations, where, formerly, it was repulsion; intercourse is now their object, where before it was separation.

Yes. The world is changed. Heaven has vouchsafed to man a new order of events, and a higher aim for his aspirations of social advancement.

Magnus, ab integro, sæclorum nascitur ordo.
Jam redit et virgo, redeunt Saturnia regna.

War has ceased to be the employment, it has ceased to be the glory, it has ceased to be the enricher of

* The universal consent of men, learned and unlearned, has spurned the theory of Hobbes, that war is the natural state of man. And he is looked upon, for his views in this matter, as a sort of evil genius; and his name, as a philosopher is in reproach. But if the doctrine we have attempted to examine be correct; if war be necessary; if men cannot be kept from fighting with each other, and it is justifiable that they should fight, and beneficial too, then Hobbes's theory *is true*. *War is the natural state of man*. It is in vain to disguise this. If we denounce Hobbes, why do we embrace his doctrine? If we abjure his sentiments, why are they found nestling in our own bosoms?

nations. A new spirit is at work in political transactions. The views of governments are now directed to the making of treaties for trade and for the removal of abuses, and not treaties for defence or offence. The era of commerce in national affairs has succeeded to that of war. The glowing language of Burke is literally true, and in a far higher sense than that in which he used it. "The age of chivalry *is* gone. That of economists and calculators *has* succeeded; but the glory of Europe is not," as he deemed it, "extinguished forever." No. The glory of Europe and of the world never blazed forth as now, in living splendors.

"Farewell ! the plumed troop, and the big wars,
That make ambition virtue ; O, farewell !
Farewell the neighing steed, and the shrill trump,
The spirit-stirring drum, the ear-piercing fife,
The royal banner ; and all quality,
Pride, pomp, and circumstance of glorious war !

Farewell ! Othello's occupation's gone."

Though the commercial world may be unconscious agents in this process of redemption; though they may not know, nor rightly value their high calling, and follow it rather for gain than godliness; though they may contemplate no such effect as the result of their operations; though that effect should even be contrary to their purposes and intentions; to this, at last, in the course of modern civilization, it must assuredly come.

ART. III.—*The Americans in their Moral, Social, and Political Relations*. By FRANCIS J. GRUND. Boston: Marsh, Capen, & Lyon. 1837. Two volumes in one. 12mo. pp. 423.

NOTHING annoys a portion of our countrymen more than certain books, concerning us, which English

travellers from time to time put forth. These books, it is said, abuse, misrepresent, caricature, and make us sweet food for laughter. All this is unquestionably very provoking; but it is nothing more than they who complain deserve. It is meet that English travellers should make us their sport, so long as we continue to worship the English. When we cease to be apes and dare be men, when we leave off our blind devotion to everything English, and set up for a national character of our own, thinking our own thoughts, speaking our own words, and living after our own manner, English travellers, and all other travellers, will try us by the proper standard, treat us with proper respect, and tell the truth about us. Till then, God grant that the Halls, the Trollopes, and the Hamiltons may continue to write and publish concerning us.

The book before us, by an intelligent German, who has resided several years among us, is in a very different vein from the productions with which English travellers have so liberally favored us. It is a work of respectable ability and information. It has evidently been conceived and executed in a good spirit, and with a friendly intent. The impression concerning our morals, manners, institutions, and social relations, the perusal of it must leave on the mind of a foreigner, we should think, would be in the main correct. Perhaps it is too little disposed to find fault, and that it sometimes praises us, when it would do well to censure us. However this may be, we welcome the book, and recommend it as deserving the attention of our countrymen. They may find in it some useful suggestions, and derive much pleasure from its perusal, perhaps profit from its study.

This book has one fault, at least what will be deemed a fault by many. It is not written in the interests of the aristocracy. Mr. Grund's literary reputation, as well as his standing in American "Good Society," will be seriously affected by the respect he has shown for democratic principles. Will it be believed in the

Saloons, in State Street, in Wall Street, and especially in Old Harvard, that a man capable of writing a book of unquestionable ability, has spoken of General Jackson in terms of respect, and even gone so far as to approve his administration? The fact is even so, incredible as it may appear. This is probably because Mr. Grund was neither born nor educated in America. Had he been born and educated in this country, it is not likely that he would have been guilty of such high handed *lèse-aristocratie*. The presidents and professors of our colleges take proper care that no democracy infect their halls, which are duly fumigated, and ever and anon, ventilated with fresh currents of good English atmosphere.

A foreigner might naturally think that the literature of a democratic country should be democratic; but we can teach him better. This country is too democratic to tolerate a democratic literature. What would become of our aristocracy, if our literature, by any strange mischance, should become democratic? Where would it be, if the "Rabbis of the Universities," together with the learned Dean who presides over the North American, should, by any singular confusion of ideas, embrace democratic notions, and undertake to train up the young men entrusted to their care, to love the free and democratic institutions of their country? Gone were it, and gone forever. Aristocracy dies in this country the day that it loses the aid of our literature. The people of this country will do very much as they have a mind to do; and if they take it into their heads to give the aristocracy the go-by, they will do it, and no power on earth can hinder them. Need is there then that the aristocracy keep in their own hands the control of all the influences which go to form the mind of the people. This is their only means of salvation. Of these influences the most important is literature. The men who come forth from colleges are looked upon as the masters of literature, as its creators rather, and hence the necessity of keeping democracy out of colleges.

The necessity there is of keeping up an aristocratic tone in our literature, accounts in part for our fondness for English literature and our aversion to French and German. The French and Germans, in literary matters, are rank democrats. They pay no deference to Cant, they speak out boldly what they think, and they think for themselves too. The English are not guilty of these sins. They dress the altars of thrice holy Cant, take good care to exhibit no trace of free thought or of bold and manly utterance. Their literature is not disfigured by any wildness of speculation, by any consciousness of mental independence, or any living sentiment of Humanity. It is therefore just the literature for us, young Americans. It is safe, and will tend to keep us in order. Should we once begin to study, to some extent, the literature of France and Germany, there is no telling what strange consequences might ensue. There would soon be no respect paid to a thing merely because it is old, nor to a man because he is rich. It is even possible that we should become so perverse as to reverence only worth, and to reverence that though clad in rags!

Our remarks are not quite just to English literature. England has had, and has, some writers whose works are not altogether tame and servile; but these writers are not commended, and are generally represented as dangerous and not to be read. Scott it is safe to read and to praise, for he was too much engaged with the past, too busy in furbishing up old escutcheons, and tracing out old heraldic bearings, to ever dream of elevating the masses, or of giving countenance to doctrines of political equality. But the "*Lay of the Last Minstrel*" has been sung. The Minstrel sleeps with his fathers. Peace to his ashes. We did him due honor for his genius in his day, and suffered ourselves to be beguiled, by his enchanting volumes, of many a weary hour. Bulwer it is not safe to praise or to read. He is evidently democratic. His moral character is said to be very bad, and the saints es-

chew his books ; though these same saints will support a man for president of the United States, whose character is said to be no better than they represent Mr. Bulwer's. But then this candidate for the presidency is not loaded with the sin of democracy. Poor Byron is under the ban of the Reviews, is declared to have been no poet, to have been given to the flesh, and to have sometimes sipped gin and water. There is great peril in reading him. He should be eschewed by all who have a regard for their morals. Not indeed because he was given to the flesh, for that may sometimes be the case with men accounted godly, nor because he drank gin and water, for it is lawful to praise Charles Lamb, though he would now and then get tipsy ; but because he did not reverence Cant, and because he was not, as he was in duty bound to be, a staunch aristocrat. Wordsworth may be praised, for few have the patience to read him, and moreover he is a Tory ; but poor Shelley must not be mentioned, for he dreamed of social equality. Coleridge and Southey are permitted to be read, notwithstanding the "pantisocratic" dreams of their youth, for when they became men they "put away childish things."

Of our own writers it is lawful to praise Washington Irving, for he has never, we believe, written anything not acceptable to the North American and the London Quarterly. Cooper was a favorite, so long as he wrote only to amuse, and took good care to show no sympathy with the democracy ; but since he has felt himself an American, and sought to infuse into his works some portion of American thought and feeling, he has fallen from grace, and must now be looked upon as under the ban of all the Quarterlies in the world,—except our own. It would hardly do for Bryant to hazard another volume of poems. Channing, it is said, is a loco foco, and has an eye to Congress, for he has shown no little sympathy with common Humanity. Bancroft must be endured, because nobody but a thorough going democrat can write the History of the United States, and it is very desir-

able that the History of the United States be written. The Whigs, or their fathers, have tried to write it; but they have been as unable to do it, as a Mussulman would be to write the History of Christianity. Nobody but a democrat can seize the spirit of this nation, comprehend its Idea or embody it in his narrative. Mr. Bancroft must then be endured as an historian; but as a man, he finds no mercy. He has committed the sin of democracy, in a democratic country too, and absolution he must not hope for, in this world nor in that which is to come.

Now the fact is, these democratic or liberal writers are not such depraved beings as this condemnation of them would seem to indicate. They suffer not in point of morals, talents, genius, information, by comparison with any who may be arrayed against them. A short time since, Alexander H. Everett was a great man, an accomplished scholar, an able and elegant writer; but now he is not allowed to be one or the other. Yet nobody can believe that Mr. Everett the Democrat is not every way as great a man, as accomplished a scholar, as able and as elegant a writer, as Mr. Everett the Whig. The truth of the matter is, the democratic writers are the great writers of the age and nation. This indeed is one of their principal sins. If they were weak, timid, if they neither had nor were able to impart life, they would be patronized, to a certain extent, by the aristocracy out of complacency to the common people. But being as they are, master minds, minds that will leave their impress on their age, they are not to be endured. If justice be done them by the wealthy, the fashionable, the supporters of the aristocracy, their influence will be too great to be withstood. They will breed sedition in the populace, and carry away the whole people in a democratic direction.

We beg pardon of our readers for having bestowed so much attention upon the American aristocracy, for after all, the American aristocracy is an insignificant affair. We hope no one will infer that we are

hostile to it. We do not think it strong enough, or likely in this country to do mischief enough, to excite a reasonable man's hostility. The best way to treat it is, to let it alone. It will die soon, and the east wind will sweep it away, as it did Jonah's gourd. This country is appointed, or doomed, to be a democratic country. This may or may not be an evil, but it is the fact. Men may write against it, electioneer against it, do all they can to array wealth, fashion, learning, refinement, against it, but all in vain. Democracy at last is to have a country she can call her own. Here she is to reign, and the sooner we give in our adhesion, the better for her, and the better for ourselves. The policy we should recommend would be for every friend of his country, to do his best to enlist literature, philosophy, religion, and refinement on the side of democracy. This has ever been our policy, and we trust ever will be.

The following remarks on the aristocracy in this country strike us as just.

"No aristocracy can exist or maintain itself without property. The nobility of France had virtually ceased to exist long before the hereditary peerage was abolished; while the patronage of the English would alone be sufficient to establish a power which would make itself felt, even if the House of Lords were reformed. There are even those who believe that in the latter case its power, instead of being confined to its usual channel, would extend itself over every department of state, and absorb, for a time at least, the main interests of the country. The American aristocracy, on the contrary, possess neither hereditary wealth nor privileges, nor the power of directing the lower classes. The prosperity of the country is too general to reduce any portion of the people to the abject condition of ministers to the passions and appetites of the rich. It is even gold which destroys the worship of the golden calf.

"But how can it be possible for the American aristocracy to lay claims to superior distinctions, when the people are constantly reminded, by words and actions, that *they* are the legislators, that the *fee-simple* is in *them*, and that *they* possess the invaluable privilege of calling to office men of their own choice and principles? Are not the American people called

upon to pass sentence on every individual whose ambition may prompt him to seek distinction and honor at their hands? And what is not done to conciliate the good will and favor of the people? Are they not constantly flattered, courted, and caressed by that very aristocracy which, if it truly existed, would spurn equality with the people? Is the judgment of the people, expressed by the ballot-box, not appealed to as the ultimate decision of every argument and contest? Aristocracy, if it shall deserve that name, must not only be based on the vain pretensions of certain classes, but on its public acknowledgment by law, and the common consent of others. This, however, is not the work of a generation, and requires an *historical* connexion with the origin and progress of a country.

"Why, then, should the Americans recognise a superior class of society, if that class be neither acknowledged by law nor possessed of power? How shall they be brought to worship those from whom they are accustomed to receive homage? — who are either men of their own election, and consequently of their own making, or the defeated and unhappy victims of their displeasure? The aristocracy of America may claim genius, and talent, and superiority, and they may be ambitious; but it is an 'ambition of so airy and light a quality that it is but a shadow's shadow,' — a sort of *fata morgana* reflected from beyond the waters, whose baseless fabric can neither excite apprehension, nor arrest the progress of democracy. Coteries there always were, and always will be, in large cities; but they need not necessarily be connected with power. In America, moreover, they exist principally among the ladies; there being, as yet, but few gentlemen to be called 'of leisure,' or exclusively devoted to society. The country is yet too young, and offers too large a field for the spirit of enterprise and business, to leave to the fashionable drawing-rooms other devotees than young misses and *elegants* of from fourteen to twenty years of age. That such companies may, nevertheless, have their *attractions*, no one can reasonably doubt; but they are not composed of elements capable of changing the manners and customs of the country; and, as long as their composition does not materially alter, must remain deprived of that influence which the higher circles in Europe are wont to exercise over all classes of society.

"The manners of republicans must necessarily be more nearly on a level with each other than those of a people living under a monarchical government. There are no nobles to

vie with the splendor of the throne; no commoners to outdo the nobility. The dignified simplicity of the American President and all high functionaries of state is little calculated to furnish patterns of expensive fashions; and were all Americans, in this respect, exact imitators of the amiable plainness of General Jackson, their manners would soon cease to be an object of satire to English tourists. They would then present dignity without ornament, candor without loquacity, loftiness of mind unmingled with contempt for others. Europeans would then visit the United States, not to ridicule American manners, but for the purpose of studying them; and, perhaps, carry home the useful conviction, that though republics are not fit schools for courtiers, they may, nevertheless, abound in good sense, agreeable address, and genuine cordiality of manners." — pp. 22–24.

Mr. Grund's remarks on the intelligence of the Americans, on the respect paid to men of letters, on the character and education of American ladies, we wish he had said *women*, — will be found in the main just. He appears to comprehend our society, its tone, spirit, and fundamental principles, and what he says of it is liberal and candid. He bears honorable testimony to the morals of our community, and probably says more for the sanctity of marriages than our Moral Reformers, as they call themselves, will be disposed to admit. If so, he and they must settle the difference; we believe him rather than them. Men and women, who set out to cure a single vice, are prone to see it everywhere, and they almost inevitably exaggerate, in order to demonstrate the importance of their work. We never place much reliance on the statements of those reformers, who see only one evil in the world, and have but one idea to work with.

Mr. Grund complains of our aversion to public amusements, but as we think without any just reason. Many of our friends have made the same complaint, and we think we have seen it recommended that public provision should be made for diverting the people. We have no sympathy with the complaint, nor with the recommendation. A despot may furnish amuse-

ments to the populace; it is a good way to keep them quiet, and from thinking of their rights, or trying to repossess them. For ourselves we are not frightened at sight of a serious people. A people with a destiny to achieve, a great work to accomplish for the world, has no time to be gay, to dress itself out in masquerade. It must be grave and earnest; it must think and act in relation to the future and not to the passing moment. They who are recommending amusements seem not to be aware that they are recommending America to give over the work to which God has called her.

We make the following extract because it expresses a thought and a regret which we frequently meet with among some of our countrymen, who have fallen into a habit of sentimentalizing o religion.

"But, proud as the Americans may be of their halls of congress, they have not, as yet, a single place of worship at all to be compared to the finer churches of Europe, where they might render thanks to the Omnipotent Being for the unexampled happiness and prosperity with which he has blessed their country. Some not altogether unsuccessful attempts have been made in Boston and Baltimore, at what might be called a cathedral; but neither the size nor the order, nor even the materials, are resembling those of the nobler specimens of Gothic architecture in Europe.

"Our feelings and emotions are always tinged with the reflections from the objects around us; and I cannot, therefore, divest myself of the opinion that a superior style of architecture in an edifice of public worship may materially assist the imagination, and enable the mind to turn from mere worldly objects to the contemplation of heaven and the adoration of God. I have known persons who could never pray so fervently as when encompassed by the sombre vaults of a gothic cathedral, and I have, myself, experienced the same feelings on similar occasions.

"But, in addition to the deficiency in style and ornament there exists in America, an almost universal practice of building churches, or at least the steeples, of wood, to which are frequently given the most grotesque figures, partaking of all orders of architecture, from the time of Noah to the present day. There is scarce an excuse for this corruption of taste,

except the cheapness of the material, which may recommend the custom in practice. A church ought to be the symbol of immutability and eternity, the attributes of the Infinite Being; but nothing can be more averse to either, than its construction of so frail a material as wood. An *imitation* of stone-work is still more objectionable, as it appears like an attempt at deceit, — a sort of architectural counterfeiting, least pardonable in a house of prayer. Such an edifice seems to be unworthy of its noble purpose, — a sordid mockery of grandeur, which, without elevating the mind, represents to it only the melancholy picture of human frailties." — pp. 43, 44.

Now it may be a fact that the architectural beauty of our churches is very defective, that our churches are also made of materials that are not durable; but what then? Would you have a new people, the greater part of whom must depend on their own exertions for a livelihood, lavish millions in erecting stately piles for the sake of producing a languid emotion in a few sentimental dreamers, who can see nothing in the majesty of God, in the sublime idea of communion with the universal Spirit, to move their souls? We say no. These dreamers are hardly worth saving at so great an expense. God is worshipped in spirit and in truth, by a consciousness of his presence being ever with us, by studying his law, by serving his children, doing good to mankind, our brethren. The emotion waked up by the stately piles or lofty cathedrals which some would have us erect, is not a religious emotion, and has no kindred with that stirring of the soul we are conscious of when we find ourselves in the presence of God. They who have any religion within them, can be moved without there being anything in the building in which they assemble, to strike their senses or over-awe their imaginations. They can worship God anywhere, in the fields, the forests, the shop, or by the domestic fireside. They want a church only as a meeting house. They prefer to have it chaste, simple, severe, and as little likely, by its profuse ornaments or imposing grandeur, to draw off their minds from the indwelling God as possible.

We insert the following because it gives us an opportunity to bear our testimony against those who are raising a cry about the Irish. The sin of the Irish is that they are poor, and that they are not always good and true Whigs. When a rich man chooses to immigrate into our country, our arms and our hearts are opened to receive him. Some of our readers may remember certain newspaper paragraphs concerning one Count Leon, who came to this country a few years since, reputed to be worth seven millions of dollars. Who is there to-day that does not own that the poorest Irishman that ever came among us, was worth more to us than this famous Count Leon? The honest laborer is a better inhabitant of a republic than a rich nabob. A country may be corrupted and destroyed by riches; by poverty, never. The Irish, indeed, are, to a certain extent, burdensome to us, though much less so than is pretended; but they are our brothers; they have in their own country fallen among robbers, been stript, wounded, and left half dead, and we should not deem it a hardship, that we are permitted to perform towards them the part of the good Samaritan. After the second or third generation they have become amalgamated with our native population, and are among our most useful and often our most enterprising citizens. Instead of sending them back when they come, or declaiming against them when here, we should do well to seek to elevate them, and to make their adopted country the means of raising them to the true dignity of manhood. Some of the expense our sentimentalizing religionists would have us lavish on churches would perhaps do as much for the service of God in this way as in that.

"The Irish are, by the great majority of Americans, considered as an oppressed and injured people, which is sufficient to entitle them to the sympathies of freemen. It is true, the greater number of Irish who arrive in the United States are poor, and some of them tainted by the vices of poverty, which, in some of the states, have created a prejudice against them. But, considered collectively, they constitute a highly

useful part of the American community, and contribute, by their honest industry, to increase the wealth of the country. They perform the hardest labors at the lowest wages given in the United States, and are satisfied and happy to provide for themselves and their children the bare necessities of life. But it is even their being contented with little, and their less heeding the future, which render their actions and motives less acceptable to the Americans. The Americans (as I shall prove hereafter) are living altogether for their children. They are ready to make any sacrifice for the advancement of future generations, and love their country not *as it is*; but *as it will be made* by their enterprise and industry. The Irish, on the contrary, are, by habit, inclination, and the vivacity of their temperaments, inclined to enjoy the present. Their previous lives contain but the sordid catalogues of privations and distresses, and, on their emerging from the most cruel misery which ever extorted groans from a nation, they are apt, — as all human creatures would be, — to draw the first free breath with joy and exultation. Like Lazarus, they were accustomed to feed upon the crumbs that fell from the rich man's table; and now that they are invited to sit down, and partake themselves of the banquet, those rigid censors stand by and scoff at their greedy appetites. A man, whose morning meal consisted of capon, can certainly await dinner with better grace, than he who went hungry to bed and awoke to breakfast on sorrow. Cheer to him is manna distilled from heaven, to support him on his way through the desert; and he is eager to snatch at a gift of which he knows not when it will again be within his grasp. Excess is the companion of poverty, and its consequences perpetuate its direful existence. Misery they drown in stupefying potions; for oblivion alone is the happiness of the damned.

“These are the vices of some of those wretches who are annually thrown upon the hospitality of the Americans. And shall America, the land of political and religious freedom, cast them from her, and let them perish, while a bounteous Providence has put in her possession the most fertile regions on earth, capable of supporting thousands and millions of human beings? And shall the supplications and prayers of these emigrants ascend up to heaven without invoking a blessing on the children of liberty? Are their habits and their vices not to be corrected by improving their wretched condition? All human experience speaks loudly in the affirmative. Set before them the prospect of steady employment, the hope of not only earning a subsistence, but something more; give

their children an opportunity of education ; and you will breathe into them a new vivifying principle. Occupation will prevent the commission of crimes ; the influence of religion and good example will abolish the vice of intemperance, and the facilities of instruction will make respectable citizens of their children. This is not declamation. I speak of facts which I know, and to which I shall have occasion to allude hereafter.

"The Irish in Boston are a remarkably orderly people. They are *not* usually given to intemperance ; but on the contrary, willing to aid in its suppression. If the annals of prisons and houses of correction furnish a larger number of Irish than American names, it must be remembered that, in all countries, the greatest number of culprits is furnished by the poorer and the least educated classes, and that as strangers, unacquainted with the peculiar police regulations of the towns, they are more apt to trespass against the laws, and make themselves liable to punishment, than those who have been brought up under its influence, and with whom obedience to it has become a habit.

"Abstract numbers are no criterion of public morals. Hundreds of crimes against God and against man are not amenable to the law, while others, arising sometimes from innocent motives, are visited by its severest penalties. During the space of nearly ten years I have lived in Boston, but very few capital crimes were committed, and certainly not more than three or four considerable robberies and forgeries ; but no one of them, so far as my remembrance goes, has been perpetrated or abetted by an Irishman. Their offences consisted, principally, in disorderly conduct, and in infringing on the police regulations of the city. Theft they were rarely charged with ; and I am fully persuaded that were it not for the still too pernicious influence of ardent spirits, not one half of these acts would have been committed, and no stain left on the honest reputation of even the lowest of the Irish laborers. But, when we reflect upon the number of crimes committed by the poor, we ought not to forget their exposed situation ; and when we praise the moral rectitude of the rich, we ought to consider the high premium which is paid to their virtue. It does not belong to man to condemn a whole nation as vicious, or to pray, —

"'Lord, we thank thee that we are not as these men are ;' for they too will pray, and 'the prayer of the poor shall be heard,' as it is more likely to come from the heart.

"Who never ate his bread with tears,
Who ne'er, through nights of bitter sorrow,
Sat weeping on his wretched bed,
He knows ye not, ye heavenly powers."

"But it is not so much the vices of the Irish, as their political principles, which prove sometimes offensive to Americans. Some disturbances which of late arose in New York, at the election of the Governor, and in which the Irish unfortunately participated, furnished a certain party with a convenient pretext to ascribe their want of success to the destructive influence of the Irish. In consequence of this, a series of resolutions were adopted to prevent their occurrence in future. The subsequent election, however, proved the insufficiency of the ground they had taken; for, not only did it pass without the public peace being, for one moment, disturbed, but the majority for the government was nearly doubled. But I shall not expatiate on this subject now, and will only remark, that the Irish are naturally supposed to be in favor of democracy, having been, for centuries, the victims of the opposite doctrine."—pp. 61–64.

Mr. Grund is no Unitarian, as the following uncalled for and unwarranted strictures on Unitarianism may testify.

"The Unitarians, who are forming large congregations in the Northern and Eastern States, taking for their motto the words of St. Paul, 'Prove all things; hold fast that which is good,' are, perhaps without knowing it, as nearly as possible, on the verge of pure Deism; but as long as they conform to the usual form of prayers, to the regular sabbath service and evening lectures, and partake of the sacrament, they will be considered as good Christians, and enjoy the same consideration as any other sect in existence. But their creed is far from being universally popular, especially in the Southern States, where it is almost wholly confined to the trading classes, composed of emigrants from New England.

"The inhabitants of the South are principally Episcopalians, and as much attached to authority in religion as they dislike it in politics. They consider Unitarianism as a religious democracy; because it relies less on the authority of the Scriptures, than on the manner in which the understanding of the clergy expounds them, and retains too little mysticism in its form of worship, to strike the multitude with awe. I have listened to many excellent sermons preached by Unitarian clergymen, containing the most sublime morals which I ever

knew to flow from the pulpit ; but I hardly ever perceived a close connexion between the text and the sermon ; and whenever they entered upon theological doctrines, I have always found them at variance with themselves and each other. I write this with the fullest conviction that I do not, myself, belong to any orthodox persuasion ; but, as far as logical reasoning and consequence of argument go, I think the Unitarians more deficient than any other denomination of Christians. I do not see how they can hold the ground which they have assumed : they must, in my opinion, go either further on the road to Deism, or retrace their steps, and become once more dogmatical Christians. The greatest objection I would make to Unitarianism is the absence of *love* in many of its doctrines ; and the substitution of ratiocination in most cases, where the heart alone would speak louder than all the demands of a sedate, reasonable, modest morality. When I hear an argumentative sermon, I always remember the words of our Savior :

“ ‘Happy are the poor in spirit ; for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.’ ”

“ And when I hear stoic virtues preached, I remember poor Magdalen,

“ ‘To whom much was given ; because she loved much.’ ”

“ Two reasons there are for the spreading of Unitarian doctrines in the United States. First, because its ministers are amongst the most highly gifted, and the more eloquent as they belong to a sect which is yet in the minority ; and, secondly, because there is a class of people in America, who, aware of the moral and political necessity of religion, in order to restrain the vices of human nature, would do all in their power to preserve the text and practical applications of Christianity ; while, at the same time, they would willingly dispense with certain ceremonies and popular beliefs, which, in their opinion, are not essential to religious worship. They call themselves ‘Unitarians,’ because they dare not call themselves more, or rather less ; and are better known by their opposition to orthodoxy, or what they think the extravagances of the Christian faith, than by any positive tenets of their own. They agree, as far as I am acquainted, on but one point, which is the denial of the Trinity, by denying the divinity of Christ ; but as to the *authority* for their belief, it is too nearly related to a certain branch of the applied mathematics, to require a particular comment.

“ Many Unitarian preachers have published excellent sermons, which have become popular, even in England ; and as

long as they refrain from attacking other sects, and retain their purity of style, I can see no reason why they should not be read by all denominations of Christians, as containing a concise, intelligible, and even eloquent code of morals.

"I ought to observe, moreover, that the Unitarians in New England form a highly respectable and intellectual class of society, whose private lives and virtues offer but little room either for moral or religious criticism. This is probably the reason why Unitarianism is supposed to become popular in the United States; though it is, by the great majority of the people, still looked upon as a doctrine incompatible with pure Christianity. But then we ought to distinguish between cause and effect, and not ascribe exclusively to the doctrine, what may perhaps be more easily explained by the peculiar position of its followers.

"The Unitarians in the United States are not numerous; they are, for the most part, in tolerable circumstances; and at the head of their persuasion is the oldest and best university of the country. No other religious denomination in America enjoys the same advantages; and we might, therefore, naturally expect some moral distinction in favor of its adherents. But if Unitarianism should ever become the creed of the great mass of the people, it is more than probable those advantages would cease, or, at least, be confined to a small number.

"Religion gains more from the heart than from the abstract understanding; and is more accessible through the medium of the feelings, than through the most logical course of demonstrative reasoning. Man is naturally a sophist, and ever ready to adapt his creed to his actions, or at least to allow his conscience a certain latitude, incompatible with moral and religious justice.

"The Christian religion addresses itself particularly to the heart, and is, on that account, accessible to all capacities, and adapted to every condition of life. Love and charity are its basis; and Christ himself has set the divine example in dying for the sins of this world. To strip religion of its awful mysteries, to explain the creation and redemption of man like a phenomenon in natural philosophy, and to make human intellect the ultimate judge of its truth and applications, — is to deprive it of its sanctity, and thereby of its influence on the majority of mankind.

"I do not believe that the spreading of Unitarianism will serve to increase the respect for the Christian religion, or that its moral consequences will benefit society in general. Neither do I think it capable of becoming the universal religion of the

people, whose affections and hopes require a stronger prop than the cold dictates of human morality.

" Venture then to hope ; and fondly dream ;
Yonder world shall every pledge redeem,
Of your true and faithful sentiment.

" Thus far, it does not appear that Unitarianism has made very rapid progress in the United States. The number of its congregations is still small when compared to those of other denominations of Christians, and, as far as I am acquainted, is not on the increase. This, however, is not owing to the want of zeal in their clergymen, but principally to the doctrine itself ; which does not seem to captivate the feelings and sympathies of the great mass of Americans, however it may please and accord with the argumentative disposition of its followers." — pp. 158 – 161.

It is not our especial province to defend Unitarians or any other denomination of Christians as such ; but we cannot pass over this statement in silence. Whatever may be thought of Unitarianism as a definitive form of the Christian religion, the Unitarians have rendered an invaluable service to Christianity by the introduction of Rationalism into theological speculations. They have done something towards making Theology a Science, and towards adapting it to the improved state of the human mind. They have too rendered a much greater service to democracy than some of its conservative fathers are aware of. A religion, based on a positive instead of a rational authority, cannot long coexist with perfect political freedom. The habit of yielding to authority in matters of religion, and of believing without conviction, disposes the mind to servitude, and paves the way for absolutism in the state. If it prevail, political liberty must be given up. On the other hand, the habit of inquiring freely into all matters of science, of civil and political liberty, and of judging for oneself in all these matters, is incompatible with a blind adherence to authority in religious matters. Unitarians have, to a certain extent, tolerated free inquiry in matters of religion, and have asserted for the mind, in relation to religion, the same rights that the democrats

have asserted for it in relation to politics. In doing this they have done much. This has made them the Liberal party, and it is as Liberalists, not merely as Unitarians, that they have gained the footing they now hold; and it is only by being Liberalists that they can retain it.

The charge that Unitarians approach Deism is too stale to be dwelt upon. They are Deists in that they believe in one God and no more; but when the term Deist is taken to mean one who rejects Divine Revelation, they are no more Deists than are Calvinists, Episcopalians, or Roman Catholics. Every Unitarian believes in Divine Revelation, in the Inspiration of the Bible, and many of them believe in the Inspiration of God made to the soul of every man. If on this head there be any charge to be brought against Unitarians, it is that they place too much reliance on the mere letter that killeth, and not enough on the spirit that giveth life.

The sentimentalism about mysteries is all very well. Whatever is unknown is mysterious, and do our best to know all that we can know, to explain all that we can explain, there will always be a universe of Mystery round, about, and within us, before which we may stand in awe, or bow down with adoration. We shall always have enough to wonder at, to surprise us, to seek to find out, to unravel, however earnestly and successfully we may ply our reason. The fear Mr. Grund seems to have that Unitarians will explain all mysteries, and make all things so easy to be understood, that religion will cease to excite in us any profound emotions of wonder and awe, we look upon as perfectly idle. If it were not so, we should still say to the Unitarian, go on and make all things plain. The wonder and awe, which come only because we have remained in voluntary ignorance, we do not regard as worth much. Man may serve God by reasoning as well as by feeling, and a clear and sublime thought is an offering not less acceptable to him than a profound emotion of wonder or awe. Sentimen-

talism will do for boarding-school misses and for boys who begin to dream of love, but for grown up men and women, let us have something more robust and healthy. The greatest objection we have to our German friends is that they are dreamy, sentimental youths, lying all day watching the bubbling fountain, rather than strong and active men prepared to go forth into the world and to labor with a vigorous arm and a stout heart. We do not underrate the emotions. We may have felt in our day, and perhaps can feel even now ; but we are past the age to place religion or the worship of God in emotion merely. Let us have clear thought and masculine energy of soul ; with these we will do more for God than with all the fine feelings in the world.

Mr. Grund thinks the Unitarians are deficient in love. We think this is no more the case with them than with some other Christian denominations, nor even so much. It is customary to call them cold, even freezing. We know they are not quite so hot as some sectarians are, and do not say so much about hot places ; but we have yet to learn that this is much to their discredit. The fault we find with Unitarians, and not with them alone, is that they do not seem to us to feel that deep, abiding interest in the weal of Humanity, which as Christians they ought to feel. They feel as much as any sect ; for the earnestness other sects manifest is for their creed or their sect, not for Humanity ; but they feel not enough. They are not enough in earnest. They do not feel that they should live for man, and for man only. They do not feel the deep and abiding interest in whatever concerns mankind that Jesus did. They do not seem to us to be conscious of the great work, and of the high glory, to which God has called them. They have done something, and they seem to think that they have done all. Nevertheless they are getting the better of this fault. They are enlarging their views, and kindling their hearts, and nerving their souls, for the revelation and the maintenance of a

new and a higher life. Our faith in the Unitarian body is strong, and we expect great things from them. A glorious future is before them. A noble destiny awaits them. Let them open their eyes, look, behold, and march.

Mr. Grund, in the following extract, makes out quite a good plea for Judge Lynch, much better than he deserves.

"There exists but one practice in the United States, which seems to be at variance with what I have thus far advanced; and yet, upon further consideration, I am almost inclined to consider it as a part of the common law of the country. I would refer to the 'Lynch law,' of which the most brilliant accounts are furnished in the British papers. The Lynch law of America, it must be remembered, is not a child of democracy; it is of a much more ancient and illustrious origin, and occurs already in the early history of the colonies. It was begot in those happy times, in which religious customs took the place of the law; and in which the ingenuity of the settlers recurred to the simplest means of obtaining the most summary justice. It is, in fact, of a patriarchal nature, having for its motto the wisdom of Solomon;—'Do not spare the rod.' The pilgrim fathers, who settled the New England States, were a highly religious people,—with whom the authority of the elders of the Church was of more avail, than any positive law of Great Britain, which, from its distance, and the manner in which it had been abused into an instrument of oppression, had considerably lost of its force. Their little community was more governed by mutual agreement and consent, than by any written code, except that to which their ministers pointed, as leading the way to salvation. The Bible furnished them with precedents of the cheap, easy, and salutary correction of flogging; and there was no reason why their legislators should have attempted to improve upon the wisdom of Moses.

"The custom being once introduced and found expedient, was gradually increased in severity as the rigid morals of the puritans began to relax; until, towards the American Revolution, when abuses had reached their climax, the original method of 'tarring and feathering' was substituted for the more lenient punishment of the rod. The commencement being made with the excisemen in Boston, was soon imitated in the other provinces; and being at first employed in a patriotic cause, created a universal prejudice in its favor. It became a

national custom which, as far as I remember, was only used in cases more or less directly affecting the people. Thus, whenever an individual gave a national insult, or did or practised anything which threatened the peace and happiness of the people, they resorted to it as a domestic remedy; but I am quite certain not with the intention of opposing the regular law. They only resorted to it *ad interim*, till the regular physician could be called in; and in most cases effected a *radical cure*, without paying for the attendance of the doctor. In this manner the Lynch law was executed on gamblers, disorderly persons, and latterly also on a certain species of itinerant ministers, who, a little too anxious for the emancipation of the Negroes in the Southern States, had betaken themselves to preaching the doctrine of *revenge*, instead of that of the *atonement*, and thereby forced the good people to apply the doctrine to those, who evinced the most zeal for its propagation. But as I have said before, the Lynch law is not, properly speaking, an opposition to the established laws of the country, or is, at least, not contemplated as such by its adherents; but rather as a supplement to them,—a species of *common law*, which is as old as the country, and which, whatever may be the notion of 'the *learned* in the law,' has nevertheless been productive of some of the happiest results. I am aware there are different versions of the origin of 'Lynch;' but the above will be found to contain the essence and philosophy of all."—pp. 178 – 180.

Mr. Grund is right in saying that Lynch law has long existed in this country. More than one of our towns has borne witness to some lewd or disorderly person ridden on a *rail* out of its precincts. In general this fact may be taken as a proof of our morals rather than of our disregard for law and order.

So long as Judge Lynch confined his operations to those whom everybody counted guilty, nobody saw anything in his court likely to trench on the authority or jurisdiction of the other courts of the land. He is now impeached, because he has ventured to sentence some concerning whose guilt there is a difference of opinion. The lawless tenor of his court is now seen, and efforts are now made to remove him from the bench. Perhaps it is well that he has extended the jurisdiction of his court, and pronounced concerning some doubtful cases. He will be the

sooner removed. It is well that he has struck some who are able to enlist a portion of popular sympathy in their favor. The poor wretch, with whom nobody sympathizes, and for whom nobody has a single kind word, may not now be exposed, as he was, to be Lynched. He, whom the laws do not condemn, may not now be sentenced and executed without law. A good may therefore come out of the late prevalence of Lynching.

For ourselves, we do not share the fears of some of our friends in regard to Lynch law. It is wrong, totally wrong, and never to be tolerated for a moment; but it does not make us despair of the Republic. We have confidence in the people. They love law and order. Nothing is so hateful to them as anarchy, and they will submit for ages to the grossest of tyrannies rather than to run the peril of it. If the constituted authorities of this country were all overthrown to-morrow, the great body of the people would continue the even tenor of their way, as quietly and as orderly as ever. The people, in fact, do not stand in half so much need of being taken care of, as do the enlightened and kind-hearted few, who are always volunteering their services to take care of them. They, who are always trembling for order, and dreading anarchy, neither know the people nor the history of their race. The people can spare all governments altogether better than governments can spare the people. We have therefore no fears that Judge Lynch will overthrow our free institutions and bring freedom into disrepute. His days are numbered.

We would simply add, that they who declaim against Judge Lynch mistake the effect for the cause. Lynching comes, at least in these times, from the want of proper respect for the rights of the mind and freedom of utterance. We have not yet learned to respect every man's opinion to the extent, we would have every man respect ours. We have not yet learned that no opinion is or can be dangerous, if reason be left free to combat it, and he who avows it be

not obliged to suffer some social, bodily, or mental inconvenience for avowing it. When we learn this and practise accordingly, Judge Lynch will trouble us no more.

We must tell Mr. Grund that we are not pleased with the manner in which he speaks of the political importance of the German settlers, in the following extract.

"The quiet temper of the Germans does not allow them to take a very active part in politics, though their number would be sufficient to form a most powerful party. In Pennsylvania they have, nevertheless, acquired great influence, and the governors of that state have, for many years past, been selected from amongst their countrymen. This is a matter so much settled by mutual consent, that, even at the last election, when there were two democratic and one whig candidate for office, all three were taken from the ranks of the Germans, and none other would have had the least chance of success. In the state of Ohio, though it was originally settled by emigrants from New England, there are, at present, not less than from thirty-five to forty thousand German voters. The state of New York, though originally settled by the Dutch, contains, nevertheless, a large German population in several counties, especially in that of Columbia, which gave birth to Mr. Van Buren, the present vice-president, and, in all probability, the next president of the United States. The state of Maryland contains a large proportion of German voters; the population of Illinois is nearly one third German; and the valley of the Mississippi is being settled by thousands of new emigrants from Europe. I do not think it an exaggeration to state, that not less than one hundred thousand votes are annually cast by Germans, and that, in less than twenty years, their number will have increased to half a million. In the city of New York the Germans have already a great influence on the election of mayor and the other city officers; the number of those who are entitled to vote amounting now to three thousand five hundred.

"Under these circumstances, '*the German vote*,' as it is termed, becomes a matter of great solicitude with politicians of all ranks and persuasions; and, accordingly, newspapers in their own language are established in all parts of the United States where they have settled. In Pennsylvania alone there are now more than thirty German (mostly weekly) papers; and in Ohio and Illinois, as many more are published and cir-

culated. A considerable number of them is also published in Maryland; and the 'New York Staatszeitung' was entirely established by the democratic Germans of that city. If these papers were ably directed by a standard publication in any of the large cities, whose editor should understand the peculiarities of the German mind, the local circumstances of their settlements, and their relation to the general government, they could be made a most powerful political engine, which would give strength and perpetuity to any party in whose favor it should once declare itself.

"But the Germans in the United States have, to this day, no powerful political organ to express their opinions and sentiments; and their policy, therefore, is but a reflection from the ruling doctrines of the other states: they are unconscious of their power, and more bent on increasing their numbers, than on concentrating their efforts, and directing them to a certain point. The Germans in America are not so easily excited as their brethren to the south or north, and are consequently often indifferent on a variety of minor questions, the connexion of which with the more important principles of government seems to escape their immediate notice. In this manner they are often defeated in their own ranks, and contrary to their intentions and purposes, made the tool of insidious politicians. But no sooner is an important question of state agitated, than they unite again; and, despite of all efforts to disseminate discord by appealing to their prejudices and local interests, — an appeal which is hardly ever made in vain to the inhabitants of any other section of the country, — persevere in supporting the men and principles of their adoption.

"They are not apt to speculate on politics, but rather act in accordance with general maxims, which are as liberal as possible, and of which they never question the utility, provided they agree with their ideas of moral and political justice. They seldom enter on details, but never desert a principle; and are, therefore, least actuated by motives of interest and selfishness. Their practical sense is republican; and as I have previously observed, they are democratic almost by instinct. But the time may come when they will be conscious of their power; and they will then form a party, the strength and importance of which will, in all probability, be beyond the computation of mere abstract politicians." — pp. 215 – 217.

'We have none but kindly feelings towards the German immigrants to this country; but when they have once taken up their residence with us and become

nationalized, we do not choose to look upon them as Germans. We would regard them as Americans and fellow citizens. But in order to be so regarded by us, they must so regard themselves. Nothing can be more detrimental to them, or tend more to create prejudices against them, than a disposition on their part to form a distinct population by themselves, and especially to band together as a German party in politics. Let them act in political and social life as Americans, not as Germans; let them consider themselves an integral part of our common population, not as foreigners, if they would have this country become to them a second home, and its citizens their brothers. We always welcome foreigners who come to amalgamate with us and to account themselves of us; but emigrants from any foreign nation will find this an uncomfortable residence, if they undertake to get up parties in their own favor, and by combination among themselves to control the politics of the country. Such an undertaking would be fraught with danger both to the emigrants and to the nation. Mr. Grund should have known this, and advised his German brethren more judiciously.

Few travellers in this or any other country have deigned to take much notice of the common people. Travellers see very little of the people among whom they travel. They stop at public houses, and usually visit with the wealthy, the fashionable, or the educated. They see what are usually termed the more favored classes, and from these form their opinion of the nation. An opinion of this country, formed in this way, would be worth little or nothing. The upper classes here, if we may be pardoned the bull, are the lowest, altogether the most unfavorable representatives of the American people. We blame nobody in the world for ridiculing what may be termed American fashionable society, nor for expressing their disgust at the manners of the would-be American aristocracy. Our "good society," the society of which travellers see the most, is the very

worst society, the most vulgar, and the most immoral, of any society in the country. It is the masses that are great with us. Whoever would judge correctly of the American people, must go into the houses of our small, independent proprietors, of our industrious mechanics, and study that portion of our population not met at public hotels, in steamboats, stages, nor saloons. These are our real aristocracy, who for true nobility of mind, and native dignity and courtesy of manners, we will put against the world. English travellers may say what they will about our would-be aristocracy, but we have a people the world cannot match. Of this Mr. Grund is well aware, and we thank him for his notice of the fact.

“Where a man has to labor all day in order to obtain for himself and family a bare subsistence, there it is impossible for his mind to act with a proper degree of freedom. The physical wants are too urgent to allow him sufficient respite for thought and reflection, and the only thing coveted, after the cravings of his stomach are appeased, is the necessary rest to restore his physical abilities. In America, not only the master mechanic, but also his journeymen, have the means of earning more than is required for a mere living; they are able to procure for themselves comforts which would hardly enter the imagination of similar orders in Europe. They are enabled to command a portion of their time; and their minds being free from the anxieties of a precarious life, and less vitiated by a desire of frivolous pleasures, are better qualified for study or improvement,—the only sure means by which they can hope to better their conditions. Their domestic habits, and the custom of spending the Sabbath at home, are highly favorable to the development of their mental faculties, and in this respect, of immense advantage to the general morals of the people. The majority of the lower order of European workmen hardly think of becoming independent, or doing business on their own account; and, being less sustained by hope, in the exercise of their physical powers, need more relaxation and amusement than the Americans, who consider the hardest of labor but an introduction to something better which is to follow. The American operatives are sustained by the very efforts they make, and need not have recourse to the sordid pleasures of debauchery, or the bottle, in order to plunge themselves into a momentary and brutal oblivion of their present necessities.

"I wonder the superior condition of the laboring classes in America has not been taken notice of by any English tourist, (if we except Mr. Hamilton's philosophical dialogue with the Scotch baker,) while they were so tediously minute in describing the fashionable coteries! No drawing-room, in any part of the world, is without its second and third-rate performers, and their number in America may even be greater than in Europe. Nor will I deny that an American exquisite is, *per se*, an inferior being. A man, in Europe, may be a coxcomb, or a buffoon, in a manner peculiar to his own country, in which case he is still a *national* character; but to be a slavish imitator of the follies of others, in a country where they are only known to be despised, presupposes a degree of presumptuous imbecility, for which no excuse can be found in the customs and manners of the people. If Englishmen censure Americans for imitating the fashions of Europe, they ridicule them justly for not being wiser than themselves, or for succeeding less in an unprofitable enterprise. But let them turn their attention to the thousands with whom they hardly come in contact on their tours; let them observe and watch the elevated character of the merchants, the skilful industry of the mechanic, the sober regularity of the workmen, and they will find ample room for a more charitable exercise of their judgment; they will then find the true strength and superiority of the American *people* over all other nations on the globe. They will find no humiliating imitation in the trade and commerce of the United States. They will see the arts exercised on a most liberal and extensive scale; the character of workmen raised by emulation to that of respectable citizens; and, instead of machines or mechanical operatives, they will discover everywhere intelligent beings, capable of accounting for every process, and improving it constantly by their own ingenuity. In no other country could they behold a similar spectacle; in none other witness the same emancipation of the mind. In England and Scotland a most generous beginning has been made to arrive at similar results; but the improvements have not yet penetrated to all classes, and for many a generation, America yet will be unrivalled in the moral elevation of her citizens.

"A great deal has been said, by American and foreign writers, on the subject of trades' unions and other societies of operatives known under the name of 'workies,' and especially about their cries for 'equal and universal education.' I confess I never knew that the workmen wished to *arrest* the progress of education, in order to reduce the moral superiority of

the higher classes to a sordid level with themselves, but, on the contrary, understood them to covet the same opportunities of mental improvement, which are enjoyed by the wealthier portion of the community. I am quite certain there is no class of Americans so utterly degraded in their moral sentiments, as to wish for universal ignorance, or a comparative mediocrity of talents, in order to protect and excuse their own imbecility. The workmen of New York, Boston, and Philadelphia have struck for the 'ten-hour system,' on the ground that if a man work more than ten hours a day, '*he is unfit to read and improve his mind in the evening, or to superintend the education of his children*;' a plea which expresses certainly a very different desire from that of destroying the opportunities of acquiring superior knowledge. The wages of American workmen are high; but then it is seldom known that they make an improper use of their money; and they abstain entirely from the European custom of spending in one or two days, the whole earnings of the week. They understand not only how to make money, but also the art of saving it; and the amount of capital deposited in the various savings banks of the country furnishes the strongest evidence of the prudence and frugality of their habits. As long as these last, I cannot possibly persuade myself that the institutions of the country are in danger, whatever be the aberrations of individuals, or whole classes, in their respective political orbits." — pp. 290 – 292.

Those of our readers who recollect what an uproar was made a few years since about the "Ten-hour men," will probably read with some surprise the remarks of Mr. Grund in the last paragraph of the above extract. The mechanics in some of our larger cities took it into their heads, a few years since, that ten hours a day was as much as an honest man ought to labor, and therefore resolved that ten hours' labor was as much as they would sell for a day's work. A very harmless resolution one would think. It was neither more nor less than a number of free-men saying to the men who wished to employ them, "We will work for you indeed, but only ten hours in each day." What mischief there was concealed under the mealy form of these words, we were never able to divine. Yet all our great men, learned men,

wealthy men, business men, all those men who think they alone, of all the men of the nation, are qualified to exercise the right of suffrage, and to govern the people for the people's good, were struck with consternation, and for a long time were evidently *distraught*,—a proof of their superiority and fitness to be rulers! We never supported the ten-hour system; but if the mechanics had struck for six hours, instead of ten, we would have supported them to the best of our ability. Six hours is enough for any man to labor in one day, enough for his health, and enough, in a state of society at all approaching a just one, for his worldly prosperity. Man has mind as well as body, and should have time to think as well as to exercise his limbs. If the mechanics have become aware of this fact, and therefore choose to shorten their hours of labor, we should rather applaud, encourage, aid them, than censure them, or be frightened at their movements. Has not the journeyman mechanic a perfect right to say how many hours he will work in a day? Has anybody a right to compel him to work more hours than he chooses? And who that is a man would see his brother man made a beast of burden, doomed to toil from sunrise to sundown, with no time to read, no opportunity to improve his mind, and become a man?

But we are told that these "working men would not spend the few hours' leisure obtained, in acquiring useful information. They would run to the grog-shops, and spend their leisure in dissipation." Now we do not believe this; and if we did, we should not recognise the employer's right of guardianship over men who are every way his equals, except it be in the amount of borrowed money in his pocket. The men who struck for ten hours were not the men who go to grog-shops, who spend their time in dissipation. They were our industrious, honest, and intelligent working men, who, having obtained a little knowledge, wished for leisure to acquire more. The idle and dissipated who hang round places where

they can get drunk, were not of the Ten-hour Men. These loafers, who are maintained occasionally at the public expense, are genuine aristocrats, and have as honorable an aversion to honest labor as any gentleman in the land.

Mr. Grund goes very fully into the question of slavery, and proves clearly that he is no Abolitionist. From many of his views on this subject we wholly dissent. We did intend to remark on this part of his book at some length, but we have not the space to do it. The slave question has become quite an absorbing one. Its discussion cannot be and ought not to be prevented. Slavery in any form is an evil, and should be removed as soon as it can be. The right of citizens of the North to form associations for the removal of slavery in the South, is a distinct question from that of the good or evil of slavery, and should never be confounded with it. We doubt both the right and the expediency of these associations, and therefore are not Abolitionists; but we are decidedly opposed to slavery, in any and every possible shape. All that we of the North have a right to do with Southern slavery is, to throw what light we can on the wrong it does to man, the danger with which it menaces the country, and the means by which it may be safely and expeditiously removed with benefit to the slave. We have no right to use any but moral and rational means, arguments addressed to the reason and consciences of our Southern brethren. The argument of numbers, which is the only argument gained by associations, is an argument which every man, who is conscious of the dignity of manhood, will scorn to listen to. So far as the Abolitionists are merely addressing arguments to the reason and consciences of the community against slavery, we are with them; so far as they are merely organizing associations to concentrate public opinion, and bring it to bear on the Southern planter, we are not with them. We dislike to urge a man to do this or that because public opinion demands it. We con-

sult the voice of God within, not the voice of the multitude without, to learn our duty and to find our motive for acting.

ART. IV. — *Thoughts on Unity, Progress, and Government.*

ALL truth, whether in science, philosophy, religion, or politics, is one. The one truth is God's idea, the Right, the Expedient, the Indispensable.

The soul is also a unity. It has no dualism, either in its powers or its requisites. Humanity has but one law, as the Deity has but one mind.

All errors in theology, politics, life, have originated in dualism, complexity, ignorance of, or disloyalty to, unity. Mankind have sought good, not in the resolution of all things into one, but in division. Hence idolatry, despotism, anarchy. The mission of the present, our hope, our safety, is the centering of the fractions in the great One, the return of all men into the One Man, the atonement of the Creature with the Creator.

All nature is republican. Minerals, vegetables, animals, men, angels, the Deity, sway themselves. Each blade of grass, each constellation, is an independency. The harmony of the whole universe is but the union of distinct sovereignties. As by polarization, spirits in all worlds act and react upon each other. The thoughts of a child move the cherubim, as a drop influences the ocean. So one soul heaves the whole tide of spiritual life that flows from eternity to eternity.

Truth thus communicates itself, as by electricity, from prophet to prophet, as one by one the several minds, through which it passes, conduct, and straightway become surcharged again.

This union of all in one, being offended and lost sight of through selfishness, was the origin of sin, war, slavery. The oracle therefore ceased; want and fear became the insurgent foes of peace, and hatred in all its forms usurped the throne of universal love.

The elements of a Millennial kingdom have spread through the Past as in chaotic parcels; the Present is fast centring all these fragments; the Future will give them sphericity and an orbit. Heaven will be the space of their revolution, God their everlasting sun, centre, and system, and eternity their cycle.

The present age is prophetic. The seers are on the watch towers, gazing with serene eye upon the moral firmament, reading the aspect of the lights and shadows which alternate in the moral heavens, solving the problems, interpreting the prophecies, and opening the parables which are written in the history of man, which are uttered by the experience of society.

The inspiration of nature is the music in all our hearts. Brotherhood, the warm tide that, flowing through the arteries of the universal frame, connects the unit to the whole, and the whole to the parts by a life-current of quick loves. Individual minds are the best interpreters of the Divinity. The original thinkers, the single-eyed, the holy-hearted, are the purest conductors of infinite truth, the Christs of God. The word is incarnate in every God-child. The oracles of the Father-mind issue warm from the bosoms of his Well-beloved, in all generations. Revelation is confined to no age. No man can invent truth; all men may discover it. God reveals himself to all orders of spirits equally, as the sun illumines all alike, even the blind. It is our opaqueness that hinders the Deity from shining through us. Were we only transparent and true, we should shine also.

Fear has frozen up the well-springs of truth in the past. The voice in us, which is in unison with the same voice in every man, must utter itself, or the prophet in us dies. The teacher is taught by his own lesson; as he scatters light, his own orbs are brimmed

with light; and thus the blind see, and the dumb find tongues, and through sympathy with truth, a heavenly speech is breathed through the lips of death. The rustic is thus touched with an Isaiah's coal from the inward altar, and Chrysostoms are multiplied in the back-woods, on the hill sides, and in the market place. Thus has the world ever been taught; Moses from his sheepfold, the carpenter's son from his manger.

Thus truth is constantly surprising us by its spontaneous outbreakings; and while men say, "Lo here, and lo there," the kingdom of God is within us. The mysteries in which truth has been shrouded by the initiated, theology by the priest, nature by the professor, have frightened young and credulous minds from researching the more profound religion of Humanity, the more glorious science of the Soul. Corporations have monopolized literature and the arts, colleges patented for themselves the sole right to inculcate truth, and the pale of the church has shut out man and shut in Christianity, so that all aliens, from these self-constituted commonwealths, are either idiots, or infidels; and notwithstanding all this, are there mines still unwrought, systems unmeasured. The Omniscient, the Infinite, is still to be approached, to be known. The Allholy may yet be seen, worshipped, loved, and imitated.

One of the most striking characteristics of the present age, the spirit of association, is fast giving place to the more powerful engine of progress, individuality. The moral power, hitherto divided, subdivided, and weakened through multiplied associations, is beginning to be centred and sublimated in the strong focus of single minds. The great idea, that the whole is best served by the perfection of the parts, is becoming more and more the ruling sentiment of our times. Men are daily made to feel and to revere the "might that slumbers in a peasant's arm," the value, the responsibility, the God-like capabilities of individuals. This is a progress of public opinion, far in advance of all the past. It is a great central truth

which shall one day become as universal as it is omnipotent. It is a truth which speaks to the souls of all who perceive and appreciate it in the voice of Divine inspiration, commanding a self-respect far removed from all egotism, prompting a steady and sincere obedience to the inward original law,—the elder Scripture, which in its result will unite the Human with the Divine, the whole spiritual universe with the Father. Men have been classed heretofore in masses; they have been weighed collectively. The standard of any age or nation has been that of the general average. The view now taken of mankind is a personal one. We look at man in the abstract. The standard of the age is one man, the purest specimen, the most perfect character. As a prism separates the rays of light, so does the highest idea of this age count, and single out, and give independency to individual minds. This characteristic is the bright harbinger of new power to the approaching era; rightly seen, and duly appreciated, it is the chief element of that revolution on whose eve we are standing.

To this feature of the age, too, we are in no small degree indebted for those numerous biographies, lately presented us by the press, of the great and good, who have been signalized in the world's annals; and to this we owe some of the best poetry and philosophy of our times, the best and most original papers of our periodical literature. Heretofore there has been too much mental and moral plagiarism manifested in all departments of science, literature, life. Few men have dared to utter the sincere, profound, and lone reflections and convictions of their own spirits. Every religious, philosophical, or political idea, which courted the public eye, or popular ear, has been clad in popular guise, moulded into fashionable shape, and tricked out in the cant of party, sect, or school. The press, the lyceum, the pulpit have been all held in servile bondage to the taste of the past. Every post in the government, every legislative assembly, has been crowded with the delegates of a departed day,

with men whose constituents are either dead, or have passed on in the progress of society, to a point far in their advance.

The idea of the present has not been echoed in the Capitol; the spirit of the age is nowhere truly embodied; conservative forms, a paper constitution, the reverence of the people for the past, and, above all, the balancing power of hope in the future realization of the great idea of our government, is all which has given any centre or union to our republic. We rejoice, however, that the reign of yesterday is over, that neither its watchwords nor its livery will suit the men of to-morrow. We are grateful that there are spirits sufficient for to-day's exigencies, and the progressive duties which, like "coming events, cast their shadows before." We hail the promise everywhere given, by the restless, panting, prospective, and resolving genius of the present age, simultaneously breaking forth with electric movement and prophetic power throughout our land, of a firm union, a manly struggle, a majestic achievement in the cause of American truth, religion, government, life. Amid the gloom of political strife, commercial embarrassments, and monetary revolutions, we are comforted with the rise and progress of a movement party, as yet perhaps ungathered, certainly unmarshalled as a distinct body, yet none the less but rather the more powerful on that account, from the very fact of the diffusion of its members, and the peace and silence, but strong moral force which secretly unites them. This party we may denominate the brotherhood of universal Man. Its field is the world; its bond love; its aim the perfection and happiness of entire Humanity. It embraces all those spirits in every clime and of every name, who have been regenerated by the new birth of righteousness, duty, progress. It comprises all ages, both sexes, and all nations, who acknowledge the legitimate supremacy of the soul; who feel strongly the inward workings of the Divinity enshrined within them; who have seized the true idea of Christianity, and separated all

that is powerful, practical, and holy, in the religion of Jesus, from all that was local, temporary, and incidental; who have passed beyond all symbols to the spirit and truth breathing and embodied in the living Christ; who regard the salvation of the gospel as character; and whose highest ideal of Divine worship is to become like the Father.

Christianity, rightly understood, has a mission to fulfil for Humanity, as yet but faintly conceived, certainly never systematically developed. It has great political objects to achieve, a heavenly kingdom to establish on earth, such a kingdom as philosophers, philanthropists, and statesmen have delighted to contemplate as a beautiful vision of Utopian fancy, but too beautiful ever to be realized. Essentially progressive in itself, it is the sure engine of progress to society. Deeply rooted in the constitution of man, its indisputable office is his entire perfection, an office which it proceeds calmly indeed, but surely and successfully, to accomplish. An important and indestructible element of spiritual being, it is the spontaneous system by which all spirits in the universe *are*, love, and grow; the omnipotent law which the Deity himself fulfils. If we will receive it, there is no other law of mind than Christianity, no higher constitution of government, bill of rights, magna charta of Humanity. For what is Christianity, in its last analysis, but God? What is the gospel revelation, but a transcript of the Divine mind? and what was Christ but the visible image of the character of the Infinite, God manifest in the flesh, God-Man with us?

From the earliest Fetichism to the most perfect Monotheism, by all religious forms, by every theological symbol, from prostration before an image to the worship of a Christian Father by imitation of his holiness, this great idea has been embodied. Religion and government rightly understood are one; the craving for a power to adore is the yearning after a mind to obey; the hungering and thirsting after a righteousness to rule, the desire of a perfect system of legisla-

tion—life. The inward struggle to attain God is the profound longing after a model, guide, and governor for our salvation. Therefore it is that throughout all systems of religion we find, clearly marked, a uniformity of character between the people worshipping, and the Being worshipped. The dominant idea of the Divinity in any age, is always the ruling feature of the religion, character, and legislation of that age. Men, whose objects of adoration are heroes, are warlike; men, who worship the divinities which their vices and passions enshrine, are vicious; men whose ideas of the Deity, like those of the Jews, are merely ritual, are formal. True Christians are spiritual. Describe to me the Deity a man worships, and I will portray the man. Show me the nation's God, and I will define its laws and character. It is precisely as natural for a good man to worship God, as for the savage to deify demons. Divinities mark epochs in the world's history, as well in individual virtue as in jurisprudence. The early sacrifices of men and beasts mark a cruel age; the worship of Venus and Bacchus marks a sensual one. And thus we might settle every period in the progress of man, morally or politically considered, by the data furnished by his religious symbols.

The same is true with regard to Christianity. In proportion as it has been rightly understood, in proportion as it has clearly and truly instructed mankind in the knowledge of God, in that same proportion individuals and nations have advanced in their characters and government; and in proportion as it becomes better understood, and as it more fully instructs them, shall they continue to advance. Every advancement made in the science of the Divine mind is a step taken in perfect Humanity. Every advance gained in the true wisdom of Man is, in its turn, an advance gained in the interpretation of the Deity.

The tendency of all enlightened Christian education then must be the establishment of a perfect theocracy; not a theocracy like that of the Jews, but the theocracy of Jesus; not a theocracy wherein priests have

power, but that in which God shall reign in the spirit of his children, that of the great human brotherhood.* The tendency of all growth in religion will be a centring of all spirits in their great First Cause. There will be union in opinion, for the one truth alone will be worshipped; union in thought, and heart, and hope, for the soul [the universal reason] will be revered, as the light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world. There will be union in government, for there will be only one law, of the one Lawgiver, even God. Forms may grow old, altars decay, and prophets die, creeds change, and dynasties crumble in the dust, but man shall always be priest and king, so long as he shall be true to the Urim and Thummim stamped on his heart; so long as he shall obey the oracle of his own spirit, and fulfil the inwritten commandment of his Godlike nature. As we learn to reason justly, and record our experience wisely, we shall change our religious views, so as to permit the reception of more perfect, because personal, revelations. Whatever may become of systems, principalities, and powers, Truth changes not, but remains the same yesterday, to-day, and forever. We should remember that we have the nature and capacities of God-sons to account for. We should toil, even to the baptism of blood, for the establishment of our Father's kingdom, and for its establishment on the earth, ever remembering the apostolic promise, that "speaking the truth in love, we may grow up into him in all things, who is the head, even Christ, from whom the whole body fitly joined together, and compacted by that which every joint supplieth, according to the effectual working in the measure of every part, maketh increase of the body unto the edifying of itself in love."

* This would be rather an *anthropocracy*, if we may coin a word, or a democracy, than a theocracy. Yet it makes no difference; for that which is highest in man is one with God; and it is only that which is highest in man that has a right to rule. True democracy and theocracy, as above defined, are one and the same thing. We do not object therefore to the idea of the writer, though we own that we dislike the term theocracy. — *Ed.*

ART. V.—*The Boston Association of the Friends of the Rights of Man.*

VERY few of our readers, we presume, have ever heard of this new Association, and most of them, on reading its name, will probably be somewhat puzzled to make out who may be its members, or what can be its object. Are its members abolitionists, infidels, fanatics? or are they philosophers? What propose they to do? Why do they associate in defence of the rights of man, especially in this free country, where the rights of man are acknowledged and secured? Perhaps the following, which they have put forth as their confession of faith, may throw some light on these questions.

"*Principles.*—1st. The *rights of man* are not grants or privileges; they are derived from no compacts; but are founded on the simple fact that man is man. They cannot be alienated by the individual, given nor taken away by civil authority.

"2d. Every man, by virtue of the fact that he is a man, has the right to develop freely, and to perfect all his faculties, his whole nature, as a moral, intellectual, and physical being.

"3d. Every man has a right to freedom of industry, freedom of thought, and freedom of conscience.

"4th. The rights of society can never be in opposition to the rights of the individual. If they could be, right would be able to change its nature, and become wrong, and there would be the foundation of a perpetual war between the individual and society, in which both parties would be, at the same time and in relation to the same proposition, in the right and in the wrong.

"5th. That social state, therefore, which does not respect all and every one of the rights of its members, is by virtue of that fact wrong, and needs to be revolutionized, reformed, or ameliorated.

"6th. Government is the creature of society, and is restricted in its functions to the mission of maintaining, from all encroachments, the rights of the individual and of society.

"*Objects.*—Our Objects are to ascertain in detail and to determine with precision what are the rights of man and of society; to ascertain and fix the boundaries of the legitimate

province of government; to keep government within its province; and lastly, to labor for such reforms in governments, in the individual, and in society, as will secure to every member of the community the opportunity and the means to be and to do, what he is fitted to be and to do, by the nature and faculties with which he is endowed.

"*Means.*—Our Means are simple, but mighty, and such as can work no injustice to governments or to individuals. The causes of all existing abuses are ignorance and selfishness; abuses, therefore, can be removed only by knowledge and love; these are our means. We wish to direct our own attention, and that of the whole community, more directly than it has heretofore been, to the whole subject of the rights of Man, and the means of promoting the progress of Man, and of Society.

"We therefore propose to inquire into the whole subject, and to inform ourselves as to what the Rights of Man and Society really are; also to ascertain how far those rights are acknowledged, secured, or enjoyed in our present social state, and how far custom, prejudice, false notions, governments, or legislation, disregard, abridge, or attempt to disannul them.

"If we can do something by private discussions, by public debates, by lectures, and the publication of well written essays, and select libraries, to diffuse just knowledge among the people on these great subjects, and to kindle up in our own hearts and in the hearts of others a love of virtue, and the genuine sentiments of Humanity, we shall at least do something to preserve our rights as far as already obtained, and to obtain them where they are yet denied.

"Let the people once perceive and understand their rights—perceive and understand what is wrong in our present systems of legislation, and defective in our social arrangements, and let them be inspired by a true sense of the worth of Man, as man, and they will easily and peaceably effect all the governmental and social reforms needed to place every man in the free and full enjoyment of all his faculties."

This, to our way of thinking, is not a bad confession of faith; and it indicates very good intentions on the part of those who make it. It proves that the members of this new association are not wholly ignorant of the subject with which they concern themselves; that they have lofty aims; that they take broad and comprehensive views; and that they con-

template a most thorough, radical reform, one which will root out nearly all existing evils, and base governments and society itself on the laws of universal, eternal, and unalterable justice. For such a reform, every heart must cry out, and every hand exert itself. The members of this association may never live to realize it; they will in all likelihood die without having been able to witness any perceptible change in the world for the better; but we cannot but deem them deserving high praise for contemplating such a reform, and for undertaking to effect it. Men who have bright and glorious dreams are never to be spoken lightly of. They have rich stuff in their souls, and may always be relied on as true friends to the cause of Humanity.

We may also add that this association is composed mainly, if not exclusively, of mechanics and other working-men; and it is this fact, more than any other, that has induced us to place its name at the head of this article. This is the age of associations. Men now-a-days associate for every purpose, great or small, good, bad, or indifferent. The simple fact of the organization of a new association deserves of itself no attention. But we confess we cannot view an association like this with indifference. We feel something of patriotic pride swelling our hearts, when we find even our working-men associating for the study and defence of the rights of man, and putting forth such declarations as the one we have laid before our readers. It is a proof that our free institutions work well, and that their quickening and elevating influences reach even to the lowest ranks of society. Nowhere but in this democratic country of ours, could we think of finding an association like the one we are considering. The working-men must have advanced far, and attained to a good share of well-being, before they could think of their rights, before they could have the leisure, the intelligence, and the means of investigating such great subjects as those set forth in this confession of faith. The fact then of the organi-

zation of this association is a proof of the comparatively good condition of the working-men in this country, that their condition has been improved, and that though it may not yet be as good as it should be, or as it one day will be, yet that it has become tolerable. This fact should endear our free institutions to the friends of mankind, and forbid us ever to despair of popular liberty.

We have been struck, coming as it does from the working-men, with the catholic spirit that pervades this confession of faith. It breathes peace and good will; it censures nobody, makes war upon no class of society, and manifests hostility to no existing institution. It makes war, if war it makes, upon ignorance and selfishness only; and the weapons of its warfare are those of knowledge and love; powerful weapons indeed, but harmless save against evil and evil-doers. These working-men seem to forget themselves, to sink themselves in common Humanity, and to dream of no good for themselves, which is not at the same time a good for universal Man. Changes they no doubt contemplate, reforms they may demand, thorough, radical reforms they may wish to be, but not with a view to their own interests alone—not with a view to the interests of a class, sect, or party; but with a view to the interests of mankind. We commend this fact to those of our friends who are apprehending a “war of the poor against the rich,” who have feared that the movements of the working-men would render property insecure, throw the whole community into a universal hubbub, and send us all back to the savage state to go naked, to feed on nuts and the scanty and precarious supplies of fishing and hunting. The working-men will respect the rights of property, for they have a natural love of justice, and because they have no design in what they are attempting, but that of making justice universally triumphant.

More might be said against the visionary or impracticable character of what these working-men propose, than against its dangerous tendency. It might be

said, with some plausibility, perhaps, that hopes of a reform so vast, so thorough, so radical, of results so desirable and so felicitous as they contemplate, are perfectly idle, and that no sane man, at all acquainted with the world, can indulge them for a moment; that the world is as good, society, here especially, as perfect, as we have any right to expect; and that instead of wasting ourselves in fruitless efforts to make the world better, we ought to do our best to keep it from growing worse. This all may be so. We have a great respect for the practical men, the men of routine, who say so; that is, when they keep in their own sphere; but when they undertake to prophesy, we have no disposition to lend them our ears. We cannot but distrust their capacity to look through the whole future, and tell us exactly what can and what cannot be done. They would themselves do well to bear in mind that he, who undertakes to tell what cannot be done, may be as much out in his reckoning, as he who undertakes to tell what can be done. For ourselves, we rarely tell a man that he is a visionary, that his schemes are impracticable. We do not know everything. We have not been able, as yet, to find out the exact boundary between the possible and the impossible, the practicable and the impracticable, between the man who is verily a visionary, and the one who entertains projects which are rational and may one day be realized. We do not know what may or may not yet be done. For aught we know, man may yet rise above the loftiest and loveliest ideal, which the most rapt dreamer in his most ecstatic moments has ever bodied forth to his dreaming fancy. "The prophet that hath a dream let him tell a dream," for who knows but the dream may turn out to have been from God, and to contain a truth in the diffusion of which all coming ages are interested?

More than all this, we would not discourage these dreamers, as the world calls them. The man whose mind never strays beyond the actual, never soars into the ideal, and loses itself in that which is not

and perhaps will not be realized, is never able to perform any great and glorious deed. The mind moves before the hand; and he who contemplates nothing great or good in his soul, will accomplish nothing great or good in his deeds. It is by communing with the sweet, and holy, and sublime visions which ever and anon flit across the soul, by seizing, seeking to embody, and prevent them from escaping us, that we ever become able to do anything for which the world should bless our memories. He who has a glorious ideal will achieve glorious deeds. He who hopes much will accomplish much. Never should we damp the ardor of hope, or seek to chain to the earth the soul that would rise to heaven. Never should we seek to subdue man's faith in himself or in his race. Faith is the true miracle-worker. To him that believeth all things are possible. We know not how much injury we have done by clipping the wings of the young eagles, that were ambitious of taking their lofty flight through the heavens; how much we have dwarfed the intellect and kept back the progress of our race by our sneers at enthusiasm, and our cold-water counsels of experience poured on the ardent hopes, and burning zeal of the young prophets of Humanity. Men of the world, who never had any dreams, and old men, who no longer remember the dreams of their youth, should never be suffered to open their lips, or in any way to hint a counsel. They are the Deevs of Ahriman's kingdom, the kingdom of darkness, and should ever be avoided by the children of Ormuzd, the children of the light.

But we are not sure that these working-men deserve to be accounted visionaries. We confess that we see nothing in the result they would bring about, in the end they are in pursuit of, that even *practical* men, men of routine, men wise for yesterday and not for tomorrow, men with pleasant country seats, who think only of enjoying snug quarters for the rest of life's campaign, need regard as visionary or chimerical. They, who oppose the result, who think they can arrest

the working-men's movements, and prevent this result; they are the visionaries, the real dreamers. This result, this end the working-men are pursuing, of which they have a lively sentiment, if not a clear perception, is that towards which the whole force of modern civilization is bearing us. These working-men's movements, which have alarmed some, and which short-sighted politicians have thought to arrest by a sneer or a nick-name, by crying out "workie," "loco-foco," "agrarian," and other like terms of presumed reproach, are but so many proofs that the great law of modern civilization is still in force, and that its influence is at work in the heart of the millions. The working-men in these alarming or visionary movements are only, consciously or unconsciously, exerting themselves to fulfil the mission of that order of civilization, to which Christianity has given birth. The whole tendency of this civilization is in the direction these working-men are looking, to the realization of such "reforms as will place every man in the free and full enjoyment of all his faculties."

They, who have no faith in the progress of man and society, are always very fond of appealing to history, as though history was in their favor; and they are always ready with a pile of individual facts, with which to drive back the reformer or beat out his brains; but happily for Humanity, the reformer can read history to-day as well as they, and it shall go hard but his reading shall turn out to be as correct as theirs. According to his reading, history shows us everywhere progress, and is ever with her ten thousand angel voices calling us to a loftier and lovelier future. They, who find history against the reformer, may perhaps be convicted of having never read history. Descriptions of some famous battles they may have read, some court anecdotes they may have picked up, and the dates of certain events they may have ascertained, but the concealed causes in operation, the invisible forces, the spiritual facts, the laws of the

great events which have occurred, and to which the facts usually narrated in history owe their birth, and which are the only things in history it concerns us to know; these it is altogether likely they have not discovered, have not stumbled upon in any of their historic researches. To know history is to know these; and these, with modesty be it said, bear witness to the kindling truth that the human race is progressive, and that society is ever struggling to realize a more and more perfect ideal.

How many different orders of civilization have, each in its turn, ruled the world, we know not. Some think they catch here and there a glimpse of an earlier civilization, which they call the Cyclopean, the "golden age" of the poets; but the earliest civilization, of which we can affirm anything with certainty, is the sacerdotal civilization, as we find it in ancient India, Egypt, and Syria; in its greatest perfection, perhaps, in Judea. The idea of God is the dominant idea of this order of civilization. God reigns, in principle, supreme, though, in fact, his symbol, or representative, the priesthood, possesses all the power. The state and the individual, as we have shown in another place, succumb to the priesthood. Everything, all ideas and all actions, are held to be subordinate and subservient to the worship of God.

To the sacerdotal civilization succeeds the Greek and Roman, or political civilization. The dominant idea of this order of civilization is the state. The state is everything. The priesthood is a function of the state, and religion is regulated by a decree of the senate, or an edict of the emperor. The individual man is not yet born. There is no people. There is the Roman city, but no Roman people, as we understand the term people now.

The mission of this order of civilization was the realization of the majesty of the state. This mission it accomplished. We stand in awe, even to-day, of the majesty of the Roman state. Wherever Rome set her foot she left the imprint of her majesty. The

modern traveller, over what was once her dominion, is struck with a sense of her greatness in every fragment of her antiquity he meets. The language she has left us, reveals in every phrase, in its very construction, in its single words even, her majesty. We can hardly, by imagination the most creative, conceive of the greatness and power of that City of the Tiber, which could make her presence felt, her faintest whisper heard, and obeyed as law, at the same moment, throughout the extremities of Europe, Asia, and Africa. But the majesty, before which we stand awe-struck, is always the majesty of the state, never of the people as individuals. The individual is merely a member of the corporation, and aside from his corporate capacity has no recognised existence, no rights, no worth. If he is cared for, it is solely because he is an appendage to the state, a part of the body politic.

This fact becomes apparent, if we merely glance at the conquest of the Roman empire by the Barbarians. In the long agony of that struggle, the Barbarian encounters no forces but those of the Roman legions. In scarcely an instance does he find a people to resist him. The moment the Roman state is overthrown, nothing is to be found standing. From the general silence of history, we might almost infer that just in proportion as the Roman legions were withdrawn from the provinces, especially from the provinces of Gaul, they became deserts, and that of all the numerous populations which covered them none were left. In most instances of a conquered country, the conquerors do not gain at once a peaceful and undisputed possession. The conquered revolt, rebel, rise against their conquerors, and attempt to throw off their yoke. But nothing of this meets us in the history of the conquest of the Roman empire by the Barbarians. When once the regular forces of the empire have been overcome, the conquest is complete. We take our stand in the heart of the Western Empire at the close of the fifth century; the Franks are seated in Gaul,

the Visigoths in Spain, the Vandals in Africa, and the Ostrogoths in Italy, and of that vast empire we see nothing, unless it be a few of its municipal institutions in the city of Rome itself, and some of the larger towns. Wherever the eye extends, nothing is to be seen but barbarians, the church, and slaves. The reason of this must needs be in the fact that, under the Roman civilization, all authority, all energy was absorbed in the state, and none was left to the people. That civilization created a majestic city, but not a majestic people. The populations which lived under it had no inherent vigor, no self-reliance, no resources in themselves. Consequently, when the protection of the city was withdrawn, they had no power to beat back the invader; and when fallen under the Barbarian rule, no energy to revolt and to struggle to regain their independence.

Rome called herself a Republic, and boasted of her liberty; but the people had less freedom under her dominion than they now have under the most despotic of Christian princes. Beneath the overshadowing majesty of the government, the dazzling prosperity of the state, there was the most abject servitude, the most inconceivable wretchedness. The masses were degraded below the condition of our Southern slaves. Human rights, human well-being, a regard for man simply as man, efforts to raise every man to the true dignity of manhood, were unknown, undreamed of. Now was this to be the definitive state of human society? Could this civilization be the term of human progress? It could not. Something better for man was needed, and must come. The good of Humanity required a new and a different order of civilization; one which should substitute the majesty of man for the majesty of the state. This new order of civilization is the natural fruit of the Christian idea of the worth of man, as man. Christianity gives to man precisely the place given by the political civilization to the state. But by its great doctrine of the universal brotherhood of Humanity, the enfranchise-

ment it demands for one man, it demands for every man.

Modern civilization is the offspring of Christianity. It is the attempt to realize the great idea of the equal worth of every individual man, as man. Its mission is the perfect realization of this idea in the new society to which it gives birth. Now the perfect realization of this idea is precisely what these workingmen, of whom we have spoken, are striving after. Will this idea be realized? That is, will modern civilization fulfil its mission? Will it fail, die before its time comes? Did Judaism fail before it had fulfilled its mission? Did Greece and Rome expire before their work was done? Has a nation ever been known to die before realizing the idea on which it was founded? Are there any indications of disease, weakness, decline, decrepitude, in modern civilization? Has it ceased to extend itself, to make conquests? Is there a new order of civilization springing up and threatening to invade its territory? Is it not still vigorous, young, and full of the future? What reason have we, then, to think that it will fail to do its work?

When modern civilization began its career, the individual, we have said, was nothing, the state was everything. The first thing to be done, was to break down the state and raise up the individual. But this could be done only by destroying the old order of civilization, and of course not without overthrowing the Roman empire which it had created and which was its last word. This could be done only by raising up a new and vigorous society in its bosom, which should contain the germs of the new civilization, and by the influx of a new people, in whom the individual should still live in all his integrity. The first was found in the Church which undermined the Roman state from within, and the second was supplied by the Barbarians who invaded and conquered it from without.

In the savage state, individuality predominates. There is in that state no society. The elements of society are there, but they are isolated, and for the most part inoperative. Each man is his own centre, and forms a whole by himself. The city is not yet organized, and counts for nothing. The tribe counts for something, but it can never absorb the individual. The attachment to the tribe, or to its chieftain, is personal, not political. The Barbarians who supplanted the Roman empire cannot be said to have been pure savages, nevertheless they had not advanced so far as to lose sight of the individual. Personal freedom was still the dominant sentiment. Individual Barbarians indeed grouped, at unequal distances, around a chief; but he was their leader, not their master; and their attachment to him was by no means a political attachment. He was not in their eyes the representative of the majesty of the state, but a man like the rest of them, only perhaps a little taller, or the descendant of a more respected branch of the common family. The Barbarians' idea of freedom was always that of personal freedom, freedom of the individual, not the freedom of the state, or body politic. In seating themselves in the Roman territory, they necessarily introduced into that territory this element of individual freedom. This is one of the benefits which has resulted from the overthrow of the Roman empire, and may induce us to regard the destruction of the Roman civilization as a blessing, not as a curse, to Humanity. As we come to know more of the designs of Providence, and to see more clearly their wisdom, we shall be less and less disposed to complain of what has been.

If we take our stand again in the Western Empire immediately after the Conquest, immediately after the irruptions of the Barbarians have ceased, we shall discover, already at work, all the elements of modern civilization. These elements are, first, The Church, depositary of the earlier or sacerdotal civilization, invigorated by the infusion of the Christian idea of the

majesty of man ; second, Royalty, or recollections of imperial Rome, mingled with the Barbarian notions of chieftainship ; third, Republicanism, or recollections of republican Rome which survived in the city of Rome, in some of the Italian cities, and a few towns in southern Gaul ; and fourth, Feudalism, in germ, which embodied the new element, that of personal freedom.*

Each of these elements is good and essential to a perfect state of society. The fundamental idea of the church is that of the supremacy of moral power. Its aim is to substitute, in the government of the world, moral power for brute force. The order of civilization it represents, the sacerdotal, is that which breaks down the savage state, and rescues man from the dominion of brute force. It must necessarily precede the political civilization. Theocracy is older than monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy, as the priesthood is older than the state. The church becomes mischievous only when it becomes exclusive, and governs in the interests of the priesthood, and not according to the law of God ; when it resorts to material force to make what it calls moral right prevail. It then becomes a theocracy, and practises a tyranny over man, of all tyrannies the worst ; for it strikes not only the body, but the soul also, perverts conscience, and makes man a slave within as well as without.

Royalty, as it exists in modern Europe, is a branch of republicanism. All governments, whatever their form, which represent the majesty of the state and are held to be instituted for the public, are republican. Asiatic monarchies are instituted not for the public, but for the monarch ; they therefore are not republics. But the governments of France and England, for instance, are held to be instituted not for the benefit of the monarch, but to take charge of the public affairs, for the public good. The real idea which lies at the bottom of republicanism, whether

* See Guizot's *Histoire générale de la Civilisation Moderne en Europe*. Paris, 1828.

bearing a royal or popular form, is that of the state. The idea of the state is that of the social nature of man. Its mission is to realize the social instincts of mankind, to give order, regularity, harmony, stability, to all social actions and social intercourse. When it becomes exclusive, separated, on the one hand, from morality, and, on the other, from personal freedom, it degenerates into despotism either of the one, the few, or the many, and becomes unjust, cruel, and oppressive.

The fundamental element of feudalism is, as we have said, the element of individuality or personal freedom. It is the recognition of the fact that there are rights of man, as well as rights of the priesthood, and of the state. But when this element is predominant, not limited by the moral and the social elements of our nature, it breaks all social bonds, destroys everything like social order, and precipitates us into the savage state. When it is not generalized, or when it is coupled with the notion that might creates right, and that he only deserves to be a freeman who is able to assert and maintain his freedom, it establishes an order of things like that, which prevailed in Europe from the sixth century to nearly the close of the fourteenth. It gives us then only here and there a man, (a baron, for baron means man, a man, or the man, probably from the Latin, *vir*,) while the many are his vassals, serfs, bondmen, or slaves. An exemplification of this may be seen on any southern slave plantation, and a reminiscence of it in a cotton factory in our own New England.

The exclusive predominance of any one of these elements would have defeated the design of modern civilization. Has any one of these been able to obtain exclusive dominion over modern society?

Each of these elements of modern civilization has made its effort to reign without a rival. The church made the attempt, and appeared to succeed, but it did not. The progress of civilization is not backward. The past never returns. The success of the

church would have been the reproduction of the sacerdotal civilization of Egypt, India, Judea, which had yielded to the political civilization of Greece and Rome. It therefore failed. It reached its culminating point under Hildebrand, Gregory VII., and from that time, notwithstanding appearances and pretensions, it steadily declined till Luther appeared to prepare the way for its reconstruction under a more liberal form. Royalty attempted to gain exclusive dominion, and under the Frank emperor, Charlemagne, seemed to have reproduced imperial Rome; but feudalism was too strong for it, and Charlemagne was hardly laid in his tomb, before his empire was dissolved. Republicanism, especially in the Italian cities and the large towns in the south of France, made an effort, threatened for a time to reproduce republican Rome on a small scale, and to cover Europe with a multitude of city-republics; but it could not succeed against royalty, feudalism, and the church. Feudalism made its effort also, and nearly plunged the European world into primeval barbarism. It resisted all the tendencies to centralization which manifested themselves under Charlemagne, and Gregory VII. It held the burghers in subjection, and yet it enfranchised the slave. Under Louis XI., it was shorn of its power, and it lost itself in the Public under Louis XIV. Not one of these elements has been able to succeed in obtaining exclusive dominion, and yet all the ideas they represent have ever been gaining power.

The conquest of England by the Normans hastened in that country the march of civilization, and tended to establish and develop those free institutions, which have for so long a time been the boast of Englishmen. The first effect of the conquest was a large accession of power to the central government, that is, to the monarch. This was necessary in order to keep the Saxons, or native English, in subjection, and to secure to the Norman adventurers the quiet possession of their estates. But this accession of power to the central government led to tyranny, on the part of the

monarch, and for a time threatened the triumph of absolutism. Feudalism took the alarm, and calling to its aid a portion of the burghers, principally of the Saxon race, wrested Magna Charta from king John at Runnymede, a sort of compromise between feudalism and royalty. For a time the preponderance might have been on the side of feudalism; but the barons found themselves arrested in their progress by the burghers. They had used the burghers against king John, against royalty, and these uniting with royalty under Henry VII., restrained and all but annihilated them, weakened as they had become by the wars of the Roses. Royalty threatened again to become absolute under Henry VIII. and Elizabeth, but it was resisted under James I. and decapitated under his successor. The Republic appeared with the Long Parliament; but inasmuch as sufficient account was not made of personal freedom, it gave way to the Restoration, which in its turn yielded to the Revolution of 1688, a compromise between all the elements of modern civilization, the church, royalty, feudalism, and republicanism.

Thus we see that not one of these elements has succeeded, though all have made the attempt. Each in turn has been defeated. Yet in being defeated it has not been destroyed. Defeat has brought along with it a modification, but an increase rather than a diminution of real power. Royalty, meaning by it either the central government or the representative of the majesty of the state, has been always on the advance. Order has been ever on the increase, and social relations have ever been becoming more determinate and fixed, social action and intercourse freer and more regular. The church, though shorn of some of its material splendors, has lost nothing of its spiritual power. Moral power has been continually gaining on brute force. France was more truly religious in the eighteenth century than it was in the eleventh. Feudalism had lost much of its exclusive dominion, but personal freedom and security, the ideas it repre-

sented, were much greater under Louis XIV., or James II., than under saint Louis, or Henry III. Republicanism had not succeeded in establishing the Communal régime; yet in the sixteenth century, we find a PUBLIC, and the burghers sitting in Parliament as one of the three estates of the realm, and exerting an influence on public affairs, almost infinitely greater than they did in the most palmy days of the Communes.

Though all the elements of modern civilization existed and were at work, as soon as the Barbarian conquest had been effected, yet they existed separately and were at work, each on its own account. Before modern civilization could achieve its destiny, all these elements were to be brought together and moulded into an harmonious whole. They must needs go through a process of fusion. The governing forces, the church, royalty, and republicanism needed to be fused into one uniform power; and the feudal or conquering population, and the conquered or indigenous population, into a uniform population, in which every member should be free and equal to every other member. This was the work to be done. How far has it been accomplished?

One great imperfection in modern society has been the separation of church and state. The separation of church and state is the separation of morality and politics. The church, faithfully or unfaithfully, represents the ideas which belong to the moral order; the state represents those which belong to the social order. The church separated from the state gives us a moral, spiritual code indeed, but one which embraces no social idea, which in no wise regulates the intercourse of man with man, as a social being, or directs him to labor for the melioration or progress of society. The state separated from the church establishes a social order indeed, but a social order that embraces no moral idea, and which is supported by no appeals to conscience, or to a sense of justice inherent in man. It is founded on physical might, and is sustained by

the sword, the *posse comitatus*, the dungeon, the scaffold, and the gibbet. The two, not united, but, blended into one, forming a unity rather than a union, give us a government resting for its support on moral power, and a social order founded on justice. The unity of church and state is the great desideratum. Now to this unity, we think, both church and state have been tending. This is what the Puritans had a presentiment of, precisely what Vane, the Fifth Monarchy men, and the Quakers sought to realize in the English Revolution of 1648.

There should be in no country two societies, one spiritual and the other political. During the past, this division has been doubtless the less of two evils ; but it always marks an imperfect social state. Civil government should be instituted for the purpose of maintaining social order, and that social order too, which is founded on absolute justice ; the means it makes use of to establish and maintain social order, should always be strictly moral, spiritual, holy. Its symbol should not be the sword, but the crosier. If this were the case, civil government would be as holy as the church has ever claimed to be. The church, as a governing or controlling body, would then be superseded, or rather, the state having become the church as well as the state, no separate church would be needed or admissible. Religion we should still have, preachers we should have, meeting-houses we should have, but no ecclesiastical corporation. The duty of the preacher would cease to be that of gathering people into an outward, visible church, and become that of infusing into all hearts a love of goodness, and that of directing all minds to the decrees of strict justice, as the laws to be obeyed in all social and individual action. Clergymen might make public prayers, administer the sacraments, and wear a surplice or a black gown ; but they would not constitute a separate class of men, organized into a distinct body, whose members must be accounted, *par excellence*, men of God. They would be teachers of right-

eousness, men laboring to promote knowledge, justice, piety. Now this is precisely the condition to which, with us, both church and state are tending. The separation of church and state hardly exists in this country, especially in this Commonwealth, which stands as it should and as it becomes it, in the front rank of the advanced guard of the great army of progress. All the ecclesiastical establishments of this country are breaking up. The Episcopalians gain few converts to the doctrine of the Divine right of bishops; the Methodist church has reached its culminating point, and its members, democrats as most of them are, will soon see that their church establishment is an engine which may be directed with but too much success against freedom. As soon as they discover this, they will abandon it, which they may do without abandoning their doctrines or their piety. The Presbyterian church is torn by intestine divisions, and is penetrated in all directions by Congregational notions, and it must ultimately adopt the Congregational form of church government, the only form of church government that can long coexist in harmony with democracy in the state. To the same result England and France are tending. To no other end can tend the writings of the Abbé de la Mennais and his party.

Not only do we perceive an approximation to the unity of church and state, but a sort of blending of royalty and republicanism. The notion that kings own their subjects, are their absolute lords and proprietors, is growing obsolete. Kings are beginning to be regarded as public officers, and royalty is considered, as we have said, the representative of the majesty of the state. The king is not considered now as governing for his own good, but for the public good. He is not above, but under law. The Republic, which may be said to represent the majesty of the people, is also under law. The people may do what they will, but not unless they will that which is lawful, right. All governments are now, at least in the principal states of Christendom, held to be public, to

be instituted for the public, and to have it for their mission to make justice prevail. The question between monarchy and its rivals is merely a question of expediency, a question as to what form of government is most likely to secure the prevalence of justice. There is then a sort of fusion of the church, the empire, and the commune, taking place, and they must soon lose their opposition, and become one under the dominion of law—justice.

On the other hand, a similar fusion has been taking place in relation to the different populations of Christendom. At the beginning of the sixth century, all that part of Europe, which had been under the Roman dominion, was covered over by two distinct populations, one noble, and the other ignoble. The Barbarians, with a very few exceptions, constituted alone the noble population. The native population, saving that portion of it which belonged to the ecclesiastical society, was ignoble, deemed an inferior and degraded race. It was the conquered population, and to that fact, to a great extent, must be attributed the ideas which the conquerors entertained respecting its inferiority. It was everywhere oppressed. It had no rights, no protection. All employments deemed noble or honorable, except those of the church, were reserved to its masters, the Barbarian nobility. It could not meet the Barbarian on equal terms. It could approach him only at a humble distance. It was in relation to the conquerors what the ancient Gibeonites were to the ancient Israelites, "hewers of wood and drawers of water." The distance between these two classes, two populations, was not to be passed at once. Not in one day was the slave to become the equal of his master, the serf, to stand up by the side of his lord, and all traces of conquest to be wiped out. Yet the distance between the two populations has been lessened. The two races have been brought together, and so intermixed, that their separation is henceforth impossible. Not all the noble families, in France or in England, can trace their descent to the

conquerors. The descendants of the conquered have frequently risen to the highest ranks, and those of the conquerors have fallen in many instances to the lowest. The English of to-day are neither Normans nor Saxons, but a people formed from the union of both. Robert of Glocester says,

"The folk of Normandie

Among us woneth yet, and shalleth evermore.

Of Normans beth these high men thath beth in this land,
And the low men of Saxons."

But this cannot be said now. Some of the "high men" in the land are of Saxon origin, and some of the "low men" are of Norman blood. In France, the Franks are not now the exclusively noble. The Franks and the Gallo-Romans have commingled. There is now a French nation, as there is a French language. In this country, the fusion of the two populations is complete. We have no noble, no ignoble race. Saving the Negroes and Indians, not included in the civilized population, we know only one race; and we have adopted in state and in society, as well as in the church, the doctrine that "God hath made of one blood all the nations of men." Here few traces of the Conquest are discernible. We recognise no distinction of ranks, no inferiority or superiority of classes. No honest employment unfits any one for any social circle, any office of honor, trust, or emolument. There is not here and there a baron with his army of retainers, bondmen and slaves. All are barons, that is, men. No man is more than man, and no one is less than man. At least this is our theory, though it must be admitted that our practice does not as yet fully conform to it. All Europe is tending to this same result. The distinctions of rank are wearing away; the prejudices of blood are losing their force; the burghers are up with the lords, and, in point of intelligence, influence, and social importance, even beyond them. The People have become the nation; Royalty and Nobility are their servants, and maintain themselves standing, only on the plea of the public

good. The London Quarterly itself is forced to admit that De Tocqueville is right in saying, that all Western Europe has been for several hundred years hastening to democratic equality. The progress is assuredly in that direction, and no earthly power seems able to arrest it, or even for a moment to divert it from its course.

How has this change been effected? What are the causes which have produced it? Are these causes still in operation? And may we hope that they will be as efficient in accomplishing what remains to be done, as they have been in accomplishing what has already been accomplished?

One of the most efficient causes of this change is Christianity. By Christianity, in this connexion, we do not mean exclusively the church, but the new life revealed, the philanthropic movement commenced, by Jesus for Humanity, and of which we have spoken in a foregoing article. Christianity surrounds every man with a bulwark of sanctity. It declares the unity of the human race, that God has made of one blood all the nations of men, and that all men are equal before Him. This declaration cannot remain unfruitful. When it is once received, when the idea of man's worth as man, together with that of man's brotherhood to man, is once entertained, has once become a sincere, an earnest, a religious conviction, it becomes all-powerful for human enfranchisement. To the influence of this idea must be attributed the manumission of the slaves of modern Europe, which, in nearly all cases, has been the voluntary act of their masters, done from religious motives.

The church, properly so called, has done something. It opened its bosom alike to the children of both races. In the house of God, in its services for the sick and dying, and in its solemn funeral rites, the high men and the low men were reduced to a momentary level. They were alike amenable to its discipline; they alike partook of its sacraments, and alike

equipage. The proprietors of the seigniories and manors, loaded their farmers and villeins with excessive taxes and exactions, alleging, as a pretext for each new demand, the necessity they were under of going to fight the French in France, to prevent them from making a descent on England. But the peasants said to themselves and to one another, "they tax us to aid the knights and country squires to defend their possessions; we are their bond-men; we are their flocks which they fleece; and yet, taking all in all, if England were lost, they would lose altogether more than we."

To such words as these, on their return from the fields, by the way, or in the clubs where they met in the evening, after the labors of the day were ended, succeeded words of far graver import. Some of the orators at these clubs were *priests*, who drew from the *Bible* their arguments against the social order of their epoch. "Good folks," said they, "things cannot and will not go right in England until there be no more villeins, nor gentlemen; until all are equal, and the lords be no more masters than we. Why should they be? Why do they hold us in bondage? Have we not all, they and we, sprung from the same parents, Adam and Eve? They are clothed in velvet, and crimson, and fur; they have flesh-meat, and spices, and good wines, and we have only miserable orts to eat and water to drink. They have ease in their beautiful manors, and we have pain and labor, wet and cold in the fields." At such discourses as these, the multitude cried out in tumult, "There must be no more villeins; we will be treated as beasts no longer; and if we work for the gentlemen, they SHALL PAY US WAGES!" *

Surely this demand of the villeins was by no means an extravagant one. It was simply that they should be no longer held in bondage, that they should hence-

* See Thierry's *Histoire de la Conquête de l'Angleterre, par les Normans*, T. IV. pp. 309-317, et seq.

forth be treated as men, not as beasts, and that they should receive wages. They made no war on the rich as such; it entered not into their minds that these estates, held by the descendants of the conquerors, had been unjustly wrested from their fathers; they had no thought of stripping the gentlemen of their property; they merely wished to be accounted freemen, and to be paid for their labor. Was this unjust, unreasonable? Certainly not. The lower classes have never been known to make an unjust demand. They always claim altogether less than their rights, and, we may add, the terror they inspire by their demands is always in consequence of their justice, and not their injustice. The lords and gentlemen have always seemed to hear, in the faint voice of the feeble peasant, the awful voice of God summoning them to judgment. The simple demand of these peasants not to be treated as beasts, and to be paid for their labor, struck all the upper classes of England with consternation. However, the peasants gained nothing. The day of their deliverance had not yet dawned. They were cajoled by a few lying words of the king, their leaders were killed, themselves dispersed, and fifteen hundred of their number put to death by the common hangman. Their movements have no great historical importance, except as showing that they drew their arguments for equality from the Bible; that they legitimated them on the ground of the unity of the human race, that high men and low men have the same parents, even Adam and Eve, and therefore are brethren and equals.

Christianity also did much to effect the change of which we have spoken, by its spirit of tenderness and compassion, by the generous and humane sentiments with which it sought to inspire men one towards another, and by encouraging the practice of the kindly charities of social and private life. It did much by exalting the sentiments; and it elevated the poor by giving them the assurance, that though forsaken by men, they were yet remembered by God, and though

destitute, wronged, down-trodden here, they should be kings and priests hereafter. It did something too by inspiring the ministers of the church with courage to rebuke the king and the feudal lord, and to remind them, that the truest nobility they could aspire to was the practice of the Christian virtues.

Philosophy, or the spirit of inquiry, the desire for general intelligence, which had been kept alive by the church, and which took a new start after the feudal régime had become somewhat fixed, also contributed its share towards effecting the social change we have noted. The desire to philosophize, or to know the reason and nature of things, manifested itself in a striking degree in the twelfth century, and has been manifesting itself more and more strikingly ever since. The first subject to which it applied itself was theology. There was at first no disposition to disprove nor even to question the truth of theology, but a craving to establish its truth on rational conviction, and not on positive authority. Abelard attempted to do this, and gave birth to the Scholastic Philosophy, a philosophy more ridiculed than understood, and whose influence on the progress of society has been altogether underrated.

To the Scholastic Philosophy succeeded the Revival of Letters, and the study of Grecian antiquity. The study of ancient literature and philosophy enlarged the modern circle of ideas, and introduced a more liberal and just mode of thinking into the affairs of the world. From the study of antiquity and the human mind, men passed to the study of nature, and opened a new career to science. Scientific discoveries followed in rapid succession, and gave a new face to war, commerce, and manufactures, which in their turn reacted upon the social state, and lessened its evils. No small portion of the evils of the lower classes was owing to their ignorance. As soon as they began to think, to find out that they had thinking faculties, and to use them, their condition was ameliorated. The low-born man by means of intelli-

gence became the equal of the high-born ; he became a minister of state, an influential prelate, one of the real nobility of his country. By means of knowledge the two classes were occasionally brought into contact, and the plebeian found himself the master of the patrician.

The habit of looking into the reason and nature of things soon disclosed the unreasonableness of the pretensions of the Church, the illegitimacy of the authority of the Pope, and brought about the Reformation. It carried more intelligence and order into the administration of government, into legislative enactments, and the interpretation of laws, which produced in return something like social order, and gave something like security to persons and property, facilitated industry, and by that elevated the industrious class.

But the cause, to which, more than to any other, we are indebted for this change, is to be found in the rise, progress, and dominion of the moneyed power, represented and sustained by what we term the business part of the community. Much is said against this power at present, and perhaps justly. It has attained its zenith. Business men have had their golden age. They have become the sovereigns of the world. Kings, nobilities, hierarchies, legislators, are their servants. The world, it may be, is growing weary of their dominion, and perhaps restless under the weight of their tyranny. A strong party is organizing itself against them ; and in this country we are in the midst of a revolution which must overthrow the Money-King, and inaugurate Humanity. Nevertheless the Money-King was once a slave, as vile a slave, as maltreated a slave, as any on whom kings and nobility trampled, and his accession to power marks the enfranchisement of industry. Whether desirous or not of prolonging his reign, we must all admit that his reign *has been* for the best interests of the human race.

Owing to conquest as the proximate, if not as the

ultimate cause, the immense majority of mankind, at an early day, were reduced to a servile condition. Hence the reason why the working-men, the manual laborers, the creators, in one view of the case, of all the wealth, comforts, and luxuries of a nation, are themselves, always and everywhere, poor, ignorant, degraded, accounted the lower class, an inferior order of being. This is owing to conquest, not, as the advocates of aristocracy ignorantly allege, to the natural inequality with which God creates men. The laboring class has been always the lower class, poor, and ignorant, and menial, because the tribe or nation, to which it originally belonged, was conquered by another tribe or nation, stript of its possessions which went to increase the stock of the conquerors, reduced to slavery, and compelled to perform all the labor of the community, and by its labor to augment that stock still more.

Rome was conquered by the Barbarians; the wealth of the Roman world, at least the greater part of it, passed into their hands; consequently the indigenous population was left destitute. Destitute of property, they were entirely at the mercy of their Barbarian lords. Poor, dependent, enslaved, they of course must be regarded as inferior, and as unworthy as incapable of associating with the conquerors on equal terms. Poor, dependent, enslaved, regarded as inferior, as low, vile, they must needs be deprived of all means of improvement, excluded from what was held to be good society, and debarred from all opportunities of cultivating elegant manners and refined tastes. It needs no argument, therefore, to prove that they must cease to be dependent, that they must acquire some portion of this world's goods, and a certain degree of leisure, intelligence, and refinement, before they could claim to be of an equal race with those who constituted the upper classes. The laboring or conquered population could rise to a level with the conquerors, and thus regain their lost independence, only by the acquisition of

wealth. They must become capitalists, proprietors. The man, who has nothing in this wide world that he can call his own, can hardly exhibit the bearing or the virtues of a man. A man must feel that he has something, before he can feel that he is something.

This is not all. The laboring class, so long as they are doomed to perpetual toil, must needs be ignorant and brutish. They cannot take their place with the upper classes of society, until they have become intellectually, and in point of intelligence, their equals. But their equals they cannot become in the lowest depths of poverty. Great wealth is no doubt unfavorable to mental growth; but a certain degree of wealth is needed, in order that the mind may have leisure to concern itself with something besides mere animal wants. The laborer must be able to live like a man, before he can think like a man, have a man's intelligence. The distinction between the upper classes and the lower, the conquerors and the conquered, could then be obliterated only by means of a physical amelioration of the lower or laboring class. The interests of this class, then, at first were necessarily identified with the moneyed interest. The first service to be rendered it was to open to it the road to wealth.

Now the road to wealth this depressed, enslaved population was obliged to open to itself, by its own efforts. Nothing was to be hoped from the upper classes. Whatever was obtained from them was to be obtained by main force. The conquerors will hold, with all their power, the conquests they have made. The conquered must rely on themselves alone. The odds are altogether against them. They are poor and naked, and the earth and nearly all the means of gain are in the hands of their masters. They are placed under almost every conceivable disadvantage. Nevertheless they must work out their own salvation; and by their own energy and perseverance rise from bondmen to freemen, and from slaves to be the sovereigns of the world. Their work is a great one, and

ages must elapse before we can perceive that they have made any progress. Yet progress they do make ; and after centuries of secret, silent working, ever interrupted, but ever beginning anew, perpetually thwarted, but never despairing, we see that they have made a mighty advance.

The plebeian population, on the establishment of the Barbarians, though all equally vile, were not all in precisely the same condition. The agricultural portion was the most unfavorably situated. The land, whether cultivated or not, was all appropriated in the hands of a few, and for the most part locked up in entail. The agricultural laborers could therefore have no hope of becoming proprietors. All they could hope for was to be tenants on such terms as their masters should be pleased to grant. The inhabitants of the towns or cities were somewhat better situated. They were held to be as vile, as menial, and as far removed from freemen as were the villeins or agricultural bondmen ; but they were mainly tradesmen and artisans, who could manufacture articles for sale, and carry on a species of traffic with the upper classes themselves. The Barbarian population, calling itself noble, disdained to be traders or handicraftsmen. Consequently trade and manufactures fell to the indigenous population, and of course to the inhabitants of the towns. Trade and manufacture, though insecure, subjected to innumerable risks, and loaded with vexatious and all but ruinous exactions, nevertheless enriched the traders and the artisans, who became in due time merchants and manufacturers. The mercantile and manufacturing population, as the most favorably situated for the acquisition of wealth, therefore take the lead in the enfranchisement of industry, and are the first of the conquered population to become free and independent.

Trade and manufactures require outlays, and when they are carried on to a great extent, they demand large capitalists. This gives rise to a division in the conquered population itself, a division between capi-

talists and simple operatives,—a division which may one day lead to a war between capital and labor, but which at this epoch could work no ill. The amount of capital in the hands of the industrious class, including the mercantile and manufacturing portion, in comparison with that possessed by the feudal population, was exceedingly small, and it was necessary to concentrate it in as few hands as possible, in order to increase its productiveness and augment its power. It was so small, that if equally distributed among the whole population, it would have been lost, at least have had no power to redeem the class. Every trader or manufacturer, who had capital which he invested in commercial or manufacturing enterprises, became a public benefactor; because he was increasing the amount of wealth belonging to the industrious class, and throwing into its hands the power with which it was one day to conquer equality with the feudal lord.

Trade and manufactures, though they did not distribute wealth equally among all the members of the industrious class, nevertheless augmented the gross amount of its wealth, enriched it as a class. But for them the capital of the world would have remained in the hands of the feudal society, in the hands of the nobility and of the church. In their hands it must have remained virtually unproductive. No addition to its amount would or could have been made. But just in proportion as capital came into the hands of the trader and the manufacturer, it became productive, and the wealth of the world was augmented. Individuals amassed large estates; but not by impoverishing others, as was the case when a nobleman became rich, or richer. The wealth they amassed they had called into existence; not, it is true, with their own hands, but by the profitable employment of the hands of others. In creating this additional amount of wealth, they did a real good, without doing any injury. The operatives they employed, indeed, did not become rich themselves, but they did not become the poorer. Their condition, on the contrary,

was much improved. The laborer at wages, though his wages were below what they ought to have been, was in a condition altogether superior to that of a bondman, which he was before he became a workman at wages.

Trade gives a spring to manufactures. It finds out markets, and thus creates a demand for them. By creating a demand for them, it aids their growth, calls a greater number of workmen into the factories. This in its turn increases the demand for agricultural products, and with this increased demand for the products of agriculture, agricultural labor rises in importance, and as a necessary consequence the agricultural laborer finds his condition improving. The smaller nobility, proprietors of a portion of the soil, turn their attention to the better cultivation of their lands, and take pains to increase their productiveness, because they find a market for their produce, or because they wish to obtain a larger supply of the articles furnished them by the merchant and the manufacturer. An additional amount of capital, a portion of that invested in land, is thus added to that employed in the interests of industry.

As the merchant and manufacturer, the tradesman and artisan, increase in wealth, they form a sort of middle class, or a class of commoners. Gradually they give to their children a decent education, and prepare them to compete, successfully in many respects, with the children of the nobility. Intelligence, polished manners, and refined taste are, after a while, associated with the names of some wealthy commoners. Some casual intercourse is commenced between them and the nobility. A marriage between one of their daughters and one of the sons of the nobility, desirous of replenishing his estate, now and then occurs,—and the process of amalgamation begins, never to cease till it becomes complete.

It is only by slow degrees that the money power is instituted, and business men obtain an influence in the affairs of the world. Business men require a

fixed order, security for persons and property. They can do little for themselves or for the cause of industry, when they can count with no tolerable certainty on a return for their outlays. Now through long ages of modern Europe, order, security for property or persons, there was little. The banker was not always a nobleman. The capitalist was not always a lord. From the fifth century to the tenth, moneyed men in no sense of the word constituted an aristocracy. No class of the community were more harassed or more exposed than they. Kings, lords, and bishops, harassed, vexed, taxed, despoiled them at their will. Nevertheless they contrived to prosper. Their wealth, power, importance, were ever on the increase. This is seen in the Communal movement, in the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, of which we have already spoken. The burghers were then able, in a multitude of cases, to force the kings, lords, and even bishops, to grant them charters of incorporation, securing to them important privileges, and allowing them, within the walls of their town, to live under laws of their own making, and magistrates of their own choosing. Some, we are aware, pretend that these charters were granted to the towns, through the generosity or policy of the kings; on the one hand to aid the people, and on the other to secure their assistance in controlling the feudal lord, of whose power the kings were jealous. But they who attribute the least of the good, which they find the people enjoying, to the generosity or policy of kings, are the worthiest interpreters of history. Kings play a much less conspicuous part in the real history of the world than they do in the narratives of historians. The Communal charters, in nearly all cases where they secured any important franchises, were obtained because the Commune was powerful enough to conquer them, or rich enough to buy them. That the kings of France and of England, as well as some of the great feudal lords, and perhaps now and then a bishop, did grant charters of incorporations to some old

towns, and to some new ones, is very certain ; but they did it as a means to obtain money. Whether, therefore, the burghers conquered or purchased their charters of incorporation, the fact of the charters being granted proves their growing importance, their increasing wealth, and their efforts to obtain a fixed order, favorable to trade and manufactures.

The Communal movement failed before the end of the fourteenth century, and in the fifteenth century, the towns and boroughs, as a sort of petty republics, have no longer any significance. But the wealth and influence of the burghers or commoners have increased. They constitute now one of the three estates of the States-General. They were first compelled to send their deputies to the Parliament to vote the supplies demanded by the king, that the town or borough might be held to pay it, because voted by its deputy. But this, which was at first a compulsory duty, becomes with the improved condition of the commoners, a valued right, not to be surrendered, and the origin of representative government. The commons remembering that they originally voted supplies, and forgetting that they did it because compelled, and in the interest of the king, not of themselves, come to claim the exclusive right to vote them, and therefore become masters of the government, and from an estate, become the nation.

These, of course, are only loose hints on the influence of the moneyed power in elevating the plebeian class, in creating the Commons, and in amalgamating the two populations which occupied the European territory at the commencement of modern history. We should be glad to be more explicit and minute ; but we have been enough so for our present purpose. The moneyed power has been one of the great agents by which modern civilization has advanced, and the business men have contributed their full share to the progress of popular liberty. By means of trade and manufactures, the majority of the available wealth of Christendom has been thrown into the hands of the

Commons, and this has given the Commons a preponderance in the government of the world. It must be added too, that trade and manufactures have not robbed the feudal lord of the wealth, they have placed in the hands of the Commons. They have created it, and by so much augmented the wealth of Christendom, of the world. Having now, at least in England, France, and America, a majority of the wealth on their side, the Commons are the real rulers. They have as a class risen from their degradation, broken the yoke of the conqueror, and recovered their independence.

The progress of society has brought up the industrious class as far as it was identified with the moneyed power. But the work of modern civilization is not completed. The feudal lord restrained the absolutism of the monarch; the moneyed power has restrained, supplanted, taken the place of the feudal lord, and made the government of the world pass from the hands of the soldier to those of the banker, and substituted the pen for the sword. But it places that government still in the hands of a class, not in the hands of Humanity. It has brought up a much larger class than the old feudal nobility, and a class too, which has come out from the bosom of the people and can claim no preëminence over them, in point of blood, or race; but still it leaves the immense majority below the proper estate of man. The distinction between the capitalist and the laborer now manifests itself, and becomes an evil. Till the moneyed power had triumphed over the old nobility and lodged the government in the hands of the business men, the interests of capital and labor were one and the same. It was necessary to secure the victory to the moneyed power, in order to redeem the people, that population to whom the business men belong. That victory is gained; the class is redeemed, as a class; and the work now is to redeem the class *as individuals*, that henceforth the government of the world shall be in the hands of no class, but in those of Humanity.

This new work was seriously begun with the American Revolution. The world had, here and there, attempted it before, but without success. It was attempted in England, in the seventeenth century, but the agricultural population were too weak to perform their share of it. The soil, or the greater part of it, was in the hands of the nobility, and its cultivators were too poor and too dependent. The work failed, or rather was suspended, adjourned. This country had been discovered. The land here was unappropriated. Its cultivators became its owners. The agricultural population here became, therefore, independent proprietors, without ceasing to be laborers. Their influence, and a powerful influence too, was therefore capable of being thrown into the scale, not, as in England, against the laborers in towns, cities, and factories, but against the power of any dominant class.

Our Revolution was effected not in favor of men in classes; not in favor of orders or estates; but in favor of man, men as integers. It marks a new epoch in human progress. The influence of capital, or the moneyed power, as the ruling power, had then ceased to be legitimate. Man, not Money, was then to be sovereign; and the whole people, not the business men merely, were to hold the reins of government. But this was not fully understood at the time. Alexander Hamilton and his party thought matters stood as they ever had done, and that the moneyed power was still the legitimate sovereign. They were doubtless sincere. They had not that order of mind which is first to discern when old watch-words change their meaning. The country, in consequence of the war of the Revolution, was embarrassed with a national debt, and the aid of the business men was needed to pay it off. A national bank was therefore established, and the Money-King suffered to wear the crown yet longer. In 1800, an effort was made to dethrone the Money-King, and enthrone the People, and attended with partial, which would have

been complete, success, had it not been for the war of 1812. That war plunged us again into debt, and made it necessary, in 1816, to recall the money power. The debt is now paid off; the nation owes not a cent; and the great contest has recommenced between capital and labor, or more properly, between Man and Money; — between the moneyed power supported by the business men, and the entire people sustained by a majority of the agricultural and mechanical population.

It is not likely that this contest will be immediately ended, yet we cannot doubt the final result. Modern civilization has brought up the nobility against the king, and maintained them; it has brought up the business men against the nobility, enfranchised capital and capitalists, and sustained them; it now brings up the laborer, that portion of the plebeian class whose enfranchisement was adjourned, so as not to prejudice the interests of capital; and shall it fail now? It shall not. Humanity, from the depths of her universal being, utters the word, it shall not fail. The struggle may be long, arduous, and perhaps bloody; the oppressed may have to groan yet longer; the friends of Humanity may experience more than one defeat; but they will never give over the struggle, or despair of ultimate success. They have been too long victorious, and too often have they gained the victory, in darker days than these and with feebler forces than they now have at their command, to despair, or “bate a jot of heart or hope.”

All classes, each in turn, have possessed the government; and the time has come for all predominance of class to end; for Man, the People to rule. To this end all modern civilization has been tending, and for this it gives valiant battle to-day. Its forces appear to us as numerous, as well disciplined, as skilfully drawn up in battle array, as ever; and unless God has changed his purposes, and inverted the order of his Providence, it shall come off conqueror; and Man be redeemed; and the work for his friends henceforth

cease to be the melioration of society, and become that of perfecting the individuals of each successive generation, as they appear in time and pass off into eternity. This done, and the wish of the working-men is fulfilled; the visions of the prophets are realized; and the prayers of the philanthropist are heard in heaven, and answered on the earth.

ART. VI. — *Slavery.* By WILLIAM E. CHANNING. 4th Edition, Revised. Boston: James Munroe & Co. 1836. 16mo. pp. 187.

WE have not introduced this little volume of Dr. Channing's for the purpose of reviewing it. It has been too widely circulated, and too generally read, to permit such a purpose to be either necessary or proper. The public have long since made up their minds respecting its merits, and are quietly giving it the high rank it deserves. In our opinion, though not wholly unexceptionable, it is the best book that the present discussion of slavery among us has called forth, and the only one, we have met, that we can read with anything like general satisfaction. With its general estimate of slavery, its lofty moral tone, and its profound reverence for the rights of man, we sympathize with our whole soul; but some of its special views, and the traces of a doctrine tending somewhat to centralization, which we here and there discover, and of which we believe the author to be unconscious, we cannot entirely approve.

We place this work at the head of this article merely for the purpose of testifying in general terms our high appreciation of its merits, and because it gives us an occasion of expressing our own views at some length on the subject of slavery. The subject of

slavery is fairly before the public, and it must be met. However much we may regret its agitation at this time, when all thoughts should be turned to the settling of the financial affairs of the nation, we must suffer it to be discussed, and take part in its discussion. We would merely add, let it be discussed calmly, without passion, and in a truly Christian spirit.

We say without any hesitation, that we are wholly and totally opposed to slavery, and that we do not consider it any question at all with the American people, whether it be a good or an evil. We believe that question is decided by the Declaration of Independence, and forever put at rest. To attempt to prove that slavery is wrong, that it is not to be perpetuated, and that it ought to be abolished, as soon as it can be, is to insult every true American's mind and heart, and that too, whether he live north or south of Mason's and Dixon's line. We have much mistaken the character of our Southern brethren, if there be one among them, that will for one moment contend that slavery is the proper estate of a man.

That man has no absolute right to hold his brother man in slavery, is but a necessary inference from the fact that slavery is wrong. It can never be right, no man can ever have the right, to do wrong. Every slave-holder, then, ought to do all he can do to rescue his fellow beings, whether black or white, from the servitude in which he finds them, or to which he may have reduced them. If slavery be wrong, his duty is plain. He must, if in his power, remove it. Here is no room for dispute, no need of argument.

Again; we hold that slavery must and will be abolished. The whole force of modern civilization is against it, and before the onward march of that civilization it must be swept away. To this result we do not believe that our Southern brethren are opposed. Some of them may believe that slavery is fixed upon them forever, may believe that its abolition is impossible, and therefore may undertake to invent good

reasons for its continuance; but secretly none of them love it, and the immense majority of them would rejoice to be rid of it.

But while we contend that slavery is wrong, that it is wrong to hold slaves, and that the slave-holder ought to labor with all his power for its abolition, we do not agree with our friends the Abolitionists, in denouncing slave-holders, and in declaring that no slave-holder can be a Christian. Reformers should war against systems, not against men. Paul was always careful to have it understood, that he did not "wrestle against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places." For ourselves, we have learned that men may profit by institutions opposed to the best good of Humanity, without necessarily being bad men. Many practices, which, in one view of the case, strike us as altogether wrong, in another point of view, appear to us as excusable, if not even as justifiable. The older we grow, the more we see, — we speak personally, — the less and less are we disposed to be censorious. The world is *not* all wrong, everything is not out of place, and every man is not a devil. Thank God! we every day acquire fresh faith in human virtue; and while we bate nothing in our zeal or efforts for progress, we become able to look with more and more complacency on the world, and to feel that, of all God's prophets, we are not the only one that is left alive. There are more than we who have not bowed the knee to Baal.

If slave-holding were purely an individual act, we confess, we should doubt the possibility of the slave-holder's being a good man, save at the expense of his intelligence. But slave-holding, in our Southern States, for instance, is not an individual but a social act. Slavery is not an individual but a social institution, and society, not the individual conscience alone, is responsible for it. The question is not, Is slave-holding wrong? but, Can a man who adheres to, and

attempts to profit by a wrong, social institution, be a good Christian man? Must he necessarily be a sinner? This is the question, and we wish our moralists and divines would answer it. It is an important case of conscience, and reaches, perhaps, further than we are ordinarily aware of. Society always has been, and everywhere is, imperfect. All its institutions are more or less imperfect, more or less in opposition to absolute Justice. We may all of us be getting our living to-day by means of institutions, as unjust in themselves as Abolitionists have shown slavery to be. If no man who adheres to, or profits by, a wrong social institution, can be a good man, that is, a Christian, what shall we do with the upholders of monarchy, hereditary nobility, corrupting hierarchies, with Mahometans, Brahmins, all who live in an imperfect social state, and profit by unjust social institutions? Nay, what shall we do with ourselves; for who of us has anything which we can say positively has come into our possession without the aid of any wrong social institution? We should, it seems to us, view with suspicion all rules of judgment, which in their operation must overstock hell, and leave heaven an unpeopled desert.

For ourselves, we ask no questions of the slaveholder that we do not of any other man. Is the slaveholder faithful to all his engagements, in the discharge of all the private virtues? Does he cultivate piety towards God and love to man? Does he make slavery as light a burden as he can; that is, does he treat his slaves with kindness and respect? Does he inquire into the character of his social institutions, and do what he can to perfect them? If so, we must call him a good Christian. We know the Abolitionists may say, that it is his duty to free his slaves at once; and so should we, if it depended on his individual will whether he should free them or not. But this matter of freeing the slaves is a matter for the community, rather than the individual slaveholder. As a member of the community, the individual should do

all he can do, to hasten the period when the community shall unfetter the slave and let him go free. Before that period he cannot free his slaves, even if he would.

But we are told by the South, that this is their affair and not ours, and that we have no right to meddle with it. Is the South right? This brings us to the question, what rights have we at the North in regard to Southern slavery? This after all is the real question before the American people, and unhappily this question has become so entangled with other questions, that it is difficult to give it a separate and distinct answer. Our own opinion on the matter we have hinted in a foregoing article, but we deem it necessary, in justice to ourselves and to the cause of liberty, to go more fully into it, and to state more at large the grounds of our opinion. We do this the more readily, because nobody can for one moment suspect us of any desire to palliate slavery or to prolong it. All who know us, know well that we are heartily opposed to every form of slavery, and that our whole life is devoted to the cause of universal liberty to universal man, — a cause for which we have made some sacrifices, and for which we are ready, if need be, to make more and greater sacrifices.

In all that concerns their internal regulations, institutions, and police, we regard the several States which compose the Union, as distinct, independent communities. We are to be regarded as one people, as one nation, only in the several respects specified in the Constitution of the United States. In all other respects we are not one nation, but twenty-six independent nations, and stand in relation to one another, precisely as the United States as one nation stands in relation to France, England, or Mexico. We of Massachusetts have no more concern with the internal policy and social institutions of South Carolina, for instance, than we have with the internal police of Russia, Austria, or Turkey. Slavery, then, in the States is not a National institution; that is, not an

institution over which the people of the United States, in the sense in which they are one people, have any control. The right of the people of the non-slaveholding States, in relation to slavery in the Southern States, is precisely what it is in relation to it in Constantinople, or in any foreign slave-holding state.

In one respect slavery may in this country be regarded as a National and not as a State institution. The Constitution of the United States allows slavery to form one of the bases of National representation. All the States have a legal right to concern themselves with this question. We of the North, if we choose, may undoubtedly use all just means to amend the Constitution so that slavery shall not be represented in Congress. Whether it is desirable so to amend the Constitution, is a question of policy, which we do not now undertake to decide. Slavery in the District of Columbia, and in the Territories belonging to the United States, is a different matter from slavery in the States, and, for aught we can see, may constitutionally be acted upon by the Congress of the United States. Whether Congress should act upon it in the District and the Territories, is a question on which good men will differ. For our own part, we wish slavery, when abolished, to be abolished by a concert of all the the slave-holding States, together with the Congress of the United States. We can see little utility in abolishing it at present in the District of Columbia and the Territories. To petition Congress to do it, is only to petition Congress to do indirectly, what all parties agree it may not do directly, that is, abolish slavery in the States.

Here is the ground of the objection, which the South makes to the reception of anti-slavery petitions by Congress. These petitions literally touch the question of slavery only in the sections of the slave-holding country, over which Congress has exclusive jurisdiction, but really, and in the minds of those who get them up, they are petitions for the abolition of

slavery in the States themselves. Does any body believe, that, if Congress should grant the prayer of the petitioners, slavery would stand a year in this country? Do not all the Abolitionists believe, that the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia and the Territories, by Congress, would necessarily involve its abolition in all the slave-holding States? Is not this also the belief of the South? What, then, is the true character of the petitions with which Congress is flooded in regard to slavery? Are they not in fact, though not in name, petitions for Congress to interfere with the internal police of the Southern States? So the South regards them, and on this ground it opposes their reception. Is the South right in this? Have we a right to petition Congress to abolish slavery in South Carolina? Have we a right to petition Congress to violate the Constitution of the United States? A right to petition it to do indirectly, what it may not do directly, openly, avowedly? Yet we have unquestionably the right to petition Congress to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia and the Territories, and the South have been unwise and impolitic, to say the least, in denying it. By denying it, they have mixed up with the question of Abolition that of the right of petition, which has in reality no connexion with it. The Abolitionists have by this means been able to make themselves regarded as the defenders of the right of petition, a right dear to all New-England men, from the memory of the struggle of their fathers of England in the seventeenth century with Charles Stuart. And yet, virtually, the South are, in this very controversy, truer defenders of constitutional rights than the Abolitionists. The Abolitionists are technically, literally right, and the South technically, literally wrong; and hence their efforts work altogether against them, and recruit the ranks of Abolitionists by thousands. Abolitionists never rejoiced more sincerely than they did at the passage of Mr. Patton's Resolution. Congress, we believe, ought to receive the petitions as the less of two evils, and to treat them with all proper respect.

But to return to the question of the right of the people of the free States to interfere with slavery. What is this right? How far does it extend? The right of the people of the non-slave-holding States, in relation to Southern slavery, is precisely their right in relation to any of the social institutions of France or England. They have the same right to labor for the abolition of monarchy or the House of Lords in England, that they have for the abolition of slavery in any of the Southern States. What is this right? How far does it extend? In our opinion simply to the free and full discussion of the question. As men, as citizens, in this respect, of independent communities, and therefore divested of none of our natural rights by any other community, we have the right to discuss freely, and give our views unreservedly, on all questions which concern Humanity. We have, for instance, a perfect right to question the legitimacy of monarchy, to show, if we can, that it is a bad institution, that it is founded in usurpation, that it does great wrong to man, and that it ought to be abolished forthwith. We may also throw all the light in our power on the means of abolishing it, and offer what we believe to be sound and cogent reasons for abolishing it. So of slavery. We may examine it, publish all the facts we can collect respecting it, speak, print, publish, in the limits of our respective states, fully and freely, our honest convictions of its nature, tendency, justice, injustice, the necessity, the duty, the means of its preservation or removal. This we believe is the extent of our right of interference. A step further than this contravenes international law, and encroaches upon the rights of the slave-holding states.

The right here stated, and to this extent, we claim for ourselves. We claim it on the ground that we are men, and have therefore a right to interest ourselves in whatever concerns men, as men. We claim it on the ground that we are citizens of a State which allows, which guaranties free discussion, freedom of speech and the press, and which no other State

has any right to interfere with or seek to control. This right the South must not presume to deny us. While we respect her rights, she must respect ours. If we may not interfere with her legislation, she must not interfere with ours. Moreover, neither the North nor the South has any right to abridge or restrain freedom of discussion, because freedom of discussion is one of the rights of man, and therefore older than governments, and raised above their legitimate reach. The South has erred in denying us this right. In doing this she has struck a blow at our independence, made the Abolitionists, with no great consistency however, appear to be the champions of free discussion, and induced not a few to join them under this character, that never would have joined them as simple Abolitionists.

Still, we are inclined to believe, that the South has never intended to deny us the right to discuss, in our own way, the abstract question of slavery. All she has really intended to do, is to assert her right to manage her internal police as she judges proper, and to deny, as a necessary inference from this, our right to interfere with it. The real question at issue between the Abolitionists and the South is not whether slavery be good, bad, or indifferent, but whether one State has the right to avow the design of changing the institutions of another State, and of adopting a series of measures directed expressly to that end? This is the question. In all that concerns them as States, these United States are as independent on one another as are England and France. France has as much right to interfere in the internal police of England, as Massachusetts has in the internal police of South Carolina. Slavery is unquestionably a matter which falls within the powers of the States, as independent, sovereign States. In relation to this question, then, all the States stand to one another precisely as foreign nations. The question then comes up in this shape: Have we the right to avow the design, and to adopt measures to control the internal legislation

of a foreign nation? The question needs no answer. Every body knows that we have not, at least so long as we acknowledge the independence of that nation.

Nor does it alter the nature of the question, that the actual interference is by individual citizens and not by the state. What the state is prohibited from doing, it can never be lawful for the citizens to do. Interference in the affairs of foreigners is as unlawful on the part of individual citizens as of states. Who will pretend that La Fayette had any more right to interfere in the quarrel between this country and England, than France herself had? And who will pretend to justify La Fayette's interference by international law? France was at peace with England, and La Fayette, as a subject of France, was bound to keep that peace. We adduce not this case to censure La Fayette, whose chivalrous aid to the cause of American Independence we appreciate as highly as do any of our countrymen, but simply to show that the obligations of the state bind the citizen. Our Canadian neighbors are now in a quarrel. Has this nation a right to interfere in that quarrel? Certainly not under its existing treaty obligations to England. It may side with the Canadians, but not without involving itself in a war with England. Its duty, if it would preserve its peace relations with England, is to remain neutral. Is not the duty of the citizens the same? Can an American citizen take up for the Canadians, without losing his character of American citizen, and forfeiting the protection of American laws?

If the individual citizens may do in relation to an independent state, what the state may not do, the consequences are not difficult to be foreseen. If the citizens of this State may associate to do what the State itself may not do, all that is requisite to enlist the whole force of the State in that which it is unlawful for the State to do, is to waive the State, and band all the citizens together into what shall be called a voluntary association. If half a dozen citizens may

unite in an Abolition Society, pledged to emancipate the slaves, all the citizens of the State may do it. And when all the citizens of the State have thus formed themselves into an association, what is that association but the State under a different name? The interference of such an association would be as efficient, to say the least, as that of the State itself. And if the citizens of a state may thus lawfully associate for changing the institutions of foreign nations, we ask, what security can one foreign nation ever have in relation to another? It is of the greatest importance to the peace and safety of nations, that citizens or subjects observe with scrupulous fidelity the engagements of their respective governments. The Abolitionists themselves were of this opinion in relation to the interference of our citizens in the affairs of Texas.

Nor, again, will it do to say that slavery is an institution of so peculiar a character, that we may claim the right of interfering with it, without claiming the right to interfere with the whole internal police of foreign nations. In the first place, it is not an institution peculiar in its kind. Something similar to it is found in every State, in which the law makes any discrimination between individual citizens. The principle which legitimates Southern slavery may be found incorporated, if we are not much mistaken, into the constitution and laws of every State, in the Union. In every State in which restrictions are placed on eligibility, as in this State, or in which the law presumes to say who may and who may not exercise the right of suffrage, or in which there are monopolies or exclusive privileges recognised by law, there is the seminal principle of slavery. But waive this, as not essential to our argument. In the next place, we say we have no right to make any inquiry concerning the institutions of foreign nations, for the purpose of ascertaining which of them we have or have not the right of undertaking to abolish. We cannot do this without denying the independence of the nation in

question. Do we acknowledge South Carolina, for instance, to be a free and independent State? Do we acknowledge her sovereignty to be absolute, so far as not limited by the Constitution of the United States? Then what right have we to take the revision of her doings? Can we do this without virtually denying her sovereignty? Can we deny her sovereignty without giving her just cause of offence? And when we admit her sovereignty, do we not acknowledge her right to establish such institutions as she pleases? If then she pleases to establish slavery, is it not her affair, and one of which we have debarred ourselves, by the acknowledgment of her sovereignty, from taking any cognizance?

But it may be said, that slavery is unjust, that no State has the right to establish an unjust institution; therefore, South Carolina has no right to establish slavery. Grant it. What then? Who has the right to determine the question, as to the justice or injustice of the institution, South Carolina or we? If she be an independent State, she has the right to be her own judge as to the rectitude of her decisions. She is not accountable to us, and we have no right to arraign her before our tribunal. If we believe her decision unjust, we may undoubtedly tell her so; but so long as we admit her independence, we must speak to her as an equal, not as a culprit. We must concede her right to judge for herself; we must disavow the right, and the intention, of dictating to her; and we must confine ourselves to the simple statement of our reasons, as one man may state to another man his reasons for not agreeing with him in opinion. If, however, instead of doing this, we begin by formally declaring her in the wrong, by denouncing her as awfully wicked, by stirring up wrath and indignation against her, by solemnly pledging ourselves not to cease our exertions till we have compelled her to reverse her decision, and by adopting all the measures in our power which we believe conducive to that end, do we not then fail to treat her as an independent

state, refuse to acknowledge her right to judge for herself, and are we not, to all intents and purposes, waging war against her?

It will be seen from what we have said, that we do not question the proceedings of the the Abolitionists on Constitutional grounds. We do not believe that we of the North have made a compact with the South, by which we are debarred from interfering with slavery. We find in the Constitution of the United States no such compact. None such in fact was needed. Slavery exists in the States by virtue of no Constitutional guarantee, but solely by virtue of State sovereignty. The question in relation to it stands precisely as it did before the formation of the National government, and we have precisely the same rights, and only the same rights, of interference with it, that we should have had, had no National government ever been formed. The States are older than the Union, and they retain in their own hands all the rights of sovereignty not, in so many words, conceded to the Union. Now as the disposition of slavery is not conceded to the Union, it belongs as a matter of course to the States. By belonging to them it stands precisely as it did before the Union was consummated. As the States before the Union were so many independent nations, the question of slavery in them is to be treated solely as a question between foreign nations. Interference with it in one State by the citizens of another State is to be regulated by international, and not by constitutional law. Had the Union not been effected, everybody knows that efforts by the citizens of Massachusetts to free the slaves in South Carolina, efforts begun and carried on with express reference to that end, would have been a violation of international law, especially if accompanied with perpetual denunciation of South Carolina, and by their very character threatening to disturb her internal peace and tranquillity. Now this, which would have been true without the Union, we contend, is true under it. The South, we think, must therefore

place her defence on the ground of State sovereignty. It is as striking against State sovereignty, as denying the independence of the several States, as claiming for the citizens of one State jurisdiction over the legislation of another, that we view the proceedings of Abolition Societies with suspicion and alarm. To say the least, they assert the justice of a species of propagandism, which, if admitted, must strike at all national independency, and which will not fail to disturb the peaceful intercourse of nations, embroil them in war, and deluge the earth in blood. He who comes forth as the champion of liberty must bear in mind, that he is under no less obligation to defend the rights of communities, than he is the rights of individuals. He who loves America, and would live and die for American liberty, should look well before he adopts a course which may embroil the several States in a civil war, or in the end change the relations which now subsist between the National government and that of the several States. Liberty is as much interested in maintaining inviolate the rights of the National government, on the one hand, and especially of the several States which compose the Union, on the other hand, as she is in freeing the slave. In the measures the Abolitionists adopt, there is a deeper question involved than that of Negro slavery. All who are accustomed to look below the surface of things, may see that it is a question of no less magnitude than that of changing the whole structure of the government of this country, and possibly that of destroying the liberty of the whole American people. When hundreds and thousands of our citizens are banded together to trample on the rights of independent communities in the holy name of Freedom herself, we confess we are not a little alarmed for the rights of the individual. One barrier leaped, another may be; and when communities can no longer make their rights respected, what can the individual do?

But we shall be told that all our fears are idle, all

our reasonings groundless, for Abolitionists do not propose to do anything more than we have conceded them the right to do; that is, to express freely their honest convictions on the question of slavery. We deny this. The Abolition Societies, as everybody knows, are not formed for the discussion of slavery, but for its abolition. Their members are pledged to the "immediate emancipation of the slaves without expatriation." Lawyers may have been consulted, and the wording of their constitutions may be technically within the letter of the law, but we know, and everybody knows, that the real end, the avowed end, of their formation is not merely to give utterance to certain opinions on the question of slavery, but to effect its abolition. They are not formed for deliberation, for discussion, but for action, and action, too, within the limits of States of which Abolitionists are not citizens.

But we shall be told again, that, admitting the Abolition Societies are formed for the abolition and not the discussion of slavery, they do not contravene international law, because they adopt for the purpose of carrying their end only legal and constitutional means, such means as the laws of nations permit them to adopt. This undoubtedly is the real ground on which the Abolitionists rest their defence. We object to it, because we are not yet able to perceive that the legitimacy of the means, in themselves, can legitimate an unlawful end. It is admitted that the Abolitionists have no legal right to emancipate the slaves. Yet the emancipation of the slaves is what they propose to do. They propose to do what the laws of nations prohibit them from doing. Are any means directed to that end lawful to be used?

The Abolitionists, it will be said, do not propose to emancipate the slaves, except as the effect of the expression of their opinions and feelings on the subject of slavery. We question this statement; but admit it for a moment. The Abolitionists, unless they choose to break with the slave-holding States, to

refuse to sustain the relation of friends to them, and to come into open war with them, are bound by the laws of nations to refrain from all words and deeds which will disturb their peace and tranquillity, stir up insurrection in them, sully their reputation, or excite public indignation against them. Now we may undoubtedly discuss the question of slavery, but not so as to produce any of these results. Free discussion is itself subjected to this restriction. So long as we wish to be at peace and amity with foreign nations, we are bound to treat all their institutions, as their institutions, with respect. We have no more right to denounce them, to slander them, to speak to their prejudice, or to injure them in any way, because their institutions differ from ours, or from what we believe just, than we have an individual whose creed we happen to disbelieve. We may reason against such a man's creed, but we are bound to see that our reasoning against it do not result in any injury to him. If we should represent him as one with whom his neighbors should hold no intercourse, brand him as a sinner of the deepest dye, hire editors of papers to publish him to the world as such, and hold public meetings and pass public resolves to the effect that, if he do not change his creed instantly, he shall be placed out of the pale of Humanity, we should most assuredly transcend our rights in regard to him, and give him just cause of complaint against us. Now the Abolitionists pursue a course like this towards the slave-holding communities, and they do this for the express purpose of freeing the slave. They may in all this be only giving utterance to their honest convictions and feelings, but have they, under plea of free discussion, a right to utter themselves in this manner? Can they do this and be in a state of peace with those communities?

The Abolitionists say they use only moral and rational means, merely arguments addressed to the reason and the conscience. Is it so? To what kind of a reason or a conscience is denunciation addressed?

Is it so? What mean then these fifteen hundred affiliated Societies, spread over the non-slave-holding States, pledged to the immediate emancipation of the slaves? Are these Societies' arguments addressed to the individual reason and conscience of the slave-holder? What is the rationale of this argument? What is its legitimacy? Many hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children, all solemnly pledged to effect the immediate emancipation of the slaves, are banded together in some fifteen hundred Societies; therefore slavery is a sin; therefore no slave-holder is a Christian; and therefore every slave-holder must immediately emancipate his slaves! We confess this is a species of logic that passes our comprehension. That these Societies, by banding together the majority of our population, may so concentrate public opinion, and bring it to bear with such force on the institution of slavery, that the slave-holder shall feel himself unable to withstand it, and therefore compelled to free his slaves, is what we can understand very well; but this is neither a rational nor a moral argument for the abolition of slavery. A man finds a loaded pistol presented at his breast, and to save his life gives up his purse; and the slave-holder finds the community pointing the finger of scorn at him, and to save his reputation, which he holds dearer than life, emancipates his slaves; which is the more moral and rational argument of the two? An army, organized and marching upon the South to free the slaves at the point of the bayonet, would, in principle, be an argument to the individual reason and conscience of the slave-holder, equally as forcible, appropriate, and convincing, as an associated multitude pointing the finger of scorn, or shouting denunciation, and threatening the vengeance of Heaven.

Nor is it true that our Abolitionists contemplate no action on the subject, but the action of truth and moral suasion. They do contemplate political action. They let pass no possible opportunity of bringing the subject of slavery before the State legislatures; and

they are constantly at work to get it discussed on the floor of Congress. What, we ask, is all this agitation for? Why is Abolitionism organizing a political party in the States and the Nation? Why does it want Abolition members in our State Legislatures? Why does it interrogate candidates for office as to their views of slavery? Is there no political action intended? Give it a majority in Congress, and will it not legislate on the subject? It will at once abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, and in the Territories. Will it stop there? Who so simple as to believe it? It will usurp, or alter the United States Constitution so as not to need to usurp, the power to abolish it in the States. What are paper constitutions in the way of a body of men, women, and children, inflamed, drunken with a great Idea, and so much the more drunken because the Idea with which they are filled is a holy one,—what are paper constitutions in their way, when they have in their hands the actual power to advance? He knows nothing of the power of an enthusiastic multitude, who thinks such feeble barriers would arrest their progress. Their leaders might rush before them, the wise and prudent might beg them to pause; but leaders, and the wise and prudent are as chaff before the wind, and on will the multitude press, sweeping them away, or trampling them under their feet, to the realization of the Idea which inspires them. Here is the danger. Let the Abolitionists get the majority banded together in or under the control of their affiliated Societies, pledged to the immediate emancipation of the slaves, and they will throw into Congress the power to do it; that is, power to regulate the internal institutions of the States; gone then is the independency of the States; and then goes individual freedom; and then all power is in the central government; Greece or Rome is reproduced; the absolutism of the state is established, which merely preludes the absolutism of the Emperor. God grant, that in the honest and earnest defence of Liberty we dig not her grave!

We speak on this subject strongly, but we have no fears of being misunderstood. There is not a man or woman living that can accuse us of defending slavery. This whole number of our Review is devoted to the defence of the rights of Man, not to the rights of one man, of a few men, but of every man. We can legitimate our own right to freedom, only by arguments which prove also the Negro's right to be free. We have all our life long sympathized with the poor and the oppressed, and we yield to no Abolitionist in the amount of the sacrifices we have made, wisely or unwisely, needlessly or not, in the cause of human freedom. It is not to-day, nor this year, that we have pledged ourselves, for life or for death, to the holy cause of universal liberty. But everything, we say, in its time. First, we must settle the bases of individual freedom, settle the principle that man measures man the world over, and establish our government upon it, and secure the action of the government in accordance with it, and then we may proceed to make all details harmonize with it.

To explain ourselves; the work to be done in this country to-day is to place the government in the hands of the people, not only in principle, but in fact. Hitherto the government, in point of fact, has been in the hands of the business men, who have shaped legislation to their especial interests. We are struggling now to get it out of their hands,—not to the disadvantage of the business men,—but to hinder them from having an exclusive control over it. The business men form a part of the people, a large part, and a respectable part, and we must not wish to turn the government in any respect against them; but we must seek so to arrange matters, that they shall share only an equal protection with all the other sections of the community. The object is to effect such changes, that there shall henceforth, in all governmental relations and actions, be no classes, but simply the People. This done, we shall have established the principle of universal liberty, and opened the door for

every man to enter into the possession of entire freedom, under the dominion of equal laws. We shall then have all the individual freedom of the savage state with all the order and social harmony of the highest degree of civilization. This is the end to be gained, as we have attempted to show in the article which precedes this.

Now, our danger is not from an excess of individuality, but from centralization. The danger to be apprehended is from the strength, not the weakness of the government. Nearly the whole North has a strong tendency to merge the individual in the state. The North is enterprising, fond of undertaking great things, which are to be accomplished only by concentrating the power of masses, to be wielded by a few directing minds. This tendency is good, and springs from noble qualities; nevertheless it may, in its eagerness to reach its end, so centralize power, that the individual from an integer may become a mere fraction of the body politic. It therefore needs a check, a counterbalancing power, at least until the bases of legislation and social action become so fixed, that there shall henceforth be no danger that the state will swallow up the individual.

This check is found in the strong individuality of the South, arising from the individual importance which each man there possesses in consequence of being himself a sort of petty sovereign. The Southern planter keeps alive here the very element of individual freedom, represented by the feudal baron in Europe. The South therefore becomes the defender of individual freedom, as the North is the great advocate of social freedom. One represents the individual element, as the other does the social element of human nature. Hence the North demands a strong government, and the South a strong people. The North have been Federalists, the South Democrats. Now if we weaken the Southern individuality before the Northern centralization be fixed by laws, which leave the individual in possession of all his natural

rights, we destroy the equilibrium between the individual and the state, and endanger the freedom of both. This is one reason why we regret the present agitation of the slave question, and why we see danger, not to the Union merely, but to liberty herself in the Abolition movements.

This strong individuality of the South is the effect of the institution of slavery. The South without slaves would have had the same tendency to centralization that we have at the North. The cause of it here is the fact that no individual here feels himself of much importance by the side of the state. Individually he can do but little, and feels himself small. Hence his strong desire to lean on the state, his uncommon fondness for associations, corporations, partnerships, whatever concentrates power and adds to individual strength. Then again our commercial and manufacturing pursuits also tend to make us desire somewhere the social power, we can call in to supply our individual deficiency in strength, capital, or skill. The Southern planter is a sort of prince. Living in the centre of his plantation, of his own principality, absolute lord and proprietor of a number of human beings, he feels that he, individually, is a man; that his rights as a man are of too much consequence to be swallowed up in the rights of the state. It is true, he ought to reflect that his Negroes have the same rights by nature, as himself, and so he will one day; but first he must secure his own rights. After he has secured his own rights as a man, and finds them no longer in danger from the Northern tendency to centralization, he will perceive that he has, in defending them, been defending those of his Negroes; and then he will take up in earnest the matter of freeing them. To free them before were of no use, because before he has secured his own rights, there can be no security for theirs.

Here is the aid which slavery itself, through the providence of God, is made to contribute to liberty. Good always comes out of evil; and Southern states-

men are nearer the truth than we commonly think them, when they say, that "Southern slavery is the support of Northern liberty." We confess, that as things were, we see no way in which freedom could have been established in this country, without the strong sense of individual freedom which slavery tends to produce in the planter. When the world has become Christianized, we shall support individual freedom on the maxim, that "you are as good as I;" but in an earlier stage of social and individual progress, we must do it by means of this other maxim, "I am as good as you." Now this feeling of personal importance, of egotism, if you please, was in no way, that we can see, to be introduced but by slavery, and without this, our Republic would not have had the checks and balances needed. The time will come, when this will not be needed, and then slavery will cease. Before, it will not.

Another means of saving individual freedom is in the sovereignty of the individual States. Destroy the States as sovereignties and make them only provinces of one consolidated state, and centralization swallows up everything. The individual finds the government so far from him, and his own share in it comparatively so insignificant, that he soon comes to feel himself individually of little or no importance, and when he so feels he ceases from all manly defence of his rights, and loses himself in the mass. Now the South, in consequence of having peculiar State institutions to defend, has been the foremost in defence of State Rights, the Sovereignty of the States in its plenitude, so far at least as all their internal affairs are concerned. It is because they have had slaves, not to be retained without the supreme control of all State institutions, that they have been so earnest in defence of State sovereignty. There is some analogy between the relation a State holds to the Union, and that held by the individual to the State. The arguments which defend the rights of the individual defend those of the State, and those which defend the rights

of the State defend those of the individual. The South may have sometimes carried her doctrine of State Rights too far, but her repeated assertion of it has done not a little to save American liberty.

Now, until we have settled the controversy about state rights and individual rights, and obtained the amplest security for both, it is as unwise as it is useless to touch the question of slavery. As yet there is no security given, or capable of being given, that the slave will be a free man even if declared free by the laws. Let this security be obtained before you attempt to emancipate him. He is now, paradoxical as it may seem, aiding in laying the foundation of universal liberty to universal man, and when the superstructure is reared, and the multitude throng its courts, he shall appear in the temple a free and equal worshipper.

Hard undoubtedly is it, that liberty should be purchased at the slave's expense, and we confess we have no fondness for the idea; but less injustice is done the slave than we commonly imagine. The Negro on a Southern plantation is unquestionably a superior being to the Negro in his native Africa. By being enslaved, he has been elevated, not degraded. Degraded he no doubt is in comparison with his master, but his captivity shall redeem his race. The years of his bondage shall not be so long, his labors, sufferings, and sacrifices in becoming a civilized man shall be far less, than ours have been. So far as we may judge from the Past, it is the settled order of God's providence, that man shall be saved only by crucified redeemers. Man is never to receive freedom and civilization as a boon; he can obtain them only by toil and struggle and blood. Why it should be so, is one of the mysteries of Providence, for which we might perhaps assign some good reasons, but which we do not undertake to solve. The world is full of mysteries, and this is no more dark and perplexing than a thousand others. Time will clear it up.

THE
BOSTON QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JULY, 1838.

ART. I. — *Academical Lectures on the Jewish Scriptures and Antiquities.* By JOHN GORHAM PALFREY, D.D., Professor of Biblical Literature in the University of Cambridge. Vol I. The last four Books of the Pentateuch. Boston: James Munroe & Co. 1838. 8vo. pp. xx. and 512.

THIS is the work of a scholar of ripe years, who has brought to the difficult task of explaining the Old Testament, a keen, scrutinizing intellect, habits of careful and impartial observation, and an iron diligence. It is a work also on a subject on which English and American theological students have long needed a new work. The works on the same subject, which have been in common use among us, are of small value. Gray's Key to the Old Testament is too contemptible to be named among critical works. Every candid reader turns over its meagre pages, astonished at such condensation of weakness, stupidity, and superstition, — regretting that good paper should be perverted to such abuse.

The work of Mr. Horne* is of a different character,

* An Introduction to the critical Study and Knowledge of the Holy Scriptures, by Thomas Hartwell Horne, M. A. Fourth American edition. [!] Philadelphia, 1831.

and has some merits. Indeed he must have a rare sagacity in avoiding truth, who could write four goodly octavos without impinging upon it. He who shoots all day, though never so awkwardly, must sometimes hit the mark. The plan of his work appears to be better and more complete than that of Dr. Palfrey.

Mr. Horne states many facts, which it is necessary a scholar should know; but, at the same time, he makes so many errors, or mistakes, that none but the thorough scholar can use his work without danger of being misled.

The work of Dr. Graves on the *Pentateuch* is written with force and beauty. It was a valuable work, (for the English,) in its day; but it is liable to the same objection with the preceding work.

The capital fault of these three works, and of all others in our language, which treat upon the same subject, is this. They set out with false principles. Their chart is not accurate; their needle does not point to the north. With one consent, they regard the Scriptures as a peculiar work, demanding a peculiar interpretation to explain it. Assuming the complete inspiration of the books, they can see no error in them. "They seek what they find, and find what they seek." But if it be admitted, at the outset, that every line of the Old Testament was originally dictated by the Most High to the writer, it does not appear why the same criticism may not apply to it as to other ancient writings. Words are but vehicles of thought, whether uttered by God or man; as words, therefore, they must be interpreted. The same criticism, then, is to be applied to the writings of Moses and Aristotle. The genuine is to be separated from the spurious; the true from the false; the reasonable from the fantastic and absurd.

Dr. Palfrey, we are happy to find, has abjured these false principles of his predecessors. He starts from a different point; governs his course by different laws. The Books of the Old Testament are before him; he professes to assume nothing more. He ex-

amines the works with the same impartial rigor he would exercise upon the writings of Hesiod or Her-mias. If he concludes the books of Moses were written at the time alleged, it is because he sees what he esteems sufficient reason for that opinion. Does he credit the inspiration of a book or a passage, it is because he finds evidence which convinces him of the fact. This is his method; and though some may differ from his conclusions, or question their legitimacy, none can justly accuse him of begging the question at the outset, and revolving in the circle so well trodden by his predecessors.

He believes a revelation has been made to man in words, spoken in the Hebrew language. He sees no philosophical objections to such a belief. He considers the religious principle as the most important element in human nature; but at the same time so weak, that, unlike all the other principles, it cannot be trusted to shift for itself, to discover the truth and adhere to it.

He sees no objection to a miracle, when there is occasion for one; and he finds such an occasion, whenever a new religious truth is needed, and is to be disclosed by God. He supposes that all religious truth must be revealed directly and immediately from God, as man is incapable of discovering it for himself. Every such revelation must be authenticated by a miracle, for without this authenticating miracle man could not distinguish, — in matters of religion, — truth from falsehood. He defines a miracle, and makes its essence consist simply in its *extraordinariness*, that is, its *rareness*. Taking with him this standard, he justly concludes that miracles could not be continued, — as some maintain, — throughout the whole forty years of the Jew's pilgrimage in the wilderness, for they would cease to be rare, and by an easy process pass from miraculous to natural events.

Dr. Palfrey has at least done one service to biblical theology, by the work before us. He has laid down the principle, that in interpreting the Scriptures,

Truth should take precedence of Tradition, and that we should follow the dictates of the enlightened understanding, instead of the superstition of our fathers. In support of this assertion we refer to the following extracts. It has commonly been thought that the Jews were the only ancient nation blessed with a religion supernaturally revealed ; but Dr. Palfrey says,

“ I certainly would not venture to affirm * * * that the Jews were the only people of antiquity favored with a supernaturally revealed religion. Perhaps the most that with safety and modesty we could affirm upon the subject is this ; that we have no sufficient evidence to show that any other nation has been so privileged. * * * *But this is not proof that he [God] never did make any other such revelation.*” — pp. 95, 96.

Some writers have fancied they were doing God service, by maintaining that the laws of Moses had no foundation in the existing customs of the Jews or the Egyptians. A great outcry was once made against Spencer, for attempting to show that the Egyptians and other nations observed similar laws before the time of Moses. But Dr. Palfrey makes some of his most important institutions grow out of the condition of the people, while in the desert.

“ To whom does it not occur, that the direction to the males of the nation to assemble three times in every year had its first occasion in the necessity of preserving the integrity of the people, by preventing those who had the care of flocks and herds from wandering, in their excursions, to too great a distance from the camp.” — p. 87.

Again, he says,

“ They [the festivals] brought the citizens amicably together in a great national *Pic-nic* ; they did, not ostensibly, but only therefore the more effectually, the excellent office of our modern invention of Cattle Shows and Fairs.” — p. 457, note.

The book of Judges he considers “ filled up with marvels.” Yet his predecessors would fain have us believe them all as gospel truths ; even as they are mistranslated in our common version.

Some have pronounced the Mosaic legislation per-

fect; suitable for the largest empire. Dr. Palfrey calls it "a minute, detailed, (shall I say technical?) discipline, *only capable of being administered in a small community.*" — p. 95.

Not only is every word of the law accounted inspired, by Horne and his coadjutors, but it is supposed to have a concealed spiritual meaning, quite independent of its literal sense.* Dr. Palfrey differs, heaven wide, from these English Talmudists,—who have nothing of Moses, but his veil and his "slow tongue,"—and recognises no meaning in a sentence which is not to be found out by the fair and common rules of interpretation. He has no mystical theories to develope, and therefore finds none in Moses. He is so far from believing that Moses was immediately inspired to write *all* the laws in these books, that he declares some of the most important regulations proceeded from Moses himself, or from his friends, and that others originated with him, and were, by a singular process, "submitted for the divine approval," and then announced, "as resting on the divine authority." — pp. 145, 146. The impartial student of ancient history knows well that the words, "The Lord spake," have the same meaning with "Be it enacted," prefixed to our statutes. Dr. Palfrey nowhere makes this assertion; but if, as he observes, the phrase, "He [God] buried him," [Moses,] means simply, "He was buried," why may not the analogous formula, "God said," mean simply, "It was said?" This construction is sometimes put upon it by the author himself. In one instance cited in this volume, (p. 146,) the same event is twice recorded; once it is said, "And the Lord spake unto Moses, saying, 'Send thou men that they may search the land of Canaan.'" But in Deuteronomy, where the same incident is related, it is written, "Ye came near unto me every one of you and said, 'We will send men before us and they shall

* See numerous instances in *Horne* ubi supra. Vol. II., Part. II., ch. ii., and in many other places.

search out the land,' and the saying *pleased me well.*" From this and a similar case, the author deduces the following "principle of interpretation."

"When we read, 'The Lord said unto Moses, Establish and proclaim such or such a law,' *if that law appears to us trivial, * * we are not debarred from supposing that it had its origin in the imperfect wisdom of Moses*, and that he was but permitted to adopt it, in order that he might perceive its imperfections, and learn the political wisdom which his station demanded." — pp. 147, 148.

This is the most important principle in the book. It gives the reader liberty to measure the laws of Moses by his own mind. If the law is just, true, suitable, he will pronounce it divine; if absurd, he can refer it to "the imperfect wisdom of Moses."

The author departs from the common opinion in his views of the Sabbath. It is commonly fancied that the Sabbath was established by the Almighty at the creation; that it was observed by all the Patriarchs,—though from Adam to Moses, no notice of such observance appears,—and repeated to Moses, as a "perpetual ordinance," which has been changed for the Christian Sabbath. But Dr. Palfrey thinks the Sabbath was *first* instituted after the departure from Egypt, was designed as "a commemoration of the national deliverance from Egyptian servitude," and was celebrated by a simple cessation from labor. It is true, he adds, there was a particular sacrifice on that day; but this fact neither distinguished it from many other days, nor did it affect the individual's solemnization of the day." There was an holy convocation, that is, an assembly of such as were near at hand, to witness the sacrifice. Perhaps there were festive meetings of friends. Following Michaelis, he says,

"A Jew, who should sit perfectly unemployed, or even who should sleep, through the day, would have kept the Sabbath with a punctilious observance. 'In it thou shalt do no work,' says the command in the Decalogue; and this is the length and breadth of all which it enjoins." — p. 186.

The destruction of the first-born of the Egyptians, has usually been regarded as a signal miracle; so dreadful indeed, that it forced the tyrant to grant the prayer of Moses. The author considers the declaration, “‘All the first-born in the land of Egypt shall die; from the first-born of Pharaoh, that sitteth on his throne, even unto the first-born of the maid-servant that is behind the mill, and all the first-born of beasts,’ to be equivalent to this; ‘There shall be a remarkable mortality among the first-born of men and beasts.’” — pp. 133, 134. We are by no means informed, he adds, that the mortality was greater on this than on any other night, but “the intervention of a divinity was manifest in the extraordinary selection of the victims.” “‘But there was not an house,’ we are told, ‘where there was not one dead.’” “It remains to be asked,” he continues, “‘one’ *what* was dead in every house?”

Again, he opposes the the common opinion respecting manna, which is, that this food fell down miraculously from the sky, on six days, in each week, for forty years; and in such abundance that the Hebrews used no other food, except on certain specified occasions; that none fell on the Sabbath, while twice the usual quantity was provided on the preceding day. On the contrary, Dr. Palfrey contends that manna is a well known natural substance; as much “*fell*” on the Sabbath, with *one* exception, as on any other day; that it did not continue to fall throughout the forty years, and that it was never the only food of the nation. — pp. 143–159. He however recedes a little from this point.

“But after all it may have been necessary for the poorer portion of the people to be permanently provided for; and if so there could be *no more unexceptionable way* [*for God!*] of affording the supply, than by a constant supernaturally increased production of a natural product of the wilderness.” — p. 157, note.

Finally, to conclude this portion of our remarks, he denies that there was any miraculous agency con-

cerned in guiding the nation, by a cloud by day and a pillar of fire by night.

“When masses of men were moving through the vast plains of the East, we know that it was anciently the practice for their movements to be regulated by a fire near the leader’s person, whose flame would be visible in the night-time, and its wreath of smoke by day, marking the spot where his tent was pitched when encamped, and the road which he was taking when on the march. It at least deserves careful consideration, whether the verse which I have quoted was intended to declare that the Lord went before the people in a flame and smoke, in any other sense, than that he was always in communication with their leader; he was always present in the smoke and flame, which, according to convenient and prevailing custom, were the artificial signal of the leader’s presence. And this view appears to derive confirmation from the fact, that Hobab was subsequently engaged by Moses to be his guide, as one acquainted with the intricacies of the wilderness. If he had already supernatural conduct, there seems no reason why he should have sought such offices from Hobab.” — p. 150.

And yet, with an alarming inconsistency, quite common in these pages, he attributes miraculous powers to this same fiery guide. For, on one occasion, he states it proved “to be a miraculous divine instrument;” again, “on the side turned towards the favored people, it was *all guiding and cheering radiance, while it rolled over the devoted heads of their enemies* its dense volumes of blinding and threatening smoke. *Such was its peculiar miraculous agency, on the present occasion.* But this,” adds the author, “by no means proves it to have been, at other times, a supernatural phenomenon.” — p. 151.

Sir Thomas Brown loved seven tests of his faith, even desiring a fourth person to be added to the Trinity, that he might believe the more; but we query whether even he, with his capacious faith, could believe there was no miracle in the general guidance of the fire-pillar, and yet affirm it wrought all these wonders on this occasion.

These instances show us very clearly the freedom

with which Dr. Palfrey explains the wonderful events recorded in the *Pentateuch*. Yet we can hardly believe that his explanations will be found satisfactory to the majority of readers. While he admits the abstract credibility of miracles, he seems desirous of restricting the miraculous agency to the smallest sphere possible. But when the *Deus ex Machinâ* is once fairly introduced, neither the frequency nor the marvellousness of his operations can produce any embarrassment. It is no relief to explain away ninety and nine miracles, while the hundredth is permitted to remain. If one camel may go through the needle's eye, all may.

Dr. Palfrey's explanations of the miracles, so far from being satisfactory, will in many minds create new doubts and embarrassments. If so much is mere natural occurrence, why call any portion a miracle? If so many of the events hitherto accounted miraculous can be explained away by the application of enlightened and searching criticism, why may not the few remaining ones be explained away by the application of the same criticism? Most readers, we are inclined to think, will wish the author had shown a broader and more obvious difference than he has, between the miracles he explains away, and those he retains, and also between those circumstances attending the same occurrences, which he ascribes to miraculous agency, and those which he concludes were but natural events. His decisions, in most cases, appear to us to be extremely arbitrary; at least he rarely adduces any solid reasons to justify them. He must expect then his readers in general either to stop this side of him, or to go beyond him.

We are free to confess that we do not find the difficulties, we have felt in regard to the wonderful events recorded in the *Pentateuch*, removed, or in the least diminished. The author does too much or not enough. He does not permit us to receive them as we have been taught to receive them from childhood, nor to find relief in regarding them as natural events,

which, through the long lapse of ages, men's ignorance, superstition, and natural love of the marvellous have greatly exaggerated. Does he not take quite too much liberty with the writings on which he comments, if they are to be regarded as the Holy Word of God; and quite too little if they are to be regarded merely as a collection of ancient traditions? — quite too much if there be any ground for supposing Moses their author; and quite too little if we may receive them as anonymous productions? Is it not easier to believe all the miracles recorded in them, precisely as they stand, than the few he retains, and as he explains them? And will not the impression of most of his readers be, that, had the author not adopted a theory he was desirous of maintaining, he would have admitted miraculous agency in them all, or in none? that his theory was to be sustained, and as it could not be by human aid, the introduction of supernatural agency became indispensable?

It will, however, be seen, from the instances we have adduced, that Theology is changing its ground among us; that it is abandoning some of its old positions, whether it be assuming new and tenable ground or not. It may not march as yet, but assuredly, we think, here is proof that it is preparing for a movement. The principles laid down in this volume, though the author may not always be faithful to them, are certainly far more consistent with reason than those of his English predecessors. None of them have ever dared advance such principles, or examine the Books of Moses with so free a spirit. Believing, as we do, that Theology, as a science, may in its nature be progressive, as well as the science of chemistry, or that of geology, we certainly rejoice at this, and without complaining of the author for what he has not done, we very cordially thank him for what he has done.

This volume comprises twenty Lectures or Chapters. The first sets forth the importance of the Inquiry. According to the common opinion of Christians, the

Jewish books contain the record of a revelation from God ; and although Christianity is more full and perfect, yet the first revelation is still of great value and importance, both on account of the truth it contains, and its historical interest. Besides the New Testament is connected with the Old, and modified by it.

Many objections urged against Christianity have proceeded from a misunderstanding of the Hebrew Scriptures. He thinks the language of the Jews was first fixed by Moses ; that his writings exerted an influence upon the Hebrew tongue, similar to that of Luther upon the German, and of King James's translators upon our own language. But if the Hebrew language were formed before the time of Moses, it presents a strange anomaly, — a nation of slaves forming a language totally unlike that of their masters. If it were formed by him, even during his life, we should find his language bearing the same resemblance to that of later writers, which the writings of Otfried and Chaucer bear to those of Goethe and Byron. Many of the learned of Europe date the Books of Moses in the high and palmy days of Hebrew literature.

One of the most valuable Lectures in the book is that on the Canon of the Old Testament. It seems scarcely to belong to the work. It is conceived in a different spirit. It displays more research than any four chapters beside. Fearless of consequences, the author follows Truth wherever she leads him. He states the common opinion upon this subject. That all the thirty-nine books of the Old Testament are of equal canonical authority ; that the Jews anciently esteemed them sacred, containing a peculiar revelation ; and that they were all collected into a single volume, at an early date, laid up in the temple at Jerusalem, distinguished from all other writings, and guarded with religious veneration. Some maintain that Ezra made this collection after his return from exile. But there is no authority for the fact ; and

it is certain a portion of the Old Testament was written after his time. Others ascribe this collection to the men of the Great Synagogue. "But such a body of men is unknown to authentic history." The conclusion of the author is,

"That there does not appear to have been any absolutely uniform Canon of the Old Testament, till three or four centuries, at least, after the New Testament revelation. If this be true, then it follows, not only that the uniformity was introduced at a period too late to admit of its being intelligently done, but still more, that, in giving this kind of definiteness to what earlier times had left indefinite, a contradiction was offered to the truth of history. If before, and at the time of our Savior, the Jews did not know, that precisely the books which compose their and our present received Canon possessed a peculiar and exclusive character of sacredness, then it could never become known to the Jews, for instance, of the fourth century; since it could only be through the channel of that earlier age, that the opinion, allowing that it was a correct one, could have come down to this later." — p. 23.

In the Old Testament we find works of the most opposite character united. Histories, mythical stories, the most beautiful hymns, amatory poems, proverbs, and predictions. How came such various works united in the same volume? When were they collected? By whom? On what principles was the collection made? Does it comprise all the relics of the Hebrew literature? Are all parts of it supernaturally inspired? If not, how is the divine to be distinguished from the human portion? All these questions connect themselves with this inquiry upon the Canon.

In ancient times a great diversity of opinion prevailed upon this subject. The Canon of the Samaritans added to the *Pentateuch* the book of Joshua. The Alexandrian version comprises not only all the books we include in the Old Testament, but the greater part of the Apocrypha.

Philo, contemporary with Jesus Christ, refers to

nineteen books of the Old Testament, though he mentions by name only two of the minor prophets.*

Josephus enumerates twenty-two sacred books. but we have no authority for believing they were just the same which we pronounce canonical, since Josephus says the last of them was written before the time of Artaxerxes Longimanus, who died 424 before Christ.

Among the early Christians there was no uniform canon, received by all. Origen, a great authority, does not enumerate the twelve minor prophets, though he repeatedly quotes them in his works. The author furnishes us with a list of the books contained in the canon of several of the Christian fathers.

We cannot forbear enlarging a little upon this topic. The books of the Old Testament seem to have been collected as relics of the national literature. Probably all the documents known were gathered together. The Jews of Egypt made additions to this collection. Some manuscripts contained more than others; no one, perhaps, contained all of our present Canon. These writings were well known to Jesus and his hearers. He and his disciples refer to them. Twenty-two books are thought to be directly quoted. This fact does not prove these books are canonical, or of divine authority, for Jesus also alludes to the Apocryphal writings.† Paul quotes the Greek poets; and Jude refers to the apocryphal book of Enoch.

* He makes no use of the Apocrypha, says Dr. de Wette, (*Einleitung*, § 17,) one of the profoundest of modern critics. Eichhorn (*Einleitung*, § 26) infers from his language, that he was acquainted with the Apocrypha, but did not hold it in so high esteem as the writings of Solon, Plato, and others, from which he made extracts in his own works. Jesus the son of Sirach mentions the sacred books of his nation, calling them "the Law, the Prophets, and the other Books of our Fathers." — *Prologue to the Wisdom of Jesus the son of Sirach*.

† Compare particularly, John iv. 13, and Ecclesiasticus xxiv. 20.

xv. 1,	17.
i. 1,	9.
iv. 13, 14, and vi. 35,	21.
Matthew xi. 28,	19.

The fact that these writings are thus quoted is no proof of the inspiration or value of the writings themselves.

In the fourth or fifth century, for the first time, we find the Canon is definitely settled, in its present form. But by what authority? That of Time and Use. The Hebrew books were collected into one volume. This is the Hebrew Canon. Those found in the Hellenistic Dialect were likewise united. These form the Canon of the Alexandrian version. At this day, there is no Canon of Scripture, acknowledged by all sects of Christians. The Greek Church has always differed from the Latin. The Protestants adopt one Canon; the Catholics another.

"I find no way to avoid the opinion, that, as in the New Testament collection, so in the Old, the several books are to be judged on their several and independent grounds of evidence; and that, further, the mere circumstance of being excluded from the established Canon, and stigmatized by the title of Apocryphal, should not prevent other books from having their claims considered. I find nothing in history to simplify the labor of a critic on the Jewish scriptures, by satisfying him, that, by mere force of being found embraced in the now received collection, a book is to be acknowledged for an authoritative teacher of faith or practice. This is what, I conceive, he has first to ascertain, before he is justified to proceed upon it as a fact." — p. 42.

The next subject of importance, discussed in this volume, is the authenticity of the *Pentateuch*. Undue stress, we think, has been laid upon this question by the English and American theologians. Some writers seem to regard a doubt upon this point as one of the cardinal sins, and not like any other historic doubt. Dr. Palfrey defends the authenticity, but more feebly, we fear, than some of his predecessors. Since little has been written amongst us against the authenticity, and since the question is one of importance, we shall devote considerable space to an examination of both sides of the argument; only premising that the True is always the Best. The question is not connected

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with Christian theology. No doctrine of morals, or religion depends upon it. It is an historical question, and is to be settled like all other historical questions.

The question at issue is simply this, did Moses write the four books, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy? Before the author puts the question, he makes certain necessary preliminary remarks. We are not to expect the same amount of evidence to support the authenticity of these works and that of the books of the New Testament. The former are very ancient; the latter comparatively modern. We must not expect allusions to Moses, in writers contemporary with, or immediately subsequent to him. No such writers existed; at least their works have not reached us. Again, all, he says, who maintain the later origin of these books, refer the principles of the laws to Moses, as their author. On the other hand, the defenders of the authenticity admit the existence of interpolations of a later age. Without this admission the authenticity cannot be defended. Some think the laws are from the hand of Moses, but the miracles are of a later date. Others defend the intimate connexion between the alleged miracles and the laws. He admits the Pentateuch cannot have had a supernatural origin, "*if immoralities are commanded, and erroneous and unworthy views of the Deity are presented*" in it. This admission is important, and deserves to be remembered.

If these books are authentic, they explain the existence of a pure theology among the Jews. Whence did they obtain the doctrine of the one true God, except from revelation? Admit the authenticity of these books, and the answer is plain; deny it, and the most perplexing problem is presented. The fact, that the Hebrew nation are found in possession of a pure theology, is only to be explained by supposing they received a supernatural revelation. This could only be authenticated by miracles. It is more reasonable to suppose these recorded are the "authenticating" miracles, than to suppose the record has been lost, and a false one substituted.

Again, if the books were not written in the time of Moses, when were they written? If Moses did not, who did write them? They were not written in the age of the Judges. The laws could not have been composed or adopted in such unsettled times. It was too near the age of Moses. The forgery would be detected. The work could not be written in the time of the Kings; for the laws are republican, and one passage is hostile to a royal government.* For the same reason it could not be written after the separation of the Kingdoms of Israel and Judah. Besides, the Israelites would not receive the law from their rivals, nor *vice versa*. Yet these books were revered by all the nation. "All the evidence * * * we have of its existence among the Israelites appears * * * so much proof of its having existed among them before the separation. * * * The possibility of such a theological system being devised at that period * * * will become more incredible." — p. 73.

Ezra read the law after the return from exile; its most rigorous command was obeyed. This shows the sense entertained of its authority. About one hundred and fifty years afterwards it was translated into Greek. The discrepancies between this version and the Hebrew original seem to show the work had long been in circulation, otherwise there would not be such different readings in various copies. This argument is enhanced by the Samaritan Pentateuch; which exhibits readings different from our Hebrew.

This is the external argument by which he attempts to defend the authenticity of the Books of Moses. But to give it more force he traces its several steps backwards. The work translated three hundred years before Christ, could not have been written between this time and that of Nehemiah, for he mentions the "Law," "the Law of God," and "the Book of Mo-

* Deuteronomy xvii. 14-20. But the whole passage favors monarchy, instead of "breathing a vehement jealousy" of it. Some writers think verses 16 and 17 were written after the time of Solomon. They apply to his conduct.

ses." Ezra, also, his contemporary, speaks of the "book of Moses," and of the "law of Moses, the man of God." The books of Chronicles, written about the same time, mention these books in the same terms, and recognise their existence in the reigns of Josiah, Amaziah, Joash, Jehosaphat, and David, who lived about five hundred years before Nehemiah. In the books of Kings it is spoken of in the same terms; and in the book of Joshua it is said to have been "Joshua's guide," about four hundred years earlier than the times of the kings.

Such then is the external argument in favor of the authenticity of the Pentateuch, traced forward and retraced backward. We have condensed the author's argument; but trust we have not misrepresented him. And to how much does this argument amount? Is it conclusive for the authenticity of the Pentateuch?

His arguments from the internal structure and character of the work are briefly as follows.

"The style of the Pentateuch agrees with the supposition of a remote age. The idioms of language and the rhetorical representations are of a simple character, while the tone and structure of the composition are such as we might expect from a man, engaged in an enterprise like that which he describes." "The work is written after the manner of a journal." "There are laws which breathe the desert air." Amongst these he places the laws relating to the feasts. "The anthropomorphic character of some representations, in it, of the divine Being," is "proof to us of the early origin of the book." "The remarkable chasm between the books of Genesis and Exodus," could only have been left by Moses. "The conclusion of the whole matter" is this.

"For the present I conclude with the remark, that, without urging the external evidence, with a confidence, such as has been professed in respect to it, but such as I think it will not justify, it yet appears to me, that *whatever there is, favors the commonly received opinion*: and that it is substantially, what we should be entitled to expect on the supposition of the cor-

rectness of this opinion, the actual circumstances hardly admitting, in any such case, of more. The internal evidence alleged against the authenticity I conceive to be based, for the most part, on mere misapprehensions, while that in its favor is of a very weighty kind and large amount." — pp. 89, 90.

The author does not profess to have done more than lay out the grounds of the argument, which he is to labor upon in the following chapters. But, alas, very little fruit of that labor appears in the sequel. Such is the argument; such the evidence from without and within, to support the assertion that these books were written by Moses, in their present form, some few interpolations only being excepted.

Is this argument satisfactory? Does it remove the objections; answer the questions which naturally arise? To us there are difficulties, attending a belief in the author's opinion, arising both from historical facts, and from the character of the work itself, difficulties which his argument by no means removes. It is not just to demand contemporary evidence to the authenticity of these books; but if Moses wrote them, by acknowledged divine authority; if he wrought all the miracles recorded in them; publicly enforced the observance of these remarkable laws in his life-time; if he enjoined their observance upon his successor and all the people, and, shortly before his death, commanded them to read these laws and histories to their children, — and all this is related in these books, and maintained by Dr. Palfrey, — then are we justified in demanding allusions to these laws and to the law-giver in the records of the times immediately subsequent to his age.

According to Dr. Palfrey, the earliest allusions to these laws are found in the book of Joshua, which treats of the times immediately after the death of Moses. He dates this book not far from the accession of Saul, or David, that is, about 1095 or 1055 before Christ, or five or six hundred years after the death of Moses. For our part we should rather date the book after the captivity, 588 before Christ. The

arguments for this date are as follows. In chapter x. 13, reference is made to the book of Jasher, which could not have been written before the death of Saul, since we learn from 2 Sam. i. 18, that David's lament upon that event was contained in it. The book of Joshua, therefore, could not have been written before the time of David. Again, chapter xi. 16, the Mountains of Israel and Judah are spoken of. This passage could not have been written before the separation of the two kingdoms. Finally, the mythology, the myths, the whole spirit of the book resemble that of the books of Chronicles, and seem to belong to an age when the Babylonians had exerted an influence upon the national character.* On account of its modernness, therefore, the book of Joshua can be of no value in determining the present question. If the book of the Law existed in its present form when the book of Joshua was written, it is natural for the author of the latter to refer to it. But such a reference would be a dubious evidence in favor of its early existence.

The book of Judges bears marks of greater antiquity than the preceding book. There is, perhaps, no reason to doubt that some of its narratives are nearly contemporary with the events they relate. The book may have been written before the age of David.† Here then is the earliest work after the time of Moses, but it does not mention him, nor allude to his institutions in the slightest manner. The history is minute; it deploras the idolatry of the land; but it mentions no sacrifice to the Lord, like that appointed by the law. It never speaks of a Levitical order of priests. Now, if the books of Moses were then in existence, is it not strange they are not alluded to? Would the

* See chap. v. 13-15. See De Wette, *Beiträge zur Einleitung in das Alte Testament*. Bd. I. § 147, et seq.

† It should be noticed that this book consists of two parts, first, i. - xvi., second, xvii. - xxi. This latter part bears marks of its recent composition. The day of the captivity is mentioned xviii. 30, which could not have been written before the time of Hezekiah.

most important precepts of the law be violated, and yet no notice be taken of the fact?

The books of Samuel contain the history of the following times. They were probably written soon after the separation of the kingdom.* They comprise an history of the nation from the time of Samuel to David. Moses and Aaron are both mentioned very naturally; but not a word is said of the law of Moses, or of the law-book. But allusions to customs in use among the Jews, similar to those enjoined in the books of Moses, occasionally occur. This is to be expected. But sometimes acts are done contrary to these laws. The ten plagues are mentioned, but are said to have been inflicted in the wilderness, and not in Egypt. The deliverance from the land of bondage is spoken of. Several passages in these two books resemble others in the Mosaic writings; but this is easily explained by reference to an unwritten tradition. It is besides highly probable that parts of the law were written before the composition of the whole.

Perhaps it is not just to infer the non-existence of the Pentateuch from the fact that it is not mentioned. But an event occurred which rendered it necessary to refer to the laws of Moses, if they were in existence. The laws provide for the election of a king; they even encourage it, and furnish directions for his government. In the time of Samuel the Hebrews desire a king of him. He is displeased with their request, and evidently considers it hostile to the spirit of their institutions. Had he been acquainted with the law in Deuteronomy,† would he not have granted their request without opposition? The most we can gather from these books, relative to the present question is, that some of the laws now in the Pentateuch were then in force; and that tradition had preserved a remembrance of the national bondage in Egypt, and of the delivery from it by Moses. All this is antecedently probable.

* See 1 Samuel, xxvii. 6.

† Deuteronomy, xvii. 14, et seq.

The books of the Kings were evidently written after the captivity.* In them we find allusions to the law. The law of Moses is mentioned for the first time in them. The dying David charges Solomon to keep the statutes, commandments, &c., "as it is written in the law of Moses." Now, since we know the law of Moses was acknowledged as the law of the land; at the time these books were reduced to their present form, it is more probable that the writer puts these words into the mouth of David, than that David ever uttered them. This consideration is strengthened by the fact, that we can find no trace of these laws during the reign of David, except this single passage written five or six hundred years after his death. But granting these words were uttered by David, the fact would only prove, — what may be admitted, — the existence of a written law of Moses, not that of the whole *Pentateuch* in its present form.

In the books of Kings, as in those of Samuel, an event occurs, which must have led to a mention of the book of the Law, if it had been an acknowledged authority. In Deuteronomy, especial directions are given for the preservation of the law-book, that is, the *Pentateuch*. "Take this book of the Law, and put it in the side of the ark of the covenant of the Lord your God, that it may be there for a witness against them."† A more suitable place could not be found; for the ark already contained the two stone tablets of the decalogue. If the law were revered as a divine authority, the book must have been in the ark. Now Solomon, at the dedication of the temple, solemnly transfers the ark to its new place in the Holy of Holies. "There was nothing in the ark," says the narrator, "save the two tables of stone, which Moses put there at Horeb."‡

In the long period from David to Josiah, — an interval of more than four hundred years, — we find the law of Moses mentioned but once, in the book of

* 2 Kings, xxv.

† Deut. xxxi. 26.

‡ 1 Kings, viii. 9.

Kings. There the "book of the Law" is spoken of, and a passage quoted from it.*

In the books of the Chronicles, — perhaps the most modern work in the Old Testament, — the law, and the law-book of Moses are oftener referred to, and a spirit more conformable to his institutions prevails. The Levites are in great power; they teach the people out of the law of the Lord. There is a feast at Jerusalem. Hezekiah offers immense sacrifices, and celebrates the Passover.† But soon after we are told of the discovery of the law-book. In the eighteenth year of the reign of Josiah, about 624 before Christ, while the temple was undergoing repairs, Hilkiah the priest says unto Shaphan the scribe, "I have found the book of the Law in the house of the Lord."‡ The fact is related to Josiah. The law is read to him. He is filled with alarm, because it has been so long neglected, and even disobeyed. He sends to a prophetess to learn his duty. He commences a general reform; and both he and his subjects take an oath to keep the law. He cut down the groves consecrated to idols.

"And the king commanded Hilkiah the high priest, and the priests of the second order, and the keepers of the door, to bring forth out of the temple of the Lord all the vessels that were made for Baal, and for the grove, and for all the host of heaven; and he burnt them without Jerusalem in the fields of Kidron, and carried the ashes of them unto Beth-el. And he put down the idolatrous priests, whom the kings of Judah had ordained to burn incense in the high places in the cities of Judah, and in the places round about Jerusalem; them also that burnt incense unto Baal, to the sun, and to the moon, and to the planets, and to all the host of heaven."§

He expelled the idol-priests from the cities of Judah. — "He took away the horses, that the kings of

* 2 Kings, xiv. 8.

† 2 Kings, xxiii. et seq.

‡ 2 Chron. xxix. — xxxi.

§ 2 Kings, xxiii. 4, 5.

Judah had given to the Sun, at the entering in at the house of the Lord." He removed the altar on the top of the house of Ahaz; and those Manasseh had erected in the very courts of the temple. He destroyed the vestiges of Solomon's idolatry. He commands the prophet to keep the Passover, as it was written in the law. The writer adds, "Surely there was not holden such a Passover from the days of the Judges."*

Now if this book had been in existence eight or nine centuries, and all this time had been the law of the land, acknowledged as the word of God, could allusions to it be so rare in the history? When the nation desired a king, would not the provision for such an emergency, made by the law, be mentioned? Would monarchy be regarded as hostile to the institutions of the land, when the law-book encourages monarchy? The law commands that the book of the Law shall be kept in the ark; why do we not find it there? If the laws had been so long known and obeyed, when the law-book was produced in the time of Josiah, would it excite such a "sensation;" or lead to such a revolution in civil and ecclesiastical affairs? We feel tempted to say, with Jeremiah, the contemporary of Josiah, "Thus saith the Lord of Hosts, the God of Israel. * * * *I spake not unto your fathers*, nor commanded them, in the day that I brought them out of the land of Egypt, *concerning burnt offerings or sacrifices*, but this thing I commanded them, saying, Obey my voice."†

Again, some of the most important enactments of the Mosaic law were, at least, neglected from the period of his death to the reign of Josiah. The law demands that there shall be but one place of sacrifice. It insists earnestly upon this point. But sacrifices were offered at various places, by the proper officers. There were at least six favorite places of sacrifice, Mizpah, Gilgal, Bethel, Shiloh, Hebron, and Bochim.

* 2 Kings, xxiii. 21 - 23.

† Jeremiah, vii. 21 - 23.

It may be said that sacrifices were to be offered wherever the tabernacle rested. But the tabernacle could occupy but one place at the same time; and it appears from many passages, that sacrifices were offered contemporarily in several places. It appears that each man builds an altar where he pleases.* After David had built a tent at Jerusalem, to receive the wandering ark, sacrifices were offered in various places. This practice still continued, even after Solomon had built a temple, and was first abolished by Josiah.

The law forbids all sacrifices, except by the hand of the priests; yet David and Solomon perform the office of chief priests. The Levites do not appear to hold any distinct place in the nation, before the time of David. The drink-offering at Mizpah, Jephtha's offering of his daughter, the sacrifice of Saul's seven sons,—“slain before the Lord,” as a sin-offering,—all these are foreign to the letter and the spirit of the law of Moses. We are not told that the Passover was kept from the time of Joshua to Hezekiah. If we are to credit the historian, the Sabbath was not kept for four hundred and ninety years, and for this neglect the nation is to remain in captivity the seventh part of that time, to keep a sabbath of seventy years.† Idolatry, a capital crime, high treason by the Mosaic law, always prevailed to a great extent. Horses, consecrated to the Sun, stood in the porch of Solomon's temple. The altars of idolatry disgraced its two courts. Magicians and false prophets, whom the law would put to death, were consulted by more than one king of Israel. There were three kings who ruled the whole land. Two were theists, the third an idolater. After the separation twenty kings ruled over Judah; fourteen of them were idolaters.

* See this subject treated at length by De Wette, *ubi supra*, § 226 et seq., and by Leo, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte des Jüdischen Staates*. Berlin. 1828. VI. Vorles.

† 2 Chronicles, xxxvi. 21.

Twenty also ascended the throne of Israel, and of them nineteen worshipped images.*

Such are some of the results of an examination of the external evidence, that Dr. Palfrey says,

“Is all, which on the supposition of its authenticity, we could expect under the circumstances to possess; and which would create a strong persuasion of the authenticity of the work, were not its contents thought to be such as to bring suspicion upon that hypothesis.” — pp. 79, 80.

Let us now consider the internal evidence. But before we proceed to examine particular portions of the Mosaic legislation, we would remark, that in our judgment, as a whole, this legislation far transcends all ancient codes. No other system has come down to us so thoroughly penetrated with love for man, with piety towards God. We can never adequately express our admiration of the beauty of some of its precepts; of the holy spirit displayed in many parts of it; of the rare political wisdom it evinces. What an influence have these laws exerted upon the world! Every christian lawgiver has been instructed by these hoary institutions. Some of them breathe the freshness of old time, when there was “open vision;” others seem animated by the breath of God. All men,—the stranger and the slave,—are brothers to the proudest Jew. God, the infinite King, watches over all. His eye sees the heart of the king; his arm sustains the beggar who is ready to perish. Some of the precious truths of Christianity had shed their splendor upon the writers of these books, whoever they were.† The voice of God speaks in them more clearly than in any other ancient laws.

* Constant de la Religion, ii. 233.

† “The appearance and the character of the Jewish theism at a time and among a people, equally incapable of conceiving the idea, and of preserving it when presented, are phenomena to my mind which cannot be explained by the common principles of reasoning. If that which I call revelation, divine teaching, light proceeding from the wisdom and goodness of God, be called by others an inward sentiment, the development of a germ implanted in the human soul, it

Dr. Palfrey asserts that in style these books resemble the compositions of the age of David and Solomon. Yet he adds, the difference between Deuteronomy and the Psalms of David is very nearly as great, as that between the latter and the writings of Malachi, (the last of the prophets,) if we except his Chaldaisms. It would be difficult to say why we are to make this exception; for the national language was exposed to corrupting influences in the time of Moses, and immediately afterwards,—especially during the long wars with other nations,—quite as powerful, as any it subsequently experienced. If it is possible that seventy persons should increase to a nation of three millions, while they were slaves in a land where they alone spoke this language, and still preserve it immaculate for four hundred and thirty years; if this language could be transmitted from the age of Moses to the time of David, with no farther alteration than the author allows, then it is not strange the nation should preserve it pure during seventy years of exile. But it did not continue pure during this latter period. What then preserved it at the age between Moses and Hezekiah? Was there a miracle wrought to defend it? Dr. Palfrey accounts for the slowness of the change in this period by asserting that “in the East the fashions of language do not rapidly change,” and cites Dr. Johnson to confirm it, who says, in substance, the language of a semi-barbarous people will continue long unchanged, if they are secluded from strangers. But the Jewish language, according to the author’s hypothesis, was formed in

is of little consequence. * * * We do not certainly recognise a divine revelation in the massacre of enemies, in the burning of cities, in the slaying of infants in the arms of their mothers. * * * We recognise the revelation made to Moses, in that portion of the Hebrew Scriptures, in which all the virtues are recommended, filial love, conjugal love, hospitality towards strangers, charity, friendship,—which no other legislation elevates to the rank of virtues,—justice, and even pity. Here is the divine voice. Here is the manifestation of Heaven on earth.”—*Philosophical Miscellanies, translated by George Ripley.* Boston. 1838. Vol. II. pp. 286–289.

the midst of strangers, and the nation was in contact with strangers long before David.

"Turning from the supposed adverse, to the favorable internal evidence," says the writer, "I ask a Christian, who believes that whatever professes to proceed directly from a benevolent God, is recommended to his reception, in that character, by its apparent strong efficacy to preserve the purposes of God, in the religious improvement of his children, to observe the fitness of the law of Moses, to exert, and the fact of its having actually exerted, such an influence." — p. 84.

If we understand the first part of this sentence, he believes that everything which *professes* to proceed from God, is *therefore* recommended to his reception by its apparently strong efficacy to serve the purposes of God. Now almost all the religions of the world make this pretence; but does it follow that they will serve the purposes of God, because they make this profession? Is the religion of Mahomet perfectly good and pure, because it professes to come directly from God? Having taken due notice of this antecedent value of religions which profess to come from God, the Christian is to observe the "fitness of the law of Moses to exert, and the fact of its having actually exerted, such an influence." From what has already been said, it may be seen that the fruits borne before the time of the Captivity, are not of the most flattering character. But admitting the law had all the fitness claimed for it; that it was perfect; this fitness proves the excellence of the law, not its antiquity or divinity, unless all good laws are old, and the result of supernatural or miraculous inspiration.

The language of the Pentateuch furnishes the author with another argument. The chief difference between the language in these and in later books is this,—in the former, a masculine noun and pronoun are frequently used with a feminine signification. He cites Dr. Gesenius, the Magnus Apollo of Hebricians in these days, as authority to prove "both to be Archaisms," referring to a well known work of the German writer. It is not for us to join issue with our author,

on a question of this nature, for we are "babes in Hebrew," and he the Coryphæus of philology. We rather prefer to rest the question with the author he has himself quoted. Nay, we will rest upon the very passage he cites, (p. 85, note,) for it contains matter to the purpose. "The language and usage of the Pentateuch," says Gesenius,* "in the historical sections, agree perfectly with those of the historical books. * * * However, the Pentateuch has some peculiarities." He then adduces the words above-mentioned, and adds, "These two forms have commonly been considered as Archaisms, and, in virtue of this, have been used as arguments in favor of the high antiquity of these books. This may be admitted, and they may be paralleled by the Latin forms, *Tulli, Terrai, Senatuis, &c.*, which, though somewhat more ancient, were used by some writers, as well as the common forms."

Again, "The work is written in the manner of a journal," says the author. But why then are there such chasms in his history? How can we account for the fact, that not a word is said of the long period between Joseph and Moses, so important in the Jewish history, — the formation period of the nation, of its language, and "common law?" If the language were so far perfected that the Pentateuch could be written in its beautiful style, immediately after the departure from Egypt, would there be no records of that period? Would not Moses collect these, as he did the earlier documents of less important ages?† If "Moses wrote a journal," why is there no history of his nation from the second till the fortieth year of the Exode? Why is there no minute account of his proceedings until the twentieth day of the second month of the second year, and so meagre a narrative after it? Why is the list of the resting places so im-

* Gesenius geschichte der Hebräischen sprache und schrift. Leipzig. 1815. § 11, 31, 32.

† We suppose the author considers Moses the compiler of the book of Genesis.

perfect, some of them being an hundred miles from any one of the others?

Again, "There are laws, which breathe the desert air," some of which, it seems, "wasted their fragrance" on it, as they were repealed before they were put in practice. One of these "laws, which breathe the desert air," is that relating to the feasts. It had "its first occasion in the necessity of preventing the people from wandering too far from home, while they were in the desert." Now we read, that the most important of these feasts was established while the nation was in Egypt. He himself says, (p. 137,) it was a commemoration of the deliverance from bondage, and not merely an ingenious device to keep shepherds at home.* Besides, be it observed, that during the whole pilgrimage of forty years, the Pass-over was celebrated but once,† for this very good reason,—the nation was not yet delivered from danger and hardship. How could they celebrate a feast of deliverance before they were delivered?‡ We are not told in these books, that the feast of Pentecost, or the feast of Tabernacles, was ever kept during the life of Moses. It was kept, perhaps for the first time, by Ezra.§ Yet it was during this period of the residence in the wilderness, that these feasts would have exerted their best influence, according to our author.

But if some of these laws grew out of the occasion, what shall be said of the numerous enactments, alleged to be prospective, which belong to a different state of society; which "breathe the air" of the city, rather than that of the desert? If the one favors, the other opposes the authenticity. Let an impartial reader examine the Mosaic legislation, and

* See De Wette, ubi supra, § 293—298.

† Numbers, ix. 4, 5.

‡ When Aaron had made the calf he appointed a feast. "And the people sat down to eat and to drink, and rose up to play."—Exodus, xxii. 5, 6.

§ Ezra, iii. 4.

he will find statutes which could only proceed from a nation, who were already firmly established, and had made considerable progress in civilization. Such are the laws concerning real property, the amount to be paid the Levites, the duties of kings, and many others. It may be said the laws all proceeded directly from the revelation of God, and since all times are alike to the revelator, it is of no importance when they were revealed. "As we flew by enchantment, so we saw by enchantment," said the Spanish prototype of these reasoners.

He considers the "anthropomorphic character of some representations of the divine Being, * * * as just so much proof to us of the early origin of the book." If they prove the "early origin," according to his hypothesis, they prove also its supernatural, miraculous origin. He says "these representations would be out of place, if prepared for the refined age of David, or Solomon, or Hezekiah." But "representations of the divine Being," equally anthropomorphic, are found in the book of Daniel, which was written much later. And it does not appear that the author of the Pentateuch was much more inclined to such representations than his present commentator, who thinks the Almighty not only spoke with a human voice, and displayed his glory in a burning bush; in a bright cloud; and in loud thunders, but made laws never to be carried into execution, and established the Jewish ritual to sustain his own honor! * We see not why the text and the comment could not have proceeded from the same hand.

These books do not all agree amongst themselves. There are striking discrepancies between Deuterono-

* Let it not be thought the author is misrepresented. These are his words. "Is it not an intelligible, and, * * * a probable thing, that as an independent object, *God's honor* was to be consulted by his worship not being permitted to be wholly banished from this earth?"—p. 92. The great Apostle to the Gentiles has answered this question. "*God*, that made the world and all things therein, * * * dwelleth not in temples made with hands; *neither is worshipped with men's hands as though he needed anything.*"—Acts, xvii. 24, 25.

my and the preceding books. In one book a certain command proceeds from God; in another from Moses.* A particular counsel is ascribed to God, in one book, but to the people, in another. It is said the Edomites would not suffer the Jews to pass through their state, and again this is contradicted.† The laws relating to false prophets, to divorce, and to kings are peculiar to the book of Deuteronomy. This book gives greater authority to the Levites than the other books; yet it does not mention the forty-eight Levitical cities. Our limits prevent us from proceeding to further details upon this point; but these are sufficient for our purpose.

There are other inconsistencies, still more obvious, in these books. Pharaoh issues a decree for murdering all the male infants who are born among the Hebrews; yet eighty years afterwards there are six hundred thousand adult men in the nation. It is said the Supreme Being was not known to the Patriarchs by his name Jehovah; yet he appears to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob as known by that name.

Is it possible in the nature of things, that a body of three millions of people could effect such a march as that described in these books? How could they pass the Red Sea by a narrow strip of land in a single night? Will Dr. Palfrey avail himself of a miracle to account for this passage, as well as for the removal of the waters? (Here, be it observed, Josephus makes no miracle.) How could they be supported, fed, and clothed, for forty years? The answer is obvious; a miracle was continually repeated. But our author cannot be sheltered by this position, for he says miracles could not be repeated for forty years; they would wear out. But admitting they were *fed* by the "supernaturally increased production of a natural product," how were they clothed? Could a wandering body of three millions of run-away slaves

* Deuteronomy, i. 22; Numbers, xiii. 1, 2.

† Numbers, xx. 14-21; Deuteronomy, ii. 29.

possess sheep and cattle enough to furnish them with garments of leather or of cloth? Was a miracle wrought to teach the Hebrews the art of shepherds and husbandmen; or were their garments miraculously preserved during this long period, as some suppose? Is it possible that such a body of undisciplined men, exposed to manifold trials and perils, embarked in an expedition which they detested, whose progress was painful and tedious, its end distant and uncertain, could be controlled by a single man, without subordinate officers to aid him, and that at a time when his sister heads a rebellion, and his brother makes an idol and worships it? We do not impiously limit the power of the Almighty, when we say he acts by the laws he has made, not against them; and certainly if this expedition really took place as described in these books, then all the common motives which govern mankind ceased to act, and principles, never known before, never since, took their place.

The tabernacle is represented as a costly building, fifty-four feet in length, eighteen in breadth, and the same in height. This pavilion was made of the most costly materials; "of fine twined linen," skins of costly die, precious wood, and gold and silver. The gold and silver employed in the structure, independently of the brass, wood, skins, and labor, have been estimated at the value of nearly a million of dollars." Taking this as the basis, the cost of the edifice could not have been less than three millions of dollars. Whence did the Jews obtain this wealth; these costly materials? Did fugitive slaves bring them from Egypt? Gold and silver could not be very abundant in the camp, for, before the erection of the tabernacle, the people were obliged to contribute the ear-rings of their wives and daughters to furnish materials for the golden calf.*

* The ornaments of the tent were wrought with such exquisite skill, that two of the workmen were accounted inspired "to devise curious work." But centuries later, there was not a "smith in Is-

While the nation was travelling from place to place, would not such a building be exceedingly cumbersome? It must have been carried through a sandy waste and in the midst of enemies. It was not borne on railway cars, but on the shoulders of men.

We find it difficult to believe that quails fell in such abundance that throughout an area sixty-six miles in diameter, they lay two cubits deep; or that "he that gathered least gathered ten homers," eighty bushels!* Perhaps it is unjust to mention this instance, for there must be an error in the statement of the quantity which each man gathered, though our author notices no such error.

But if all these objections could be removed, there is one consideration which alone would lead us to doubt the authenticity of these books. It arises from the character of the laws themselves. If the books are pronounced genuine, and literally true, then we must refer all their laws to God, as their direct and immediate author, except in a few cases already mentioned. Now who is ready to maintain that the Almighty makes his appearance in a visible form to announce these laws, in words, in the Hebrew tongue?† Are we to suppose he gives directions about "rams' skins died red, and badgers' skins;" "oil for the light and spices for anointing oil?" Are all the minute rules relating to the dress and purification of the priest, the soldiers, and others, to be regarded as laws verbally uttered by the Most High? Still more, will the God, who is a father, and whose brightest

rael." The soldiers used neither sword nor spear. (1 Sam. xiii. 19.) Even Solomon found it impossible to erect his temple without recourse to foreign artists. Admitting the existence of such a tabernacle as this, a miracle is necessary to account for the fact that such materials were in the hands of the Hebrews; and again that such cunning artists were found among them.

* Numbers, xi. 31, 32.

† "It was a literal sound which conveyed the sense" on Mount Horeb, "and not an internal impression only."—p. 104. Though sometimes he thinks communications were made without an articulate voice.

attribute is love, enact such laws as those which enjoin the total extermination of certain tribes of the Canaanites? Is it God who commands that defenceless old men, unprotected women, innocent babes shall be savagely slaughtered with every aggravation of cruelty? Shall it be said they were idolaters? What then were the Hebrews? We are indeed told that Jehovah would in like manner have exterminated all the Hebrew nation, save the descendants of Moses, had not Moses interceded for them. Can a Christian attribute such commands to the Father of Gentile and Jew; to the God of Love? Our author admits that the divine origin must be given up, if it be proved that immoralities are commanded, or unworthy views of the Deity presented. One would suppose the question then was already settled, for both the immorality and the unworthy views are apparent. He admits that the representations of the Deity are rude and anthropomorphic. Nay, he considers this fact proof of the early origin of the book.

Now he is bound by his own assertions to admit one of two things, — either these rude anthropomorphic representations of the divine Being, are not unworthy, but true; that God *is* such a Being as he is here represented; or, to admit the books are not of divine origin.

We here close our remarks upon the authenticity of the *Pentateuch*. We have not labored to construct an argument, but to state some of the difficulties we have encountered in repeated perusals and a careful study of these writings. Nor have we done this because we are desirous of magnifying these difficulties, for they are obvious and well known. We have written what we have in no spirit of hostility to the books of Moses, for we regard them as worthy of deep admiration, and we will go as far as Dr. Palfrey himself in praise of their general wisdom and humanity. We offer no theory on the composition of these writings, for we are not teachers, but humble inquirers on the outskirts of theology; who would gladly find

access to the Holy of Holies, where immortal Truth is manifest.*

Several topics, discussed by the author, present themselves to our notice. He conceives the design of the Mosaic revelation was to put the Hebrew nation "in possession of a purer theology, and to place them in a condition to preserve," "and to communicate it to the rest of the world." Now the distinctive feature of this pure theology is the unity of God. The Jews were theists, while, it is alleged, the surrounding nations were polytheists. Dr. Palfrey thinks the facts of these books alone serve to explain this peculiarity of the Hebrew religion; and that the wonderful incidents, mentioned therein, were brought about to "authenticate the revelation" of this pure theology; in other words, that the miracles recorded in these books were wrought to authenticate the truth, that there is ONE GOD. Admit the truth of the Mosaic history, says he, and all is plain; deny it, all is perplexing.

Now in this reasoning, two things seem to be taken for granted:—The fact that the divine unity was *first* taught by Moses; and again, that man, unaided by a supernatural revelation, accompanied with miracles, could never arrive at this truth. A word may be said upon each of these assumptions.

The unity of the Supreme Being was taught long before the time of Moses. To prove this, it is not necessary to refer to the doubtful annals of the Celestial Empire; nor, to the uncertain writings of the sages of Hindostan, which transmit this doctrine from the hoariest ages of the world. We find an easier proof, in the Scripture itself. If the accounts in Genesis may be relied upon, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob

* What is here alleged against the authenticity of the *Pentateuch* must be taken merely as a statement of difficulties, not as a profession of faith or want of faith on the part of the writer, much less of the editor of this work. ED.

were pure theists. Jehovah was their God. The oldest of them lived six hundred and forty-five years before the departure from Egypt, if we follow the common chronology. The doctrine of the unity was an old doctrine in the time of Moses,—a doctrine familiar to his fathers. What need then of a new revelation to teach this old doctrine? What need of miracles to confirm what had been believed six centuries before without a miracle? Had this once familiar truth faded from the memories of men? Which inheres longest in the mind,—falsehood or truth? From the author's admission, the doctrine of the divine unity outlasts the wreck of systems,—the most valuable being ever the most vital truth.* Was this doctrine unknown in Egypt in the time of Moses? Two eminent antiquarians, Cudworth and Jablonski, maintain, not without good reason, that it was well known.† It is true, polytheism prevailed among the common people. But was not idolatry popular,—favored by the king and the subject,—in the Hebrew nation, a thousand years after Moses? The Egyptian priests could scarcely be unacquainted with this doctrine. Their mysteries and scientific culture would lead to this opinion. They were the first civilized people, says Herodotus, who believed the immortality of the soul. However, the ancient religion of Egypt is still but imperfectly understood.

Again; is it philosophical to assume that a peculiar revelation is needed to impart this doctrine, and miracles to authenticate the revelation? The assumption makes a broad distinction between divine truth and human truths. The latter can be discovered by the common use of the intellectual faculties; the former, he pretends, can only be made known by a direct, immediate communication from God, accompanied with

* See pp. 95, 96, note.

† But see Meiners. *Historia Doctrinæ de Vero Deo*. Vol. I. ch. i. He remarks that the arguments of Cudworth are not worthy of notice, and brings serious objections to those of Jablonski.

rare phenomena, to authenticate them. Now are there two such classes of truths? Must all knowledge of God, of Duty, of Religion, be imparted to us from without, and sanctioned by miracles, before we can receive it? The words of an old writer are to the point. "We affirm that those precepts, which learned men of the Gentiles, influenced by the general sentiment and judgment of nature, have committed to writing, are not less divine than those which are extant in the stone tables of Moses. * * * Nor does our Heavenly Father wish that the laws he wrote in stone should be more valued by us than those he has imprinted on the very sentiments of our souls." *

Is there not a sentiment in human nature, which impels us to worship the Infinite God? If not, religion has no foundation in man's soul, and divine communications would find no ear to listen. The marble could be religious as well as the man. Does not this sentiment, this highest instinct of the soul, act with the same certainty as the humbler, the physical instincts?

The merest savage knows there is one God. True, he has his *fetich*,—a stone, or a crocodile. These are to satisfy the want of the moment. The Catholic, unable to rise to the Infinite, worships the Virgin, or the Son, or the Saints, or their images. But far above these objects of adoration he sees the SUPREME. There is a something, he knows not what, too vast for comprehension; invisible; inscrutable; dwelling apart from the universe. HIM, he acknowledges, but does not adore. "We pray not to HIM," says a savage, "for he takes no concern in the world; we offer HIM no sacrifice, for he needs nothing." The Indian worships not the Buffaloe, but the Manitou of Buffaloes.

The farther we go back in primitive history, the more certainly do we find a belief in the unity of God. The descendants of Abraham were monotheists, till

* Melancthon. Præf. in Hæc. in Meiners, ubi sup.

they migrated to Egypt, where the artifice of the priests had, in part, corrupted the primeval faith of man.* How was this faith acquired? From "the Light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world." "The spirit searcheth all things; yea, *the*

* Nothing is intended to be asserted by this expression, inconsistent with the view of man's religious progress, taken by Benjamin Constant and others, and which supposes the earliest form of religion was Fetichism, succeeded by Polytheism, through which men found their way to Theism. Logically considered, the idea of unity is older than that of plurality, as the Infinite is older than the Finite; but chronologically, the reverse is true. We learn things in the concrete before we do in the abstract. We behold the Creature before we conceive of the Creator, and are familiar with finite existences long before we have any well defined belief in one Infinite Being.

Nevertheless the Idea of the Infinite, of Unity, of one God, is in the reason from the first, and is active there from the moment of our first experience. It lies at the bottom of all our affirmations, and forms the ground of all our religious feelings, faith, and hopes. But it lies there in darkness. We are affected by its presence, but we do not see it. It does not become a fact of consciousness, till we have found all the things around us variable and transitory, and sufficient neither for themselves, nor for the wants of the soul. There is from the first a vague sentiment of the Infinite floating in the dark regions of the soul, though it is a long time before it shapes itself into the belief in one God. The religious sentiment is the craving of the soul after the Infinite, and is ever urging us towards it; but at first it seeks it in the Finite. It seeks it in the ill-shapen Fetich; then in something more beautiful or more useful, in the sun or stars; and then in the spirit of the sun, in the spirit of the stars; gradually refining and elevating itself, it rises above the sun-spirit, the star-spirit, and bodies forth a Jupiter, Father of gods and king of men; and then higher yet, it attains to one God, an absolute God, Cause, Life, Substance of all that is,—absolute Being, wise, good, benevolent,—a Father, merciful and kind. Now in calling Theism the primitive faith of mankind, it is not meant that belief in one God, as here stated, was the belief with which they commenced, but that all their religious instincts and conceptions, from the first, implied such a being, and could be legitimated only on the fact of his existence. The one God always hovered over the religious beliefs of mankind. Therefore the natural development of their beliefs would necessarily lead to Theism. Just in proportion as men studied and comprehended their religious instincts, would they approach it. If left to themselves, they would, in the proper time, of themselves, come to the belief in one God; and if before that time, unless there were some supernatural enlargement or development of the faculties of those who were to receive it, as well as of him who was to reveal it, a supernatural announcement of the truth of one God

depths of God." This faith proceeds from revelation; but is it not from the Divine *in* man the revelation comes? "The inspiration of the Almighty" hath given understanding to each; but if the first revelation from consciousness be that of unity, the idea of

were made, it could not reveal him, or give to mankind either the conception of one God or a belief in him.

Admitting, as most critics have done, that Moses was the virtual author of the Pentateuch, it does not follow that he was the first who taught the doctrine of one God. Indeed it may be questioned whether he taught the doctrine at all, or even believed it. The strict monotheism of the Pentateuch is far from being so certain as some people have thought. It may, perhaps, be maintained, that Moses taught one God only for Israel. Other nations had many gods; the Egyptians were famous for the number of their gods; but Israel was to have only one God. "Hear, O Israel, the Lord *thy* God is one, Jehovah." Is not this the meaning of the declaration, "Thou shalt have no other gods, before me?" That is, the Israelites were to acknowledge only one God, and were to hold him to be superior to all other gods, or the gods of other nations. The author of the Pentateuch does by no means deny the godship of the gods of the nations, and in one instance forbids any one to do it. He invariably speaks of Jehovah as the God of Israel. The idea, which runs through the whole Pentateuch, appears to be that Jehovah had chosen the Israelites to be his people, and that if they would worship him in preference to all other gods, he would make them the greatest nation on earth, and prove himself to be the greatest God of all gods. This is not monotheism.

Then again, admitting Moses did reveal the doctrine of one God, it does not follow that the wonderful events recorded in the Pentateuch were designed to authenticate it, or that they did or were capable of serving that purpose. It is nowhere said in the Pentateuch itself, or in any other part of the Bible, that this was their design. He who says it was has no scriptural authority to support him. They did not serve this purpose, for while they were taking place before their very eyes, the Jews continued to be idolaters, and there is no evidence that they ever ceased to be idolaters till after the Babylonish captivity. According to their own history, their monotheism cannot be dated very far back. They could not serve the purpose alleged. A proof must be more obvious and certain than the proposition it is adduced to prove, otherwise it is no proof. If it be not more obvious and certain that the miracle is from God, than it is that there is but one God, how can it prove the doctrine of the Divine Unity? Before a miracle can be admitted to be from God, it must be known there is a God; and before it can be alleged as a proof of one God, it must be known with *infallible certainty*, that there is only one God who can perform it. So then, before the miracle can authenticate a revelation of one God, it must be known that there is

divinity speedily follows. The diverse effects of nature must proceed from different causes, say men. Therefore a Nymph pours the river from her invisible urn; a God guides the sun's fire-chariot through the sky; one Deity calls forth the stars, another rules the

but one God; all that the miracle is designed to prove must, then, be believed before the miracle can prove anything.

Again; it may be said, that miracles indeed cannot prove the doctrines, but they authenticate the mission of him who reveals them; they establish the fact, that he speaks by Divine authority, and therefore that he is worthy of credit. According to Dr. Palfrey, Moses performed real miracles, and the magicians performed sham miracles; but the spectators could not tell the difference. In this case the sham miracles were as good evidence to the spectators, that the magicians were divinely commissioned, as the real ones were that Moses was. Knowing, as those spectators probably did, that the miracles of the magicians were sham miracles, how were they to be prevented from inferring that those of Moses were not also sham miracles? How could they know that the miracles of Moses were real miracles? How can we know it? The testimony of the by-standers would be good for nothing, if we had it, because they saw no difference between the wonderful acts of Moses, and the bungling imitations of them by the magicians. How then? Because Moses himself tells us? How is it to be known now that Moses tells the truth, or how was it to be known then that he told the truth? Because he could work miracles? But the fact that he could work miracles rests merely on his word; how then can the alleged miracles be a proof that his word is to be believed? Will the advocates of miracles help us out of this circle?

Again; if I am ignorant of God, why is the performance of an act, passing my comprehension, a more certain proof to me of a divine commission, than is the teaching of a doctrine passing my comprehension? Before the act can authenticate the fact, that he who performs it is commissioned by God, we must know enough of God, to know positively that the agency, by which it is performed, can be none other than His immediate agency. Now if we know so much of God, as to know this, with infallible certainty as we must, why do we not know enough of God to know that the man is divinely commissioned, from the simple doctrine he teaches, without any recurrence at all to the miracle? If I know God, I know from what the man says, whether he speaks by divine authority or not; if I do not know God, I cannot know that His is the agency, which performs the miracle; therefore the miracle cannot establish the divine authority of the apparent miracle-worker. This is the defect in all miraculous testimony. It can never authenticate a revelation or divine commission to those who know not God, and to those who do know him it is superfluous. Ed.

deep. Yet the deep, mysterious sentiment looks ever to *One* above the Nymph, the Sun-God, the Ruler of the Sky and Sea. Hence polytheism is based on a belief in the One God. In the twilight of idolatry, there are gleams of the Light which has once shone, and is to reappear. "God is one," says the oldest book of the Bramins; "everlasting; the creator of the world-all. Like a ball, he hath neither beginning nor end. By everlasting and everchanging laws, he governs the world. Mortal, inquire not thou too far, in searching the essence or the nature of the Eternal. It is enough for thee to examine Day and Night; the greatness of his works; his wisdom; his power; his goodness." The name of this being is Ekhumesha, "the one who always was." *

Now, if this doctrine of the divine unity did not form the primitive belief of all nations; if even it were not known to the Hebrew nation before the time of Moses, how could his miracles impart the idea? What force could they add to his argument? If his doctrine was true, it needed not the support of miracles; if false, no miracles could make it true. We have always been pleased with the remarks of an old Jewish writer upon this point. "The Hebrews did not believe our father Moses, on account of the miracles he wrought, for, in the mind of the believer, there might be a suspicion in regard to the miracle. It might have been that some wrought the miracle by incantation, or sorcery. But all the miracles of Moses in the Desert, he wrought through the necessity of the occasion, and not to establish the proof of his mission as a prophet; for a man may work a miracle and show a sign, and yet be no prophet." † In another place he adds that Moses was never believed on account of his miracles. Moses himself makes

* This is extracted from a book adjudged to have been written (?) in its present form, (?) 1600 B. C. (?) See Rhöde religiöse Bildung, Mythologie und Philosophie der Hindus. (Leip. 1827. 8vo.) Bd. I. § 115-121, 434 et seq.

† Maimonides de fundamentis legis, viii § 1.

the doctrine, and not the miracle, the test of inspiration.

If a man have not a true conception of the unity of God, how can a miracle help him to form that conception? A command, it is true, may be uttered by the Most High, in words in the Hebrew tongue, but will this impart an idea of the one true God? Dr. Palfrey thinks this truth could not be ascertained without miracles to authenticate it; and maintains that such miracles were granted only to the Jews. If other nations did not know this truth, they must necessarily be idolaters, since they must worship something. Yet for this idolatry,—according to our author,—they were destroyed;—were punished for their ignorance of what they could not know. Idolatry is always denounced as a sin in the Scriptures. This shows plainly that man has power, without supernatural aid, to arrive at the truth.

Among two classes of men, we find that a belief in the unity of God, like that of the immortality of the soul, will prevail; among the simple, who trust the native religious instinct of the heart, and among those who have learned to see the identity of spontaneous sentiment, and the sublimest conclusions of the intellect. Between these two, there is a large class, neither simple enough to trust the heart, nor sufficiently wise to discover this truth with the mind.

Now let the doctrine in question be announced to this middle class,—announced by the very voice of the Almighty, with all the apparatus of clouds, and thunder, and darkness, and lightning, and trumpets, and gorgeous mountain scenery, which the most obdurate critic claims for Moses,—and it will not be understood. Let these miracles be repeated till they cease to be miracles, (according to Dr. Palfrey's ingenious theory,) still the doctrine will not inhere in the material mind. The history of the Jews proves this assertion. To enlighten the nation, and to purify their hearts, were the only methods of rendering them monotheists. Miracles repeated never so often cannot

effect this. If then we admit the authenticity of these books, the strangest problem is presented, "authenticating" miracles are profusely wrought, the people take little heed thereof: they refuse to receive the truth miraculously authenticated as it is; they fall down and worship a golden calf, while Moses veiled in the most awful pomp, before their eyes, holds communion with God, face to face. They were nourished by the "supernaturally increased production of a natural product," watered and clothed, guided and governed by miracles,—yet refused to believe in the power, or listen to the authority of Him who wrought these miracles, for the sake of producing this belief. Such is the importance of miracles to work conviction upon eye witnesses. Abraham, in his simple heart, had believed this doctrine, though not taught by miracles, six centuries before. In later times, when the people had made farther advance in civilization,—after the Babylonian exile,—we hear of no farther relapses into idolatry, though there was no "open vision," and no miracles were wrought.

Dr. Palfrey believes Moses wrought real miracles in Egypt before Pharaoh, while the magicians were mere jugglers, who performed curious tricks by legerdemain. The king of Egypt could not distinguish the real from the pretended miracle. Is it not somewhat irreverent to state that the Almighty works miracles with a certain design, which cannot be distinguished by an eye witness from common feats of jugglery? It were as reasonable to believe with Dr. Doddridge, that the latter were "wrought by superior evil beings." These miracles in Egypt, it is to be observed, were not wrought for the same or a similar purpose with those in the wilderness. The former were to induce Pharaoh to "let Israel go," the latter to prove the unity of God. The former "did not propose to prove, even to the Jews, that their national God was the only God; * * * still less were they designed to prove this to the Egyptians."

Here Jehovah is represented, "as the God of the

Jews only," says the author, who thinks this fact is an argument to prove the work written by the inspired Moses; a singular argument truly. He thinks there was a supernatural production of frogs, at the command of Aaron. But the magicians merely "used some substance to attract into a vacant space some specimens of an animal, whose habits are so well known."

He denies the "supernatural nature" of the fire-pillar and the cloud. But, as we have before observed, they become miraculous agents when occasion demands. He is ready to admit a miracle, when a miracle is necessary, that is, when it affords the easiest explanation of a passage. May we not say that a miracle is to our author, what "enchantment" was to a certain knight,—the universal solvent of difficulties?

The author sees an especial fitness in the magnificent scenery around Mount Sinai, in the "flaming and smoking top" of the mountain, in the awful drapery of clouds, in the thunder and lightning, in the midst of which the law was announced,—to make a deep impression upon the minds of the people. We must confess there is "an abstract fitness," to use his own expression, in such a spectacle, but we ask him to tell us why it failed to make the anticipated impression?

Soon after, with similar pomp, to follow the text of Exodus, the whole nation promises to obey these laws. How solemn the scene; what a profound impression must it make! Soon they will clamor to return to Egypt; worship a golden calf. Singular result! Could no one "contrive to discern those *thirteen* most poor, mean-dressed men, at a frugal Supper, in a mean Jewish dwelling, with no symbol but hearts God-initiated into that "Divine depth of Sorrow," and a *Do this in remembrance of me?*"

The work fails to explain many difficult passages. In Exodus, xxiv. 9–11, it is said, that Moses and

* Carlyle's French Revolution.

seventy three others "saw the God of Israel, and under his feet, as it were, a paved work of a sapphire stone," &c. The explanation of the author is, "They saw a splendor in the sky, above all earthly things, and were made to know that there, in heaven, Jehovah, the God of their nation, had his place and government." — p. 184. Does this explanation remove the difficulty? This appears to be one of the passages of which he says, "a confession of ignorance is at once most fair, most modest, and most safe." — p. 229.

The anthropomorphic character of the Supreme Being in these books is but poorly explained. Nothing can be plainer to every reader, than this fact, that God is spoken of as having a body, and hands, and feet, throughout these books. The author admits the anthropomorphic character of the representations of God, when it favors his argument, but again (p. 224 et seq.) he attempts, very unsatisfactorily, to explain it on another hypothesis.

It has usually been thought difficult to account for the fact alleged, Exodus xvii. 11, that in time of battle, when Moses held up his hand the Jews prevailed, but when his hand sunk his enemies were victorious, and, that to insure the victory, two of his attendants supported his hand. Our author finds "no difficulty in the matter." The universal solvent is at hand, — a miracle. "When the people saw the banner of the Lord in his hand, * * * *always insuring to them victory*, [?] as long as it was raised, [how could they know this?] and leaving them to defeat when it sank, they took an impressive lesson concerning the power, which he was authorized to exert over them, and the divine protection he enjoyed, shared by themselves as long as they yielded to his guidance." — pp. 159, 160.

On the same principles (?) he explains the cures effected by the brazen serpent.*

Sometimes the author rises above these principles. Men, says he, "inquired of God," when they came to

* Numbers, xxi. 4-9.

Moses for his arbitration on disputed questions; he pronounced judgment agreeably to established principles of equity, such as God is understood to approve; and this he called "making them know the statutes of God and his laws." — p. 146. It is to be wished the spirit, which dictated the above paragraph, had prevailed more widely in this volume. This is an application of a principle previously laid down, viz. that we are at liberty to suppose any one of these laws really proceeded from Moses, though bearing the name of God. In the same spirit, the "Eagle of the synagogue" says, "when any man feels his powers excited, impelling him to speak, — whether he speaks of sciences or arts, or utters psalms and hymns, or moral precepts, or discourses of political affairs, — he speaks by the Holy Spirit."

But we must bring these remarks to a close. We have treated Dr. Palfrey's work with freedom, but we trust not with severity. It is not precisely the work the public expected; nor is it such a one as the wants of the public most needed. It is not the work Dr. Palfrey, in justice to himself, to his position, the institution and class of Christians with which he is connected, should have produced. We fear that it will do little to enhance his reputation, or that of the University of Cambridge, to draw young men to the School, in which he is a Professor, or to inspire confidence in the Biblical instructions he is imparting to the future teachers of Liberal Christianity. We do not think it likely to commend the Old Testament to those who have hitherto wanted confidence in it, or to subdue the strong prejudices which exist, far and wide, against that form of Christianity he is generally understood to uphold.

Nevertheless we regard this book as a valuable accession to our Biblical Literature, not indeed because it has accomplished everything, but because it shows an earnest desire to do something. It treats an important subject, and with more freedom and critical sagacity than it has been before treated in

this country, and puts forth principles, which, in other hands, may lead to valuable results. It breaks the ice, and lays open the Jewish antiquities to the free action of reason and philology. It commences a movement, that may continue long, and go far before it is arrested. In these respects the publication is opportune, and should be cordially greeted. Moreover, the book breathes an earnest spirit. The author is serious in what he does. He has evidently aimed to do a service to Biblical Literature, and for this we thank him, and take what he has given us without complaint. For ourselves we wish the work had been different. But we have no right to dictate to an author.

We cannot avoid expressing our belief, that the author would have done himself better justice, had he extended his researches further. It is true he gives us ample proof of zeal and diligence, but there are many valuable works on his subject, which he seems not to have consulted, or which at least he appears to have made no use of. This remark is especially true, as it regards the later German works. It is true he may not esteem very highly what is called German Theology. Yet he can hardly deem it useless to consult, in such a work as this, the best German writers, who treat the same subject. Moreover, there are scholars among us, whose opinions deserve great weight, who are far from thinking lightly of German theology, who in fact regard Germany very much as a "New East," out of which the Bethlehem Star of theology is to arise, and guide us to a place of rest, where we may repose under the branches of the Tree of Life, screened alike from the icy blast of Skepticism, and the red simoon of Superstition and Fanaticism. Inquiry there is thought to be more free, than it is here. In that land men have no fears of Truth, for all truth is known to be God's truth. There each man follows what is right in his own eyes, and utters the word God gives him to utter; while here all follow their leaders, think the same

thoughts, speak the same words, and start at the same shadows. Now the works of scholars, where there is this freedom, this single-eyed pursuit of truth, and this bold utterance of one's own convictions, must needs have no small value over the works of scholars who can see, think, and speak only according to a prescribed formula. No man could fail to be profited by a careful study of them. We regard it, then, as a serious defect in Dr. Palfrey's work, that it shows so little familiarity with the best productions of late German scholars.

Many works have recently appeared in Germany, which treat of the subjects discussed in this volume. Some of them must be admitted by every one to be of great value. De Wette, in a single work, which we have more than once cited in this article, has done more for the history of the Jews, says Professor Leo, than Niebuhr for that of Rome, or Heeren for that of Greece. Yet these works are never cited in the volume before us. It is clear the author has never seen them. This is a grave defect in such a work as this, on such a subject as is here treated, and one we find it extremely difficult to overlook. For such a work as this should not only contain the results of the author's own observations, but those of his contemporaries, as well as those of his predecessors. For aught that appears, this work might have been written a quarter of a century ago. What should be said of a Naturalist, who should write a book on Geology, or on Zoölogy, connecting only the writings published, at least a quarter of a century before him, thus rejecting the discoveries of all his fellow inquirers?

Perhaps, in justice to Dr. Palfrey, we should say he probably did not intend to write a work for the learned, nor for that portion of the *clergy* who do not aspire to that title, but for those who, in his own words, may be called "the better sort" of unlearned laymen. We are inclined to adopt this conclusion from the fact, that what he has given us, that is new or original, will be regarded by theologians as

of no great importance, while the really valuable remarks, he has scattered throughout his work, are already familiar to them in the writings of Clericus, Grotius, or, in a word, in Rosenmüller's well known Scholia. There they have found the same remarks, the same difficulties disposed of, the same authorities referred to, and the same passages cited. Verily, says the Wise Man, there is nothing new under the sun. The thing that hath been, the same shall be. The writings of commentators are like a French saloon, hung round with mirrors, wherein objects "multiform and mix," all the mirrors reflecting the same things. But they create nothing new, save illusions. Still the service rendered by this work is important, though little credit may be due it on the score of originality. It contains essentially the views of Rosenmüller, and gives them to us in tolerable English, instead of tolerable Latin. This work is small, that of Rosenmüller is large. But if the former is more brief, the latter is more satisfactory. If the one is condensed, it has the faults of an abridgment, obscurity and weakness. If the other is diffuse, it is usually clear, often profound, and sometimes forcible. The one is compact; the other orderly. Rosenmüller was an indefatigable, ingenious, and learned man. He had lived long in the world of literature; had written more than most men have read. He was at once a natural philosopher, an antiquarian, a philologist, and a theologian. He was an universal scholar. His net swept the bottom of the great deep of theology; it collected the treasures which all ages and every land had contributed. From resources so vast, what gems did he gather! In his treasury were things old and new. Peace to his shade. Other writers have outstripped him, but he taught many to walk, and never lamented when his pupils outran his instructions.

The merit of this work, though mainly that of giving in English what existed in Latin, is, after all, no slight one. For the last quarter of a century what have the English theologians done for the Old Testa-

ment? Not a ray of light have they shed on the Egyptian darkness, which, to them, overhangs the laws of Moses. Like Ajax they are stumbling in the shade. They even, with creeds and formularies, close up the windows of morning, and repel the light just risen in the East. Dr. Palfrey deserves warm gratitude for his efforts to dispel the shadows, and to enable us to behold the beauty, and to comprehend the worth, the divine worth, of the Jewish Scriptures. Philosophy may not admit all his premises; nor history verify all his conclusions; yet his assertions will awaken other scholars; his principles will guide them to better rules, to a farther light, to a clearer vision, to a juster reverence for the word of God.

"So" books "appear imperfect, and but given
 With purpose to resign them, in full time,
 Up to a better covenant, *disciplined*
From shadowy types to Truth; from flesh to Spirit,
 * * * * * from servile fear
 To filial; works of Law, to works of Faith."

ART. II. — *An Inquiry into the Moral and Religious Character of the American Government.* New York: Wiley & Putnam. 1838. 8vo. pp. 208.

THIS is a work written with some ability, possibly with a sincere intention, and probably for a good end. Most religious people, — not accustomed to much reflection on the subject it treats, — will think it an admirable book, and be inclined to receive it as a sort of second Gospel. In our judgment it is the production of a man who has very little knowledge of religion in general, and none of Christianity in particular. The author designs to point out the relation which should subsist between Christianity and civil government, and to place certain matters, which

have not hitherto been very well understood, in a new and clearer light; but so far as we can come at the results of his Inquiry, he merely makes "confusion worse confounded."

Who the author of this book is we know not; but, be he who he may, we should like to know his name, that we might give him an immortality, which he has not secured to himself by this production. He belongs to the "Blue Ruin" party, both in politics and religion. He is a genuine croaker, though somewhat cunning, and withal, capable of croaking in a tolerable voice, and is less disagreeable than most of his family connexions. Our country, to believe him, is assuredly ruined; the altars of religion are all desecrated; pestilential heresies are rife in the land; Socinians and Jews, and even Unbelievers, vote, and are sometimes voted for; and the awful visitations of God's wrath cannot be delayed much longer. One may almost fancy him a second Jonah, lately disgorged from some whale's belly, come to denounce divine judgments upon another Nineveh. The good people of America, it is devoutly hoped, may take warning and repent, ere the "forty days" be run out.

The sum of all his complaints is, he tells us, "that one way or another, that religion, which has given us a name among the states of Christendom, and which many of us deem essential to our future well-being, as a people, is everywhere *politically set at nought*; regarded as an outlaw to the institutions of the country; a feather in the scale of its interests; as useless, if not discreditable in public life; and in reference to the elective sovereignty itself not to be thought of!" Surely this is a grievous complaint. But on what facts does the author rest for its justification? And what kind of political recognition of religion does he demand?

The facts, which justify the complaint, and prove all here set forth, are: 1st. President Jefferson refused to appoint a fast when some of his political opponents wanted one, for the purpose of fasting over some of

his political sins, and alleged in his own defence, that he could not find any power delegated to him by the constitution of the United States, authorizing him to interfere with religious doctrines, institutions, discipline, or exercise. 2dly. The refusal on the part of General Jackson to appoint a fast, to keep off the cholera, when certain religious people requested him to do it. 3dly. The assertion of a United States Senator, that a reference to the Bible, in the Senate, as authority, was not fortunate, that book not being the statute book of that body. 4thly. The refusal on the part of Congress to stop the Mail from running on Sunday. 5thly. The fact, that the New York Legislature, during its last session, refused to appoint a chaplain. 6thly. The fact, that the Legislature of pious Connecticut debated the question, whether they would not do the same. 7thly. Electors do not inquire whether candidates for office are orthodox or not, and orthodox electors do sometimes vote for anti-orthodox, or heterodox candidates.

These are the facts which justify his complaint, and authorize him to call our government an irreligious one. What would he have as a remedy for the evil? What kind of connexion between religion and politics does he demand? A union of church and state? No; that is not to be thought of. Have the state become the servant of the church? Most likely; but he does not say so. Have the state decree a body of Divinity, which all must embrace, a ritual all must observe? No. What then? Enact that the Bible is the holy word of God; that no man who does not profess to believe it shall be eligible to any office; that to deny the existence of God, the truth of the doctrine of the Trinity, or the inspiration of the Old and New Testaments, is blasphemy, to be punished as a criminal offence; to prohibit by strong penal enactments all profane swearing, and all Sabbath-breaking, and to appoint fasts whenever the clergy or the church say the occasion demands them.

The author of the book contends that ours is a

Christian commonwealth, and therefore infers that all which comes or may come under the denomination of Christian ethics should be legally enforced. He divides Christianity into two parts, *Ecclesiastical Christianity* and the *Ethics* of Christianity. The first belongs exclusively to the church, which is a body distinct from all civil polity, and raised infinitely above the reach of the civil legislature; it asks and will submit to no civil protection or control. The ethics of Christianity are binding on legislatures, and are proper objects of legislation; it is the duty of civil governments to respect them and to cause them to be respected.

That the government of this country is a Christian government, is inferred from the fact, that in no case is it positively declared not to be. The constitution of the United States repudiates some of the abuses of Christianity, but says nothing against Christianity itself. The first settlers of this country were Christians, and in nearly all cases designed to found a Christian commonwealth, and did found one. Nearly all the state constitutions originally recognised Christianity, and the greater part of them do it even now. Christianity is part and parcel of the common law of England, [doubted,] which was brought here by our fathers, and which is still in force. The majority are Christians; and as the majority have an absolute right to rule, it follows that they have a right to form a Christian commonwealth, and to insist upon Christianity as the religion of the government. Moreover, in practice, the government in all its branches, saving the cases of Presidents Jefferson and Jackson, the majority of the committee on Sabbath mails, the New York legislature, in dispensing with a chaplain, has always recognised Christianity, and respected it as the religion of the country.

Ours being a Christian commonwealth, it follows that our government must regard Christian ethics as its own, and that it can have no right to introduce Pagan, Jewish, or Mahometan ethics; and it also

receive a new idea. The history of the nation is but the history of the practical development of the ideas with which it starts. A theocracy can never grow naturally into a government in which the interests of man are paramount to all others ; a monarchy never softens down into an aristocracy, especially not into a democracy. The old nation is destroyed, and a new one takes its place, whenever a change similar to any of these is observed to occur. The natural growth of a nation is the natural unfolding of the ideas with which it begins its career. If theocracy had been the dominant idea of our fathers, if their leading design had been to found Christian commonwealths, then the natural growth of our institutions would have manifested this idea, this design, more and more clearly. But instead of this, the idea of liberty, of the rights of man, is the idea which has been gradually unfolding itself from our institutions. Every advance, every change has tended to bring out this idea. The tendency from the first has been to prune away whatever conceals the majesty of man or overshadows his rights. Church membership was at first made a prerequisite to citizenship, because at first it was thought none others were really men. But this is no longer the case, because we have ascertained that individuals, who are not church members, may be men. Property qualifications for the exercise of the right of suffrage have, in most cases, been abandoned ; for it has been ascertained that a man has rights, though he have not property ; religious tests have been dispensed with, not because the people have become less religious, but because it has been found that religious tests are inconsistent with the rights of man. In every case of amendment to our state constitutions, the idea of the rights of man has been brought out more clearly, and liberty extended or surrounded with new guarantees. This fact is decisive. It proves that freedom, not religion, is the dominant idea of our institutions. Our commonwealths are free commonwealths, rather

than Christian commonwealths. Their genius is liberty, not Christianity, *anthropocratic*, if we may use the term, not theocratic.

Now, should we find in our institutions certain provisions favorable to a theocracy, — which we take it is what is meant by a Christian commonwealth, in the sense the term is used by this author and his friends, — we must regard them as exceptions, anomalies, which are not yet brought under the general rule, not as indications of their real character and design. All these provisions must be interpreted in favor of liberty, — as much in accordance with the genius of our institutions as they will bear. The fact, that the author finds some such provisions in the constitutions and laws of the several states, is not, and should not be regarded by him as a proof, that our commonwealths are Christian commonwealths, in his sense of the term; but merely as a proof, that many of our ideas are yet in their theological envelope, and that we have not brought all our constitutional and statutory provisions into perfect keeping with our great, our dominant, idea of liberty.

Assuming then, as we do, that the great idea, the genius, of our government, is that of a government instituted for nourishing and maintaining the rights of man, we deny that a Christian, as such, has any preëminence over any other man. We speak now of Christianity as a positive system of religion, a positive institution. In this sense Christianity is younger than man. Man existed in all his integrity and with all his rights as a man, before it was instituted. His rights as a man are older than his claims as a Christian. They are not derived from Christianity, they are not dependent on Christianity; then their enjoyment and exercise cannot be made to rest, under a government which professes to recognise and is bound to maintain them, on the fact of embracing Christianity. Give Christianity, or take it away, man and his rights remain the same. Governments, then, that are instituted for the purpose ours are, have pre-

cisely the same rights to recognise and maintain in the case of him who is not a Christian, as in the case of him who is. If there are any provisions in the constitutions and laws of our several states in opposition to this, they are inconsistencies, incongruities, made null and void, in justice, by the genius of our institutions.

It behooves professed Christians to beware how they controvert this position. On what ground will they do it? On what ground will a man pretend that he has a right to be a Christian, if he denies to his brother the right not to be one? The right of any one to be a Christian can be legitimated only by the admission of that more general right of every man to choose his own religion. And, as religion is in all cases a matter of opinion, of belief, the right of a man to choose his own form of religion can be legitimated only by admitting a right still more general, that of the entire liberty of every man to form and express his own opinions. This last right is virtually recognised and secured in those constitutional provisions which guaranty us the freedom of speech and the press. The greater always includes the less. It would be absurd to admit that we have the liberty to propagate by speech or by the press our opinions, whatever they may be, and yet to deny us the right to form our opinions by the free action of our own understandings.

The Christian claims protection under our government, not by virtue of the fact, that he is a Christian, but by virtue of the fact that he is a man, and because it is one of the rights of man to be protected in the peaceable enjoyment of his religious belief. If he withhold this right from another, if he prohibit another from the free enjoyment of his religious belief, then he denies that this right to the enjoyment of one's own religious belief is one of the rights of man. In doing this, he denies his own right as a man to be a Christian, and bases his right to protection in his religious faith on mere accident, on the

accident that he lives under a government favorable to his views, or that he has the good fortune to be of the majority. But, if he claim his protection on the ground that he is a man, and ought not to be molested in his belief, then his plea is equally good for every other man, whatever may be that other man's belief.

Lay down the rule that government has a right to protect one belief in preference to another, or to make any exceptions to a man in any case on account of his belief, and where shall we stop? If the state may declare it necessary to believe in a God in order to be a citizen with all the rights and immunities of a citizen, then it may declare what God must be believed in, whether it must be the Hindoo God, the Greek and Roman God, the Jewish God, the Mahometan God, the Catholic God, the Calvinistic God, the Materialist's God, or the Spiritualist's God. If it may do this, it may do more. It may declare the Bible to be the word of God; and if this, still more; it may determine the interpretation that may be put upon the Bible; it may decide whether the Trinitarian or the Unitarian commentators shall be the orthodox commentators, whom it is lawful to read. In fine, once begin, there is no stopping place, this side of absolute religious despotism. Is our author in favor of this? O no. The doctrines of religion belong to the church, and the state may not meddle with them. What then? He merely asks that Christians be protected in their religion. What, protected in the enjoyment of their religion, as all men are protected in their opinions? If this be all, he asks nothing unreasonable; but he asks what he already has. This, however, is not all. He asks as a Christian to be protected in his religion, not only so far as concerns his own freedom of professing it, but also in preventing any body from opposing it. He thinks it a grievous wrong that in this country, where the majority are Christians, he must submit to hear the truth and sacredness of that religion, he embraces and reveres, questioned and even ridiculed. He wishes not

that any body should be required by law to believe it, but merely that nobody shall be permitted by law to oppose it, and that whoever does oppose it shall not only be without note, but also without civil rights in the commonwealth.

Very well. On what grounds does he make this modest demand? Is what he asks one of the rights of man? Does he claim it on the ground that he is a man, and therefore has a right to profess his faith without being opposed or questioned? If so, his plea is equally available in the case of any one who adopts a different faith. If the atheist may not question his faith in God, then may he not question the atheist's faith in No-God. If the disbeliever in the inspiration of the Old and New Testaments may not speak against his belief in that inspiration, what right has he to speak against disbelief in it? If he have a right to demand that the legislature decree it blasphemy to deny the doctrine of the Trinity, the Unitarian has an equal right to demand that it decree it blasphemy to assert it. Will our author do as he would be done by, treat the beliefs and disbeliefs of others as he would have his own treated? Not at all. He wants a preference shown to himself and all of his way of thinking. Very well, we say again. But we beseech him to tell us on what ground he legitimates his right to the preference he demands. Not on the simple ground that he is a man, for all men are equal as men, and he must give what he asks to receive, and this excludes all idea of preference. On what ground then? That his faith is true, and therefore must not be opposed? But they, who oppose him, say his faith is false, and therefore ought in justice to truth and Humanity to be opposed. Why shall the government credit him rather than them?

But our author claims this preference to his faith, because it is the faith of the majority. The majority are Christians; and as the majority have a right to rule, they have a right to enact that their religion shall be respected as the religion of the country,

which may not be lawfully denied. But will he admit the soundness of this argument? We ask why the majority have any more right to decree that their religion is the religion of the land, than the minority have to decree the same thing of theirs? We should like to know why a man has any more right to have his religion respected, because he is in the majority, than he would have, if he were in the minority? Are the rights of man matters dependent on the will of the majority? Does one's rights as a man vary as he chances to be in the majority or in the minority? What may be one's rights to-day, then, may not be one's rights to-morrow, for majorities may change.

Our author, we presume, is a Christian as he understands Christianity. There are countries in which Christianity is in a feeble minority. Suppose our author should have his lot cast in one of those countries, would he think that it would be wrong for him to profess his religion there, or that it would be right, if born there, that he should not be permitted the freedom of the commonwealth, because the majority embraced a religion different from his own? Jesus and the Apostles were once a small minority, a little band with the whole world against them. Were they justified in opposing the religious notions of the majority? and were those Roman laws wise and just, which required the early Christians to respect the pagan Gods? Luther and Calvin were in a small minority; they denounced the religion of the majority. Were they right, or were they wrong? The author has arraigned the report of the majority of the committee of Congress on Sunday Mails. As that report was the report of the majority, would our author, had he been on that committee, have deemed himself justified in making a minority report against it? Had he been in Congress at the time, would he have spoken against it, in the minority, as he would have been? Nay, was he not there? and did he not make a speech there against the opinions of the majority of the House? This book reminds us very

much of a certain speech made on the occasion by a distinguished Senator from New Jersey, who, for aught we know may be its author. But what right would he have had to say anything against the opinions of the majority? If the majority have a right to prohibit all speech against their opinions, the rule is absolute; and it applies to the majority of a committee, or of Congress, as well as to any other majority. Will the author follow his doctrine to this, its logical result? If not, where will he stop? Why stop there, rather than somewhere else?

We have spoken of the rights of man. Now the rights of man go with man wherever he goes. He does not acquire them by being in the majority, nor does he forfeit them by falling into the minority. The Christian has a right to be protected in his honest belief, and in the peaceable exercise of his religion, because this is one of the rights of man. Faith and worship are individual matters; and so long as they are not made pretexts for injuring the rights of others, the individual has a perfect right to enjoy them. It is the grossest tyranny, either by legislative enactments or by public opinion, to make him suffer for them. If the Christian has the right, as a man, to defend his honest belief, the Deist, the Jew, the Atheist must have the same right. A law making it criminal to disavow faith in God, in the Scriptures, or in the Trinity, is as much an infringement upon the rights of man, as a law making it criminal to profess to believe either one or the other. If one man has as much right to avow atheism as another has theism, one must have as much right to speak against theism as the other has against atheism. If the majority to-day have a right to decree that Christianity is the religion of the country, and to make it criminal to speak against it, it may decree, if it choose, the reverse to-morrow. If the majority have the absolute right to rule, it has the same right to make a law against asserting the existence of a God, that it has against denying his existence. All which our infi-

dels want then to justify them in making strong penal enactments against Christianity, is merely to become the majority. Has our author thought of this?

Christianity itself is decidedly against this author. It recognises the great brotherhood of men, and teaches that all are equal. It teaches this when it commands us to do unto others as we would have others do unto us. This command can be legitimated only on the ground that man is everywhere equal to man. Man being everywhere equal to man, it follows that whatever it is proper for one man to do by another, it is proper that other should do by him. Men are men, whatever their beliefs. The respect one claims for his belief, he must show to the belief of others. This is the Christian law. Our author as a Christian is bound to obey it. As he would have infidels treat his belief, so let him treat theirs then. If he does this, how can he demand the preference to be shown to his faith by the government, which he has pointed out, and on which he so earnestly insists?

The writer falls into the common mistake in relation to liberty of conscience. He thinks he has a right to enjoy liberty of conscience, and that his conscience, as a Christian, should be respected. Is he not correct, justifiable in this? But he forgets that other men have consciences as well as he, and that government is as much bound to respect their consciences as his. He forgets that to construe one's own liberty of conscience, so as to interfere with another's liberty of conscience, is to misconstrue it.

We hold to liberty of conscience. Conscience we regard as the supreme law, for the individual, in all cases whatsoever. It is more ultimate than the *lex scripta*, than the *lex non scripta*, of paramount authority to all creeds, confessions, rituals, dictates of fashion, public opinion, or decrees of the majority. It is to the individual, the voice of God, which he may not disregard without sin, and which he is bound to follow, though it lead to reproach, poverty, the dungeon, the scaffold, or the cross. But by the very fact,

that we recognise the supremacy of the individual conscience, we necessarily restrict the sphere of its supremacy to the individual himself. Conscience cannot be divided against itself. Consequently the persuasion one may have, which would lead him to force or restrain the exercise of conscience in another, can never be conscience. The liberty of conscience in each individual must then be always so construed as to leave an equal liberty in every other individual. They pervert conscience, who make it the plea for exercising a control over others, which they will not suffer others to exercise over them. One's conscience leads him to observe the Sabbath. It is well. Let him obey his conscience. But let him at the same time remember that he must not impose his conscience on another. That other has a conscience of his own, which is his supreme law.

Our author we suppose would, in part, admit this. But he does it on the ground, that unbelievers have no conscience. We shall not dispute this ground. We should prefer to question, whether he who assumes it has a conscience or not. The man who really supposes that unbelievers are destitute of moral feelings and moral judgments, or who supposes them in general less conscientious than Christians, has no right to set himself up as one capable of instructing the commonwealth. If he assert it without seriously believing it, what is his own conscience worth? Unbelievers are to be compassionated because they want that serenity of soul, that inward repose which faith alone can give; but we are never to suppose them necessarily more deficient in the moral qualities of human nature than the rest of mankind. Indeed, in the majority of instances, we presume, the unbeliever is so called, because he has more faith than his neighbors. We shall make little progress in the work of converting unbelievers to Christianity, till we learn that they are men, to be respected and loved as brothers. The arguments which will convince their understandings, or win their hearts, are not those which

exclude them from the freedom of the commonwealth, and deny them to be human beings. Christianity is most grievously wronged when we make it the pretext for imposing on others burdens, which we would not submit to have others impose on us. Jesus wept with unbelievers, and died on the cross that they might have faith in man and in God. It was in enduring, not in inflicting, legal penalties, that the early Christians arrested the attention of the world, and prepared the way for its conversion.

"Our fathers," says this author, "had no conception of some of the modern notions of what are called state-rights; and I believe they would have stood amazed at the kind of suggestion now current in the country, that a government, such as they have left us, so respectful of the rights of man, ought yet to be administered with as little avowed deference as possible for those of the Supreme Being." What is meant by the rights of the Supreme Being? Are governments instituted for God, or for man? Is it their especial province to guard the rights of God? Does God stand in need of human governments, and look to them for protection? God is his own guardian, his own avenger. He asks no aid of man, no human arm to be raised in his defence. But suppose it not so, we would ask, how can we better respect his rights than by protecting those of his children? If we have studied Christianity to any purpose, it teaches us that we serve and honor God by loving and serving his children, our brethren.

Our author contends that we ought to respect Christianity legally, politically, because Christianity is favorable to liberty. If he means by this that our laws should be enacted and administered in accordance with the great principles of justice, meekness, and love, which constitute the essence of Christianity, assuredly we have no controversy with him. We contend earnestly, in season and out of season, for the same. But if he means that Christianity is to be recognised legally, politically, in its character of a

unless it be so. Now, if he will reflect a moment, that all these injunctions are injunctions of positive, not of natural morality, resting upon an arbitrary authority for their obligation, he must see that they cannot be legally recognised and enforced, without denying all freedom of opinion. Whether they have anything to do with real worth of character or not, is a matter of opinion. They are not felt to be universally obligatory. This man may contend for them, that one may oppose them. I may believe that I ought to be just and merciful, to do no harm, and to do all the good I can, and I may labor to be true to my faith; yet I may regard all this positive morality as of no binding force, and think that I am at liberty to observe it or not, according to my own convictions. Bring in the government now with its positive law, and it reduces me to slavery. If it may command me to observe the first day of the week as holy time, it may enjoin any religious observance it pleases. If it may forbid me to labor on that day, if it may command me to attend church on that day, it may tell me on what days of the week I shall plough my ground, what days hoe my corn; indeed prescribe to me every act of my life, I am permitted to do, and the time and manner of doing it. The same may be said of all the other particulars specified.

The only safe rule is for government to confine itself to natural morality, and leave positive morality to every one's own conscience. They who believe in the Trinity ought to be protected in the enjoyment and expression of their belief; they who do not believe it, should have full liberty to oppose it. So of all other matters of belief. They who regard the first day of the week as holy should have the right to keep it holy; but not, as they claim to have, the right to force those to keep it holy who do not regard it as holy. They who reverence the Bible should have full liberty to reverence it, but no authority from government to exact reverence from those who do not believe it worthy of reverence. It may hurt the

feelings of Christians to hear it spoken against, and so may it hurt the feelings of unbelievers to hear their favorite books spoken against; and if it be blasphemy to hurt the feelings of the one, there is no reason in the world why it should not be blasphemy to hurt the feelings of the other. If the Christian demands a law prohibiting unbelievers from reviling his sacred books, he must submit to a law prohibiting him from reviling the sacred books of unbelievers. He has not always done this. He has said as hard and as malignant things against the Age of Reason, as believers in the Age of Reason have ever said against believers in the Bible.

We are aware that this rule, so far as government is concerned, places men of all opinions on a par, and gives the Christian no legal or political advantage over the infidel. Shall the Christian object to this? Shall the Christian ask for a legal and political advantage over his unbelieving brother? Has he not God and truth on his side, and is not this advantage enough? Has he not also the majority, fashion, public opinion on his side; all the schools and colleges and most of the means of influence in his hands; and does he ask for more? Shall the Christian intimate that he is unwilling to meet the infidel on equal terms? Let him blush then to call himself a Christian. *He* is the infidel who wants faith in Reason, and fears to trust it.

It is often alleged that atheism is incompatible with the stability of government, and the peace and welfare of the community, and may therefore be punished as an offence. We have not the space to enter far into the matter involved in this statement. We hold that no government can have any right to maintain itself by the sacrifice of private right. The powers of government are not made up from the individual rights surrendered to it. The notion that individuals give up a portion of their natural rights to society, in order to secure protection for the remainder, is a false notion. Government is not a contract, a bargain. It

rests on Divine Right. The *Jus Divinum* must be reasserted, if there be any government to be maintained. The magistrate is ordained of God. Define the legitimate powers of government, and those powers are sacred, and are derived from God. But as they are derived from God, they can never be in opposition to individual rights, which are also derived from God. If then we have established the fact, that a man has a natural right to profess atheism, the consequences of professing it, to the government, be they what they may, can never invalidate one's right to profess it. The good of the community may be consulted and ought to be; but only in harmony with the good of each part. The greatest good of the greatest number is not the end to be sought, but the greatest good of the whole. The few may never be sacrificed to secure the safety and well-being of the many. No individual, however lowly, may be overlooked. No individual can ever be without significance; and whenever the rights of one individual are disregarded, be the end what it may, the rights of every individual and of the whole community are invaded.

But let this pass. Atheism, we deny to be dangerous to communities, and we might quote as high authority for our assertion as that of Lord Bacon, but that we are not much given to quotations. An atheistical community cannot be found. The history of our race contains the record of no such community. Mankind almost universally regard the atheist with horror. This horror, which we naturally feel at the denial of God, and the declaration of our own orphanage, is a sufficient protection against the spread of atheism. If it were a seducing doctrine, one, to the profession of which there were many and strong temptations, then it might, perhaps, be necessary to consider whether we have the right to suppress it. It has hitherto been rarely if ever professed for its own sake, but because it has been a refuge from oppression. Men oppressed, despoiled of their possessions

and their rights, overwhelmed with the weight of tyrannical kings, nobilities, and hierarchies, professing to reign in the name of God, and by divine ordination, have sought relief in atheism, and denied God, that they might shake off a tyranny which had become too grievous to be borne. Give the atheist perfect liberty to profess his atheism, take away from him the conviction that in professing it he is warring against an arrogant authority, and he will himself be disgusted with it, and no longer have any wish to profess it. When men are permitted to see in God a father, they have no disposition to deny him; and when they see belief in him drawing mankind together as brothers, they will love that belief and do their best to acquire it.*

Similar remarks may be made in regard to sabbath-keeping and attendance on public worship. The first question is always, whether the government have a right to enforce them? The Sabbath, it is said, should be kept holy, but they only will keep it holy who believe it to be holy time, law or no law;—and they who believe it to be holy time will keep it holy,

* It may also be remarked, that society depends not on religion for its subsistence, but on the social instincts of human nature. Man lives in society, not because he has a religion, but because he is man, and is created with a social nature. The instinct of society is a primitive, not a secondary instinct. It is not a result of a belief in God, nor of any other belief. Men have not reasoned themselves into society; they have not said to themselves, Let us create society. They have always lived in society. Society is as old as man himself. God, in giving us social instincts, social affections, and cravings, which society alone can satisfy, has amply provided for its subsistence. If men would believe more in God, and understand a little more of human nature, and rely less on their positive creeds, they would have fewer fears of the disastrous effects of the propagation of error. He, who really believes in God, believes that the Power which controls all worlds and events is mightier than any false opinion. They who think a little heterodoxy can bring the world to an end, or essentially alter its course, who fear that it can dissolve society, and prevent men from uniting with one another, be they called what they may, or profess they what faith they will, are the genuine infidels, the real atheists, against whom the friends of religion should be most on their guard, and against whom, if against any, laws of blasphemy should be enacted and enforced.

although not legally enjoined. They who believe in the propriety of public worship, and who would profit by attendance on it, will attend it, if they can. They who do not believe in its propriety, and have no relish for it, would not worship, though compelled to attend the places of worship. Religious worship, to be acceptable, must be free and sincere. If it be not offered freely, from the spontaneous promptings of the heart, it can have no worth. All laws, having for their object the enforcement of religion, or a respect for its ordinances, are therefore useless in the case of those who are religious, and can only produce hypocrisy in the case of those who are not. And hypocrisy, in our estimation, is a much more heinous sin in the sight of God, than sabbath-breaking, or neglect of public worship.

We have spoken, as we have, from no indifference to religion or to its ordinances, but from the overflowings of our zeal for Christian freedom. We would by no means encourage atheism, sabbath-breaking, non-attendance on public worship, or the habit of elevating to office men deficient in high moral and religious worth. But we are convinced that the best way to secure belief in the existence of God, reverence for religion, its ordinances, and the practice of the Christian virtues, is for Christians to be just, to respect all the rights of man, and to attempt to secure no legal or political advantages to themselves. We would leave religion perfectly free, and rely solely on arguments addressed to the reason and the conscience for its maintenance and prosperity.

The disposition on the part of churchmen to arrogate to themselves rights, they will not concede to others, the practice believers indulge of denouncing unbelievers, treating them with bitterness, scorn, and contempt, of ridiculing their notions and their writings, publishing from the pulpit and the press gross exaggerations of their doctrines, and utter falsehoods about their personal characters, the low and vulgar rank to which they seek to sink them in the social scale, and

their unwillingness to respect them for what is just and true in their doctrines and characters, may be set down among the chief causes of existing indifference to religion, and the spreading infidelity, which every true Christian deplors ; and till the church become Christianized, and professed Christians imbibe the spirit and follow the example of their Master, it will be of little avail to demand laws against unbelievers and sabbath-breakers, to speak against infidels, or to labor for their conversion.

- ART. III. — SUB-TREASURY BILL. — 1. *Mr. Webster's Speech on the Currency. Delivered in the Senate of the United States. Sept. 28, 1837.*
2. *Speech of Mr. Calhoun, of South Carolina, on the Sub-Treasury Bill. Delivered in the Senate of the United States, Feb. 15, 1838.*
 3. *Mr. Webster's Second Speech on the Sub-Treasury Bill. Delivered in the Senate of the United States, March 12, 1838.*
 4. *Speech of Mr. Calhoun, of South Carolina, in reply to Mr. Clay, on the Sub-Treasury Bill. Delivered in the Senate of the United States, March 10, 1838.*
 5. *Speech of Mr. Calhoun, of South Carolina, in reply to Mr. Webster, on the Sub-Treasury Bill. Delivered in the Senate of the United States, March 22, 1838.*

WE regard the Sub-Treasury Bill as one of the most important measures which our government has proposed since its organization. It constitutes now, and will probably, for some time to come, the great question in Federal politics. Its adoption or rejection will have an immense bearing on our whole future history. We believe, therefore, it may be well to devote a few pages to the consideration of the principal arguments for it, and chief objections against it.

The principle of the Sub-Treasury Bill is simply that of providing for collecting, safe-keeping, and disbursing the public revenues without recourse to Banks. We shall not trouble ourselves or our readers with the details of the Bill. They are, we presume, in the main satisfactory; for we have heard little or nothing said against them. The principle of the Bill is all that we feel much interest in; it is all the friends of the Bill are very tenacious of, and all its enemies very strenuously oppose. To the principle of the Bill, as we have stated it, shall we, therefore, confine the greater portion of the remarks we have to offer.

It may be assumed in the outset, that the government has the right to collect, keep, and disburse its revenues, by means of its own officers, without any recourse to bank agency. It may also be assumed that the banks have no natural claim on the government to be employed as its fiscal agents, and that they will have no injustice to complain of, if they are not so employed. Moreover, it may be assumed again, that the government can, if it choose, manage its fiscal concerns without any connexion with banks or banking institutions. Banks are a contrivance of yesterday; but governments are older than history, older even than tradition; and there can be no doubt that they had fiscal concerns, which they managed, and in some instances very well too, a considerable time before banks were dreamed of. What has been done may be done. The question, then, on the side we are now viewing it, is one of expediency. Is it expedient for the government to dispense with banks, and all bank agency, in the management of its fiscal concerns?

Our government, in its measures and practical character, should conform as strictly as possible to the ideal or theory of our institutions. Nobody, we trust, is prepared for a revolution; nobody, we also trust, is bold enough to avow a wish to depart very widely from the fundamental principles of our insti-

tutions; and everybody will admit that the statesman should study to preserve those institutions in their simplicity and integrity, and should seek, in every law or measure he proposes, merely to bring out their practical worth, and secure the ends for which they were established. Their spirit should dictate every legislative enactment, every judicial decision, and every executive measure. Any law not in harmony with their genius, any measure which would be likely to disturb the nicely adjusted balance of their respective powers, or that would give them, in their practical operation, a character essentially different from the one they were originally intended to have, should be discountenanced, and never for a single moment entertained.

We would not be understood to be absolutely opposed to all innovations or changes, whatever their character. It is true, we can never consent to disturb the settled order of a state, without strong and urgent reasons; but we can conceive of cases in which we should deem it our duty to demand a revolution. When a government has outlived its idea, and the institutions of a country no longer bear any relation to the prevailing habits, thoughts, and sentiments of the people, and have become a mere dead carcass, an encumbrance, an offence, we can call loudly for a revolution, and behold with comparative coolness its terrible doings. But such a case does not as yet present itself here. Our institutions are all young, full of life and the future. Here, we cannot be revolutionists. Here, we can tolerate no innovations, no changes, which touch fundamental laws. None are admissible but such as are needed to preserve our institutions in their original character, to bring out their concealed beauty, to clear the field for their free operation, and to give more directness and force to their legitimate activity. Every measure must be in harmony with them, grow as it were out of them, and be but a development of their fundamental laws.

The government of the United States is a congress rather than a government. It is not instituted for the ordinary purposes of government, but for a few, and comparatively a very few, special purposes. The ordinary rules for interpreting the powers of government can be applied to it only to a limited extent, and even then with great caution. The principal governments of the country, according to the theory of American institutions, are the State governments. These were intended to be the governments for the people in all their civil, municipal, domestic, and individual interests and relations. The Federal government was designed merely to take charge of the external relations of the confederated States with foreign nations, and, to a certain extent, with one another. It was never intended to be a government affecting the private interests of the people, as individual citizens. It in fact repudiates every measure which would make it a great central government, giving law to the States, or which tends to give it a direct or indirect control over the private fortunes and affairs of the people; and it can own only such measures as tend to keep it within its province, to preserve its original idea, and enable it to discharge its legitimate functions.

Undoubtedly the Federal government may take such measures, though they affect the private fortunes and relations of individual citizens, as are *necessary* to the exercise of its delegated powers. But they must be necessary, not merely convenient. The rule always to be observed is, the Federal government must touch the individual citizen as seldom and as lightly as possible, consistently with the faithful discharge of its constitutional duties. Should two measures be proposed for accomplishing a constitutional end, one of which has very little bearing on individual citizens, leaving them almost entire freedom, the other connecting the government intimately with all the business of the country, and bringing it into a close relation with every individual citizen; the

first ought to be adopted instead of the last, although the last might be the more feasible of the two, and likely to be attended with more beneficial results. What may not be consulted openly and done directly, must never be consulted covertly, and done indirectly. We must avoid, as far as practicable, all incidental action of the government,—and that too, when it promises to be useful as well as when it threatens to be injurious.

These principles, we believe are sound. We do not mean to say that some persons may not be found who will controvert them; for there are persons to be found who do not very well comprehend the relations, which were originally established between the Federal government and the State governments, and who have a strong desire to make the Federal government the supreme government of the country. But they are the only principles we can adopt, if we mean to avoid the charge of being revolutionists, and to preserve our institutions in their real character; if we mean to preserve to the States, as we ought, the main business of government, and to restrict the Federal government in its action to the special purposes for which it was originally instituted.

Yet these principles have been departed from. The Federal government, in point of fact, has become the supreme government of the land. It is no longer a congress for regulating our relations with foreigners, for adjusting the intercourse of the states with one another, and providing for the general defence; but it has become a grand central government, affecting, by its measures, individual interests and relations more powerfully than the action of the State governments themselves. The people, at least a large and influential portion of them, have come to regard it as the supreme government. They think of it as such; speak of it as such; commend it as such; condemn it as such. All eyes turn towards it. Do capitalists want to change their mode of investment, Congress must provide for the change; do their profits turn

out to be less than their wishes, Congress must raise the tariff of duties to make them greater. Is there distress in the money market, commercial embarrassment, the Federal government has caused it; are our factories closed, ships hauled up to rot, industry paralyzed, and the laborer seeking in vain for employment, the Federal government is in fault, and Congress must afford relief.

Federal politics, too, absorb State politics. State legislators vote on a bill for the organization of a primary school, or for constructing or repairing a bridge, according to their opinions on a bill before Congress, or the fitness or unfitness of this or that man to fill the Presidential chair. A Federal warrant must be obtained before one feels himself authorized to support a measure of State policy; and the merits or demerits of any given measure will be determined by the fact, that it is or is not opposed by the Federal administration. Federal politics therefore decide everything, and reduce State politics to insignificance.

Is this the order of things demanded by the genius of our institutions? Does this comport with the Divine Idea with which our fathers were inspired? Was the Federal government framed to be the supreme government, and intended to invade by its acts even our domestic fire-sides? Does the theory of our institutions make the State governments mere prefectures, dependent on and accountable to the Federal government? Most assuredly not. Widely then have we departed from that theory, and fearfully rapid has been our progress towards centralization, which is only another name for despotism. Without delay, then, should we hasten to retrace our steps, and return to the special purposes for which the government was instituted, and beyond which it should never have strayed.

The people are honest, and they mean to preserve their democratic institutions. They never would have suffered this departure from first principles, had

they clearly perceived the precise nature of the Federal government. Our system of government, though exceedingly simple, has nevertheless the appearance of being exceedingly complex. Foreigners rarely if ever comprehend its real character. They regard the Federal government as the supreme government, the State governments as inferior and subordinate. Their view of it presupposes the Federal government to have possessed in the outset all the powers of government, and to retain in its possession now all not conceded to the States. Many of our own citizens seem to fall into the same error. They appear to regard the constitution of the United States as a limitation, rather than as an enumeration, of the powers of the Federal government. They seem to forget that the sovereignty exercised by the Federal government is after all vested in the States, and is exercised by the Federal government, only because the States have by mutual compact agreed that that portion of their sovereignty shall be so exercised. They have therefore felt that the Federal government, instead of being at liberty to do only what it has the express leave to do, is at liberty to do whatever it is not forbidden to do; that where it has not the power to act directly, it may act indirectly; and while in the pursuit of a constitutional end, it may accomplish, incidentally, any object it can, providing that object promises to be of general utility. They have therefore been able to see, without alarm, the government touching more interests and exerting almost infinitely greater control incidentally, than it can directly, in the plain, straight-forward exercise of its constitutional powers. They have also, in consequence of adopting this principle of interpretation, been able to solicit, without compunction, a continual extension of this incidental action, and to allege pretenses for so extending it, as to bring it home to every man's "bosom and business." Had they clearly perceived the true character of the Federal government, they had not seen this without lively alarm, nor done it without poignant remorse.

In consequence of adopting the rule, that the government may do incidentally what it may not do directly, and what is not necessary to the discharge of its constitutional functions, three systems of policy have grown up, which not only create obstacles to a return of the government to its legitimate province, but also perpetual inducements for it to depart further and still further from it. These are the system of Internal Improvements, the American System, as it is called, and the connexion of the government with Banking. There is no constitutional grant of power to the Federal government, in favor of any one of these. Congress has the right to establish post offices and post roads, and to provide for the general welfare; therefore it has been contended that it may intersect the whole country with great roads, and undertake any work of internal improvement that promises to be generally useful. It has no right to lay a protective tariff, but inasmuch as it has the right to lay imposts for the purposes of revenue, it may lay them to double the amount needed for revenue, and so lay them as to tax one portion of the community to enhance the profits of another, and in point of fact so as to affect all the business relations of the whole country. Under the grant of power to regulate commerce, to coin money and fix the value thereof, it is contended that it has the right to be connected with the banks and the whole business of banking. By means of its connexion with the banks and banking business, it is brought into the closest connexion with every man, woman, and child in these twenty-six confederated States. We say nothing against banks or the banking system. We are not now inquiring whether the system be a good or a bad one. What we are contending for stands above and independent on any views, anybody may entertain of banks or banking. The banks are intimately connected with all the business concerns of the community; they affect the private fortune of every individual; they determine, to a great extent at least, the price of every article bought

or sold, produced or consumed. The government, by being connected with them, becomes connected with the business concerns of every individual citizen, and controls those concerns, just in proportion as it is connected with the banks or exerts a controlling influence over their operations.

By means of the Internal Improvement system, of the American system, and its connexion with banks, the Federal government has become the supreme government of the land. We say *has* become, perhaps it were as well to say, *had* become. The tendency to centralization was unchecked till the accession of General Jackson to the presidency. During his administration it began to be arrested. Some may indeed question this fact, and we will not insist on it so far as concerns the executive department of the Federal government. Circumstances, not sought by General Jackson, and which we see not well how he could have controlled, threw into the hands of the Executive an uncommon share of power, and gave to administrative measures an influence and an importance, which we hope never to see possessed by the measures of any subsequent administration. Nevertheless, the tendency, — excepting always a certain proclamation, — so far as the doctrines promulgated, and measures recommended were concerned, — was arrested. The Internal Improvement system was vetoed, the American system was modified, compromised, and sent on its way to the place whence it came. And now, if we mean to finish the work, and arrest completely and perhaps forever, this dangerous tendency, we must disconnect the government from all banks and bank agency, and adopt the principle of the Sub-Treasury Bill.

Now, as we have taken it for granted that nobody amongst us is for changing the fundamental laws of our institutions, or for disturbing the relations which our fathers saw fit to establish between the Federal government and the State governments, we see not well how any man can avoid coming to the above con-

clusion. There are only two courses for us to take. One course is to make the Federal government, by its connexion with the banking business, and through that with private credit, which is, in this country, the basis of most business transactions, the supreme government, the government controlling all the State governments, and the one which most vitally affects the people. We can take this course if we will. Revive the Deposit system, or charter a National bank, and we shall have taken it. But then our institutions are radically changed; the wisdom of our fathers set at naught; and we ourselves afloat on the tide of a new experiment. We trust that we are, as a people, yet too near the cradle of our institutions, and that we yet feel too much of the joy that thrilled our hearts, when we were told the young child, Liberty, was born, to be prepared for this. We trust also that we have too much stability of character, firmness of purpose, and self respect, to disappoint at once the hopes of the friends of freedom throughout the world, who have been looking to us for encouragement, and for a triumphant answer to those who allege that society cannot subsist without Kings, Hierarchies, and Nobilities.

The other course is to adopt the principle of the Sub-Treasury Bill, and divorce the government from its destructive alliance with the business of banking. It is to follow out the policy already commenced; and as we have abandoned the Internal Improvement system, and the Protective system, so now to abandon the Banking system. We mean not by this that the government is to wage a war against the banks, but that it shall let them alone. If the States have not yielded up to the general government their right to institute banks, the banks are matters wholly within the jurisdiction of the States, and we should be the first to repel any attacks the Federal government might be disposed to make on them; and this too whether we approved the banking system or not. The States are competent to manage their own affairs. We ask

nothing of the Federal government in relation to banks, but to provide for the management of its fiscal concerns, without making any use, directly or indirectly, of their agency.

The adoption of this principle will be for the Federal government to withdraw itself within its legitimate province, from which we can see nothing, very soon at least, likely to tempt it forth again. This will leave a broader field and weightier matters to the State governments, which will raise their importance in the estimation of the people, make them objects of more serious attention, enlist more talent in their administration, and make them altogether more practically useful. We have no wish to underrate the Federal government. If the tendency of the times were to lessen its importance, we would set forth its claims in as strong terms as we do now those of the States. Because we value the rights of the States, it must not be inferred that we do not value the Union. The Union is by no means likely in our days to be under-estimated. The centripetal force is altogether too strong for that. Should we, however, see the centrifugal force predominating, and be led to apprehend any danger from a tendency to individuality, to disunion, dissolution, we trust we should be found among the fast friends of the Union. But we are not one of those who neglect the danger which now is, to utter warnings against a danger, which may possibly never come. Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof. The Federal government is indispensable, and in its sphere, it should be preserved at all hazards. But it is after all less essential than our State governments. Our external relations, our affairs as communities, which it belongs to the Federal government to watch over and regulate, are of far less consequence than our relations as individual citizens. The former are few, and comparatively remote, while the latter are many and intimate. The first affect us only occasionally, the last continually, every moment. The Federal government is also so far removed from the individual citi-

zen, and permits so few to take part in its deliberations or administration, that it can never legislate for private interests, wisely, usefully, and safely, even if it have the constitutional right to do it. The States are therefore the more important institutions of the two. They should therefore claim our first attention. If the principle of the Bill under consideration be adopted, they will receive our first attention. Political men will not be thinking perpetually then of what may be thought at Washington. They will have leisure to bestow their best thoughts on State legislation, on the means of removing abuses which weigh heavily on the individual citizen, of improving our systems of jurisprudence, increasing the facilities for popular education, encouraging literature and the arts, and elevating the individual man. The balance between the State and the individual, between the Federal government and the State governments, may be readjusted, and we be at liberty to develop the resources of our noble country, to avail ourselves of our commanding position, and to prove ourselves a people worthy to be studied and imitated.

The principle of this Bill ought also to be adopted, because it simplifies the fiscal concerns of the nation, and keeps them clear of the complicated financial systems of the Old World. The real governments of the Old World are at this moment on 'Change or the Bourse, and the regulation of funds is the principal business of government. Government, instituted for the social weal of the people, becomes thus the mere instrument of private interest, of stock-jobbers, speculators in the funds. We do not want this state of things here. We want a government, simple, open, and direct in its action, performing in the simplest and plainest manner possible the functions assigned to it.

We have also commenced in this country a new system of government, not in form only, but in spirit. We reject the maxim, that it is necessary to deceive the people for the people's good, and adopt the maxim,

that honesty is the best policy. To carry out this maxim, it is necessary that the government should always tell the truth, both in its words and its deeds. It has a right to impose taxes, but only for defraying the expenses incurred in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional powers. It may lay imposts and collect revenues, for this purpose, and for this purpose only. It has then no right to use its revenues, or to suffer them to be used, for any other purpose. Now, when it deposits its revenues in the banks, whether in a National bank or in a State bank, in general deposite, as it is contended it should, it uses its revenues, or suffers them to be used, for other purposes than those of defraying its expenses. They are not deposited there for safe keeping, as the people are taught to believe, but to be made the basis of loans to the business part of the community. They serve the purpose of sustaining the credit of the banks and, through the banks, of the merchants and manufacturers. This is to collect the revenues for one purpose, and to appropriate them to another. This is to deceive the people, and to depart from the fundamental maxim of our state policy. If it be necessary to tax the community some thirty millions of dollars annually, to sustain the credit of business men, and to enable them to carry on their extensive operations, let them be so taxed ; but let it be openly and avowedly. The people will know then what they are taxed for. But so long as the revenues are avowedly collected for the purpose of defraying the expenses of the government, they should be sacred to that end. If in this way a portion of the funds of the nation be useless, it may operate as an inducement to make the taxes as light as possible, which in its turn will relieve the people, and keep the government poor ; and by keeping it poor, keep it honest, free from corruption.

The greatest objection, or one of the greatest objections to the Deposit system, in either a National bank or in State banks, is that it gives to the banks the use of the government funds. Being given to the

banks, the use of these funds is virtually given to the business community. The business community, so long as it has the use of them, will not be anxious to reduce the revenues. It will prefer high taxes, and favor the accumulation of a surplus, because by having the use of the funds to sustain its credit, it gets back more than it is obliged to pay in taxes. This part of the subject, Mr. Calhoun, in his speech of February 15th, has set in a clear light, and his remarks deserve to be read and pondered well by every freeman. The policy of our government should be to make the taxes as light as possible, consequently to look with distrust on all measures the direct tendency of which must be to increase them.

It may also be maintained, with some plausibility at least, that it is for the true interest of the banks themselves to have no connexion with the fiscal concerns of the government. Nobody, we presume, is hardy enough to contend that the banks should control the government. It has never, we believe, been the intention of the people to place the real government of the country in the hands of bank corporations. They have, we believe, always intended that the government should maintain its supremacy, and follow its own interest and that of the country, regardless of the special interests of the presidents and directors of banks. In case the government maintains its supremacy, the amount of its funds, the time, place, and extent of its appropriations, must always be matters beyond the control of the banks, and also matters which they may not always foresee or be prepared to meet. Government will have it in its power to disturb, whenever it chooses, their nicest business calculations, and thwart them in their most cherished plans. It may call upon them for its funds, when they are all loaned out, and when they cannot be called in without great detriment to the business operations of the community, often not without producing a panic, financial embarrassment, commercial distress. If there be but one bank, or if

there be one mammoth bank, it may, perhaps, profit by panics, financial embarrassments, commercial distress, but the banks generally cannot. Their interest is one and the same with that of the business community; it is best promoted by sustaining credit, by keeping the waters smooth and even, the times good and easy. They ought, then, to be free from all connexion with a partner over whose operations they have no control, and who may choose to withdraw his investments at the very moment when they are most in need of them. It is altogether better for them to trust to their own means, and keep to their proper vocation, than it is to mix up their interests with those of the government. The history of the late Deposit banks may be thought to afford some evidence of the truth of this.

We did intend to adduce several other considerations in favor of the Sub-Treasury Bill, but our limits forbid. We have barely room left to offer a few brief remarks on the principal objections we have heard urged against it.

The Bill is said by some to be objectionable, because in its original form, it contemplates the disuse of bank notes in payment of the public dues. But this is essential to the principle of the Bill. It is impossible to separate the government from the business of banking, so long as it receives or pays out bank notes. There is no difference in principle between receiving a bank note, and making a bank deposit. A bank note is merely a certificate of deposit in the bank in favor of its holder, to its nominal amount. If the bank be solvent it will be paid on demand, and so will be the deposit made in any other form.

Then again, why should the government receive the notes of banks rather than of individuals? Bank notes are not money, — currency. Their value consists in the confidence entertained by the community, that their promises to pay money will be redeemed on demand. Notes of individuals may be as likely to be redeemed as these bank notes, may be worth as much,

and be in as good credit ; why not take them ? Why demand payment of the revenues at all ? Why not take the notes or bonds of the government debtors, as sufficient ? The principle would be the same with that of taking bank notes. What would the people think of a provision for receiving the notes of certain individual merchants or manufacturers in payment of the public dues ?

Bank notes, we have said, are not currency. Currency is that which passes current in the legal discharge of debts. In no case, except that of the government, are bank notes ever made a legal tender. No creditor but the government is under any obligation to receive them. Why shall the government be compelled to receive them ? Why may not the government, as a creditor, be placed on an equal footing with any other creditor ?

Bank notes are no doubt convenient and highly useful in commercial transactions. A change in the source and method of their emission, together with additional securities for their redemption, is unquestionably demanded, and must ere long be effected ; but no one at all acquainted with the business operations of the commercial world will think of dispensing wholly with their use. But when they have no legal value in the discharge of debts, when they are left for their circulation, so far as the law is concerned, to the free-will and confidence of the community,—they have even then a natural tendency to become superabundant, and to stimulate individual credit beyond what is consistent with its soundness. Should the government receive them in payment of the public dues, it would strengthen this tendency, and greatly aggravate its evil consequences. Bank notes will become sufficiently abundant, and be in as good credit as they deserve, although the government should have nothing to do with them, neither receiving them nor paying them out.

We are also disposed to concur with Mr. Calhoun in the position he has assumed, that the Federal gov-

ernment cannot place its funds in the banks in general deposite without violating an express clause of the Constitution. He contends that when the revenues are collected and deposited in the banks, they are, if ever, in the Treasury. The Constitution says expressly, that "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law." The public funds deposited in the banks are drawn from them for other purposes than those of meeting appropriations made by law; they are made by the banks the basis of discounts, and are frequently all loaned out to their customers. Can this be done without violating the Constitution?

If the principle involved in this statement be admitted, it follows as a necessary consequence, that the government cannot receive bank notes in payment of the public dues. In denying the right to make the deposite, we necessarily deny the right to receive the notes. To receive the notes of the banks, since these notes are only certificates of deposits, is only an indirect way of making bank deposits. The right to receive them can then rest only on the right to make the deposits.

Mr. Webster promised to reply to this constitutional objection, but, unhappily, he failed to redeem his promise. He merely proved that the government had been in the habit of receiving bank notes in payment of the public dues,—a fact well known, and admitted by Mr. Calhoun. The fact, that the government has been in the habit of receiving bank notes, does not prove that it has a constitutional right to receive them. In establishing the fact, therefore, Mr. Webster did not establish the right,—the only point he was called upon to establish. As he did not do this, since it was what was essential to be done, we presume he could not. If Mr. Webster could not, who can? We conclude, therefore, that Mr. Calhoun is correct, that the government has no constitutional right to place its funds in the banks in general deposite, nor to receive bank notes in payment of the public

dues; and consequently the objection to the Bill, we are considering, is not an objection to the Bill itself, but to the Constitution.

Mr. Webster's main objection to the Bill is, that it does not provide for a uniform currency, safe and of equal value throughout the Union. This objection is about as reasonable as would be the objection to a Bill fixing the weight and fineness of the dollar, that it does not fix the length of the yard-stick. The Bill professes simply to provide for collecting, safe-keeping, and disbursing the public revenues, without any recourse to banks or to bank agency. To object to it that it does not effect another object, and one which it does not contemplate, is hardly fair. Is it Mr. Webster's creed, that all governmental measures should be avowedly adopted for one object, but really and intentionally for another and a different object? If so, he must pardon us; we cannot, with our present notions of honesty and plain-dealing, consent to embrace it.

Mr. Webster insists upon the obligation of the Federal government to provide for a uniform currency, safe and of equal value throughout the Union. He reiterates this, and dwells upon it with as much earnestness, as if he verily thought he was bringing out a novel and unadmitted theory. But really, in the constitutional sense of the term currency, nobody disputes him. It was unquestionably the intention of the framers of the Constitution, that the Federal government should provide for a currency which should be uniform and of equal value throughout all the States. The Union of the States was desired and effected, principally to facilitate their commercial intercourse with one another and with foreign nations. Commerce craved and effected the Union, made us one people. Without the Union, the States would have been to each other foreign nations, and the commercial transactions between the citizens of one State and those of another would have been subjected to the laws, which govern the trade of our citizens

with the subjects of England, France, or any other foreign nation. This was a thing to be avoided. It was desirable to bind the States together in a closer intimacy than that of foreign States, and to make the business intercourse between the citizens of one State and the citizens of another State, as facile and as safe, as the business intercourse between citizens of the same State.

But this was to be effected only by giving to the Federal government the power to provide for a uniform currency, to "coin money and regulate the value thereof." Had this power over the currency been retained by the States individually, there might have been as many currencies as States. What was coin in one State would have been bullion in relation to another. Coins of the same denomination might have varied in value as you passed from State to State, and there would have been no currency in the Union with which debts could be discharged alike in all the States. To avoid this last result, the States were prohibited from issuing bills of credit, and from making any thing but gold and silver a legal tender. This prohibition was not laid on the States for the purpose of protecting the citizens of the same State against one another, but the citizens of one State against those of another State. The object in view was still a uniform currency. It was to secure to every creditor payment in a currency which would be of equal value in whatever part of the Union he might wish to use it.

Now thus far we contend as earnestly as Mr. Webster, that it is the duty of the Federal government to furnish a uniform currency. We contend that this is one of the chief duties of the government, not merely that it may equalize taxes and provide a uniform currency in which to collect its revenues, as we have heard it suggested by some, but also to provide for the wants of commerce, to facilitate the business intercourse between the citizens of one State and those of another. But we do not find that this im-

plies an obligation on the part of the Federal government to provide a currency of bank paper, which shall be safe and of uniform value throughout the States. We cannot find that the Constitution and laws know any other currency than that of gold and silver; and when we consider the object which led to the prohibition of the States from issuing bills of credit, and from making anything but gold and silver a legal tender, we may safely conclude that it was the intention of the framers of the Constitution, that gold and silver alone should constitute the legal currency. Bank notes may circulate, because they are convenient, and because it may be believed that they will be redeemed in specie on demand, as may bills of exchange and the promissory notes of individuals; but however much they may circulate they do not constitute a legal currency. It is always optional with the creditor, whether he will receive them or not. So far as the law is concerned he may always insist on payment in gold and silver. If he consents to take bank notes and discharge his debtor, the law regards it, and treats it as a private contract, bargain, or agreement.

Mr. Webster himself, — when it suits his purpose, — contends that gold and silver constitute the only currency known to the Constitution and laws. The following extract from a speech of his in Congress in 1816, which we find in Mr. Calhoun's speech of March 22, is very clear and satisfactory on this point.

“MR. WEBSTER first addressed the House. He regretted the manner in which this debate had been commenced, on a detached feature of the bill, and not a question affecting the principle; and expressed his fears that a week or two would be lost in the discussion of this question, to no purpose, inasmuch as it might ultimately end in the rejection of the bill. *He proceeded to reply to the arguments of the advocates of the bill.* It was a mistaken idea, he said, which he had heard uttered on this subject, *that we were about to reform the National currency.* No nation had a better currency, he said, than the United States; there was no nation which had guarded its currency with more care; for the framers of the Con-

stitution, and those who enacted the early statutes on this subject, were *hard money men*; they had felt, and therefore duly *appreciated the evils of a paper medium*; they, therefore, sedulously guarded *the currency of the United States from debasement*. *The legal currency of the United States was gold and silver coin*; this was a subject in regard to which Congress had run into no folly.

“‘What, then,’ he asked, ‘was the present evil? *Having a perfectly sound national currency, and the Government having no power in fact to make anything else current but gold and silver, there had grown up in different States a currency of paper issued by banks, setting out with the promise to pay gold and silver, which they had been wholly unable to redeem: the consequence was, that there was a mass of paper afloat, of perhaps fifty millions, which sustained no immediate relation to the legal currency of the country,—a paper which will not enable any man to pay money he owes to his neighbor, or his debts to the Government. The banks had issued more money than they could redeem, and the evil was severely felt,*’ &c. Mr. Webster declined occupying the time of the House, to prove that there was a depreciation of the paper in circulation: *the legal standard of value was gold and silver*; the relation of paper to it proved its state, and the rate of its depreciation. *Gold and silver currency, he said, was the law of the land at home, and the law of the world abroad; there could, in the present state of the world, be no other currency.*” — pp. 13, 14.

Nevertheless Mr. Webster means a bank currency, when he contends the Federal government is bound to provide a safe and uniform currency of equal value throughout the States. He infers the government is bound to provide this currency not only from its general power over the currency, but also from its special power to regulate commerce. Its general power over the currency extends merely to coining money and regulating its value. The power to regulate commerce, even he in his sober moments can hardly contend, reaches his case. On this point Mr. Calhoun’s reply to him is sufficient.

“The last argument of the Senator, on the question at issue, was drawn from the provision of the Constitution, which gives to Congress the right to regulate commerce, and which he says involves the right and obligation to furnish a sound

circulating medium. The train of his reasoning, as far as I could comprehend it, was, that, without a currency, commerce could not exist, at least to any considerable extent, and, of course, there would be nothing to regulate: and, therefore, unless Congress furnished a currency, its power of regulating commerce would become a mere nullity; and from which he inferred the right and obligation to furnish not only a currency, but a bank currency! Whatever may be said of the soundness of the reasoning, all must admit that his mode of construing the Constitution is very bold and novel. To what would it lead? The same clause, in that instrument, which gives Congress the right to coin money and regulate the value thereof, gives it also the kindred right to fix the standard of weights and measures. They are just as essential to the existence of commerce as the currency itself. The yard and the bushel are not less important in the exchange of commodities, than the dollar and the eagle; and the very train of reasoning which would make it the right and duty of the Government to furnish the one, would make it equally so to furnish the other. Again: commerce cannot exist without ships and other means of transportation. Is the government also bound to furnish them? Nor without articles or commodities to be exchanged, cotton, rice, tobacco, and the various products of agriculture and manufactures. Is it also bound to furnish them? Nor these in turn, without labor; and must that too be furnished? If not, I ask the Senator to make the distinction. Where will he draw the line, and on what principles? Does he not see that, according to this mode of construction, the higher powers granted in the Constitution would carry all the inferior, and that this would become a Government of unlimited powers? Take, for instance, the war power, and apply the same mode of construction to it, and what power would there be that Congress could not exercise, nay, be bound to exercise? Intelligence, morals, wealth, numbers, currency, all are important elements of power, and may become so to the defence of the union and safety of the country; and according to the Senator's reasoning, the Government would have the right and would be in duty bound to take charge of the schools, the pulpits, the industry, the population, as well as the currency of the country; and these would comprehend the entire circle of legislation, and leave the State Governments as useless appendages of the system." — pp. 14, 15.

Mr. Webster contends, that since a paper currency has sprung up in the States under the auspices of

State legislation, which answers in many respects all the purposes of the legal currency, it ought, in order to be uniform, current alike in all parts of the Union, to come under the control of the Federal government. Now, if he be right in this, he must admit that the Federal government has the supreme control over all the banks of the country, the full right to determine the mode and extent of their issues, and the securities they must give the public for the redemption of their notes. A power less unlimited than this will not meet the exigencies of the case. But the Federal government can have this power over only the banks of its own creation. Nobody can be mad enough to contend that it may have this power over State institutions. State institutions for furnishing a paper currency must then be abandoned, and Federal banks alone be tolerated.* If the power supposed be vested in the Federal government, the constitutional right of the States to incorporate banks must be given up. Our State banks are all unconstitutional, and the recent act of the Legislature of the State of New-York, authorizing private banking is unconstitutional also. Will Mr. Webster go this length? Is he aware that the ground he assumes is

* It will not alter the state of the case at all, to say that Congress need not exert this control directly; that it may do it indirectly through the agency of a great National Bank. Granting, what however we much doubt, that a National bank would exert the control over State banks here supposed, Congress has no more right to establish a bank for exerting that control, than it has to exert it immediately, by direct Federal legislation. Nothing is clearer than that a government may not do medietely what it may not do immediately. If it have no right to control State banks by direct legislation, it of course has no right to establish a bank to do it. Consequently if the Federal government is bound to regulate the circulation and value of bank paper, it must have the supreme control over the sources of its emission. It can have this control over no institutions but those of its own creation. Either then the Federal government must, after having done its duty in relation to a gold and silver currency, leave bank issues entirely to the people and the States, or else all State banks, or institutions created by the States to furnish a paper currency, must be given up. We yield Mr. Webster either horn of the dilemma.

incompatible with the constitutionality of the State banks? We believe he is, and notwithstanding his professions of regard for them, that he is very nearly prepared to abolish them. No man has said harder things against them, and we believe his soberest convictions are, that the Federal government only has a right to incorporate a bank. It becomes the friends of State banks to look well to Mr. Webster's arguments for a sound, uniform, national bank paper currency. Just as much power as he claims for the Federal government over the paper currency of the country, just so much does he deny to the States; and as he claims the supreme control for the Federal government, he of course leaves nothing to the State governments.

The Bill under consideration is also accounted objectionable, by some, because it will lock up the money of the country in the government vaults, and keep it from general use. But this can be the case only to a limited extent. It is not the policy of modern governments to hoard money. The true theory of our government is to collect no more money than is wanted for its necessary expenditures. Consequently what is collected must always be immediately disbursed in payment of government creditors, and go again into general circulation. Very little will be kept constantly on hand. Mr. Wright thinks about five millions, Mr. Calhoun, in our judgment more correctly, thinks three millions will be nearer the truth. The Bill will tend if adopted to keep down the taxes or revenues. The business portion of the community, who are now for high taxes, because they have the loan of the government funds, will, when they find they can make no use of them, and derive no advantage from them, exert their whole influence to keep them down to the wants of government, and also to keep the wants of government as few as is compatible with its free and healthy action. In this way altogether more will be gained to the country than will be lost by suffering a few millions of dollars to lie idle in the government vaults.

It is said that the Bill increases the patronage of the government. It adds nine additional clerks to the present list of government agents, and creates four new offices of receivers general. This is not much, not sufficient to alarm a man possessed of any tolerable nerves. As for the power of the government over the public funds, it remains precisely the same under the new arrangement as under the old. The change in this respect is merely taking away the control of the banks over the public money, without increasing that of the government. The objection would be nearer the truth if it read, The Bill diminishes the influence of the banks over the fiscal concerns of the government. Put it in the worst light possible, all that can be said is, the safe-keeping of the government funds is placed in the hands of government officers, instead of the hands of irresponsible bank presidents and directors. Is this a weighty objection?

The money will not, it is said, be safe. All safety is comparative. They who have money must run the risk of losing it. Government vaults may be made as safe as bank vaults, and perhaps there may be government officers, who are as honest, as trustworthy, as the officers and agents of banks, whether State or National. The chances against loss are much greater under the Bill, than under the deposit system, in either of its forms. Under the Bill honesty and ordinary prudence alone will suffice to keep them safe, for they are locked up. Under the deposit system they are loaned out, and it depends on the sagacity and accurate calculations, as well as the honesty, of the bank agents, and on the honesty and ability of the bank debtors, whether they shall be kept safe or not.

These are the principal objections which we have heard urged against the Bill. It is in reality unobjectionable, and the opposition to it does not arise from any conviction that the measure itself will not work well, but from the fact, that it does not give to the business community the use of the government funds,

during the period which elapses between their collection and disbursement. From the organization of the Federal government up to the present moment, the business community, by means of the funding system and bank agency, have had, in a greater or less degree, the use of the public funds, and made them, to a great extent, the basis of their credit and business operations. They have had the use of these funds so long that they seem to have forgotten that they were originally collected, not for them, but for the government. They seem to think that long possession has given them a right to them. And now that the government proposes to reclaim them, and to make them sacred to the uses for which they were collected, they feel themselves sorely grieved, and talk of the government, as though it were doing them a wrong. We hope, however, they will moderate their wrath, and reflect with a little soberness. If they do, we think they must be satisfied that the government is not wronging them.

For ourselves, we can see no reason why the business portion of the community should have, directly or indirectly, the use of the government funds. We will charge upon no class of our fellow citizens the doctrine that the government ought to protect, or specially favor one portion of the community, as the means of benefiting other portions of the community. We do not believe that the business men will maintain, in general thesis, that government ought to favor them, facilitate their operations, in order to enable them to advance the interests of the farmer and the artisan. There is, we devoutly hope, nobody among us to contend that the government should hire one class to take care of another. For, here, everybody knows, government can give to one class only what it takes from another. We go against all special protection, against all special favors. We wish well to commerce, well to manufactures, well to agriculture, well to the mechanic arts. These are all sister interests; and when government does not choose

to single out one as the special object of its caresses, they all live harmoniously together, and add to each other's comfort.

If, however, any interest in this country needs to be protected more than another, it is the interest of what may be termed productive labor. Commerce and manufactures do not need with us any especial care of the government. Of all interests among us they are those which can best take care of themselves. Money always secures the influence needed for its own protection. It is those who come not into the moneyed class, honest, but humble laborers, who are usually deficient in the power to protect themselves. But for these we ask no special protection, no special governmental action. Leave industry free, unshackled, and they will work out their own salvation.

If this Bill become a law, it will, in our judgment, mark a new era in the history of our government. It will greatly diminish the business of the government, lessen the demand for legislation, and leave more to individual freedom, skill, and enterprise. Some inconveniences at first must doubtless be anticipated. It will take some little time for things to settle down, business to find a smooth and safe channel. No important change, however beneficial or desirable, can be effected without more or less of inconvenience and suffering. We gained not our national independence, without inconvenience, without long and painful sacrifices. Yet it is thought now to be worth all it cost us.

If this Bill become a law, we shall have gained, in addition to our political independence, social independence, which is still more valuable. The moneyed interest will be prevented from converting our government from a democracy into a timocracy, and the people, the whole people, will be in fact, not in name only, the state, under justice, the real sovereign. Our Republic will continue its peaceful march of freedom, and realize the Idea of its venerated founders. There is a glorious Future before us. If we only possess

the wisdom to decide rightly the great questions, as they from time to time come up, we shall assuredly realize it. We love to contemplate the destiny which may, and which we trust will be ours; and we could expatiate with no little enthusiasm on it; but we forbear. Whatever may be the fate of the Bill, we despair not of the Republic. The people here are strong; and though they may err for a moment, or for a moment be deceived, they will come round right in the end, and prove that "*vox populi*" is, after all, the surest rendering of "*vox Dei*."

ART. IV.—*The American Democrat, or Hints on the Social and Civic Relations of the United States of America.* By J. FENIMORE COOPER. Cooperstown: H. & E. Phinney. 1838. 12mo. pp. 192.

THE creator of *Natty Leatherstocking* and the author of the *Bravo* can hardly write a book that shall be read without interest, or fail to deserve the respectful consideration of his countrymen. He possesses talents of a high order, is not wholly without genius, and has, in the course of his reading and travels, amassed much useful information. He has contributed something to American literature, and gained a name that will not be forgotten for some time to come.

It would be interesting to ourselves, and perhaps to our readers, were we prepared to do it, to enter into the consideration of Mr. Cooper's merits as a writer, into a critical examination of his works, and some speculations as to their probable influence upon the thought and literature of this country. The thing is to be done, and will be done; but is not for us, at present at least, to do it. His earlier novels amused us; his later productions have done something to quicken our thinking powers, and to instruct us.

We have a high regard for Mr. Cooper, for his love of independence, and his willingness to hazard his literary reputation in the cause of the people. We respect him for the fact, that he had the moral courage to approve and defend some of the measures of General Jackson's administration, and those measures, too, the most assailed by that portion of the community on which literary men are thought to be the more immediately dependent, and with which they are the more intimately connected. We respect him for his rebellion against Cant, for his earnest defence of individual freedom, and his manly assertion of every individual's right to form and express his own opinions, without being called to an account, abused, insulted, injured in his person, feelings, or reputation, for so doing. We respect him because he loves his country, and would make her true to the democratic creed she avows, as independent on foreign nations in her thoughts, as she is in her politics. In these particulars at least, he deserves the gratitude of his countrymen, and we trust he will receive it. He is willing to be known as a democrat, and the literary man, not ashamed to be called a democrat, in this democratic country, deserves to be held in more than ordinary consideration.

The work before us is written with ability, in a clear, strong, and manly style, and handles a subject with great freedom and with much justice, on which American citizens,—shame to say,—need to be instructed. Mr. Cooper thinks he sees two tendencies among us, which are alike dangerous to the stability and beneficial working of our free institutions. The upper classes, the affluent, the fashionable, he thinks are somewhat Anti-American in their thoughts, principles, and affections. They do not accept heartily our free institutions, and set themselves seriously at work to develop the practical good they contain. They imbibe too readily the notions as the fashions of foreign countries, especially of England, and sigh to reproduce an order of things, which can never exist, and

which ought never to exist on this continent. They magnify the evils of the American system of government and society, and laud beyond measure the excellences of the monarchical or aristocratical institutions of the Old World. "Fifteen years since," he says, "all complaints against our institutions were virtually silenced, whereas now it is rare to hear them praised, except by the mass, or by those who wish to profit by the favors of the mass."

The lower classes, or the mass, he thinks, are governed by an opposite tendency, which is pushing them to a dangerous extreme. Notions that are impracticable, and which, if persevered in, cannot fail to produce disorganization, if not revolution, are getting to be widely prevalent; and there is a multitude who are looking ahead in the idle hope of substituting a fancied perfection for the ills of life. This disorganizing tendency in the mass, he thinks, if not arrested, will check civilization, destroy the arts and refinements of civilized life, and reduce us all to a dead level of barbarism. This book, it may therefore be readily conjectured, is a double battery, charged alike against those who believe too much in the past, and those who believe too much in the future. The author aims to demolish those who have too much democracy and those who have too little. To be democratic over much, is ungentlemanly, and may lead to a kind of levelling not agreeable to those who are ambitious of being distinguished, and to be democratic not enough, is unwise, not to say absolutely foolish.

This is, no doubt, to a certain extent, true, and the author's efforts to recall his countrymen from extremes, and to induce them to maintain the golden mean, are, no doubt, praiseworthy; but that they will be successful is not altogether so certain. Men in masses, as well as in their individual capacity, are logicians, and have an irresistible tendency to push their first principles to their last consequences. They can never be arrested by being pointed to the dangerous

extremes into which they are running. Wise, practical observations are useless. The masses go where their principles logically developed require them to go. To arrest them we must change their principles, alter or enlarge their premises. But this is what Mr. Cooper has not done, and what he has not attempted to do. He does not seek for the causes of these opposite tendencies to dangerous extremes, to point out the defects in our first principles, and by changing our logical direction, to change also our practical direction. He does not appear to believe that the practice of a nation is merely its experimenting in verification of its theory, or the mere practical application of its theory. Change the theory, the philosophy of a nation, its ideas, and you change its history. But Mr. Cooper has no faith in theories, no love for the abstract. He affects the character of a wise man, who has seen the world; of a shrewd observer, who is above the speculations of the student, and not at all dependent on closet thinkers. He has seen, and he knows. He is a common sense man, and says, away with your visionary theories, and let us have a little common sense. All this is very well. Common sense is unquestionably a very excellent thing, and Mr. Cooper, no doubt, has it; but if it be *common* sense, we see not why we may not claim it as well as he. We think he ought to pronounce the word with fewer airs, for, if what he calls common sense, really be common sense, it must be common to all men, and he can in no wise claim a monopoly of it.

Again; Mr Cooper, though he abjures all theories, and has many a biting sarcasm at theorizers in general, is himself a theorizer, and that too of no commendable sort. Does he not theorize, when he lays it down as a general proposition, that common sense is worthy of credit? Does he not theorize, when he declares this notion is practicable and that is not? When he tells us this amount of equality may be attained, and this other amount cannot be? He

affects to have analyzed the powers of the human mind, and to have ascertained how much it is wise to aim at, and what it is merely visionary to attempt. And what are his views on these matters, but the theories he has adopted respecting the Desirable and the Undesirable, the Wise and the Foolish, the Attainable and the Unattainable? Has he not speculated in coming to his conclusions? or has he jumped to his conclusions? And is it his theory that all men ought to jump to their conclusions? If so, we say he is a theorizer, whom a wise man may well hesitate to follow. Mr. Cooper does not, we must needs think, prove himself so wise in declaiming against theorizing, which is in fact declaiming against reasoning, reflection, as he fancies; and his common sense, we imagine, may, in many instances, be found to be very uncommon sense, a very peculiar sense, even an idiosyncrasy.

This is not all. The man who is accustomed to analyze the works he reads, and reduce them to their lowest denominations, will, without much difficulty, perceive that Mr. Cooper's common sense rests, in most cases, for its support on the philosophy of Hobbes. We presume he has never read Hobbes, perhaps he has never heard of him, certainly, we presume, is unconscious of ever coinciding with his philosophic theory. But Hobbes's philosophy is, in political matters, the common sense of most Englishmen and Americans; and all Englishmen and Americans, who eschew philosophy and professedly follow common sense, are sure to be Hobbists. Mr. Cooper, we are sorry to say, forms no exception to this remark. For proof of what we allege we refer to his definition of liberty, and to the fact, that he seems to have no faith in abstract justice. Liberty with him is the right to do what one pleases. Perfect liberty, or a state of society, if society it may be called, in which there is no restraint placed on men's natural right, is a state of war, oppression, injustice. Government is instituted for the purpose of maintaining peace and

order, by restraining natural liberty. This is Hobbism, and it is the doctrine of the book before us; only Mr. Cooper thinks we may leave men a larger portion of their natural liberty than Hobbes believed could be done with safety.

Now we contend that the design of government is to maintain to every man all his natural liberty. Liberty, according to our definition of it, is freedom to do whatever one has a natural right to do; and one has a natural right to do whatever is not forbidden by natural or absolute justice. Mr. Cooper admits the right of governments to restrain the natural liberty of the citizen, to a certain extent, but we admit no such right. The government that restrains or abridges in any sense, in any degree, the natural liberty, that is the natural rights, of any, the meanest or the guiltiest citizen, is tyrannical and unjust. In checking the tendency to extremes then, which Mr. Cooper deplores and against which he arms himself with so praiseworthy a zeal, we should endeavor to point out the precise limits prescribed by justice. We should deny the justice of all restraints upon natural rights. We should then check at once the tendency to arbitrary government. Mr. Cooper, however, permits restraint to a certain extent. Why not to a greater extent? say his fashionable, affluent, and polite acquaintances. Why to so great an extent? Why not give more liberty yet? say the visionary mass, in pursuit of an ideal perfection never to be realized. What can he answer? Nothing that will satisfy either, because the question is in both cases, not a question of principle, but merely a question of more or less. This book, therefore, we think, will hardly succeed in arresting the tendency to extremes, because it leaves both parties their starting-points, and with their faces in the same direction, and merely beseeches them not to go quite so far as they have hitherto been disposed to go.

But notwithstanding our want of faith in the great influence of this book in accomplishing the object for

which it has been sent forth, and notwithstanding our objections to its want of faith in reasoning, and to the Hobbian philosophy which lies at the bottom of the author's common sense, we still welcome the book as a very timely and a very valuable publication. It is full of wise and just observations; it is in most cases characterized by good sense, and its views, on all the great political topics it treats, are in the main just and democratic. It corrects many false notions, separates numerous matters which had become confounded, and gives much useful information, for the want of which our citizens have suffered, and our free institutions been endangered. We have more faith in the masses and more sympathy with them than Mr. Cooper appears to have; and we have altogether a stronger love for progress. He seems to be a little sour, half mad at mankind, and to do little for their cause, because he loves it. He too often confounds the actual with the possible, and mistakes what is for what ought to be. But his book breathes in the main a free and independent spirit, and may be said to be written in the interests of the people. It preaches democracy, not exactly according to our reading, nevertheless it preaches it; and if, as we have heard it contended, as much through spite as through love, we complain not. We are thankful that democracy is preached, though it be through spite, through ill-will to the aristocracy.

The following chapter on an Aristocrat and a Democrat, gives a very good idea of the whole work, at least of the spirit in which it is written.

“AN ARISTOCRAT AND A DEMOCRAT.

“We live in an age, when the words aristocrat and democrat are much used, without regard to the real significations. An aristocrat is one of a few, who possess the political power of a country; a democrat, one of the many. The words are also properly applied to those who entertain notions favorable to aristocratical, or democratical forms of government. Such persons are not, necessarily, either aristocrats, or democrats in fact, but merely so in opinion. Thus a member of a

democratical government may have an aristocratical bias, and *vice versa*.

"To call a man who has the habits and opinions of a gentleman, an aristocrat, from that fact alone, is an abuse of terms, and betrays ignorance of the true principles of government, as well as of the world. It must be an equivocal freedom, under which every one is not the master of his own innocent acts and associations, and he is a sneaking democrat, indeed, who will submit to be dictated to, in those habits over which neither law nor morality assumes a right of control.

"Some men fancy that a democrat can only be one who seeks the level, social, mental, and moral, of the majority, a rule that would at once exclude all men of refinement, education, and taste from the class. These persons are enemies of democracy, as they at once render it impracticable. They are usually great sticklers for their own associations and habits, too, though unable to comprehend any of a nature that are superior. They are, in truth, aristocrats in principle, though assuming a contrary pretension; the ground work of all their feelings and arguments being self. Such is not the intention of liberty, whose aim is to leave every man to be the master of his own acts; denying hereditary honors, it is true, as unjust and unnecessary, but not denying the inevitable consequences of civilization.

"The law of God is the only rule of conduct, in this, as in other matters. Each man should do as he would be done by. Were the question put to the greatest advocate of indiscriminate association, whether he would submit to have his company and habits dictated to him, he would be one of the first to resist the tyranny; for they, who are the most rigid in maintaining their own claims, in such matters, are usually the loudest in decrying those whom they fancy to be better off than themselves. Indeed, it may be taken as a rule in social intercourse, that he who is the most apt to question the pretensions of others, is the most conscious of the doubtful position he himself occupies; thus establishing the very claims he affects to deny, by letting his jealousy of it be seen. Manners, education, and refinement, are positive things, and they bring with them innocent tastes, which are productive of high enjoyments; and it is as unjust to deny their possessors their indulgence, as it would be to insist on the less fortunate's passing the time they would rather devote to athletic amusements, in listening to operas for which they have no relish, sung in a language they do not understand.

"All that democracy means is as equal a participation in

rights as is practicable ; and to pretend that social equality is a condition of popular institutions, is to assume that the latter are destructive of civilization ; for, as nothing is more self-evident than the impossibility of raising all men to the highest standard of tastes and refinement, the alternative would be to reduce the entire community to the lowest. The whole embarrassment on this point exists in the difficulty of making men comprehend qualities they do not themselves possess. We can all perceive the difference between ourselves and our inferiors ; but when it comes to a question of the difference between us and our superiors, we fail to appreciate merits of which we have no proper conceptions. In face of this obvious difficulty, there is the safe and just governing rule, already mentioned, or that of permitting every one to be the undisturbed judge of his own habits and associations, so long as they are innocent, and do not impair the rights of others to be equally judges for themselves. It follows, that social intercourse must regulate itself, independently of institutions, with the exception that the latter, while they withhold no natural, bestow no factitious advantages beyond those which are inseparable from the rights of property, and general civilization.

“ In a democracy, men are just as free to aim at the highest attainable places in society, as to obtain the largest fortunes ; and it would be clearly unworthy of all noble sentiment to say, that the grovelling competition for money shall alone be free, while that, which enlists all the liberal acquirements and elevated sentiments of the race, is denied the democrat. Such an avowal would be at once, a declaration of the inferiority of the system, since nothing but ignorance and vulgarity could be its fruits.

“ The democratic gentleman must differ in many essential particulars from the aristocratical gentleman, though in their ordinary habits and tastes they are virtually identical. Their principles vary ; and, to a slight degree, their deportment accordingly. The democrat, recognising the right of all to participate in power, will be more liberal in his general sentiments, a quality of superiority in itself ; but, in conceding this much to his fellow man, he will proudly maintain his own independence of vulgar domination, as indispensable to his personal habits. The same principles and manliness that would induce him to depose a royal despot, would induce him to resist a vulgar tyrant.

“ There is no more capital, though more common error, than to suppose him an aristocrat who maintains his indepen-

dence of habits; for democracy asserts the control of the majority, only, in matters of law, and not in matters of custom. The very object of the institution is the utmost practicable personal liberty, and to affirm the contrary would be sacrificing the end to the means.

"An aristocrat, therefore, is merely one who fortifies his exclusive privileges by positive institutions, and a democrat, one who is willing to admit of a free competition, in all things. To say, however, that the last supposes this competition will lead to nothing, is an assumption that means are employed without any reference to an end. He is the purest democrat who best maintains his rights, and no rights can be dearer to a man of cultivation, than exemptions from unseasonable invasions on his time, by the coarse-minded and ignorant."—pp. 94–98.

Great men are rarely above taking notice of small things. Mr. Cooper forms no exception to this remark, and small things at his touch become matters of considerable magnitude.

"Some changes of the language are to be regretted, as they lead to false inferences, and society is always a loser by mistaking names for things. Life is a fact, and it is seldom any good arises from a misapprehension of the real circumstances under which we exist. The word 'gentleman' has a positive and limited signification. It means one elevated above the mass of society by his birth, manners, attainments, character, and social condition. As no civilized society can exist without these social differences, nothing is gained by denying the use of the term. If blackguards were to be *called* 'gentlemen,' and 'gentlemen,' 'blackguards,' the difference between them would be as obvious as it is to-day.

"The word 'gentleman,' is derived from the French gentleman, which originally signified one of noble birth. This was at a time when the characteristics of the condition were never found beyond a caste. As society advanced, ordinary men attained the qualifications of nobility, without that of birth, and the meaning of the word was extended. It is now possible to be a gentleman without birth, though, even in America, where such distinctions are purely conditional, they who have birth, except in extraordinary instances, are classed with gentlemen. To call a laborer, one who has neither education, manners, accomplishments, tastes, associations, nor any one of the ordinary requisites, a gentleman, is just as absurd as to

call one who is thus qualified, a fellow. The word must have some especial signification, or it would be synonymous with man. One may have gentleman-like feelings, principles, and appearance, without possessing the liberal attainments that distinguish the gentleman. Least of all does money make a gentleman, though, as it becomes a means of obtaining the other requisites, it is usual to give it a place in the claims of the class. Men may be, and often are, very rich, without having the smallest title to be deemed gentlemen. A man may be a distinguished gentleman, and not possess as much money as his own footman.

"This word, however, is sometimes used instead of the old terms, 'sirs,' 'my masters,' &c., &c., as in addressing bodies of men. Thus we say 'gentlemen,' in addressing a public meeting, in complaisance, and as, by possibility, some gentlemen may be present. This is a license that may be tolerated, though he who should insist that all present were, as individuals, gentlemen, would hardly escape ridicule.

"What has just been said of the word gentleman is equally true with that of lady. The standard of these two classes rises as society becomes more civilized and refined; the man who might pass for a gentleman in one nation, or community, not being able to maintain the same position in another.

"The inefficiency of the effort to subvert things by names, is shown in the fact that, in all civilized communities, there is a class of men, who silently and quietly recognise each other, as gentlemen; who associate together freely and without reserve, and who admit each other's claims without scruple or distrust. This class may be limited by prejudice and arbitrary enactments, as in Europe, or it may have no other rules than those of taste, sentiment, and the silent laws of usage, as in America.

"The same observations may be made of relation to the words master and servant. He who employs laborers, with the right to command, is a master, and he who lets himself to work, with an obligation to obey, a servant. Thus there are house, or domestic servants, farm servants, shop servants, and various other servants; the term master being in all these cases the correlative.

"In consequence of the domestic servants of America having once been negro-slaves, a prejudice has arisen among the laboring classes of the whites, who not only dislike the term servant, but have also rejected that of master. So far has this prejudice gone, that in lieu of the latter, they have resorted to the use of the word *boss*, which has precisely the same

meaning in Dutch! How far a subterfuge of this nature is worthy of a manly and common sense people will admit of question.

"A similar objection may be made to the use of the word 'help,' which is not only an innovation on a just and established term, but which does not properly convey the meaning intended. They who aid their masters in the toil may be deemed 'helps,' but they who perform all the labor do not assist, or help to do the thing, but they do it themselves. A man does not usually hire his cook to *help* him cook his dinner, but to cook it herself. Nothing is therefore gained, while something is lost in simplicity and clearness by the substitution of new and imperfect terms, for the long established words of the language. In all cases in which the people of America have retained the *things* of their ancestors, they should not be ashamed to keep the *names*." — pp. 120 – 122.

It is devoutly to be hoped that all this, and much more like it in the volume before us, will be duly regarded by our democratic friends. It is very important that our democrats should be taught good manners, and probably no man amongst us is better qualified to be their teacher than Mr. Cooper. He has resided long abroad, travelled much, seen much, observed much, and is himself, we presume, *au fait* in all that appertains to good manners. We hope he will meet with success, proportioned to the zeal and diligence with which he takes himself to his task. An unmannerly democracy must always be distasteful and even revolting to a *gentleman*. In sober earnest, he who improves the manners of a nation, does much for its morals. Let there be care, however, that the improvement attempted be something more than the transplanting of the conventionalisms of one country to another. "The wise are polite the world over; fools are polite only at home," says, very truly, the Citizen of the World. True politeness is made up of good sense and good nature, and no man, who has good sense and good nature, can ever be wanting in the manners of the gentleman, in the only worthy sense of the term, though he may be wanting in the conventionalisms of different countries, or of a par-

ticular clique or coterie. Really good manners always have their foundation in human nature, and must always take their hue from the age and circumstances of the individual, and the institutions of the country. The manners most appropriate to an aristocracy, or to a monarchy, can never be the most appropriate to a democracy. But we beg pardon of Mr. Cooper for trespassing on his peculiar province.

Mr. Cooper thinks the application of the terms *gentleman* and *lady*, to footmen and cooks, is very unbecoming, and ought not to be tolerated. We are sorry not to sympathize with him in this, as fully as he may desire. We applaud his motives, but we confess that we look with pleasure on the fact, that footmen and cooks are rising to the dignity of gentlemen and ladies; and it is also an article in our creed that all who are born at all are well-born. Every human being, in our belief, is of noble, ay, of royal birth, and may stand up and claim to be a king, and demand regal honors. This is the foundation stone of our democracy, and he, who has yet to learn that no human being is or can be ignoble, is in our judgment a sorry democrat.

We confess that as concerns this leveling tendency, we are unable to sympathize with the fears Mr. Cooper seems to indulge. We see no disposition among our countrymen to bring all down to a dead level of ignorance and barbarism. They, against whom the charge of desiring to do this is sometimes brought, are in no sense obnoxious to it. The workingmen, agrarians, loco-focos, jacobins, or by whatever name they may be designated by themselves or by their enemies, have made certain movements which have created some alarm, and made some say that they are for arresting civilization, and for plunging us into primitive ignorance and barbarism; but these same dreaded levellers have been the first in this country to advocate equal, universal education. They demand reforms, radical reforms, it is true; but they expect them almost solely from an improved system of edu-

cation. They propose to raise the standard of education, to breathe into education a free and living spirit, and to extend it equally to all, to every child born in the land, whether rich or poor, male or female. Is this to show a love for ignorance and barbarism? Is this a kind of levelling that should alarm a wise man, a Christian, and a democrat?

Distinctions there are in society, and distinctions there always will be; but distinction implies diversity, not necessarily inequality. The footman is diverse from the cook, but not necessarily inferior or superior to the cook. There is a difference between Mr. Cooper's gentleman and his footman, yet the two may be equal in moral worth, in knowledge, in wealth, and social position. Nevertheless admitting inequalities, they may be real, not factitious. Now all the war which has been carried on against the inequalities which do obtain in society, has had for its object, not the suppression of those inequalities which are founded in nature, or which rest on merit, but those which have no real foundation but an ignorant and barbarous public opinion, or an ignorant and barbarous state of society. Factitious inequalities, not natural, not moral inequalities, are the ones that the Radicals are striving to destroy. Beyond these they have no thought of going. There is in every man, in Jacobins as well as in conservatives, a natural instinct which leads him to bow down to superior worth. The great man can never be lost in the crowd. He who is really and intrinsically superior to the common mass will always be permitted to tower above them. Carlyle is right in his remarks on hero-worship. It is the natural and earliest religion of mankind, and it remains and will remain, though all other religions be outgrown, their altars broken down, and their temples mouldered to dust. No man, who is conscious that the royal blood flows in his veins, that the royal heart beats under his ribs, need fear that the honors of royalty will not be decreed him. Let a man be a king, and as a king shall he be owned, revered,

and obeyed. Human nature is rich in loyalty, and will pour out her blood like water in honor of even a semblance of a king. Let the wise man be ashamed then to tremble at a supposed tendency to wipe out all distinctions, and to confound the great with the little.

One tendency we do discover, and that is to strip off disguises and compel people to pass for what they are. There is a growing disgust at all make-believe, at all shamming, and a demand for reality. Therefore is there danger that some men may not always succeed in bearing the characters they once contrived to obtain. The men rather short by nature, but who have hitherto been accounted tall, because they were standing on stilts, may hereafter be taken at their true altitude, and laughed at into the bargain, for the pains they have taken to add a cubit to their stature. Mr. Cooper has nothing to apprehend from such a levelling tendency as this, nor has any other man who is conscious of true worth, and who is willing to be estimated at his real value. Others may fear,—let them.

Mr. Cooper's remarks "On the Public" are to the point, and deserve to be read and pondered well. We should be glad to extract them, but have not the room.

We must bring our remarks to a close, and we do it by throwing out a few suggestions for the consideration of American Democrats. The democracy of the last century was materialism applied to politics; it sought equality by lopping off the heads of kings and priests, and its natural tendency was to universal anarchy. We do not complain of it on this account. Kings and priests, when they have lost the true kingly and priestly nature, have no more right to wear their heads than they have to wear crowns and mitres. But democracy has changed its character. The democrat of to-day is not destructive, but constructive; he does not lop off the heads of kings and priests, but he seeks to arrive at equality by making

every man a king and a priest. He is a leveller, but he levels upward not downward. He is not affected by the fact that some are higher than others, but by the fact that some are lower than others. He grieves over the fact that human nature is wronged, that its inborn nobility is not brought out, that the mass of men are not true men, but something less than men; and he sets himself seriously at work to remove all obstacles to the full development of the true man, and to call forth the might which has for so many ages slumbered in the peasant's arm. He holds up the standard of the True Man, and labors to bring all men up to it. He therefore is eminently religious, eminently christian, eminently philosophic. He avails himself of all the means and influences, of all the arts, sciences, literature, everything, by which the universal soul of Humanity may be quickened, thought awakened, moral power increased, and the majesty of man made to appear. Be assured then that the democrat of to-day is no barbarian. He is a man, a free man, a Christian man, who believes in the powers and capacities of all men to be men, in the full significance of the term, and who labors to make them so, or to induce them to make themselves so.

Again, in a more restricted sphere, the American democrat is one who is jealous of power, and always interprets all doubtful questions so as to increase the power of the people, rather than of the government. In this, his first duty is to watch that the Federal Government do not swallow up the State governments. Power has a perpetual tendency to extend itself. The functionaries of government, whether executive, legislative, or judicial, almost inevitably so exercise their functions as to enlarge the sphere of government. There is a tendency in the Federal Government, from its central character, to engross as much of the public business of the country as possible. The first danger to our liberty is to be apprehended from this quarter. Cooks may be called ladies, and footmen gentlemen, and still our liberty be tolerably secure;

but when the Federal Government has succeeded in getting under its control, directly or indirectly, nearly all the internal affairs of the States, and is able to make its acts, like the frogs of Egypt, reach to our domestic hearths, and to come up into our sleeping chambers and kneading troughs, we may be assured that the first barriers to a consolidated despotism have been leaped. This was well nigh done. The friends of freedom have made an effort to arrest the dangerous tendency; but whether with success or not time must determine. The universal tendency throughout Christendom to centralization, a tendency accelerated a hundred fold by the "thousand and one" voluntary associations of the day, is somewhat alarming, and should teach our democrats, that this is no time to sleep at their posts, or to expect a victory without a long and obstinate struggle. They must be awake, always prepared for the battle, well armed, and stout of heart.

Lastly, the American Democrat must be on his guard against the tendency of the State governments to enlarge the dominion of the state at the expense of that of the individual. There are two antagonist tendencies at work; one to individual freedom, a tendency we traced in our April number, in our remarks on modern civilization; the other, a tendency to centralization, to the merging of the individual in the state, in the mass. This last is the only dangerous tendency in this country. The philosopher cannot fail to perceive that we have much more to apprehend from our reverence for law than from our disregard of it. Mobs, bad as they are, are not half so threatening to liberty, to the true working of our institutions, as the prosecution of a man for advocating an unpopular doctrine, or as is the prevalence of that modern doctrine of "vested rights," a doctrine, which, if admitted and practised upon, may in time cover all the property of the State with charters, and lock it up forever in close corporations. We are called upon as democrats by every consideration that can touch our

sensibility, arouse our patriotism, or our love of humanity, to contend manfully for individual rights, and resist at the threshold every encroachment of power. We must frown upon every legislative enactment, upon every judicial decision, that restricts the sphere of individual freedom, and especially upon all those huge associations which cover the land, though called moral, religious, benevolent, which tend to swallow up the individual, and are a device of the devil, by which the same control under a free government may be exerted over individual opinion and action, that is exerted over them by despotisms and hierarchies. We must throw around each individual a bulwark of sanctity, and not permit society to break through it, though it were to do the individual an unspeakable good. God leaves man his freedom, and does not control it, though man in abusing it brings damnation to his soul. Let the Divine government be a model of ours. We may not control a man's natural liberty even for the man's good. So long as the individual trespasses upon none of the rights of others, or throws no obstacle in the way of their free and full exercise, government, law, public opinion even, must leave him free to take his own course. In order to secure this end we must breathe a freer spirit into our schools, place men at the head of our colleges and higher seminaries of learning who sympathize with our democratic institutions, demand, will, create, and sustain a truly democratic literature.

ART. V.—*The Mother in her Family; or Sayings and Doings at Rose Hill Cottage.* By the Author of "The Young Wife," &c. Boston: Weeks, Jordan & Co. 1838. 12mo. pp. 391.

THE Author of this volume is a worthy and, we would fain believe, a useful man. He is sincere, earn-

courses to explain to his wife all the mysteries of the conception and birth of a human being.

Now this in our judgment is to be philanthropic overmuch. It is making philanthropy altogether too great an annoyance. No real good can come to the community from sacrificing the individual. There are things which an individual ought to be allowed to call his own, and over which he shall have the supreme control. Around each individual there should be traced a circle, within which no stranger should presume or be suffered to enter. It is no service to virtue to keep us all forever in leading-strings. If we are to be men and to show forth the virtues of men, we must be permitted to think and act for ourselves. That philanthropy which proposes to do everything for us, and which will permit us to do nothing of our own accord, may indeed keep us out of harm's way, but it is a left-handed philanthropy, and will be found always to diminish our virtues in the same proportion that it does our vices.

It must joy the heart of every benevolent man to see efforts made for the advancement of Humanity. There is room enough for Reform. But we do wish our modern Reformers would enlarge their conceptions and seek to add knowledge to their zeal. It is well to be zealously affected in a good cause; but zeal in a good cause, if not guided by just knowledge, may work as much evil as good. The world is not to be regenerated by the exertions of reformers who have but one idea, and who fancy that one idea embraces the Universe. Life is a complex affair. The good and the evil it is subject to are so intermixed, and run one so into the other, that it is often no easy matter to say which is which. There is no one sovereign remedy for all the ills of life, no one rule which is applicable at all times to all cases for the production of good. Good and evil both have their source in human nature. The one cannot be greatly increased, or the other essentially diminished, but in proportion as human nature itself is more fully developed; but in

proportion to its general culture and growth. The tree of evil is not destroyed by pruning away a branch here, and a branch there. So long as its root remains in the earth, so long will it live, and flourish. All classes of reformers see and deplore its growth. One class thinks all evils come from the breach of the seventh commandment, another class ascribes them all to the eating of flesh or fish, to the drinking of rum, wine, or cider; this class fancies the world would move on as it should, if women were but allowed equal civil and political rights with men; that class is sure all things will be restored to primitive innocence, love, and harmony, the moment negroes are declared to be no longer slaves; and this other class, when nations shall no longer appeal to arms to decide their disputes. Each of these classes of reformers mounts its hobby and rides away, condemning all as children of the Past, as wedded to old abuses, as the enemies of truth and virtue, who will not do the same. But not one or another of these classes shall succeed. All these classes of evils are mutually connected, and no one of them can be cured separately. The cause of them all lies deep in human nature, as now developed, and they must be regarded as inseparable from the present stage of human progress. The doctors, who are vaunting their skill to cure them, are merely prescribing for the symptoms, not the disease. War is a melancholy thing. Philanthropy cannot but weep over its doings. But as long as the passions of the human heart remain as they are, and the interests of the world continue in their present complicated state, it is perfectly idle to talk of the cessation of war. Everything manly in our nature rises indignant at the bare name of slavery; but should the negroes be declared free, and all other things remain as they were, slavery would not be abolished. One of its forms might be slightly changed, but its substance would continue the same. Give woman equal civil and political rights with man, and if her present tastes and culture remain, her influence will be just what it now

is. Intemperance is not a mother-evil. It is the symptom, not the disease. Temperance lectures will not cure it. It will remain in spite of Temperance Societies, in spite of law, in spite of religion, till the causes producing it are removed, and men are able to find an innocent source of the excitement they crave. Chastity may be commended, but it will not be universal, till the whole community is so trained that it can find more pleasure in sentiment than in sense. The object of each class of reformers is, we are willing to admit, good, and praiseworthy; but it can in no case be insulated and gained as a separate object.

The work of reforming the world is a noble one. The progress of Man and society goes on. But it goes on slowly, much more so than comports with the desires of our one-idea reformers. These reformers, with one idea, are no doubt worth something. Each class of them may contribute something to aid on the work. But no one of them can do much, or run far ahead of the general average of the race. The evils of life rise as lofty mountains in our path. We cannot go over them, nor turn our course around them. They rise alike before all of our race, and form the same barrier to the onward march of all. We must remove them. If we take ourselves to the work with faith and energy, we can remove them. But we can do it only a little by little. Our generation works its brief day at the task, and worn out gives way to another; another comes and removes its portion, and gives way to yet another. Thus do generations labor, and yet centuries elapse before we can perceive that they have made any impression on the mountain. Ever and anon a company may undermine a portion of rock and earth, which come down with thundering noise and raise much dust, and some of the spectators may fancy the work is done. But when the noise has subsided, and the wind has brushed away the dust and smoke, it is seen that many of their number have been crushed under the falling masses, and that fragments have rolled back and blocked up the path which had

already been cleared. There may be something sad and depressing in this view. Life is full of deep pathos to the wise man. Sorrow springs from experience. He, who knew most of man and his trials, was said to be a "man of sorrows and acquainted with grief." Man's path from the cradle to his union with God, is not of smooth and easy ascent, strewed with flowers, and shaded by groves from which the sweet songsters are ever warbling their wild notes. It is steep and rugged, and we ascend not without labor and difficulty. Yet is there no cause for complaint. Man has some strength; let him use it, and not murmur because he has also some weakness. Something he can do; let him do it, and complain not that there is something he cannot do. Each generation has its allotted work; let it take itself cheerfully to its performance. The race is immortal; and as one generation does its work and passes off to receive its reward, a new generation comes on to take up the work where its predecessor left it. The work shall then go on, and the race be ever achieving its destiny. What is it then, though this generation cannot do so much as to leave nothing to its successor?

We have no fellowship with the philosophy, that teaches us to regard with indifference the efforts of a single individual, however puny, to advance the cause of humanity. True philosophy teaches us to find a sufficient reason for whatever occurs, and to see good in everything. We ought therefore never to condemn outright any class of reformers, or plan of reform, we may meet; but we cannot refrain from regarding most of the reformers who fill our age and country as extremely short-sighted, and their plans as most wofully defective. We would not make war upon them, nor in our sober moments treat them otherwise than with great tenderness; but we cannot bring ourselves to act with them. Whoever would pass for a man of correct feelings, and of some degree of philosophic wisdom, must see and deplore the ills that

afflict himself and brethren; he must labor with all his might to cure them; but he will proceed always calmly, with chastened hopes, and with the conviction that the only way to cure many evils is to bear them. The lesson, To Bear, though difficult to learn, and one that many of us never do learn, is one of the lessons most essential to man in his earthly pilgrimage. Even these evils, of which we complain, may be made the ministers of our virtues and the means of our spiritual growth.

The human race makes its way through the centuries, step by step, to its destiny. The evils we now see and feel will one day be removed. But new evils we know not of will doubtless spring up, new mountains arise whose highest peaks are not yet seen in the distant horizon. The lessons of the reformer will be ever repeated, and his trials, labors, sufferings, martyrdom, ever renewed. Well, be it so. The brave spirit will not shrink from the prospect. Life is a struggle. Who would that it should not be? It is from this struggle that Humanity derives her strength, obtains possession of her powers; in it she finds her life; in it she lives; by it she fulfils her destiny. Let us accept it as our heritage, and go forth with strong arms and stout hearts,—and yet not with over sanguine expectations of wonders to be achieved,—to the work that lieth nearest us in time and space, and leave the result to Him in whose hands we and all things are, and with whom it rests to grant or withhold success.

LITERARY NOTICES.

Observations on the Growth of the Mind ; with Remarks on some other Subjects. By SAMPSON REED. Boston: Otis Clapp. 1838. 12mo. pp. 192. — This is a valuable little work. Little work, we may call it in its dimensions, but in no other sense. Its author, Mr. Reed, is a profound, and in some respects an original thinker. He has a mind of a high order, and might, if his ambition led him that way, be one of the first metaphysicians of the country. His *Observations on the Growth of the Mind* prove him familiar with the psychological phenomena of human nature, and they deserve to be read by all who are disposed to know themselves.

Mr. Reed is a member of the New (Swedenborgian) Church, — a Church making rather too great pretensions for our taste, but which counts among its members some of the best men our country affords, — men remarkable for their quiet demeanor, and unaffected piety. It is the custom of many to laugh at the New Church, to ridicule its pretensions to frequent intercourse with the Spirit-world ; but a Church which can commend itself to such minds as the author of this volume, and many others of the same stamp, must needs make the laughter of those who would laugh at it appear exceedingly sad. We are not prepared to receive all its doctrines ; but we confess that we find in the works of Emanuel Swedenborg much sound philosophy, many original and striking views of religion in general, and much just appreciation of Christianity in particular. Swedenborg was too exclusively a mystic for our temper ; but we believe the study of his works would do not a little to enlighten Christians of all denominations, and advance the cause of scientific theology and rational piety. We say the same of all the works we have seen of the receivers of his doctrines, and therefore it is we welcome the appearance of this little volume, and commend it to the serious attention of all who are willing to read and think on spiritual subjects.

Emancipation in the West Indies. A Six Months' Tour in Antigua, Barbadoes, and Jamaica, in the year 1837. By JAS. A. THOME, and J. HORACE KIMBALL. New York : 1838. 12mo. pp. 469. — This is a work which can hardly be expected to have any authority out of the ranks of the Abolitionists. Messrs. Thome and Kimball, two red-hot abolitionists as they were, and not over and above stocked with those qualities which are most essential to judicious observers, might indeed write a book which would commend itself to the tastes and judgment of their employers ; but they were the last men in the world to be employed to write a book on the West Indies. Men of sober feelings, calm judgment, and in no way previously committed, were the men, that should have been sent out to make observations on the working of Emancipation in those Islands. The book before us we have read attentively ; but we judge ourselves as ignorant of the real condition of the Negroes in the West Indies as we were

before. The following, however, are the results which the Abolitionists regard as established by the observations of Messrs. Thome and Kimbal.

- "1. That the act of IMMEDIATE EMANCIPATION in Antigua, was not attended with any disorder whatever.
2. That the emancipated slaves have readily, faithfully, and efficiently worked for wages from the first.
3. That wherever there has been any disturbance in the working of the apprenticeship, it has been invariably by the fault of the masters, or of the officers charged with the execution of the 'Abolition Act.'
4. That the prejudice of caste is fast disappearing in the emancipated islands.
5. That the apprenticeship was not sought for by the planters as a preparation for freedom.
6. That no such preparation was needed.
7. That the planters, who have fairly made the 'experiment,' now greatly prefer the new system to the old.
8. That the emancipated people are perceptibly rising in the scale of civilization, morals, and religion." — p. vi.

The True Intellectual System of the Universe. By RALPH CUDWORTH, D. D. Andover: Gould & Newman. 1837 and 1838. 2 volumes. 8vo. pp. 804 and 756. — We hold ourselves much obliged to Messrs. Gould and Newman, for giving to the public an American edition of the invaluable works of Dr. Cudworth. It is true we can hardly reconcile it to our feelings to see an old author we learned to reverence in venerable folio, decked out in a modern dandy octavo; nevertheless we are glad to meet Cudworth in any dress in which his publishers may please to send him abroad. We have but to converse a few moments with his profound and eloquent thoughts, to forget whatever concerns his outer man. We hail his republication as a favorable sign of the times, as a proof that there is springing up among us a taste for sound learning, profound erudition, and spiritual philosophy. Cudworth may not deserve to be followed blindly, but the happiest results may be anticipated from a general and careful study of his writings. He belonged to the glorious age of England's history and literature, and we never turn over his pages without being saddened to discover how little the English mind has advanced since the seventeenth century.

The Elements of Political Economy. Abridged for the Use of Academies. By FRANCIS WAYLAND, D. D. Boston: Gould, Kendall, & Lincoln. 1837. — We dislike abridgments. We dislike books with strings of questions to each section, whether designed for Academies or not; but aside from these two objections, we like this little volume very well. Dr. Wayland is neither profound nor original as a political economist, but he is clear, condensed, and liberal. In the main we should be disposed to concur with his views, and have no hesitation in commending this abridgment of his work on Political Economy to the principals of our Academies. We wish to say, however, that we are not yet fully convinced of the exceeding value of

the study of this science by our academical students. These students are too young to study it with advantage, and they will do little more than burthen their memories with terms, the meaning of which they will probably never learn. In our colleges it should be studied, of course.

The Sunday School Guide, and Parents' Manual. By A. B. MUZZEY. Boston: James Munroe, & Co. and Benjamin H. Greene. 1838. 18mo. pp. 219. — This is not a very profound work, nor is it in our judgment wholly unexceptionable; nevertheless it contains many good observations and judicious directions. Its great fault, like all the works of its class published among us, is a want of a clear and just perception of what education should be. No man can write a work on education, till he has mastered the philosophy of human nature, and solved the problem of the Destiny of Human Life. Education is the fitting of a man to fulfil his destiny, to attain the end to which his nature destines him. The educator, then, should understand that nature.

Memoir of the Rev. Bernard Whitman. By JASON WHITMAN. Boston: Benjamin H. Greene. 1837. 16mo. pp. 215. — This is a very sensible and well written Memoir of a man well known and highly esteemed among us, cut off in the very midst of his usefulness. Mr. Whitman was a Unitarian, and his mission as such was to popularize Unitarianism. His great object was to gain for it a permanent hold on the heart of the people. This he sought to do by adopting a plain, direct, and earnest manner of address, both in writing and preaching. It is due to him to say that his success was considerable. He contributed his full share in breaking up the exclusive aristocratic character which Unitarianism formerly assumed in this country. If with his democratic manner, he had carried along the democratic doctrines of the Gospel, his success we think would have been greater. It is not a plain dress that wins the masses, but democratic thought. He who would move them must give utterance to ideas that shall be responded to, from the depths of the universal human heart. When Unitarians add to their Rationalism the democracy of the Gospel, they will find their religion popular, and not till then.

The Young House-keeper, or Thoughts on Food and Cookery. By WILLIAM A. ALCOTT. Boston: George W. Light. 1838. 12mo. pp. 424. — This work is by the author of the "Mother in her Family," reviewed in our present number. It is a superior work to that, but of no great merit. Dr. Alcott, we regard as a pure-minded, conscientious man, anxious to benefit the world as much as he can. He is a zealous Reformer, an industrious and most prolific writer. People buy his books, and we suppose read them. For our part, we would rather read his books than eat his cooking.

Vegetable Diet, as sanctioned by Medical men and by experience in all ages. By WILLIAM A. ALCOTT. Boston: Marsh, Capen, and Lyon. 1838. 12mo. pp. 276. — Another of Dr. Alcott's books, and perhaps as good a one as any of his. We hope the good Doctor will stop a while and breathe. If he publishes at the rate he has for the last six weeks, we give him up. No Reviewer in the world will undertake to give even the titles of his books. We solemnly protest, in the name of Letters, against this *extempore* writing, or this written talk, of which Dr. Alcott gives us so many specimens. If a man feels himself moved by the spirit to write a book, let him give to the subject-matter of it his best and ripest reflections; and then let him condense his thoughts into the smallest possible compass. We do not like this way of writing on the gallop, and of giving us fewer thoughts than are needed to serve for milestones. If the book be not worth writing well, it is not worth writing at all.

NOTE. — The term, *genuineness*, would have been more proper than that of *authenticity*, in the article on the Pentateuch, and would have been adopted, had not Dr. Palfrey uniformly used the latter term in his book which is there reviewed. A book may be genuine without being authentic, and vice versa. A genuine book is one written by the author whose name it bears; an authentic book is one whose statements may be regarded as true. Our article can hardly be said to question, in this sense, the *authenticity* of the books of Moses; it merely questions their *genuineness*, that is, the fact that Moses wrote them.

One or two mistakes as to single words, and two or three as to references, may be detected in the article; but they are more vexatious to the writer than to the reader, and are not of sufficient importance to be pointed out.

THE
BOSTON QUARTERLY REVIEW.

OCTOBER, 1838.

ART. I.—ON THE PROGRESS OF CIVILIZATION, OR REASONS WHY THE NATURAL ASSOCIATION OF MEN OF LETTERS IS WITH THE DEMOCRACY.

THE material world does not change in its masses or in its powers. The stars shine with no more lustre, than when they first sang together in the glory of their birth. The flowers that gemmed the fields and the forests, before America was discovered, now bloom around us in their season. The sun that shone on Homer still shines on us in unchanging lustre. The bow that beamed on the patriarch still glitters in the clouds. Nature is the same. For her no new powers are generated; no new capacities are discovered. The earth turns on its axis, and perfects its revolutions, and renews its seasons, without increase or advancement.

Does the same passive destiny attach to the inhabitants of the earth? Is there for us no increase of capacity; no gathering of intellectual riches? Are the expectations of social improvement a delusion; and the hopes of philanthropy but a dream? Or is there an advancement of the human condition? Can there be progress in the human race?

The subject rises in interest above the limited
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character of individual pursuits; and is connected with interests that enlarge the heart, kindle imagination, and excite generous sympathies. It belongs to all. With a full consciousness, that personal convictions are of little weight, unless sanctioned by general approbation, that their justice should be questioned, unless they obtain an intuitive concurrence, it will be the object of this article to illustrate the capacity of the human race for constant progress, the method of furthering that progress, and the evidence of its reality.

I. Matter is passive. If at rest it would remain so forever; if set in motion, it continues its unmeaning course, without reason, purpose, or result. The capacity of the human race for improvement is connected with the universal diffusion of the gifts of mind.

The five senses do not constitute the whole inventory of our sources of knowledge. They are the organs by which thought connects itself with the external universe; but the power of thought is not merged in the exercise of its instruments. We have functions which connect us with heaven, as well as organs which set us in relation with earth. We have not merely the senses opening to us the external world, but an internal moral sense, which places us in connexion with the world of intelligence and the decrees of God.

It is the possession of this higher faculty which renders advancement possible. There is a *spirit in man*: not in the privileged few; not in those of us only who by the favor of Providence have been nursed in public schools: IT IS IN MAN: it is the attribute of the race. The spirit, which is the guide to truth, is the gracious gift to each member of the human family; not one is disfranchised; not one is cut off from the heavenly inheritance.

Reason exists within every breast. I mean not that faculty which deduces inferences from the expe-

rience of the senses, but that higher faculty, which from the infinite treasures of its own consciousness, originates truth, and assents to it by the force of intuitive evidence; that faculty which raises us beyond the control of time and space, and gives us faith in things eternal and invisible. There is not the difference between one mind and another, which the pride of philosophy might conceive. To Plato or Aristotle, to Leibnitz and Locke, there was no faculty given, no intellectual function conceded, which did not belong to the meanest of their countrymen. In them there could not spring up a truth, which did not equally have its source in the mind of every one. They had not the power of creation: they could but reveal what God has implanted in the breast of every one. On their minds not a truth could dawn, of which the seed did not equally live in every heart.

Knowledge is but the perception of relations. The intellectual functions, by which those relations are conceived, are the common endowments of the race. The differences are apparent, not real. The eye may in one person be dull, in another quick, in one distorted, and in another tranquil and clear; yet the relation of the eye to light is in all men the same. Just so judgment may be liable in individual minds to the bias of passion, and yet its relation to truth is immutable, and is universal.

To whatever class of moral emotions we direct attention, we shall be led to the same inference. In questions of practical duty, conscience is God's umpire in the breast. Its light illumines every heart. There is nothing in books, which had not first, and has not still its life within us. Religion itself is a dead letter, wherever its truths are not renewed in the soul. And here unchangeable truth asserts its prerogative. Though individual conscience may be corrupted by interest, or debauched by pride, yet the rule of morality is distinctly marked; like music to the ear, its harmonies reach the mind; and the moral judgment of conscience, when carefully analyzed and

referred to its principles, is always founded in right. The eastern superstition, which bids its victims prostrate themselves before the advancing car of their idols, springs from a noble root, and is but a melancholy perversion of that self-devotion, which enables the Christian to bear the cross, and subject his personal passions to the will of God. Immorality of itself never won to its support the inward voice; conscience, if questioned, never forgets to curse the guilty with the memory of sin, to cheer the upright with the meek tranquillity of approval. And this admirable power, which is the instinct of Deity, is the attribute of every man; it knocks at the palace gate, it dwells in the meanest hovel. Duty, like death, enters every abode, and delivers his message to every breast. Conscience, like reason and judgment, is universal.

That the moral affections are planted everywhere, needs only to be asserted. The savage mother loves her offspring with all the fondness that a mother can know. Beneath the odorous shade of the boundless forests of Chili, the savage youth repeats the story of love, as sincerely as it was ever chanted in the valley of Vacluse. The affections of family are not the results of civilization; they spring from the heart. The charities of life are scattered everywhere; enamelling the vales of human being, as the flowers paint the meadows. Boundless treasures of moral feeling are garnered up in the common breast. They are not the fruit of human culture, nor the privilege of refinement, but the natural instinct of Humanity.

Our age has seen a revolution in works of imagination. The poet has sought his theme in common life. Never is the genius of Scott more pathetic, than when, as in the *Antiquary*, he delineates the sorrows of a poor fisherman, or as in the *Heart of Mid Lothian*, takes his heroine from a cottage. And even Wordsworth, the purest and most original poet of the day, in spite of the inveterate character of his political predilections, has done homage to the spirit

of the age. With magic power he has thrown the divine light of genius on the walks of commonest life; he finds a moral in every grave of the village churchyard; he discloses the immense wealth of affection in the humblest minds, the peasant and shepherd, the laborer and artisan; the strolling pedlar is, under the powerful action of his genius, a teacher of the sublimest morality; and the solitary wagoner, the lonely shepherd, and even the feeblest mother of an idiot boy, furnishes the highest lessons in the reverence for Humanity.

If from things relating to truth, justice, and affection, we turn to those relating to the beautiful, we may here also assert, that the sentiment for the beautiful resides in every breast. The lovely forms of the external world delight us from their adaptation to our powers.

Yea, what were mighty Nature's self?
Her features could they win us,
Unhelped by the poetic voice
That hourly speaks within us?

The Indian mother, on the borders of Hudson's Bay, decorates her manufactures with ingenious devices and lovely colors, prompted by the same instinct which guided the pencil and mixed the colors of Raphael. The inhabitant of Nootka Sound tattoos his body with the method of harmonious Arabesques. Every form, to which the hands of the artist have ever given birth, sprung first into being as a conception of his mind, and sprung from a natural power, which belongs not to the artist only, but to man. Beauty, like truth and justice, lives within us; like virtue and like moral law, it is a creation of the soul. The power which leads to the production of beautiful forms, the power which leads to the perception of beautiful forms, in the works which God has made, is an attribute of Humanity.

But here I am met by an interrogation. What! Do you despise learning? Shall one who has spent nearly all his life in schools and universities plead

the equality of uneducated nature? Is there no difference between the man of refinement and the savage?

I am a man, said Black Hawk nobly to the chief of the first republic in the world; *I am a man*, said the barbarous chieftain, *and you are another*.

I speak for the natural equality of human powers, not of human attainments; for the capacity for progress, not for the perfection of undisciplined instincts. The intellectual functions exist in the savage; the respect which we should cherish for Humanity receives the Comanche warrior and the Caffre, within the pale of equality. Their powers may not have been exercised, but they exist. Immure a person from light in a dungeon; as he comes to the light of day, his vision seems incapable of performing its office. Does that destroy your conviction in the relation between the eye and light? The rioter over his cups resolves to eat and drink and be merry; and he forgets his spiritual nature in his obedience to the senses; but does that destroy the relation between conscience and eternity? "What ransom shall we give?" exclaimed the senators of Rome to the savage Attila, the unlettered invader from the deserts of Asia. "Give," said the barbarian, "all your gold and jewels, your costly furniture and treasures, and set free every slave." "Ah," replied the degenerate Romans, "what then will be left to us?" "I leave you your souls," replied the savage, who had learnt in the wilderness to value the immortal mind, and to despise the servile herd, that esteemed only their fortunes, and had no true respect for themselves. You cannot discover a tribe of men, but you also find the charities of life, and the proofs of spiritual existence. Behold the ignorant Algonquin deposit a bow and quiver by the side of the departed warrior; and reverence his faith in immortality. See the Comanche chieftain, in the heart of our continent, inflict on himself severest penance; and reverence his confession of the needed atonement for sin. The Barbarian

who roams our western prairies has like passions and like endowments with ourselves. He bears within him the instinct of Deity; the consciousness of a spiritual nature; the love of beauty; the rule of morality.

And shall we reverence the dark-skinned Caffre? Shall we respect the brutal Hottentot?

You may read the right answer written on every heart. It bids me not despise the sable hunter, that gathers a livelihood in the forests of Southern Africa. All are men. When we know the Hottentot better, we shall despise him less.

If it be true, that the gifts of mind and heart are universally diffused, if the sentiment of truth, justice, love, and beauty exists in every one, then it follows, as a necessary consequence, that the common judgment in politics, morals, character, and taste is the highest authority on earth, and the nearest possible approach to an infallible decision. This inference I dare not avoid; and if from the consideration of individual powers we turn to the action of the human mind in masses, we shall still retain our good hopes for the race.

If reason is a universal faculty, the decision of the common mind is the nearest criterion of truth. The public mind winnows opinions; it is the sieve which separates error from certainty.

This is evident from the nature of the case. The exercise of one faculty on the same relations would naturally lead to the same results.

But it is said there are differences. And this again proves the supreme judgment of the general mind. Truth is one. It never contradicts itself. One truth cannot contradict another truth. Hence truth is a bond of union. Men agree in sustaining it. The common mind asserts and reveres it. But error not only contradicts truth, but may contradict itself. Thus there may be many errors, and each at variance with the rest. Truth is therefore of necessity an element of harmony; error as necessarily an element of discord. Thus there can be no public judgment but a

right one. Men cannot agree in an absurdity ; neither can they agree in a falsehood.

Let us not avoid the practical test. I venture on the apparent paradox, that the public mind never received an unmixed error. Not that wrong opinions have not been cherished by the masses, but the cause always lies in the complexity of the ideas presented. Error finds its way into the soul of a nation, only through the channel of truth. It is to a truth that men listen ; and if they accept error also, it is only because the error is for the time so closely interwoven with the truth, that the one cannot readily be separated from the other.

Absolute error can have no existence in the public mind. Wherever you see men clustering together to form a party, you may be sure that however much error may be there, truth is there also. Apply this principle boldly ; it contains a lesson of candor, and a voice of encouragement. Yes, there never was a school of philosophy, nor a clan in the world of opinion, but carried along with it some important truth. And therefore every sect that has ever flourished has benefited Humanity ; for the errors of a sect pass away and are forgotten ; its truths are received into the common inheritance. To know the seminal principle of every prophet and leader of a sect, is to gather all the wisdom of the world.

By heaven ! there should not be a seer, who left
The world one doctrine, but I'd task his lore,
And commune with his spirit. All the truth
Of all the tongues of earth, I'd have them all,
Had I the powerful spell to raise their ghosts.

The multitude is therefore the oracle to which we are to listen reverently ; the tribunal before which we are to plead. Discarding the errors of individuals and of parties, we are to seek for the universal truths, which are the dictates of pure reason, and form the common faith of Humanity. Truth emerges in her brightness from the contradictions of individual opinions ; she raises herself in majestic serenity above

the conflict of sects; she acknowledges as her nearest image the general voice of mankind; the expression of universal reason; the concurrent testimony of the race.

Time would fail me, were I to pursue this subject in all its bearings. I pass therefore to a point, which has been less considered. The sentiment of beauty, as it exists in the human mind, is the criterion in works of art, inspires the conceptions of genius, and exercises a final judgment on its productions.

For who are the best judges in matters of taste? Do you think the cultivated individual? Undoubtedly not; but the collective mind. The public is wiser than the wisest critic. In Athens, where the arts were carried to perfection, it was done when "the fierce democracie" was in the ascendant; the temple of Minerva and the works of Phidias were invented and perfected to please the common people. When Greece yielded to tyrants, her genius for excellence in arts expired; or rather purity of taste disappeared; because the artist then endeavored to please the individual, and therefore humored his caprice; while before he had endeavored to please the race.

When after a long eclipse the arts again burst into a splendid existence, it was equally under a popular influence. During the rough contests and feudal tyrannies of the middle age, religion had opened in the church an asylum for the people. There the serf and the beggar could kneel; there the pilgrim and the laborer were shrived; and the children of misfortune not less than the prosperous were welcomed to the house of prayer. The church was, therefore, at once the guardian of equality, and the nurse of the arts; and the souls of Giotto, and Perugino, and Raphael, moved by an infinite sympathy with the crowd, kindled into divine conceptions of beautiful forms; and appealing to the sentiment of devotion in the common mind, they dipped their pencils in living colors, to decorate the altars where man adored. By

degrees the wealthy nobility desired in like manner to adorn their palaces; but the genius of Humanity was not present at the attempt, and the quick familiarity of the artist with the beautiful declined. Instead of the brilliant works which appealed to the soul, a school of artists arose, who appealed to the senses; and in the land which had produced the most moving pictures addressed to the religious feeling and instinct with the purest beauty, the banquet halls of the nobility were covered with grotesque forms, such as float before the imagination, when excited and bewildered by sensual indulgence. Instead of holy families, the ideal representations of the virgin mother and the godlike child, of the enduring faith of martyrs, of the blessed benevolence of evangelic love, there came the motley group of fawns and satyrs, of Diana stooping to Endymion, of voluptuous beauty, of the forms of licentiousness. Humanity frowned on the desecration of the arts; and the true genius of painting, no longer vivified by a common feeling with the multitude, refused to adapt itself to individual humors, and disappeared.

If with us the arts are destined to be awakened into a brilliant career, the inspiration must spring from the triumphs of democracy. Genius will not create, to flatter individuals or decorate saloons. It yearns for larger influences; it feeds on wider sympathies; and its perfect display can never exist, except in an appeal to the general sentiment for the beautiful.

Again. Italy is famed for its music, its inimitable operas. It is a well known fact, that the best critics are often deceived in their judgment of them; but that at the first representation, the pit, composed of the throng, does, without fail, render a true verdict.

But the taste for music, it may be said, is favored by natural organization. Precisely a statement that confirms my argument for the natural capacity of the race; for taste is then not an acquisition, but in part a gift. But let us pass to works of literature.

Who are by way of eminence the poets of all mankind? Surely Homer and Shakspeare. Now Homer formed his taste, as he wandered from door to door, a vagrant minstrel, paying for hospitality by a song; and Shakspeare wrote for an audience, wholly composed of the common people.

Or to state one more single instance. The little story of Paul and Virginia is a universal favorite. When it was first written, the author read it aloud to a circle in Paris, composed of the wife of the prime minister, and the choicest critics of France. They condemned the story, as dull and insipid. The author appealed to the public; and the children of all Europe reversed the judgment of the Parisians. The judgment of children, that is, the judgment of the common mind under its most innocent and least imposing form, was more trustworthy, than the criticism of the select refinement of the most polished city in the world.

Demosthenes of old formed himself to the perfection of eloquence by means of addresses to the crowd. The great comic poet of Greece, emphatically the poet of the vulgar mob, is distinguished above all others for the incomparable graces of his diction; and it is related of one of the most skilful writers in the Italian language, that when inquired of where he had learned the purity and nationality of his diction, he replied, from listening to the country people, as they brought their produce to market. He had learned his language in the streets.

But it is unnecessary to seek examples in detail. At the revival of letters a distinguishing feature of the rising literature was the employment of the vulgar tongue. Dante used the language of the populace and won immortality; Wickliffe, Luther, and at a later day Descartes, each employed his native language, and carried truth directly to all, who were familiar with its accents. Every beneficent revolution in letters has the character of popularity; every great reform among authors has sprung from the pow-

er of the people in its influence on the development and activity of mind.

The same influence continues unimpaired. Scott spurned a drawing-room reputation; the secret of Byron's power lay in part in the harmony which existed between his muse and the democratic tendency of the age; Wordsworth, even in the midst of his passion for a hierarchy, pleads earnestly for the rights of labor. German literature is almost entirely a popular creation. It was fostered by no monarch; it was dandled by no aristocracy. It was plebeian in its origin and manly in its results. "The public," says Schiller, "is my study and my sovereign. Of this and of no other tribunal do I acknowledge the jurisdiction. Its decrees I fear and reverence. My mind is exalted by the intention to submit to no restraints but the invisible decisions of the unbiased world; to know no court of appeals but the soul of Humanity."

The same confidence may exist in the capacity of the human race for political advancement. The absence of the prejudices of the old world leaves us here the opportunity of consulting independent truth; and man is left to apply the instinct of freedom to every social relation and public interest. We have approached so near to nature, that we can hear her gentlest whispers; we have made Humanity our lawgiver and our oracle; and, therefore, principles, which in Europe the wisest receive with distrust, are here the common property of the public mind. The spirit of the nation receives and vivifies every great doctrine, of which the application is required; no matter how abstract it may be in theory, or how remote in its influence, the intelligence of the multitude embraces, comprehends, and enforces it. Freedom of mind, freedom of the seas, freedom of industry, each great truth is firmly grasped; and whenever a great purpose has been held up, or a useful reform proposed, the national mind has calmly, steadily, and irresistibly pursued its aim.

II. A devotion to the cause of mind is therefore a devotion to the cause of Humanity, and assures its progress.

Every great object, connected with the benevolent exertions of the day, has reference to the culture of mind. The moral and intellectual powers are alone become the common inheritance; and every victory in the cause of Humanity is due to the progress of moral and intellectual culture. For this the envoys of religion cross seas, and visit remotest isles; for this the press in its freedom teems with the productions of maturest thought; for this the philanthropist plans new schemes of education; for this halls in every city and village are open to the public instructor. Not that we view with indifference the glorious efforts of material industry; the vast means of internal intercourse; the accumulations of thrifty labor; the varied results of concentrated action. But even here it is mind that achieves the triumph, and that exults in expectation. It is the genius of the architect, that gives beauty to the work of human hands, and makes the temple, the dwelling, or the public edifice an outward representation of the spirit of propriety and order. It is science, that guides the blind zeal of cupidity to the construction of the vast channels of intercourse, which are fast binding the world into one family. And it is as a method of moral improvement, that these increased means of intercourse derive their greatest value. Mind becomes universal property; the poem, that is invented on the soil of England, finds its response on the shores of lake Erie and the banks of the Missouri, and is admired near the sources of the Ganges. The defence of public liberty in our own halls of legislation penetrates the plains of Poland, is echoed along the mountains of Greece, and pierces the darkest night of eastern despotism.

From the universality of the intellectual and moral powers, and the necessity of their culture for the progress of the race, I deduce the great doctrine of

the natural right of every human being to moral and intellectual culture. This right is limited to no condition, and let me add to no sex. It is time that the rights of woman were asserted, not in the spirit of a Wolstonecraft, but in the spirit of Christianity. It was an absurd attempt, to found the claims of woman to equality on a material basis; to command her to come in competition with the industry and the strength of man. Not such is the lesson of our religion; or of conscience. The claims of woman to equality are found in her moral nature; and they need only to be presented under this aspect, to be readily acknowledged. Among the chosen and most faithful followers of Christ was woman; and her education, the development of her powers, the exercise of her high endowments are a duty not less imperative than the culture of man. Let woman share in every benefit, which the diffusion of culture achieves for the race.

It is the glory of our fathers to have established in their laws the equal claims of every child, to the public care of its morals and its mind. From this principle we may deduce the universal right to leisure. Such is the voice of nature; such the conscious claim of the human mind. The universe opens its pages to every eye; the music of creation resounds in every ear; the glorious lessons of immortal truth, that are written in the sky and on the earth, address themselves to every mind, and claim attention from every human being. God has made man upright; that he might look before and after; and he calls upon every one not merely to labor, but to reflect; not merely to practise the revelations of divine will, but to watch the displays of divine power. Nature claims for every man leisure, for she claims every man as a witness to the divine glory, manifested in the created world.

Yet evermore, through years renewed
In undisturbed vicissitude
Of seasons balancing their flight,
On the swift wings of day and night,
Kind nature keeps a heavenly door
Wide open for the scattered poor,

Where flower-breathed incense to the skies
Is wafted in mute harmonies ;
And ground fresh cloven by the plough
Is fragrant with a humbler vow ;
Where birds and brooks from leafy dells
Chime forth unwearied canticles,
And vapors magnify and spread
The glory of the sun's bright head ;
Still constant in her worship, still
Conforming to the Almighty Will,
Whether men sow or reap the fields,
Her admonitions nature yields ;
That not by bread alone we live,
Or what a hand of flesh can give ;
That every day should leave some part
Free for a sabbath of the heart ;
So shall the seventh be truly blest,
From morn to eve, with hallowed rest.

The right to universal education being thus acknowledged by our conscience, not less than by our laws, it follows, that the public mind is the true recipient of truth. Do not seek to conciliate individuals ; do not dread the frowns of a sect ; do not yield to the proscriptions of a party ; but pour out truth into the common mind. Let the waters of intelligence like the rains of heaven descend on the whole earth. And be not discouraged by the dread of encountering ignorance. *The prejudices of ignorance are more easily removed than the prejudices of interest ; the first are blindly adopted ; the second wilfully preferred.* Intelligence must be diffused among the whole people ; truth must be scattered among those who have no interest to suppress its growth. The seeds that fall on the exchange, or in the hum of business, may be choked by the thorns, that spring up in the hotbed of avarice ; the seeds, that are let fall in the saloon, may be like those dropped by the wayside, which foul birds of the air gather up, before they have taken root. Let the young aspirant after glory scatter the seeds of truth broadcast on the wide bosom of Humanity ; in the deep, fertile soil of the public mind. There it will strike deep root, and spring up, and bear an hundred fold, and bloom for ages, and ripen fruit through remote generations.

It is alone by infusing great principles into the common mind, that revolutions in human society are effected. They never have been, they never can be, effected by superior *individual* excellence. Time will allow but a single illustration. The age of the Antonines is the age of the greatest glory of the Roman empire. Men distinguished by every accomplishment of prowess and science, for a century in succession, possessed undisputed sway over more than a hundred millions of men; till at last, in the person of Mark Aurelian, philosophy herself seemed to mount the throne. And did she stay the downward tendencies of the Roman empire? Did she infuse new elements of life into the decaying constitution? Did she commence one great, beneficent reform? Not one permanent amelioration was effected; philosophy was clothed with absolute power; and yet absolute power accomplished nothing for Humanity. It could accomplish nothing. Had it been possible, Aurelian would have done it. Society can be changed, the human race can be advanced, only by moral principles diffused through the multitude.

And now let us take an opposite instance; let us see, if amelioration follow, when in despite of power truth finds its way into the bosom of the common people, and Christianity itself shall furnish my example.

When Christianity first made its way into Rome, the imperial city was the seat of wealth, philosophy, and luxury. Absolute power was already established; and had the will of Claudius been gained, or the conscience of Messalina been roused, or the heart of Narcissus, once a slave, then prime minister, been touched by the recollections of his misfortunes, the sovereign power of the civilized world would have been moved. And did the apostle of divine truth make his appeal to them? Was his mission to the emperor and his minions? to the empress and her flatterers? to servile senators? to wealthy favorites? Paul preserves for us the names of the first converts;

the Roman Mary and Junia; Julia and Nerea; and the beloved brethren. All plebeian names, unknown to history. Greet them, he adds, that be of the household of Narcissus. Now every Roman household was a community of slaves. Narcissus himself, a freedman, was the chief minister of the Roman empire; his ambition had left him no moments for the envoy from Calvary; the friends of St. Paul were a freedman's slaves. When God selected the channel by which Christianity should make its way in the city of Rome, and assuredly be carried forward to acknowledged supremacy in the Roman empire, he gave to the Apostle of the Gentiles favor in the household of Narcissus; he planted truth deep in the common soil. Had Christianity been received at court, it would have been stifled or corrupted by the prodigal vices of the age; it lived in the hearts of the common people; it sheltered itself against oppression in the catacombs and among tombs; it made misfortune its convert, and sorrow its companion, and labor its stay. It rested on a rock, for it rested on the people; it was gifted with immortality, for it struck root in the hearts of the million.

So completely was this greatest of all reforms carried forward in the vale of human life, that the great moral revolution, the great step of God's Providence in the education of the human race, was not observed by the Roman historians. Once indeed at this early period they are mentioned; for in the reign of Nero, the purity of Christianity being hateful to the corrupt, Nero had abandoned its professors to persecution. The Christians in Rome, in the darkness of midnight, were covered with pitch and set on fire to light the streets, and this singularity has been recorded by the Roman historian. But the system of the Christian morals, the religion which was to regenerate Humanity, which was the new birth of the human race, escaped all notice.

Paul, who was a Roman citizen, was beheaded, just outside of the walls of the eternal city; and Peter,

who was a plebeian, and could not claim the distinction of the axe and the block, was executed on the cross, with his head downwards to increase the pain and the indignity. Do you think the Roman emperor took notice of the names of these men, when he signed their death warrant? And yet, as they poured truth into the common mind, what series of kings, what lines of emperors can compare with them, in their influence on the destinies of mankind, in their powerful aid in promoting the progress of the human race?

Yes, reforms in society are only effected through the masses of the people.

III. And such action does take place. Human life has gone forward; the mind of the race has been quickened and edified. New truths have been constantly developed, and, becoming the common property of the human family, they have improved its condition and ensured its progress.

This progress is advanced by every sect, precisely because each sect, to obtain vitality, does of necessity embody a truth. The irresistible tendency of the human race is to advancement. Absolute power has never succeeded in suppressing a single truth. An idea once generated may find its admission into every living breast and live there. Like God it becomes immortal and omnipresent. The tendency of the species is upward, irresistibly upward. The individual is often lost; Providence never disowns the race. The individual is often corrupt; Humanity is redeemed. No principle, once promulgated, has ever been forgotten. No "timely tramp" of a despot's foot ever trod out one idea. The world cannot retrograde; the dark ages cannot return. Dynasties perish; cities are buried; nations have been victims to error, or martyrs for right; Humanity has always been on the advance; its soul has always been gaining maturity and power.

Yes, truth is immortal; it cannot be destroyed; it is invincible, it cannot long be resisted. Not every

great principle has yet been generated; but when once developed, it lives without end, in the safe custody of the race. States may pass away; every just principle of legislation which has been once established will endure without end. The ark has mouldered; the tabernacle disappeared; the Urim and the Thummim lost their lustre; but God, who revealed himself on Sinai, is still the God of the living. Jerusalem has fallen, and the very foundations of the temple have been subverted; but Christian truth still lives in the hearts of millions. Do you think that infidelity is spreading? And are you terrified by a handful of skeptics? When did the Gospel of all truth, that redeems, and blesses, and sanctifies the world, live in the hearts of so many millions, as at this moment? The forms under which it is produced may decay; for they, like all that is the work of man's hands, are subject to the changes and chances of mortal being; but the spirit of truth is incorruptible; it may be developed, illustrated, and applied; it never can die; it never can decline.

No truth can perish; no truth can pass away. Succeeding generations transmit to each other the undying flame. Thus the progress of the race is firm and sure. Wherever moral truth has started into being, Humanity claims and guards the bequest. Each generation gathers together the imperishable children of the past, and increases them by new sons of light, alike radiant with immortality.

ART. II. — *The French Revolution. A History.* By THOMAS CARLYLE. Boston: Charles C. Little & James Brown. 1837. 2 vols. 12mo.

"WHAT induced Thomas Carlyle to select such a subject as the French Revolution," we have heard

asked by those, who, having read only the "Sartor," think him a poetical mystic. "Did he write for bread, or from sympathy with that social movement?" To those who know him it is plain enough, that our good friend, however pinched by want, could not let out his mind to do job-work. His Pegasus would break down at the plough. Carlyle's heart is always, must always be, in what he does.

He selected this subject then, because to him there came a voice out of the Chaos, we may be sure. But farther, to any one, who will review his literary course, the explanation will be clear enough of his interest in that ruin and recreation of a social world. The gradual progress of his studies through Voltaire and Diderot led him to the observation of this unparalleled phenomenon. But his taste, his instinct guided him also. Like his master Goethe, he has been always hunting for a "bit of Nature." Whether he is writing of Burns or Richter, of Novalis or Elliott, of the Spirit of the Age or its Characteristics, or finally of Mirabeau, he everywhere shows the same longing after the genuine product of Nature. Hypocrisy however self-deceived and respectable is his horror, and is greeted with nothing more civil than an "anathema maranatha." This is his "fixed idea," his creed; and he clings to it with an unquestioning *bigotry*. Yes! *bigotry*; — for noble as the creed is, it is yet a *creed*; and, though he might deny it, a "formula;" and his range of sympathy, his candor of judgment, and even truth of moral sentiment are narrowed by this notion. In consequence he is prejudiced. He trusts to his first impressions. He casts his eye on a man with cutting penetration, and is satisfied that he knows him. He takes him by the arm, and by the feeling of the iron or flabby muscle judges instantly of his vigor. Truly he seldom seems much deceived by this instinctive love of Nature. Shams vanish before his glance, as gauze would in the fire. Yet even this love of Nature seems to us a kind of Cant after all. But we check ourselves; we do not like to say

even thus much in the way of fault-finding with one of the truest, honestest of critics and of men.

Our student of Nature had already picked up rare specimens here and there as he found them; and now at last he has arrived at this grand volcanic outbreak, and sits down amid mighty heaps of most indisputable genuineness, to learn what is in man. And truly he is nowise repelled by stench of sulphur and dreads not burns. But there was another reason for the study of the French Revolution. Carlyle loves man, loves the men he lives among. He is not indifferent to the temper of his own age, and thinking it, in its philosophy and professed maxims, a peculiarly mechanical, self-conscious, and artificial one, he cannot but obey the inward behest to sound his prophecy in men's ears, whether his fate be Cassandra's or not. He doubtless feels as if a sick generation needed a sanative; and what better than the pure crystal of natural feeling? His text is certainly a healthy one, and his homilies have a freshness, as if he had dipped with a leaf from the bubbling spring. In a word, our author probably anticipates, as many others do, that the *matchless* British constitution may be rent asunder by some larger growth of the social germ; and meanwhile, he may think it would be well for us not to hinder but to aid, as we can, the process.

Carlyle, we feel sure, has dropped all conventional spectacles, and opened his eyes to the true characteristic of our times, — which is, that the "better sort" are being elbowed more and more for room by the "poorer sort," as they step forward to gather a share of the manna on life's wilderness. Perhaps he thinks it high time, that they who are clad in decencies and good manners should busy themselves in teaching their brother "sans-culottes" to wear suitable garments. We believe then that our author was led to a study and history of the French Revolution, because he saw it illustrating in such characters of fire the irrepressible instinct of all men to assert and exercise their natural rights; — and the absolute neces-

sity which there is, therefore, that man's essential equality with man should be recognised.

Mr. Carlyle has evidently done his work like a man. He appears to have read most voraciously, and sifted most scrupulously. And when one thinks of the multifarious mass which he must have digested in the process of composition, we cannot but equally admire his sagacity, and respect his faithfulness. Add the consideration, that the first volume, when fully prepared, was by an unfortunate accident destroyed; and that the author, without copy or plan, was thus forced to tread over when jaded the path he had climbed in the first flush of untried adventure; and that yet with this additional labor he has been occupied only some two years and more upon the book, and our estimate of his ability, his genius, his energy, cannot but be great.

And now what has he produced? A history? Thiers, Mignet, Guizot forbid! We for ourselves call this French Revolution an Epic Poem; or, rather say the root, trunk, and branches of such a poem, not yet fully clothed with rhythm and melody indeed, but still hanging out its tassels and budding on the sprays. And here, by the way, may it not be asked whether Carlyle is not emphatically the English poet of our epoch? Is he not Shelley and Wordsworth combined, and greater than either? Thus far indeed we have seen this luminary in a critical phase chiefly. But it is not because he has read, in the life of the men he has apotheosized, true poems, incarnations of that ideal he worshipped? It seems to us an accident, that prose and criticism, not odes and positive life, have been his vein. Had he but form and tune what a poet was there! This book we say is a poem, the most remarkable of our time. It is not like a written book; it is rather like the running soliloquy of some wonderfully living and life-giving mind, as it reads a "good formula" of history; — a sort of resurrection of the dry bones of fact at the word of the prophet. Marvellous indeed! It seems as if, in some camera

obscura, one was looking upon the actual world and sky and moving forms, though all silent in that show-box. Of all books this is most graphic. It is a series of masterly outlines *à la Retzch*. Oh more, much more. It is a whole *Sistine Chapel* of fresco *à la Angelo*, drawn with bold hand in broad lights and deep shadows. Yet again it is gallery upon gallery of portraits, touched with the free grace of Vandyke, glowing with Titian's living dyes, and shining and gloomed in Rembrandt's golden haze. And once more, let us say in our attempt to describe this unique production, it is a *seer's second sight of the past*. We speak of prophetic vision. This is a *historic vision*, where events rise not as thin abstractions, but as visible embodiments; and the ghosts of a buried generation pass before us, summoned to react in silent pantomime their noisy life.

The *point of view*, from which Carlyle has written his history, is one which few men strive to gain, and which fewer still are competent to reach. He has looked upon the French Revolution, not as a man of one nation surveys the public deeds of another; nor as a man of one age reviews the vicissitudes of a time gone by. Still less has he viewed it, as a religionist from the cold heights, where he awaits his hour of translation, throws pitying regards on the bustling vanities of earth; or as a philosopher, from his inflated theory of life, spies out, while he soars, the battle of ideas. And it is not either in the passionless and pure and patient watching, with which a spirit, whose faith has passed into knowledge, awaits the harmonious unfoldings of Heaven's purposes, that he has sent his gaze upon that social movement. But it is as a *human spirit*, that Carlyle has endeavored to enter into the conscious purposes, the unconscious strivings of *human spirits*; with wonder and awe at the mighty forces which work so peacefully, yet burst out so madly in one and all at times. He has set him down before this terrible display of human energy, as at a mighty chasm which revealed the inner deeps of

man, where gigantic passions heave and stir under mountains of custom; while Free-will, attracted to move around the centre of holiness, binds their elements of discord into a habitable world. As a *man* Carlyle would study *man*. It is as if he were ever murmuring to himself; "Sons of Adam, daughters of Eve, what are ye? Angels ye plainly are not. Demons truth cannot call ye. Strange angelic-demoniac beings, on! on! Never fear! Something will come of you." Carlyle does not pretend to fathom man. His plummet sinks below soundings. We do not know a writer, who so unaffectedly expresses his wonder at the mystery of man. Now this appears to us a peculiar and a novel point of view, and a far higher one than that of the "progress of the human race." Not that he does not admit progress. The poor quibbles of those, who see in one age only the transmigration of the past, do not bewilder him. But he feels how little we can know, and do know, of this marvellous human race,—in their springs, and tendencies, and issues. This awe of man blends beautifully with reverence for Providence. There is no unconscious law of fate, no wild chance to him, but ever brightening "aurora splendors" of divine love. Enough, however of this point of view. We will but add that its effect is to give the most conscientious desire of seeing things exactly as they are, and describing them with scrupulous truth. Hence we suppose his intense effort to transfuse his soul, and animate the very eyes and ears of the men, who lived in that stormy time, and mingle up his whole being with theirs. Hence too the pictorial statement of what he gathers by that experience; and hence, in fine, a mode of historical composition, wholly original, which must revolutionize the old modes of historicising, so "stale, flat, and unprofitable," do theories and affected clearness appear, after we have once seen this flash of truth's sunlight into the dark cave of the buried years.

Of the *spirit*, in which this book is written, we would say that it breathes throughout the truest,

deepest sympathy with man. Wholly free from the cant, which would whine, and slap its breast, and wring its hands, saint-like, over the weaknesses, which the canter himself is full of,—it yet is strict in its code of right. Most *strict* indeed, though somewhat peculiar. It is not the proper or decorous, which he prizes, but it is the true. And of all writers he is the most unflinching in his castigations of pretence. He never flatters, he never minces; but yet he speaks his hard truth lovingly, and with an eye of hope. He does not spare men, because he sees more life in them than they wot of. While he says to the moral paralytic, “sin no more, lest a worse thing befall thee,” he adds, “rise, take up thy bed and walk.” He is kind, and pitiful, and tolerant of weakness, if it only does not affect to seem what it is not, and paint the livid cheek with mock hues of health. This leads us to say a word of his irony and humor, and he is full of both, though chiefly of the latter. No man has a keener eye for incongruities. It is not the feebleness of men, or the smallness of their achievements, which excites his mirth;—for where there is humbleness in the aspiration, he is of all most ready to see the Psyche in the crawling worm. But what appears to him so droll is the complacency and boastfulness, with which crowds build their Babel to climb to heaven, and the shouts of “glory” with which they put on the cap-stone, when their tower is after all so very far beneath the clouds. He loves so truly what is good in man, that he can afford to laugh at his meannesses. His respect for the essential and genuine grows with his success in exposing the artificial. Under the quaint puffings and paddings of “vanity fair” he does really see living men. He joins in the carnival. He looks upon it as a masquerade, and it is with real frolic that he snatches off the false nose or the reverend beard, and shows the real features of the dolt who would pass for a Solomon. He evidently does enjoy a practical joke on primness. But if he would, like the doctor

in the tale, make his gouty patient hop on the heated floor, it is only for his *cure*. Carlyle seems to us full of true benevolence. He loves everything but insincerity. This he cannot abide. It is the very devil, and he has but one word, "Apaze Satanas." He stands among the Pharisees with the indignant words bursting from his heart, "Ye Hypocrites." In this relation it is too true our friend is nowise angelic, but only too much a man. His contempt is too bitter. We do not readily tolerate in a frail mortal the scornful mirth, with which Carlyle sometimes shows us the cloven hoof under the surplice. Not that the indignation is not merited. But is a man ever pure enough from all taint of falsehood himself, thus to wield the spear of Michael against the dragon? Yet honor to this brave and true man. It is because he has struggled so hard, and withal so well, to disentangle himself from the last thread of cant, that he has so little patience with the poor flies yet buzzing in the web. This loathing of the formal, which a vigorous nature and a bold effort have freed him from, is, we take it, the true and very simple explanation of that occasional rudeness, and even levity, with which, it must be confessed, he speaks of so called worshippers and worship.

And this introduces us to a consideration of his religious spirit. Some perhaps would say, have said, that Carlyle's writings are not baptized into that "spirit of adoption which cries Abba Father." But to us no writings are more truly reverential. It surely is from no want of faith in the fullness of divine love, from no insensibility to the nearness of almighty aid, from no doubt as to the destiny of the soul and its responsibilities and perils, that he uses so little of the technical and prescribed language of piety. Oh how far, far from it. But he will not name the Unnamable. He will not express more than he feels, or desecrate by familiarity what he does feel, yet knows not how adequately to utter. His sense is so abiding of our present imperfect development, his hope is so vast in that good which Provi-

dence has in store in its slow but harmonious processes, that he will not "enter the kingdom of God by violence." To him the Infinite is ever present. That holy and eternal life is his life,—the soul of his soul,—the love of his love,—the wisdom of his wisdom, the power of his power,—the Father. But he strives not so much to look upon the dazzling glory of this central source, whence all of good and fair streams forth;—rather with lowly eyes would he drink in the beauty rayed abroad from each object which its light vivifies and hallows. He would *worship* in the longing to be true and pure, in the dutifulness, the cheerfulness, the humble joy, the patience, and the charities of daily life. His devotedness should be his devoutness; his joy should be his thanks; his progress his confessions; his hopeful energy his prayer; and his offering of the First Fruits a full developed, genial healthiness of nature.

But it would carry us too far to say the half of what we feel about this noble soul, whom we love, not for being the "healthiest of men," for that he is not; but for the pure instinct and reposing confidence, with which being sick, as the most are, he gives himself up to the "mighty mother" to be nursed on her bosom.

With a few words on his style we must bid Mr. Carlyle for the present farewell, only hoping for that rich fruitage of his autumn years of which this summer flush is the promise. Of his later writings it would not be far from the truth to say that we like them, not by reason of the style, but in *spite* of it. They are so savagely uncouth by the side of his former classic gracefulness. It is a savage crowned with ivy though, and crushing luscious grapes as he dances. But the *Life of Schiller* and the early essays had all this naked strength and free play of movement, and yet were decent. They wore their garland of imagery like a festive wreath; and though bright and cheerful, with the melody of pipes, they had no lawless friskiness. He has always been remarkable for the picturesqueness of the metaphors which clothed his

thoughts. But this growth of the symbolic has become ranker and ranker, until, in this last book, the very trees in full foliage are fringed with mosses. It seems as if the axis of his mind had shifted, and the regions of fancy had been brought from the temperate zone beneath the tropics, and hidden germs were bursting prodigally into life. With this teeming fruitfulness and gorgeous wealth we associate the thought of miasm and disease. One feature of this style though we do like much, it is its freedom, its conversational directness, its point and spirit, its infinite variety. How far preferable to the dandy precision of so called elegant styles, and to the solemn dryness of so called clear styles. Is it a delusion however that something of that old bewitching melody of his earlier speech has been sacrificed? There is less to our ear of that rhythm which used to charm us, of that sound and sweep like the bursting of long swelling billows on the broad beach. But we have no notion meanwhile that there is any degeneracy in the artist. We believe that there has been a progress even. We think this present style a transition one. It is a struggling for some adequate utterance, for some word of power which should open the deaf ear; for we must remember his countrymen have been deaf comparatively, and perhaps for the want of some free, hearty speech, less prim than suited the scholar's garb. Will not this Apollo find one day the murmuring shell? Some, wiser than we pretend to be, settle this matter of style summarily. They will have it that Mr. Carlyle is "*affected*." We commend to all such for candid consideration these few sentences of his own. "*Affectation* is a cheap word and of sovereign potency, and should not be rashly applied. Its essence is that it is *assumed*: the character is, as it were, forcibly crushed into some foreign mould, in the hope of being thereby reshaped and beautified: the unhappy man persuades himself that he is in truth a new and wonderfully engaging creature, and so he moves about with a conscious air, though every movement betrays

not symmetry, but dislocation. This it is to be affected, to walk in a *vain show*. But the strangeness alone is no proof of the vanity. Many men who move smoothly in the old established railways of custom will be found to have their affectation; and perhaps here and there some divergent genius be accused of it unjustly. The *show*, though common, may not cease to be *vain*; nor become so for being uncommon. Before we censure a man for *seeming* what he is not, we should be sure that we know what he *is*."

ART. III. — *Conversations with Children on the Gospels*; conducted and edited by A. BRONSON ALCOTT. Boston: James Munroe and Co. 1836. 2 vols. 12mo.

THIS is a difficult book for Reviewers. It is not easy to say what it is, or what it is not. It is hardly safe to assume it as an index to the views and opinions of its editor, or to the character and worth of the school in which these Conversations were held. The Conversations published are incomplete; they comprise only one year of what was intended to be a four years' course. The very nature of such conversations precludes the possibility of recording them with perfect accuracy, though these were recorded with great fidelity; and then, they constituted the exercise of the scholars for only a part of one half-day in a week, the rest of the time being taken up with the studies common in other schools. As it regards Mr. Alcott, these Conversations very imperfectly reveal him, or his system of instruction. One is in constant danger of misapprehending him, and of ascribing to him views and opinions which belong

solely to the children. Even his own questions, if we are not on our guard, may mislead us ; for they were frequently suggested by the remarks of the scholars, and designed merely to induce them to carry out their own thought.

Mr. Alcott has received much reproach, and we fear been made to suffer in the prosperity of his school on account of this book. He has been treated with great illiberality, and made to undergo as severe a persecution as the times allow. As a man he is singularly evangelical, pure minded, in love with all that is beautiful and good, and devoted soul and body to what he deems truth, and the regeneration of mankind. He is conscious of being sent into this world on a high and important mission, and his great study is to discharge that mission to the acceptance of him that sent him. Yet no man among us has been spoken of in severer tones, or been more seriously injured, for the moment, by the misapprehension and ill-nature, the misrepresentation and abuse, he has had to endure from those who affect to lead public opinion. It is painful to record this fact. For there is no man in our country who so well understands the art of education, and who is capable or desirous of doing more for establishing a system of Human Culture, in consonance with our faith as Christians and as republicans. And there is no fault, nor even shadow of a fault to be found with him ; save that he will be true to the deepest and holiest convictions of his own mind ; and will never sacrifice what he holds as truth, virtue, manhood, independence, to popular opinion, to a sickly taste, or a heartless conventionalism. It is not much to our credit, that we condemn him for this.

Mr. Alcott may not be sound in his philosophy, he may not be correct in all his views, and he may carry, and we believe he does carry, some of his favorite notions to extremes ; but he deserves profound reverence for his determination to be a Man ; to be true to Human Nature ; for his fearless assertion of his own convictions, and for his deep and living faith

in God and Humanity. He aims to be himself and not another; to think his own thoughts and not another's; and having done this, he will not lock up his thoughts in his own bosom, and seem to acquiesce in reigning dogmas; but he will utter them, regardless of the reproach or injury he may sustain by so doing. Such a man in these times, when there are so few who feel that they are Men and have a part of their own to act, is not to be cast aside, to be trampled on, without great detriment to our social and moral progress. Did we know what is for our good, we should seek out such men, and honor them as prophets sent from God to foretell and to usher in a more glorious future.

Still we are not at all surprised that Mr. Alcott and his publications are so little appreciated, and so greatly misapprehended. Mr. Alcott is a reformer. He does not believe that the Past has realized the highest worth man may aspire to; he does not believe that the methods of teaching usually adopted, or the systems of education contended for by our teachers and professors generally, are at all adapted to the purpose of rearing up MEN, and of making them walk as becomes moral and intellectual beings, made in the image of God and possessing a Divine Nature; he thinks that the aim of our systems of education, whether private, public, domestic, or social, is too low, and that the methods adopted are destitute of science, above all of vitality, that they are too mechanical, and make of our schools only commendable "tread-mills." Now to think and say all this is to reflect no great credit on our thousands of school-teachers and learned professors and their friends, nor upon those who boast the efforts we have made and are making in the cause of Education. This is as much as to tell his disciples, that unless their righteousness, in this respect, exceed that of the Scribes and Pharisees, the Chief Priests and Elders in the teaching Art, they shall in no wise be qualified for undertaking to rear up men and women, fit to be the citizens of a

free and Christian Republic. Can the Chief Priests and Elders, the Scribes and Pharisees, be made to believe this ; or to regard him who utters it in any other light than that of a reviler, a blasphemer ? Reformers are never understood and appreciated, till the reforms for which they contend are to a good degree realized.

Then again, Mr. Alcott is a peculiar man. He has observed more than he has read, and reflected more than he has observed. He is a man, though eminently social in his feelings and tastes, who has lived mostly in communion with himself, with children, and with Nature. His system is one which he has thought out for himself and by himself. It has therefore almost necessarily taken the hues of his own mind, and become somewhat difficult to communicate to minds not constructed like his own. The terms he has made use of in his solitary reflections to express his thoughts to himself have a special meaning, a special value in his use of them, of which those with whom he converses are ignorant, and of which it is often extremely difficult for them to conceive. In consequence of his solitary reflections, of his little intercourse with the world at large, and his limited acquaintance with books, he has framed to himself a peculiar language, which, though formed of the choicest English, is almost, if not quite wholly unintelligible to all who have not become extensively acquainted with his mode of thinking. He very easily translates the thoughts of others into his language, but it is with great difficulty that he translates his thoughts into their language. People generally in hearing him converse form no conception of his real meaning ; and if they attach any meaning to what he says, it will in nine cases out of ten be a false one. This, however, though it accounts for the misapprehension of people, in regard to him, is not altogether his fault. People may misapprehend him, because they do not understand themselves. There are not many men who have thoroughly analyzed their own minds,

become masters of their own ideas, and so familiar with them that they can recognise them when clothed in a new dress. We are familiar with certain words, which we suppose we use as signs of ideas, but which we use very often as substitutes for ideas. When we find these words defined, or hear them used indeed as signs of ideas, and as signs of the very ideas for which we should have used them, had we used them for any, we are at fault; we find ourselves introduced to entire strangers with whom we can hold no conversation. We know not our own ideas; and very likely are frightened at them, and run away from them as though they were the Evil One himself.

But due allowance made for men's own ignorance as it regards the ideas they really express, if any, by the words they use, it is still extremely difficult to understand Mr. Alcott's system in all its parts. In the work before us it is but partially developed, and nowhere has he to our knowledge given us a complete development of it. But as we believe he really has a system, and one which is truly his own, and withal one for which he is willing to labor and suffer reproach, privation, and, perhaps, death itself, were it necessary, we shall,—availing ourselves of all our means of arriving at a just comprehension of it,—endeavor to lay it before our readers, as faithfully and as fully as we can, within the very narrow limits to which we are necessarily restricted.

Mr. Alcott is known mainly as a schoolmaster, but as a schoolmaster, as we usually think of schoolmasters, he must not be viewed. Unblessed with an abundance of this world's goods, he has often been obliged to confine himself to the drudgery of mere schoolmaster duties; but he is an original thinker, and he aspires to be an educator, not of children only, but of mankind. His system of *Human Culture* is designed for the human race, and is valued by him as true in itself, and as the means of raising all men to the stature of perfect men in Christ Jesus. He pro-

fesses to have a whole system of Theology, Morality, — a philosophy of Man, of Nature, of God. His method of teaching is but the means by which men are to be led ideally and actually to the Absolute. His philosophy he regards as the philosophy of the Absolute. It is as the theologian, the philosopher, the moralist, and the philanthropist, rather than as a schoolmaster, that he is to be regarded. But we proceed to develop his system.

Suppose a man who has no means of knowledge but his five senses. Such a man can take cognizance, of only material objects, of sensible qualities. Color, form, extension, solidity, sound, odor, taste, comprise all the objects of knowledge he can consistently admit. In a word, external nature is all he knows. External nature is to him what it appears. It is real, not symbolical. It indicates nothing which it is not, — nothing on which it depends, and of which it may be regarded as the sign or apparition. It is what it appears, and when seen it is known, and when known that is the end of knowledge. Nothing more is to be known.

In Nature everything, as known by this man of five senses, and of five senses only, is concrete. Nothing is abstract. There are particulars but no generals. Mankind is merely a collective name, and has no meaning beyond the number of individual men and women it designates. A tree is a tree and nothing more. Truth and virtue are abstract nouns, invented for the convenience of conversation, but void of meaning. There may be true stories, true views, but not truth, conformity to which makes the individual story or view a true one. There may be virtuous men and women, but no virtue, conformity to which makes one virtuous.

But is this true? Are all things what they appear? And does all that is appear? Is the Appearance the Thing? Or is the Thing that appears always back of the Appearance? Is it the Thing that we recognise with our senses, or is it only the sign, symbol, or

shadow of the Thing? In man, is it the man that is apparent to the senses? The senses perceive the body, but is the body anything more than the symbol of the man? Take all the phenomena with regard to a man, presented us by the senses, and do they constitute the man? The man is evidently a collection of forces, moral, intellectual, and physical. We observe in him moral affections; we know that he performs the act of thinking; we see that such things as growth, decay, digestion, nutrition, and the like, are constantly going on in him. Now is there not back of these Something that produces them? Is it the feet that walk, or is it the man that walks? Does the brain think, or is it the man that thinks? The stomach, does it digest, or is it the man that digests? The heart, does it love, or is it the man that loves? Back then of the sense-phenomena lies the real Man, the Thing, the Reality, of which what is apparent to the senses is the mere symbol, or sign. The appearance, the apparition is not the man, but a mere index to point us to where the man is and to what he does.

Take a plant. The senses show us a certain number of phenomena. But in that plant are there not things which the senses do not show us, of which they can take no cognizance? Back of this sense-plant is there not the spirit-plant, that is, the real plant of which the senses show us only the appearance or symbol? The real plant is the law that is manifesting itself; the force which pushes itself out in what we call growth, in the bud, the blossom, the fruit; and which makes it precisely what it is, and not something else. It is not meant by this that the senses deceive us; it is only meant that they do not show us the Thing, but its sign; not the reality, but the phenomenon, as a word is not the idea, but its sign or symbol.

We do not give these examples as demonstrations, but merely as illustrations to make our meaning obvious. Now apply the remarks we have made of man and of the plant to all nature, and you have Mr. Al-

cott's doctrine of Nature, or more properly of the external world. The external world is merely the world of the senses ; it is not a real but an apparent world, not substantial, but phenomenal. He does not distrust the senses as do the Idealists, but he denies their power to attain to realities. They stop short of the Thing, and merely give us its sign. They show us where the Thing is, but leave it for the spirit to see what it is.

Pursuing the path in which we have started we may go much further. The Real is always the Invisible. But the invisible world which we have found lying immediately back of the sensible or apparent world, is it the ultimate world ? Is there not another world which the soul may discover back of that ? All effects are included in their causes, and we have not attained to the Thing till we have attained to the ultimate cause. Absolute reality of all things can then be found only in the absolute cause of all things. A cause in order to be a cause must be free, self-sufficing, and self-acting. If absolute then it must be one, for more absolute causes than one is an absurdity which the reason rejects. The world of the senses must then be resolved into the invisible world of the reason, which may for distinction's sake be called the *intelligible* world ; and the intelligible world must then be resolved into the Absolute world, the world of Unity, which, if we understand Mr. Alcott in his terminology, may be called the world of Faith. In man he recognises sense, understanding, or reason, and Faith or Instinct ; each of these has a world of its own. The absolute world, that is, Absolute Reality is found only by Faith or Instinct, and is the world of Absolute Unity.

Now, Absolute Unity, in the bosom of which all things exist, is God. In the last analysis all Reality resolves itself into God. God is the sum total of all that is ; the only Substance, the only absolute Being, the only absolute Reality. God is the Universe, and the Universe is God ; — not the sensible

universe, nor the intelligible, but the Instinctive ; — not the universe seen by the eye of sense, nor that seen by the eye of reason or understanding, but that seen by the inner eye of the soul, by Faith or Instinct.

Now the universe of the senses and that of the understanding are both manifestations of God. The sensible universe is God as he appears to the senses ; the intelligible universe is God as he unfolds himself to the intellect ; the universe beheld by Faith or Instinct, that is, by the highest in man, is God in his absoluteness ; as he is in himself, the real, not the manifested God. We take our stand now on the revelations of Instinct ; that is, in God himself, and from his point of view examine and interpret all phenomenal worlds and beings. In descending from him through the intelligible world and the sensible, we perceive that all laws, all forces, all things, so far forth as they have any real being, are identical with God. God is not the plant as it exists to the understanding, or the senses ; nevertheless, he is all the reality, all the absolute being there is in the plant ; God is not man, and man is not God, as he exists to the senses, or to the understanding ; nevertheless all the real being there is in man, all that is not phenomenal, appearance merely, is God, “ in whom we live, and move, and have our *being*.”

By a psychological examination of man, we find that he takes cognizance of the three worlds, or universes we have enumerated. Man must have then three orders of faculties, corresponding to these three worlds. He is not then merely endowed with five senses, as we supposed in the beginning ; he has, above his five senses, reason or understanding ; and above this, as that which attains to the Absolute, Faith or Instinct ; which, so far as we can perceive, is very nearly identical with what M. Cousin calls Spontaneity or the Spontaneous Reason. Now in the business of education, we should have reference to these three worlds, or these three orders of faculties, and according to their relative importance. The

education which has been and is most common has reference almost exclusively to the world of the senses ; some few philosophers and teachers are laboring to make it conform to the world of the understanding ; few or none labor to make it conform to the world of Instinct, to the absolute Truth and Reality of things. This last is Mr. Alcott's work. To call attention to this work, to show by his instructions what it is, and by his example how it may be and is to be done, is what he regards as his mission. As a partial experiment, as an intimation of what may under more favorable circumstances be accomplished, he had these Conversations recorded as they occurred, and has finally published them to the world.

Having thus far glanced at what may be called Mr. Alcott's metaphysical system, we may now proceed without much difficulty to seize his theory of education, and to a general comprehension of his views of Childhood and of Religion. These views have struck many minds as absurd, but the absurdity, we think we find in the views of others, is often an absurdity for which we alone are responsible. We assign to others very frequently the absurd views which originate with ourselves ; and it is a good rule for us to observe, that so long as a man's views appear to us to be wholly absurd, if he be a man of but tolerable understanding, we should judge ourselves ignorant of his real meaning.

Instinct, which must be carefully distinguished from Impulse, is according to Mr. Alcott's theory the Divine in Man. It is the Incarnate God. Our instincts are all divine and holy, and being the immediate actings, or promptings of the Divinity, they constitute the criterion of Truth and Duty. They are what there is in man the most real and absolute. They are then the most Godlike, the most Divine, partake the most of God ; they are then to be regarded as the highest in man, to which all else in him is to be subordinated. The instincts are to be followed as the supreme law of the soul.

The instincts, inasmuch as they are the Divine in man, the Incarnate God, contain all the truth, goodness, reality there is in man. The Divine in man, or the God Incarnate, is one with the Universal, the Absolute God. There is nothing in the sensible universe, nor in the intelligible universe, that is not in the Absolute God. All things are in God, and God is in man. In our instincts then are included, in their law, their reality, both the world of sense and the world of the understanding. To know these worlds then we must look within, not abroad. To become acquainted with God and his manifestations we must study the instincts. Knowledge, truth, goodness, all that can deserve to be called by either name, must be drawn out of the soul, not poured into it. Human culture, therefore, as the word *education*, (from *e* and *duco*,) literally implies, is merely drawing forth what exists, though enveloped, in the soul from the beginning.

As the child is born with all the instincts and with them more active and pure than they are in after life, it follows that the child is born in possession of all truth, goodness, worth, human nature can aspire to. Therefore said Jesus, "Suffer little children to come unto me, for of such is the kingdom of heaven." Childhood is therefore to be revered. The wise men from the East do always hail with joy the star of the new-born babe, and haste to the cradle to present their offerings and to worship. The educator must sit down with reverence and awe at the feet of the child, and listen. Till this be done, little progress can be expected in human culture.

The child is pure and holy. It obeys freely and without reserve its Divine Instincts. It smiles, loves, acts, as God commands. The true end, or one of the great ends of Human Culture must be to preserve the child in the grown up man. Most people at a very early day lose the child, and go through life bewailing their lost childhood. The whole family of man may be represented as the distracted mother, who

wept with loud lamentation for her children, because they were not. The only exception to this is, that they too often lose their childhood without being conscious of their loss. Childhood is lost ; the innocence, the freedom, the light of the instincts are obscured, and all but annihilated, by the false modes of life which are adopted ; by the wrong state of society which prevails ; by intemperance, in eating, drinking, sleeping, and the like ; and by the mistaken education which men have unwisely encouraged,—an education which tends perpetually to raise sense and understanding above Divine Instinct, and to subject us to shadows and illusions, rather than to truth and reality. Hence, the necessity of strict temperance in all the habits of the body, and of early attention to the instincts, so that they may be called forth and strengthened before the senses and the understanding have established their dominion over us.

The body in its true state is to the soul what the outward universe is to God,—its veil or covering, or more properly, its symbol which marks to the senses the place where it is. What are called bodily appetites and inclinations, come from the soul, not from the body ; proceeding from the soul, they should be regarded, in themselves, as of like purity and divinity, as any of the instincts of our nature. The exercise of them all, and in all cases, should be regarded as a religious exercise, and should be performed with all the feelings of awe and responsibility, with which we accompany the most solemn act of religious worship. All the functions of the body, as we call them, but which are really functions of the soul, are holy, and should be early surrounded with holy and purifying associations. Hence the conversations in the volumes before us with the children, on the mysterious phenomena attending the production and birth of a new member to the human family, or what Mr. Alcott calls the Incarnation of Spirit,—conversations which have caused him much reproach, and done him, for the moment, we fear no little injury.

His motives were pure and praiseworthy, and his theory seemed to require him to take the course he did, and he should not be censured ; but for ourselves, we regard as one of the most certain instincts of our nature, that one which leads us to throw a veil over the mysterious phenomena by which the human race is preserved and its members multiplied. Mr. Alcott's theory requires him to respect all the Instincts, and why this less than others ? In attempting to eradicate it, he appears to us to be inconsistent with himself, and likely to encourage more prurient fancies than he will be able to suppress. Nature in this has provided better, in our judgment, for the preservation of chastity in thought and in deed, than man can do by any system of culture he can devise.

Pursuing the rules implied in these general principles, the educator aims to call forth into full glory and activity the grace and truth with which man is endowed. He labors to train up the human being committed to his care, in obedience to the Highest, to see, and respect, and love all things in the light, not of the senses, not of the intellect even, but of Faith, of Instinct, of the Spirit of God,—the “ true light, which enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world.” If he succeeds in realizing his aim, the result is a perfect Man, “ armed at all points, to use the Body, Nature, and Life for his growth and renewal, and to hold dominion over the fluctuating things of the Outward.” Realize this in the case of every child born into the world, and you have reformed the world,—made earth a heaven, and men the sons of God in very deed. This is the end Mr. Alcott contemplates ; this end he believes can be attained by his method of viewing and disciplining the soul, and by no other. Hence the magnitude of the work he is engaged in,—the importance of his doctrine, and his method of culture to the human race.

If now for the word *God*, we substitute the word *Spirit*, and call spirit absolute Being, and the absolute, the real universe, which lies back of the sensi-

ble universe and the intelligible, also spirit, and therefore regard all power, force, cause, reality, as spirit, and spirit everywhere as identical, we may, with the expositions we have made, attain to a proximate notion of Mr. Alcott's theory of God, Man, and Nature, as well as of Human Culture. He sees spirit everywhere, and in everything he seeks spirit. Spirit regarded as the cause and law of organization is God; spirit organized is the universe; spirit incarnated is man. An identity therefore runs through God, Man, and Nature; they are all one in the fulness of universal and everlasting spirit.

Spirit, though incarnate in the case of every human being, attains rarely to anything like a perfect manifestation. A perfect manifestation, however, is not to be expected, because there are no bounds to the growth of spirit. Many bright specimens of the worth men may attain to have been exhibited at distant intervals in the world's history; among which Moses, Socrates, and Jesus are the worthiest. Of these three Jesus stands first.

With this estimate of the character of Jesus, the Records of his life must of course be regarded as the most suitable text book for the educator. They give the children for their study the model nearest to perfection, that can as yet be found. Besides all this, the identity of spirit, and therefore of human nature in all ages and countries of the world, implies an identity between Jesus, or the Instincts of Jesus, and the Instincts of the child. The coincidence, which we may discover between the manifestations of the pure Instincts of Childhood and those recorded of Jesus, becomes therefore a proof of the accuracy of the Record. If we can reproduce in children, as yet unspoiled, the phenomena recorded of Jesus, then we have a new proof, and a strong proof, that the Record is a faithful one. These Conversations on the Gospels, therefore, so far as the answers of the children may be regarded as a reproduction of Jesus, the doctrines or precepts ascribed to Jesus, constitute a class

of evidence for Christianity, which the Christian theologian will find not without value.

These are, rudely and imperfectly sketched, the chief outlines of Mr. Alcott's system, so far as we have ourselves been able to comprehend it. Of the two volumes before us we will not attempt to form an estimate. Different minds will estimate them differently. That they do in part accomplish the end for which they were designed we think no one can reasonably deny. They may be read with profit by all students of the New Testament; and to minds of some quickness of apprehension they will open up, in that often read but poorly comprehended volume, many views of rich and varied beauty on which the soul may feast with delight. Parents and Sunday School teachers will find them a valuable help in their work of instructing their children, and in conversing with children on religious subjects; and to them we conscientiously commend these volumes, not for the doctrines they may be supposed to teach, but for the suggestions they contain, and for the method of approaching the young mind they in part unfold.

As it regards Mr. Alcott's religious and metaphysical system, we have not much to offer. We have aimed to state it, not to criticise it. It strikes us as neither absurd nor alarming. We see much truth in it, and we recognise in it the marks of a mind earnestly in love with truth and willing to labor to gain it. The system, though original with Mr. Alcott, is by no means new or peculiar. As a whole we do not embrace it. We differ from him in several essential particulars. We do not admit that identity between Man and God, and God and Nature, which he does. God is in his works; but he is also separate from them. Creation does not exhaust the Creator. Without Him his works are nothing; but He nevertheless *is*, and *all* He is, without them. I am in my intention, but my intention makes up no part of me. I am in the word I utter; and yet I am the same with-

out the word that I am with it. In uttering it I have put forth a creative energy, but I nevertheless retain, after uttering it and independently of it, all the creative energy I had before. So of God. The universe is his intention, his word, and we may find him in it; but he remains independent of it, and is no more identical with it, than my resolution is identical with the power I have of forming resolutions, or than my word is identical with the power that utters it. Mr. Alcott appears to us not to distinguish with sufficient accuracy between the Creation and the Creator. The relation of the universe to God, according to him, is the relation of a word to the idea it stands for, whereas we regard it as the relation of an effect to its cause. It would be hard for us to entertain his views, without becoming more pantheistic than we believe truth and piety warrant.

But notwithstanding this, Mr. Alcott's views of education, as he reduces them to practice, are unexceptionable. If he runs into an extreme in some cases, if he dwells too much in the Inward, and insists too much on Spontaneity, he probably goes not farther than is necessary to counteract the strong tendency in an opposite direction, which is the most striking characteristic of our schools as they are. What we regard as erroneous in his theory, can in the actual state of things amongst us have no bad effect. We have overlooked the Inward; we have lost our faith in the Spiritual; and it is well that a man comes amongst us, who persists in directing our attention to the voice of God that speaks to us, is ever speaking to us, in the soul of man. The Instincts, as Mr. Alcott calls them, are no doubt from God; they deserve to be studied and revered; we must, however, be on our guard that we do not become exclusively devoted to them, for if we do we shall become Mystics.

ART. IV. — *Philosophical Miscellanies, translated from the French of Cousin, Jouffroy, and Benjamin Constant. With Introductory and Critical Notices.* By GEORGE RIPLEY. Boston: Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1838. 2 vols. 12mo.

THESE two volumes are the first of a series of translations, Mr. Ripley proposes to bring out, from time to time, under the general title of *Specimens of Foreign Standard Literature*. The works he proposes to translate, or to cause to be translated, are the works in highest repute in France and Germany, the best works of the ablest scholars and most distinguished authors of the two nations in the departments of Philosophy, Theology, History, and General Literature. He will be assisted in this undertaking by some of our first scholars and most eminent literary men, and will, if he realizes his plan, give us not only specimens of foreign standard literature, but also specimens of correct and elegant translation.

Mr. Ripley's undertaking is a noble one, and one in which our whole country is deeply interested. The importance of reproducing in our own language the standard literature of other nations cannot easily be overrated. Every nation has its peculiar idea, its special manner of viewing things in general, and gives a prominence, a development to some one element of universal truth, which is given by no other nation. The literature of one nation has therefore always something peculiar to itself; something of value, which can be found in the literature of no other. The study of the literatures of different nations will necessarily tend, therefore, to liberalize our minds, to enlarge our ideas, and augment our sum of truth. Very few among us have the leisure or the opportunity to make ourselves sufficiently acquainted with foreign languages, to be able to relish the works of foreigners save in translations. It is always on translations that the great mass of the people must depend for

all the direct benefit they are to receive from the labors and researches of foreign scholars ; and it is the direct benefit of the great mass of the people, that the American scholar is bound always to consult.

If translations are to be made at all, they ought to be well made, and to be of the best works, the standard works of the languages from which they are made. We have many translations from the French and German, but in a majority of cases, perhaps, we may say of works that were hardly worth the translating. This may be said especially in reference to the German. The American public study Germany not in the mature productions of her ripest scholars. Second and third rate authors, and second and third rate performances, at best, are those most generally translated. This is a grievous wrong to Germany, for it compels us to judge her for altogether less than she is ; it is also a grievous wrong to ourselves, for it deprives us of a good we might receive, and which we need. Translations too are in general miserably executed, by persons who are in no sense whatever qualified to be translators. This perhaps is more especially the case in England than in this country. They are made too often by literary hacks, who must make them or starve, and who have no adequate knowledge of either the foreign language or their own, and not the faintest conception of the thought they undertake to reproduce. In consequence of want of taste and judgment in selecting the works to be translated, and of proper qualifications on the part of translators, translations in general, unless of purely scientific works, serve little other end than to encumber our book-shelves, corrupt the language, and overload it with foreign idioms and barbarous words and phrases. Both these evils are sought to be avoided by Mr. Ripley's plan, and will be, if his plan be realized, as we doubt not it must. His plan ensures us a French or German classic reproduced in English, and constituting ever after an English classic, whereby the intellectual and literary

treasures within reach of the mere English student will be greatly augmented, the language itself enriched and perfected, the national taste refined and purified, and the national character elevated.

We are also much in want of the works Mr. Ripley proposes to reproduce. We have much to learn in the departments of Philosophy, Theology, and History, from the literatures of France and Germany. We are comparatively a young people. We have had a savage world to subdue, primitive forests to clear away, material interests to provide for. Our hands have necessarily and rightly been employed, and our thoughts busy, in procuring the means of subsistence and in preparing the theatre of our future glory; and we have not had the leisure to pore over the records of the past, to push our inquiries into surrounding nature, to sit down and patiently watch the fleeting phenomena which rapidly pass and repass over the field of consciousness, or to engage with spirit and ardor in high and extensive literary pursuits. It is not our fault, then, if we are in some respects behind the cultivated nations of the Old World. We shall not be behind them long. There is a literature in the American soul, waiting but a favorable moment to burst forth, before which the most admired literatures of the Old World will shrink into insignificance, and be forgotten. This nation is destined to excel in every department of human activity. It now takes the lead in commercial and industrial activity; it will take the lead in the sciences and the arts. From us is, one day, light to radiate, as from the central sun, to illumine the moral and intellectual universe. To us shall come, from all lands, the statesman, the philosopher, the artist, to gain instruction and inspiration, as from the God-appointed prophets of Humanity. We need not blush, then, to avail ourselves for the moment of foreign resources. The capital we borrow from abroad we shall profitably invest, and be able soon to repay, and with usury too.

This is not all. We are now the literary vassals of

England, and continue to do homage to the mother country. Our literature is tame and servile, wanting in freshness, freedom, and originality. We write as Englishmen, not as Americans. We are afraid to think our own thoughts, to speak our own words, or to give utterance to the rich and gushing sentiments of our own hearts. And so must it be so long as we rely on England's literature as exclusively as we have hitherto done. Not indeed so much because that literature is not a good one. English literature, so long as it boasts a Shakspeare and a Milton, cannot suffer in comparison with the literature of any other nation. For ourselves we reverence it, and would on no account speak lightly of it. But it cramps our national genius, and exercises a tyrannical sway over the American mind. We cannot become independent and original, till we have in some degree weakened its empire. This will be best done by the study of the fresher, and in some respects superior literatures of continental Europe. We must bring in France and Germany to combat or neutralize England, so that our national spirit may gain the freedom to manifest itself.

Moreover, excellent as is the English literature, it is not exactly the literature for young republicans. England is the most aristocratic country in the world. Its literature is, with some noble exceptions, aristocratic. It is deficient in true reverence for man as man, wholly unconscious of the fact that man is everywhere equal to man. It is full of reverence for that mass of incongruities, the British Constitution, which contains more of the character of the institutions of the Middle Age, than any other constitution or form of government to be found in Europe. It bristles from beginning to end with Dukes and Duchesses, Lords and Ladies, and overflows with servility to the great, and with contempt, or what is worse, condescension for the little. The constant and exclusive study of a literature like this cannot fail to be deeply prejudicial to republican simplicity of thought and

taste, to create a sort of disgust for republican manners and institutions, and to make us sigh to reproduce, on American soil, the aristocratic manners and institutions of England. Things seen at a distance are always more enchanting than when seen close by. Did we live in England we should spurn her institutions; but seeing them only at a distance and through the idealizing medium of poetry and works of fiction, they appear unto us beautiful and exceedingly desirable. We think it would be a fine thing to be Dukes and Duchesses, Lords and Ladies, to wear titles, ribbons, stars, and coronets, and to be elevated above the vulgar herd. We grow weary of our democratic institutions, submit to them with an ill grace, and do what in us lies to hinder their free and beneficial working. It does not occur to us that those of us, who sigh to reproduce English institutions, might, were the thing done, possibly be at the foot instead of the summit of the new social hierarchy; nor do we reflect that a nobility is elevated to its height only by making the immense majority of the people serve as its pedestal. It may be pleasant to be one of the nobility, to stand with one's head far above one's fellows; but it is not very pleasant to be the pedestal on which another stands. We wish no brother man to appear tall because his feet stand on our head; and rather than be obliged to run the risk of having some vain, fat, ignorant, proud, titled mortal stand on our head, we choose to forego the pleasure of standing on another man's head.

The corrupting tendency of English literature in this respect, on our young men and young women too, is easy to be seen, and threatens to be disastrous. Patriotism dies out; love for democracy becomes extinct; and our own government, in proportion to its fidelity to American principles, becomes the object of the severest censure, the most uncompromising hostility, or the most withering ridicule. Our own writers cannot arrest the tendency; because a considerable portion of them, formed by the study of

English literature, are themselves carried away by it; and because the remainder are too few in number, and their voices, though clear and strong, are lost in the universal din of English voices, which we are continually importing. In other words, English works reprinted and circulated here are so much more numerous, and owing to the fact that they can be furnished much cheaper, are so much more extensively circulated than the works of native authors, that they overpower them, and almost wholly counteract their influence.

Now in this situation nothing can be more suitable or more succoring for us, than large importations of French and German literature. France and Germany are monarchical, it is true, but not aristocratic. Monarchy has been, in Europe in general, popular rather than aristocratic in its tendency. The people have in most countries less to dread from the monarch than from the noble. Monarchy raises one man indeed above, far above the people, but in doing this, it lessens or neutralizes to some extent the distinctions which obtain below it. The writings of French or even German scholars breathe altogether more of a democratic spirit than do those of the English. Those of the French are altogether more democratic than the writings of American scholars themselves. Then, again, we have in this country not much to fear from the monarchical tendency. There is nothing monarchical in the genius or temper of the American people. We remember yet the struggles our fathers had with the king, and that we are the descendants of those who dethroned Mary Stuart, and brought Charles Stuart to the scaffold. Then we have no powerful families as yet that could make interest for a throne, no individual influential enough, universally popular enough, or far enough elevated above his brethren, to be thought of in connexion with a crown. We have too long been accustomed to govern ourselves, too large a portion of our citizens have taken a direct share in the affairs of government, and may always

hope to take a direct share in them, to think of abandoning them to any one man. We can arrive at monarchy in this country only through aristocracy. We do not apprehend that this will ever be the case. The aristocratic tendency is the only tendency we have to apprehend serious danger from; but even this tendency will, we trust, be arrested before it shall have done any lasting injury to our institutions. The study of French and German literature will arrest this tendency. It will break the dominion of England; and, without excluding English literature, will furnish us new elements, and a broader and more democratic basis for our own.

We are also anxious that French and German literature should be cultivated among us, because it will correct in some measure the faults of our own democracy. One extreme always begets another. The tendency on the one hand to adore England, and approach English manners and institutions, begets on the other hand a tendency to a rabid radicalism, from which danger may be apprehended, but from which good is not to be looked for. If the wealthy, the cultivated, and literary, as is and has been too much the case, approach England, the democracy of the country becomes to a great degree deprived of the helps of refinement, cultivation, literature, and the conservative element which always goes with them. True democracy has always a conservative element, and is no less wedded to order than to liberty. It unites the two; and is always normal in its proceedings. It is broad enough to take in all Humanity, and free enough to allow all the elements of human nature to develop themselves fully and harmoniously. Now in English literature this is never the case. The element of order and its adherents are separated from the element of liberty and its adherents. The exclusive study of that literature has to a considerable extent produced the same result here. Hence our democracy becomes in some measure partial, exclusive, and able to enlist on its side only at best a small

majority of the nation. This is a serious evil, and it is that from which we have more to dread than from anything else whatever. Democracy so long as it is broad and comprehensive, so long as it is true to itself, and to all the elements of human nature, is invincible, and able to go forth "conquering and to conquer."

Now in the master-pieces of French and German literature we shall find the two great elements, of which we have spoken, always united and working in harmony. There is nothing rash, nothing violent, destructive. Progress, the perfectibility of man and society is admitted and contended for, at the same time peaceable and orderly means by which to effect it are pointed out. The tree has its natural growth, and by natural growth attains its height. It is not made higher by being plucked up by the roots, and held up by artificial means. Erudition, science, philosophy, religion, art, refinement, are all combined with the spirit of progress, and made subservient to the elevation of the people. The cultivation of French and German literature must have a similar effect here, and this is what we want, and what, if Mr. Ripley's plan succeeds, we shall have.

This too is the country in which the noble ideas of man and society, which French and German scholars strike out in their speculations, are to be first applied to practice, realized in institutions. There the scholar may study; there the philosopher may investigate man; there the politician may explore the city, and ascertain how the state should be organized; and there they all may deposite the result of their speculations, their researches, their inspirations in books; but, alas, in books only; for to them is wanting the theatre on which to act them out, the practical world in which to realize them. They have old institutions to combat; old prejudices to overcome; old castles and old churches to clear away; an old people to re-youth, before they can proceed to embody their ideas, or to reduce them to practice. More than all this, they

want the freedom to do it. Authority is against them, and armed soldiery are ready to repulse them. But here is a virgin soil, an open field, a new people, full of the future, with unbounded faith in ideas, and the most ample freedom. Here, if any where on earth, may the philosopher experiment on human nature, and demonstrate what man has it in him to be when and where he has the freedom and the means to be himself. Let Germany then explore the mines, and bring out the ore, let France smelt it, extract the pure metal, determine its weight and fineness, and we will work it up into vessels of ornament or utility, apply it to the practical purposes of life.

In passing from the proposed series of translations and the importance of the undertaking to the volumes before us, we would remark that, viewed simply as translations, they must possess in the estimation of every scholar a high worth. We doubt whether better specimens of translation are to be found in the language,—better specimens certainly *we* have never met. Familiar as we are with the originals, we read these translations with pleasure. They do not seem to be translations. They have all the freedom and freshness of original compositions. Yet they are faithful and literal even, altogether more so than translations in general. They are true reproductions, and could have been made only by a man who comprehended their subject-matter hardly less thoroughly than did their original authors. Mr. Ripley deserves high praise for the example he has set to all future translators. He has not only reproduced his authors, but he has done it in pure classic English, in which the most fastidious critic will be troubled to find a single idiom, word, or phrase at which to take offence. In doing this he has done much. He has proved that translations may be made without corrupting the language. He has also rendered an important service, in these volumes, to the philosophical student, by doing much to fix our philosophical language, and to free it from that vagueness

and uncertainty, which have heretofore so grievously afflicted all who have attempted to write or read on philosophical subjects.

The several pieces which make up these volumes are selected with great judgment and taste. They are, of their shorter productions, the most important productions of their authors, and are superior to any thing else of the kind that we know of in any language. They are so selected and arranged as to form, with the Introductory and Critical Notices by the translator, very nearly a continuous whole, and to constitute something like a regular treatise on the object, method, and history of philosophy, the philosophy of history, morals, and religion, and the destiny of man and society. The Notices are in part original, and in part selected or translated. They are of great value, and were other proof wanting, would prove the translator an acute critic, an accomplished scholar, an able philosopher, and a true and warm-hearted friend of his race.

As to the general merits of the authors of these Miscellanies, we refer our readers to the introductory notices by the translator. They are three authors, who are an honor to France, and to mankind. Benjamin Constant was long known throughout Europe as an ardent lover of liberty, as the devoted advocate of constitutional government, and as a distinguished literary and political writer. His great work, *De la Religion considérée dans sa Source, ses Formes, et ses Developpements*, exhibits much erudition, philosophic insight, and religious and philanthropic sentiment. We are glad to find that it is to be included in Mr. Ripley's series. It is just the work needed in the present state of religious doubt, indifference, and fanaticism in this country, and its study would do much to reconcile Faith and Reason, and to restore us to a pure, rational, and living faith in Christianity. Jouffroy is a profound psychologist, a clear and eloquent writer, and one of the ablest and safest moral philosophers, it has ever been our good fortune to meet. He was a

pupil of Cousin, is a professor of philosophy in the Faculty of Letters at Paris, and one of the principal disciples of the New French School. Cousin is well known as the chief of the New French Philosophy, and he is unquestionably, if not the first, one of the first philosophers of the age.

The subject-matter of these volumes is worthy of the most serious attention. The time has gone by in this country, when it could be accounted a mark of good taste or of superior wisdom to sneer at metaphysical studies. The public mind has been awakened, and mental and moral science is henceforth one of our most cherished studies. Men have outgrown tradition, and they begin to find themselves unable to legitimate their beliefs. They begin to be troubled with the problem of human destiny. They ask themselves, wherefore they are here ; what is the solution of the enigma of human existence ; what man knows, and wherefore he can know that he knows. They find themselves forced by the state of their spiritual affairs to give an account to themselves of themselves, of their knowledge and their belief, their hopes, fears, and doubts. They are compelled therefore to philosophize. And they must continue to philosophize, for the problem once raised, it will not down till it is solved. Every work therefore that treats on this problem which torments the soul, every work which proposes to aid us to meet this inward questioning, of which we have become conscious, and which we indulge more and more every day, must be hailed with joy, and sought after with avidity. We have lost the early faith of childhood, we have arraigned the catechism, and we must now wear out a life of painful doubt, or attain to a rational conviction.

These Miscellanies will aid us. They state with great clearness and distinctness the principal problems which have tormented the soul in all ages ; and if they do not solve them, they at least give us the law of their solution. If they do not give us a philosophy which is perfectly satisfactory, which exhausts human

nature, they do give us the true method of philosophizing, of legitimating scientifically the universal beliefs of mankind. More appropriate to the present state of the public mind they could not be. The scholar will read them with delight; the divine, the moralist, the statesman will find them invaluable in directing them in the discharge of their several functions, and in solving the theological, moral, and political doubts they everywhere meet, and which seem almost to paralyze the spiritual powers of man. They are full of masculine thought. They breathe a liberal tone, assert with earnestness and power the rights and the worth of man, as man, and show a profound reverence for truth, beauty, goodness,—God. They are just the volumes for us young Americans, to quicken within us a sense of the dignity and reach of our mission, to kindle our faith in ourselves and in Providence, and to enable us to elaborate the glorious future which awaits mankind.

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- ART. V. — 1. *Principles and Results of the Ministry at Large in Boston.* By JOSEPH TUCKERMAN. Boston: James Munroe & Co. 1838. 12mo. pp. 327.
2. *Affaires de Rome. Mémoires adressés au Pape; des Maux de l'Église et de la Société, et des Moyens d'y remédier.* Par M. F. DE LA MENNAIS. Bruxelles: J. P. Meline. 1837.
3. *Paroles d'un Croyant. Septième Édition, augmentée de De l'Absolutisme et de la Liberté.* Par le même. Paris: Eugène Renduel. 1834. 8vo.

It is not our intention in this article to review at length the works, the titles of which we have quoted, though we desist from doing it not without much self-denial. We have introduced these works together

because they have something kindred in their spirit and object, and because they show us men, reared in widely different communions and countries, coming to virtually the same general conclusions. Dr. Tuckerman's work needs no commendation from us in this community. His own character and the Ministry, with which he has inseparably connected his name, speak for him as no reviewer can. The works of the Abbé de la Mennais, here introduced, are not his greatest works, but the most in consonance with our present purpose of any we have seen. They possess a high value, and should be in the hands of every one who believes Christianity has yet a mission to fulfil.

In a foregoing article we have endeavored to prove that the natural association of men of letters is with the democracy; we design in what follows to present some considerations which may tend to show, that the natural association of the clergy and of Christians generally is also with the democracy.

In attempting to do this we shall enter into no discussion concerning theological dogmas; we shall take sides with no sect, and show a preference for no particular communion; we shall by no means approach the borders of another world, and attempt to determine the happiness or the misery that awaits us hereafter, or the means of gaining the one or avoiding the other. We propose to speak of Christianity merely in its social and political aspects, in its bearings upon man's earthly condition.

We regard the mission of Jesus as twofold. One of its objects, and perhaps its most important object, was to make an atonement for sin, and raise man to God and heaven in the world to come. Of this object, — the more exclusively theological object, — we have nothing to say in this journal. The other object of his mission was to found a new order of things on the earth, to establish a kingdom of righteousness and peace for men while yet in the flesh. In this sense Christianity has a social and political character.

In its social and political character, Christianity has been too seldom considered. The clergy have rarely presented it in any other character than that in which it relates to another world. They have dwelt on its power to create a heaven for the sanctified soul hereafter; but only incidentally have they touched upon its power to create a heaven for the human race on the earth. They have boasted its efficacy in preparing us to die; but rarely its efficacy in preparing us to live. To hear them, one would be led to suppose that the great object of our thoughts and efforts should be to get out of the world the easiest way we can, and that the great value of religion consists in its ability to aid us in accomplishing this laudable object. Yet who knows not to live knows not to die; and who studies not to create a paradise here, may, perhaps, doubt whether he shall find the gates of a paradise open to him hereafter.

We risk nothing in saying that the great object of Christianity is to raise us all up to "the stature of perfect men in Christ Jesus." In order to accomplish this object, it must neglect no element of human nature. Man's whole nature must be accepted, freely and harmoniously developed, or he cannot be perfected. Leave out of the account that part of his nature which connects him with the Unseen, the Eternal, and the Immutable, and bestow what care you will upon what remains, and he will be forever dwarfed in his growth. Nor different will be the result if you call forth into full activity his religious elements, but neglect those by which he is led to found the state and live in society. If then man is to be perfected by the aid of Christianity, Christianity must accept and develop his social and political nature, as well as his religious nature.

This granted, it follows that Christianity has concern no less with politics than with theology, with earth than with heaven, with time than with eternity. Whatever relates to forms of government, to state policy, to the actual or possible condition of men, to

the actual or possible influences which combine or may combine in the formation of character, it must concern itself with, as well as with what relates to theological dogmas, or religious rites and ceremonies. It must have instructions for us as statesmen and as citizens, as well as instructions for us as church members, dreaming only of saving our souls in a world to come.

And what in its social and political character does Christianity teach us? What cause does it espouse? Does it take sides with the people, or with the people's masters? Does it declare all men equal before God, and consequently equal among themselves; or does it show us the Father as instituting and approving the social distinctions which obtain in civilized communities, and thinking twice, as a French lady has it, before damning persons of a given quality? Does it teach us that the many were created to be used by the few? Was Jesus the prophet of kings, hierarchies, nobilities, the rich, the great, the powerful; or was he the prophet of the democracy, sent from God to preach glad tidings to the poor? In a word, is the natural position of Christians, so far forth as they are Christians, with the aristocracy, or with the democracy, with those who would govern the people, or with those who would clear the field for the people to govern themselves? We will let the Abbé de la Mennais speak for awhile. Perhaps we can gather the answer to these questions from what he shall tell us.

“Two doctrines, two systems dispute to-day the empire of the world, — the doctrine of Liberty and the doctrine of Absolutism; the system which would found society on Right and that which would yield it up to brute force. On the triumph of one or the other will depend the future destinies of the human race. If victory remain with brute force, men, bowed to the earth like beasts, dull, mute, panting, hastened by the whip of the master, will go through life moistening with their sweat and tears the rude furrows they must turn up, and without hope, save that of burying in the grave at last the grievous burden of their misery. But if Right obtain the victory, the human race will pursue its course with its head

erect, its brow serene, and its eye fixed on the future, the radiant sanctuary where Providence has deposited the rewards promised to its persevering efforts.

"The struggle between these two systems becomes every day more violent. On one side are the people, their patience exhausted, burning with desire and hope, stirred even to the bottom of their hearts by the long dormant but now awakened instinct of all that which constitutes the real dignity and grandeur of man, strong by their faith in justice, by their love of liberty — which rightly comprehended is true order, — and by their unflinching resolution to conquer; on the other side, are the absolute governments, with their soldiers and agents of all sorts, their public resources, money, credit, and the innumerable advantages of an organization, all the parts of which hold together, are mutually interlinked, and afford one another a reciprocal support, whilst it isolates, restrains all outside of itself, and renders all movement impossible, except between the sabres of a couple of *gendarmes*, and all speech out of the question, except in the ears of a couple of spies.

"Nothing at first sight can seem more unequal than the respective forces of these two opposite camps. But let it be observed, on the one hand, that in proportion as the armies are more numerous, the more immediately are they from the people, and the more thoughts, wishes, and feelings must they have in common with the people; the people in fine themselves, having in the main, however it may be attempted to persuade them to the contrary, no interests but their own, cannot be made to submit, for a great while to come, to be mere passive instruments in the hands of their oppressors. Let it also be observed, on the other hand, that the excessive expenses which the maintenance of these armies exacts, involving sooner or later universal bankruptcy, which becomes every day more and more threatening to every European state, must hasten the moment when these huge masses of men will be dissolved for the want of the means to keep them on foot. Besides, experience proves that in a contest between two forces, one material, the other moral, the last in the long run is always sure to triumph. Now moral force or power is wholly on the side of the people. To be convinced of this, we need but consider for a moment in themselves the system of Liberty defended by the people, and the system of Absolutism which the Sovereigns have undertaken to make prevail for their own profit.

"Liberty, which has its root in the holiest and most impre-

scriptible laws of human nature, would represent perfect order, were it possible to realize perfect order on earth. But if this perfection be denied to man, by reason of the internal disease with which he is afflicted, it nevertheless should be regarded as the goal to which he should tend, the end towards which he should unceasingly direct all his efforts. Neither the people nor individuals can in this life be wholly delivered from their infirmities, which to a certain extent are inseparable from them ; but it is the duty of both to be constantly advancing in the cure which begins here, to be completed elsewhere. Whence it follows, that society, progressive by its very nature, must involve continual changes, successive revolutions. We are frightened at this word revolution, and we well may be, if we understand by it the disorders produced by selfish interests and heated passions in the bosom of a nation, in which new ideas and new hopes are fermenting. But revolutions which mark an onward step taken in true civilization, and open thus a happier era, revolutions which spring from the development of the sense of justice, have assuredly in their result a character altogether different ; and instead of being dreaded as curses, whatever the sufferings which accompany them, they ought to be hailed as blessings from God, and as striking proofs of the influence he exercises over the general destinies of Humanity. They are, so to speak, God manifested to our senses in the world. For certainly these transformations which change the condition of mankind by elevating it, these sudden gales which drive us, albeit now and then athwart rocks or shoals, towards more fortunate shores, have in them something that is divine.

“ The most radical revolution, taking it in all its bearings, which the human race has in fact ever undergone, was, without any comparison, the establishment of Christianity ; and that which has been going on in Europe for the last fifty years is nothing but a continuation of it. Who sees not this is totally incapable of seeing anything, and more incapable yet of comprehending contemporaneous events. Eighteen hundred years of social labor have hardly sufficed to prepare these events. For what is now the question ? Is it merely to modify some of the forms of power, to reform a few abuses, and introduce into the laws a few amendments which every body judges to be necessary ? Not at all. It is not this which so powerfully agitates and stirs up the people. With them it is a question of substituting, in relation to the very foundations of social order, one principle for another, the equality of nature for the inequality of blood, the liberty of all for the native and abso-

lute dominion of a few. And what is this but Christianity diffusing itself outside of the purely religious society, and quickening with its puissant life the political world, after having perfected the moral and intellectual world, far beyond what the most sanguine formerly dared hope?

"Christianity lays down as the fundamental principle of its doctrine, under the point of view we are now considering it, the equality of men before God, or the equal rights of all the members of the human family. And on this subject we may remark, that this important doctrine has no historical and philosophical value, unless we admit the unity of the race, without which evidently one race might be naturally superior to another, as Aristotle among the ancients maintained. The Christian doctrine, therefore, which in conformity with ancient traditions teaches that the human race springs from one and the same stock, is unquestionably the most favorable to Humanity, and ought to be guarded with the greatest care, as the very foundation of all reciprocally equal justice, and of all equitable society. In this respect, science, which at times is quite too hardy in its physiological conjectures, has some important duties to fulfil.

"The principle of the equality of men before God necessarily brings forth another, which is only its development, or rather its application, namely, the equality of men among themselves, or social equality; for should there exist under this relation any essential and radical inequality relative to rights, this inequality would render them primarily unequal before God. Religious equality tends therefore to produce, as its consequence and complement, civil and political equality. Now civil and political equality has, for its form, liberty; for it excludes fundamentally all power of man over man, and obliges us to conceive, in the outset, society, the state, under the idea of a free association, the object of which is to guaranty to each of its members his rights, that is, his liberty, his native independence.

"These rights guarantied by the association are of two orders. First, spiritual rights of thought and of conscience, which are held from God only, whether he be considered as the author of the moral law, which binds all intelligent beings together, and to which they owe voluntary obedience, or as the primal source of all virtue and of all reason. Second, rights of a secondary order, so to speak, material, relative to the body, to organism, and which are reduced in their essence to the right of preserving life, that is, of organism itself, and the external things necessary to its preservation. These external things are called property.

"It follows from this that, as the direct object of all true society is to guaranty right, it must, in order to realize this object, guaranty to each and all of its members, in the external order, liberty of thought and conscience, and the liberty of living and acting, or the liberty of person and property.

"Liberty of thought and of conscience, in union with the recognition of a moral spiritual law, that alone which makes man sociable, precedes the free association, or the institution of the state, and is its indispensable condition. This law, no more than the liberty which corresponds to it, namely, the civil liberty of thought and conscience, can therefore in any manner whatever be made to depend on the social compact, or a subject of the explicit or implicit preliminary deliberations which the formation of the social compact supposes; and consequently civil and political law, possessing no power to pass any statutes on this primitive right, which it can neither create nor destroy, and which it must protect against all acts that would impair it, respects it as superior to itself, prohibits and punishes, as offences against society, certain acts which are hostile to it; but it does not establish it by any of its prescriptions.

"Personal liberty, or the right to live and act freely, implies the absence of all will, of all authority that would impose arbitrary restrictions upon this liberty itself; that is, it implies the coöperation of each member of society in support of the fundamental law of society.

"The natural element of society, relative to human organization, or to the constitution of the state, is not the individual, but the family; because the element of society should be able like society to perpetuate itself; and because the individual dies, but family is immortal.

"Family is composed of the father, the principle of generation, of the wife, who is its medium, and of the child, which is its expression. These three together constitute the organic man, man reproductive, perpetuated, — man that does not die.

"Hence it follows that marriage, without which there is no family, is in this respect the first basis of society.

"The second basis of society is property, for without property life is not possible. Now as life is not arrested in its transmission, property should not be; it should be hereditary like life, because it is inseparable from it. And since man cannot live without some property, permanent or transitory, it follows that he cannot be free and independent in his person, if his property be dependent, if he be not the sovereign master of his field, his house, his industry, his labor.

"Liberty of property and property itself may be attacked in three ways: first, by attributing to the state, or its chief, a paramount right of domain, which would be at bottom only an indirect and arbitrary power of life and death over all the members of the state; second, by attributing to the state, or its chief, the right to collect, under the title of impost or tax, some portion of the revenues of property, without the consent of its owners; for this right, to which it would be impossible to assign any fixed limits, would imply that of seizing the totality of the revenues of property, or pure and simple confiscation; the third is to attribute in any degree whatever to the state, or to its chief, the right of administering the property of its members; for the right of administering one's own property is inherent in the very right of property itself, without which it would be purely fictitious.

"We can now comprehend how that the movement, which is everywhere remarked among Christian nations, is only the social action of Christianity itself, which continually tends to realize, in the political and civil order, the liberties, which the fundamental maxim of the equality of men before God contains in germ; and consequently, to free the spiritual man entirely from all human control, and property from all arbitrary dependence on government. Now this object can be obtained only by a social organization, the double character of which shall be the exclusion of all constraint in the spiritual order, and all intervention of government in the administration of property, or special interests, whether individual or collective. In this regard, government, the simple executor of the law made by all, or by the delegates of all, will merely take care that no one overstep the boundary of his own rights, or do violence to the rights or liberty of others.

"Spiritual liberty has for its expression liberty of religion or of worship, liberty of teaching, liberty of the press, and of association. When one of these, especially the last, is not complete, the others are but so many empty names. Ask not then under what form of society live the people thus deprived of their natural rights; ask rather under what tyranny they live.

"Liberty of person and of property has for its foundation election, combined with a system of free administrations within the limits we have determined. There is in fact no liberty, where the agents of power are not responsible, and where they are really responsible they cannot be hereditary. If the one be real, the other must be fictitious, and reciprocally.

"On the hypothesis of hereditary government no remedy for its abuses can be offered but the maxim supposed to be

implied of the amissibility of power. But power may be amissible in two ways, one regular, the other violent; that is, by election and by insurrection. Who can hesitate between the two? And what is it to organize society, but precisely the same thing it is to establish a series of means which, as far as human foresight can go, shall render it unnecessary, in order to save invaded rights, to recur to the dangerous hazard of insurrection?

"Such are the principles the people are instinctively seeking to realize, and which they will realize sooner or later most assuredly; for a right once known is a right conquered. Man never renounces a right which has once revealed itself to him as just. If he would do it, he could not. His nature would oppose him. And in this opposition is that very moral power, which is always sure to triumph in its struggles with material force.

"With the doctrines of Liberty now compare the doctrines of Absolutism. We will draw these from documents of unquestionable authority. The first two are Catechisms, published by the express order of the Emperor of Russia and the Emperor of Austria. The third is a semi-official writing, which produced, some years since, a very lively sensation in Italy, where the governments took great pains to circulate a large number of copies. We will speak first of the Catechisms.

"His Apostolic Majesty of Austria teaches the little children of his Empire, that the persons as well as the goods of his subjects belong to him, that he is absolute master, and may dispose of them as seemeth to him good. This doctrine, if it find credence, has the advantage of simplifying, to a marvellous degree, the whole administration of government. Does the Emperor need money or soldiers? He has but to say to one, Give me thy purse, and to another, Give me thy son. All is his, all without exception. This is his gospel, the *good news*, which he commands to be preached to the people in the name of Jesus Christ. And apparently for fear that, through mistake or evil intention, the purity of these maxims should be impaired in the Christian pulpit, he orders that the priests in certain places, in Milan for instance, be constrained to submit their sermons, before pronouncing them, to the superior lights of the police! The minds of the people and their hearts too, in the case of the Italians especially, must needs be very corrupt not to bless such an order of government! When the people become so ungrateful to their sove-

reigns, what can they look for but the vengeance of Heaven, and the end of this guilty world?

"We have just seen that the Emperor of Austria has a very lofty idea of himself and his rights; but it is nothing by the side of the Czar Nicholas. The head of a church foreign to Catholicism, he yet believes it, — so does his zeal for the truth devour him, — his duty to concern himself with the religious instructions of his Catholic subjects; and in a Catechism, printed at Wilna, and taught officially in all the schools and churches, he teaches them how they are to *adore* the autocrat, and explains to them, with great unction, the religious *worship* they are bound in conscience to offer him. Is he not for them, in fact, not merely the image but a real incarnation of the Divinity? Down on your knees! His will is the sovereign order! his commandment the law! Goods, life, all must be lavished, all must be sacrificed at the first nod of the Tartar-God. His subjects must love him from the bottom of their hearts, obey him, whatever he ordains, and never suffer themselves to complain, even in secret; but follow the example of Jesus Christ, *who submitted without a murmur to the sentence of death pronounced against him by the legitimate authority.* The pen drops from my hand. It was reserved for this man to enlarge the borders of blasphemy." — *Paroles d'un Croyant. De l'Absolutisme et de la Liberté.* pp. 203–214.

The other document referred to is entitled *Dialoghi sulle materie correnti nell' anno 1831*, and from the account the Abbé de la Mennais gives of it, (for we know it only through him,) it must be a very interesting production. It gives us, he says, "under forms sometimes grossly burlesque, sometimes downright atrocious, the whole system of Absolutism, with a frankness and a fidelity to be sought for in vain elsewhere. Here is no reticence, no hypocrisy; all is naked. One might call it a candid *proces-verbal* of the counsels of Pandemonium. The author, in more than one place, appears to be very indignant that a timid policy, through prudential considerations, should sometimes judge it necessary to veil, modify, soften the doctrines which are at bottom its invariable rule. As for us, who prefer above all things a language clear, precise, exempt from all falsehood, circumlocution, or equivocation, we are so far from blaming this

fiery defender of despotism for his contempt of those wily and pusillanimous managements, that we really thank him for the brutal sincerity of his convictions and of his speech. The word which others retain upon their lips he utters in a loud and distinct voice. This is surely much the best." But interesting as the document is in itself, and notwithstanding the light it throws on the system of Absolutism, and the designs according to which the sovereigns of Europe regulate their conduct, we must pass it over with merely two or three extracts. The system it unveils must strike every citizen of this country, at all imbued with the spirit of our institutions, as absolutely atrocious. This system is as simple as it is revolting. "God has given the people to the kings. The people belong to the king in like manner as your flocks and herds belong to you; they are their property, their *patrimony*. This is all. Conditions, compacts, charters,—such things must not be dreamed of, that is clear." The doctrine of these Dialogues, we suppose, is contained in the Letter which Experience is represented as addressing to the European Sovereigns. We extract a few paragraphs.

"When, in order to restrain the wicked, it is not sufficient to raise the voice, you must raise the hand and punish, and let the punishment be both certain and severe. Those who meditate the overturning of the world have taken their measures from afar, and prepared impunity for themselves and adherents by *preaching humanity and the moderation of penalties*.

"For some time you have allowed yourselves to be seduced by their nonsense, and in order to be gentle and merciful, you have ceased to be just. Thus has the way been opened for the introduction of all iniquity. The certainty of pardon has loosened the restraints imposed by fear, and for each criminal absolved, a hundred faithful subjects have become criminals. Retrace your steps; and if you would have few to condemn, be sure that you condemn inexorably. Forbearance has been tried, and proved to produce only evil; *make trial of blood*, and you will soon see that it will no longer be the fashion to profess oneself a rebel. Begin with small offences which lead to great ones, and be sure that the punishments

you inflict be *severe and terrible*. The ferocious souls of base wretches are not to be frightened by infantile chastisements, advised by a silly philosophy. God, who is the father of mercies, has created a hell for the punishment of the sinner, and the *creation of a hell serves in a marvellous manner to people heaven*. Would you spare innocent blood, be persuaded that HE IS THE BEST PRINCE WHO HAS A HANGMAN FOR HIS PRIME MINISTER." — pp. 224, 225.

This is not precisely the language held by those who amongst us labor for the melioration of our criminal code, but it will no doubt be acceptable to those who still believe there is use in inflicting capital punishment. But here is an extract we commend to the grave consideration of the advocates of universal education.

"One great cause of the disorder, which now obtains in the world, is the too wide diffusion of Literature, and that itching desire for reading which has penetrated the very bones of even fishermen and hostlers. Literary and scientific men are doubtless needed in the world, and so too are shoemakers, tailors, blacksmiths, ploughmen, and artisans of all sorts. It is always necessary to have a great mass of tranquil and honest folks, who can be contented to live on the faith of others, and who are satisfied to have the world guided by the intelligence of others, without aspiring to guide it by their own. *For all these folks reading is dangerous ; because it stimulates minds which nature predestinated to a narrow sphere, gives rise to doubts which their limited information cannot solve, accustoms them to intellectual pleasures which render labor monotonous and wearisome, quickens desires out of all keeping with their humble condition, and by rendering them discontented with their lot, leads them to attempt to procure another.*

"This is wherefore instead of favoring unlimited instruction and civilization (*civiltà*) you should, with prudence, set some bounds to them. Were there a master found who could in a single lesson make all men as learned and as scientific as Aristotle, and as polite as the Grand Chamberlain of the king of France, it would be necessary to knock him in head forthwith, so that society should not be destroyed. Reserve books and studies for the *higher classes* and for such extraordinary geniuses as may break through the obscurity of their condition ; let the cobbler stick to his last, the peasant be contented with his mattock, without striving to spoil both heart and head by learn-

ing the Alphabet. In consequence of a mistaken diffusion of literature, and disproportioned culture, an innumerable race of clowns and catch-pennies have turned society into chaos, by attempting in *spite of nature* to associate themselves with the higher classes, and you are compelled to skin one half of your people to make breeches for the other half; who, born to live by the axe and spade, demand places and pensions, and pretend to obtain the means of living, and of living well, by their pen. All these petty sages, without solid study or judgment, all these diminutive lords, with patrimony insufficient to boil a pot, have naturally in their hearts discontent and envy, and are combustible materials ever ready to be kindled into a revolution. The fatal propagation of letters has collected this inflammable mass; and by an adroit and discreet diminution of culture, you must stifle the flames of a self-styled philosophy, and remove the train from your thrones.

* * * *

“Above all, if you would keep the people quiet, secure your thrones, and cure the disorders of the world, you must bring back respect for religion, which, everywhere derided and rejected, finds no safe asylum, no not even in the temples. Ministers of the altar are become the scoff of the people, and their very name serves with the vulgar to designate all sorts of extravagance and baseness. . . . This hatred and this contempt of religion is the work of the revolution allied to impiety; and you cannot but be aware that the blows struck at religion have shaken your thrones and threatened to demolish them. And what have you done to reestablish in the hearts of the people religion, that protector of thrones? And where is the king whose zeal is ardent for the cause of God? Princes, you are yourselves good and religious, but are the goodness and religion of kings always the power which governs states? Does it never happen that religion may rule in the heart of kings, and yet become the tool of the interests and policy of cabinets? Lay your hands upon your breasts and answer me truly, which one of your kingdoms is it, in which a volume of edicts and royal ordinances may not be collected in opposition to the canons of the Church? which of your palaces is it, in which there is no saloon ornamented with the spoils of the sanctuary? which one of your governments is it, that has not compelled the Pastor of the Vatican to weep? So long as religion, struck by kings, stands trembling before their thrones, how can it regain its dominion over the hearts of the people? And so long as the people do not respect the restraints of religion, how can they be expected to submit to the empire of

kings? Princes, comprehend, ponder, and hope; league yourselves in good faith with the priesthood; and without placing yourselves under its feet, give it your hand; for though you are the first born, you are nevertheless children of the Church. Accord with that wise, discreet, and pious mother, employ speech, example, address, clemency, and severity to heal the wounds of religion. Raise again the stones of the altar, and its solidity shall give strength and permanency to your thrones.

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"What we have thus far read," says the Abbé in conclusion, "is then only the *secret* thought of those who now govern the world. And what in fact are they doing everywhere, but conforming to it in their practice? Thus we know their object and what they hope to accomplish. What most strikes us in this theory of despotism is its perfect consistency as a whole; attempt to modify it on any one point, and the whole system crumbles to pieces. Counsels in appearance the most exaggerated, maxims the most atrocious, are the legitimate consequences of the principle, the triumph of which is to be secured. There are no means of avoiding them. The inflexible logic of things, invincible necessity, leads to this result; and when I see everywhere princes or their agents carrying out these execrable principles into practice, I censure the men far less than the doctrines which rule them. Slaves of their own tyranny, they are compelled to forego every sentiment of justice, piety, fraternal love, to divest themselves of the human form, to be clothed with that of I know not what infernal phantom. Marked in the forehead with a fearful sign, God has decided that their aspect should shock the earth, so that the horror they inspire might begin for them here below the punishment of hell, to which they are doomed.

"But examine somewhat closely this system, which is presented as a perfect model of social organization. At the summit is placed the absolute prince who may do whatever he will; by his side stands the hangman; all else, men and property, are his *patrimony*. But there will at least be equality of servitude, equality of wretchedness? Alas, no. Below the prince are two distinct races, eternally separated; to the one wealth, instruction, information; to the other labor, ignorance, the bed of straw, and *polenta*, (the food of the lazzaroni of Naples,) the entire and eternal deprivation of the *dangerous pleasures of the intellect*, hopeless poverty, and an irrevocable brutishness. This last race is properly compared to beasts of burden. *Nature has made it what it is*, and that it must remain. But beasts of burden have plenty of proven-

der and fresh straw on which to rest. The plebeian merits not so much.

"In the society confided to the care of the hangman, the *galley-slave is more fortunate than the laborer, and the prison is sweeter than the domestic fireside*. This is indeed an anomaly, but what shall we do to make it disappear? Meliorate the condition of the workingmen? Allow some rays of enjoyment to pierce the roof of the dark hovel of the poor? What say you? These are the *whimsies* of a silly philosophy. What then shall we do? Consult Experience? She will tell us that to restore the monarchical felicity of former times, and bring back order into all things, it is necessary to augment the horrors of the prison, and the tortures of the galley, in a word, to create a hell upon earth.

"We cannot believe that such a doctrine is destined to prevail henceforth in the world, that it can succeed in stifling the love of liberty, which is now rising into a flame in the hearts of the people. In vain you abuse force, imprison, torture, kill; neither cudgellings, nor fetters, nor musket balls can disannul the eternal laws of God and Humanity. You may say, and cause to be said, that in struggling against your despotism, in claiming the political and civil enfranchisement of the people, in laboring to redress their wrongs, to solace their unutterable sufferings, to elevate their social condition, that we shake the foundation of all society, provoke disorder, and violate the precepts of Christianity; but, *it is too late*; these means are now used up. For in our turn, we may ask, what then for you is society, order, and Christianity? We may, we *will* ask you to show the act of cession, by which God and Christ have delivered over the human race to you, as your inheritance?" — pp. 230 — 237.

Here are the two doctrines, the two systems, which are now disputing the empire of the world. The cause of Liberty is the cause of the people, the democratic cause. The cause of Absolutism is the cause of the people's masters and oppressors. Which of these two causes does Christianity espouse? Christianity, says the Abbé, espouses the democratic cause, the cause of the people; for the liberty the people are seeking to realize, is nothing but the social and political application of Christianity. From this he draws the very natural inference that Christians, that the church, ought to espouse the popular cause, league with the people, and not with the sovereigns.

The governments throughout all Europe are in one sense distinct from the people, and have interests of their own in opposition to the people's interests. They everywhere oppose the system of Liberty, and consequently the people who are laboring to realize it. They everywhere are seeking to reëstablish, or to perpetuate a system of absolute rule, which reduces the millions to complete slavery in person and in property. And in this nefarious design the sovereigns have the hearty coöperation of the church,—in all its divisions and subdivisions. The church, throughout all Europe, leagues with the governments, clothes their arbitrary authority with the sacred character of legitimacy, and shelters them with its spiritual ægis from the arrows of popular indignation. Instead of speaking to the people in tones of sympathy and encouragement, instead of feeding the holy love of Liberty burning in their hearts, firing them with the zeal, the energy, the indomitable will to be free, to rise from their thralldom, and to be men, and men in a condition to show forth the virtues and the bearing of men, it steps in between them and their tyrants, commands them in the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost to desist; and assures them that another step forward is taken at the hazard of the vengeance of the sovereign, the curse of the church here, and the curse of God hereafter.

This is now the position of the church throughout the Old World. And its position, allowance made for the difference of political institutions, is very much the same here. Here the government is founded on Right, and is with the people. Our government is an attempt to realize the doctrine of Liberty. Here therefore the church, to favor the cause of Liberty, is not called upon to side with the people against the government. We have no war between the people and the government, for the government is but the simple executor of the popular will. The true position of the church here, if it would be the friend of Liberty, is to side with the government, or rather

with the cause the government in theory represents; and its duty in this case would be to explain to its members and, by all the legitimate authority it possesses, induce them to cherish the principles on which our political institutions are founded. Does it do this? Not at all. It is here an opponent of the government, and of course an opponent of the people, inasmuch as it opposes the government of the people's choice. It is as faithful to the doctrine of Absolutism, as it can be in a democratic country. It is here a disturbing force, and anti-popular in its influence. The people find it here, as elsewhere, a let and a hindrance. Its ministers, with comparatively few exceptions, have no sympathies with the democracy. They have been educated in schools into which the utmost care is taken to prevent the spirit of the age from penetrating; and they are educated to look for the golden age in the past, not in the future. They read old books, or old books reproduced, form their minds in the study of the aristocratic literature of England, treasure up old maxims, and sympathize almost entirely with their European brethren. They have no confidence in the people,—of whom they know but little,—no just conceptions of the rights and the worth of man, no dream that they are set apart to the holy work of realizing a kingdom of freedom, righteousness, and peace on the earth. They are ill-informed, thoughtless, or apparently thoughtless, as to the destiny of man in this life; sometimes, indeed, they are zealous in some partial reform, which they endanger by their indiscreet zeal; at other times so prudent as to be useless, except to serve as drawbacks upon the democracy, and to give the alarm when the prophet from God speaks, or to cry out "blasphemy," when a brother pleads for the rights of man, and calls upon the people to take possession of their rights.

We know very well that the clergy will not admit our statement to its full extent, because they probably are in some sense like those who crucified Jesus, doing they know not what. We charge them with

no evil intention. We are not their judges. They seem to us to be entirely ignorant of their true position and of their real duty. Not many of them, — perhaps none of them, — would maintain, in general thesis, the doctrine of Absolutism, and most of them, we are inclined to believe, regard themselves as friendly to liberty. Nevertheless they are not truly democratic.

The doctrine of Liberty in the main is realized politically in this country; but not yet socially. The form of government is free, but the people are not all of them as yet imbued with the true spirit of freedom. A large party in the country are laboring to secure the adoption of measures which may render even our political freedom insecure. But be this as it may; there is a wide discrepancy in American society between the theory we have avowed in our institutions, and the principles according to which we regulate our practice. If we have realized political equality, we have not yet realized social equality. We have here, in this blessed land of equality, vast multitudes who are yet far below the rank to which man is entitled. The doctrine of Liberty here leads us to labor for the realization of social equality. In Europe the doctrine must be applied politically, to the forms of the government, to the constitution of the state; but here its application requires us to labor for the abolition of all artificial distinctions, of all inequalities of ranks or classes, and of all differences in the social position of members of the same community, not growing out of differences founded in nature, or in moral worth. It requires us to labor to make every man a man, neither more nor less than man.

Well, do the clergy understand this? Do they exert themselves to do this? Do they in their conversation, their sermons, their publications, countenance an equality of the kind we have stated? Do they teach that men are equal, have equal rights, and that it is impossible for them to enjoy equal rights in a

social state, where great inequality of conditions obtains? Do they make the poor conscious of their rights, feel that they are men, and were not born to be used by their more fortunate neighbors? We fear they do not. They preach that all the distinctions which obtain in society are the appointment, the express appointment of God; and that he who attempts to do them away is not only visionary but impious. They preach to the poor, to the down-trodden, we admit; but they preach submission, and quiet. Keep quiet, they say to those they regard as the lower class, submit to the order of things you find established. God has wisely ordered distinctions in society, made some to be great and others to be small, some to be rich and others to be poor. It is necessary for the beauty and harmony of society, that some should be at the base of society, as well as some at its summit. Do not be envious of those above you. Do not complain of the rich and prosperous. You cannot all be rich and distinguished. They who are above you have cares and anxieties you know not of. The tallest oaks feel most the fury of the blast. The humble reed is sheltered at their feet, and soon recovers its erect position, if perchance a passing wind bend it to the ground. The distinctions you complain of are the sources of your greatest happiness, and of some of the noblest virtues of which human nature is capable. Were all equal, where would be gratitude for benefits received, where were the protection and kindness which the favored show the unfortunate? If there were no rich men, who would give you employment, and how would you find bread for your wives and little ones? Be satisfied then with your lot. God has assigned you the place which best befits you; submit. Do your duty where you are, and hope that ere long God will take you to himself, and permit you to live in a world, where there are no high or low, no rich or poor, no bond or free, but where all are brothers and like the angels of God!

We are sorry to send this report of our clergy to

the Old World. It will not, we apprehend, exalt our national character, nor do much to commend American institutions, or to encourage the friends of Humanity struggling there and dying in the cause of Liberty. Nevertheless we have no right to send a different report. If the clergy knowingly and intentionally side with despotism, as far as they can in this country, we suppose they are willing it should be known; if they do it ignorantly, our report may be of some service to them, by enabling them to see themselves, as the friends of Freedom see them.

In a civil and political sense, we cannot discover that the church regards Christianity in any other light than that of a curb, a bit, a restraint, a means by which the people may be kept in order and in submission to their masters. The clergy, under this point of view, are a sort of constabulary force at the service of the police, and meeting-houses a substitute for police offices, houses of correction, and penitentiaries. Far be it from us to deny the great worth of Christianity in this respect. We acknowledge the virtues of the church, as an agent of the police; but we hope we may be allowed to believe that Christianity requires the church to possess other and far higher virtues. It should not merely keep the people in subjection to an order of things which is, but fire them with the spirit and the energy to create a social order, to which it shall need no constabulary force, lay or clerical, to make the millions submissive.

But if the church, both here and in Europe, does not desert the cause of Absolutism, and make common cause with the people, its doom is sealed. Its union with the cause of Liberty is the only thing which can save it. The party of the people, the democracy throughout the civilized world, is every day increasing in numbers and in power. It is already too strong to be defeated. Popes may issue their bulls against it; bishops may denounce it; priests may slander its apostles, as they did and do Jeffer-

son, and appeal to the superstition of the multitude; kings and nobilities may collect their forces and bribe or dragoon; but in vain; IT IS TOO LATE. Democracy has become a power, and sweeps on resistless as one of the great agents of Nature. Absolute monarchs must be swept away before it. They will fail in their mad attempt to arrest the progress of the people, and to roll back the tide of civilization. They will be prostrated in the dust, and rise no more forever. Whoever or whatever leagues with them must take their fate. If the Altar be supported on the Throne, and the Church joined to the Palace, both must fall together. Would the church could see this in time to avert the sad catastrophe. It is a melancholy thing to reflect on the ruin of that majestic temple which has stood so long, over which so many ages have passed, on which so many storms have beaten, and in which so many human hearts have found shelter, solace, and heaven. It is melancholy to reflect on the condition of the people deprived of all forms of worship, and with no altar on which to offer the heart's incense to God the Father. Yet assuredly churchless, altarless, with no form or shadow of worship will the people be, if the church continue its league with Absolutism. The people have sworn deep in their hearts, that they will be free. They pursue freedom as a Divinity, and freedom they will have,—with the church if it may be, without the church if it must be. God grant that they who profess to be his especial servants may be cured of their madness in season to save the Altar!

The people almost universally identify Christianity with the church. They cannot reject the church without seeming to themselves to be rejecting Christianity, and therefore not without regarding themselves as infidels. Will the clergy consent to drive the people into infidelity? Can they not discern the signs of the times? Will they persist in maintaining social doctrines, more abhorrent to the awakening instincts of the people than atheism itself? A people, regard-

ing itself as infidel, is in the worst plight possible to pursue the work of social regeneration. It is then deprived of the hallowed and hallowing influence and guidance of the religious sentiment; and it can hardly fail to become disorderly in the pursuit of order, and to find license instead of liberty, and anarchy instead of a popular government. For its own sake then, and for the sake of liberty also, the church should break its league with the despots and join with the people, and give them its purifying and ennobling influence.

The church must do this or die. Already is it losing its hold on the hearts of the people. Everywhere is their complaint of men's want of interest in religion; everywhere is there need of most extraordinary efforts, and various and powerful machinery to bring people into the church, and few are brought in, save women and children. The pulpit has ceased to be a power. Its voice no longer charms or kindles. It finds no echo in the universal heart. Sermons are thought to be dull and vapid; and when they call forth applause, it is the preacher that wins it, not the cause he pleads. Are we at any loss to account for this? The old doctrines, the old maxims, the old exhortations, the old topics of discussion, which the clergy judge it their duty to reproduce, are not those which now most interest the people. The dominant sentiment of the people is not what it was. Once it was thought that the earth was smitten with a curse from God, and happiness was no more to be looked for *on* it than *from* it. Then all thoughts turned to another world, and the chief inquiry was, how to secure it. To save the soul from hell hereafter was then the one thing needful; and the preacher, who could show how that was to be done and heaven secured, was sure to be listened to. It is different now. Men think less of escaping hell, have less fear of the devil, more faith in the possibility of improving their earthly condition, and are more in earnest to extinguish the fires of that hell which has been burning here ever since the fall. The church must

conform to the new state of things. She cannot bring back the past. Yesterday never returns. If she would have her voice responded to, she must speak in tones that shall harmonize with the dominant sentiment of the age. *She must preach democracy*, and then will she wake an echo in every heart, and call forth a response from the depths of the universal soul of Humanity. She can speak with power only when she speaks to the dominant sentiment, and command love and obedience, only when she commands that which the people feel, for the time at least, to be the one thing needful.

In calling upon the church, by which term we mean especially the clergy of all communions, to associate with the democracy, and to labor for the realization of that equality towards which the people are everywhere tending, we seem to ourselves to be merely recalling the church to Christianity. We freely acknowledge the past services of the church. She has done much and done nobly. She has protected the friendless, fed the orphan, raised up the bowed down, and delivered him who was ready to perish. She has tamed the ruthless barbarian, infused into his heart the sentiment of chaste love, and warmed him with admiration for the generous and humane; she has made kings and potentates, who trample on their brethren without remorse, and lord it without scruple over God's heritage, feel that there is a power above them, and that thrones and diadem, sceptre and dominion, shall avail them nought in presence of the King of kings, before whom they must one day stand and be judged, as well as the meanest of their slaves; she has done a thousand times over more good for the human race than we have space or ability to relate, and blessings on her memory! eternal gratitude to God for that august assembly of saints, martyrs, and heroes, which she has nourished in her bosom, and sent forth to teach the world, by their lives, the divinity there is in man, one day to be awakened and called forth in its infinite beauty and omnipotent energy!

But while we say this, we feel that the church now, in both its catholic and protestant divisions, is unconscious of its mission, and has become false to its great Founder. Jesus was, under a political and social aspect, the prophet of the democracy. He came to the poor and afflicted, to the wronged and the outraged, to the masses, the down-trodden millions, and he spoke to them as a brother, in the tones of an infinite love, an infinite compassion, while he thundered the rebukes of Heaven against their oppressors. "Ye serpents, ye generation of vipers," says he to the people's masters, "how can ye escape the damnation of hell!" His word was with power. Ay, was it, because he spoke to the common soul, because he spoke out for outraged Humanity, and because he did not fear to speak to the great, the renowned, the rich, the boastingly religious, in terms of terrible plainness and severity. Before his piercing glance earth-born distinctions vanish, and kings and princes, scribes and pharisees, chief priests and elders sink down below the meanest fishermen, or the vilest slave, and seem to be less worthy to enter the kingdom of heaven than publicans and harlots. Their robes and widened phylacteries, their loud pretensions, their wealth, rank, refinement, influence, do not deceive him. He sees the hollow heart within them, the whited sepulchres they are, full of dead men's bones and all manner of uncleanness, vessels merely washed on the outside, all filthy within, and he denounces them in woes too terrible to be repeated. Here was the secret of his power. The great, the honored, the respectable, the aristocracy, social or religious, beheld in him a fearful denouncer of their oppressions, a ruthless unveiler of their hidden deformity, while the poor, the "common people," saw in him a friend, an advocate, a protector, ay, an avenger.

Jesus declared that the spirit of the Lord was upon him, because he was anointed to preach the Gospel to the poor; and he gave, when asked by the disciples of John, the fact that the Gospel was preached

to the poor, as one of the principal proofs of his Messiahship. He chose his disciples from the lowest ranks of his countrymen; and they were the common people who heard him gladly. Was he not a prophet from God to the masses? Was he a prophet to them merely because he prepared the way for their salvation hereafter? Say it not. The earth he came to bless; on the earth he came to establish a kingdom; and it was said of him that he should not fail nor be discouraged till he had set judgment,—justice,—in the earth and the isles waited for his law. He was to bring forth victory unto truth. In his days the earth was to be blest; under his reign all the nations were to be at peace; the sword was to be beaten into the ploughshare and the spear into the pruning hook; and war was to be no more. The wolf and the lamb were to lie down together, and they were not to hurt or destroy in all the holy mountain of the Lord. The wilderness was to rejoice and blossom as the rose, and the solitary place was to be glad. Every man was to sit under his *own* vine and fig tree, with none to molest or to make afraid. On the earth was he to found a new order of things, to bring round the blissful ages, and to give to renovated man a foretaste of heaven. It was here then the millions were to be blessed with a heaven, as well as hereafter.

This is the great truth that should arrest the attention of the church. The time has now come for this truth to be distinctly proclaimed and cordially accepted by every professed follower of Jesus. In saying this we cast no reproach on the Christian world for not having proclaimed it heretofore; for there is a time for all things, and nothing can come before its time. The time for the direct application of the social and political doctrines of Christianity was not until now. Nor in asking for a more prominent place for the social and political doctrines of Christianity, do we ask that men's attention be drawn off from the world to come. All worlds have their places and their claims, and no truth or aspect

of truth should be neglected. We ask not that men should strive less to save their souls and secure a heaven hereafter; we merely ask that they strive more, and more systematically and more religiously, to create a heaven here; we ask that the clergy bring out the great democratic principles of the Gospel; that they study and point out, and induce others to study and comprehend, their application to men's social and political relations; that they speak the language of encouragement to all who hunger and thirst after freedom; and inspire faith in the possibility of an essential improvement of man's earthly condition; that they preach ever the kindling doctrine of the fraternity of the human race, the natural equality of man with man, the equal rights of all men, and remind their congregations that all social conditions, social practices, and governmental measures, which strike against the doctrine of equal rights, are as repugnant to Christianity, as they are to democratic liberty and the true interests of mankind. We ask them to do more than to preach honesty and fidelity in the discharge of the duties belonging to the respective positions occupied by their hearers. There may be honesty and fidelity among thieves, and the thief may discharge, with the utmost promptness and fidelity, the duties that belong to his profession as a thief. Yet is he not the less a thief for that. We ask more than this of the clergy. We ask that they preach against all false positions, and take it upon them to point out what is the true social position of a man, as well as what are the proper duties of the position a man may hold.

In this we are far from asking the clergy to amuse us with visionary theories, or to send us on a wild-goose chase after a social perfection which can never be realized, and which perhaps it is not desirable to realize. Our own views of the social progress to be effected are by no means extravagant. We believe in the indefinite perfectibility of man and society, but we have struggled too long for progress, seen and

encountered and suffered too much, to look for any rapid advancement in either. But we do ask the clergy, and we do it not in our own name, but in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, and of Humanity, to preach social progress, to teach that society, as well as the individual, may advance, and that it is a *Christian* duty to seek to perfect society no less than it is to perfect the individual.

It is by no means our intention to underrate the importance of seeking to perfect the individual man. Society is for man, not man for society. The growth and perfection of the individual man is, no doubt, the end always to be consulted in our social labors. Yet is the perfection of society, viewed in itself, of vastly more importance than the perfection of any one generation of individuals. In laboring to perfect the social state we are laboring for all coming time, for the countless millions of individuals to come after us; whereas in laboring to perfect the individual we are laboring for but an insignificant unit of an innumerable multitude, and for a being, so far as this world is concerned, that is to-day and to-morrow is not. But let this pass. Give to individual perfection all the prominence the clergy have ever claimed for it, still the perfection of the social state is a means to attain it. Man can never perfect himself, so long as he makes his own perfection the end of his exertions. He who labors merely to perfect his own soul, although he may make the doing of good to others his means, is no less selfish than he, who labors merely to gratify his senses, or to promote his own worldly interests; and we need not at this late day undertake to prove that no selfish man, no man, all of whose acts terminate in himself, is or can be perfect. All that is noble and praiseworthy in man is disinterested and self-sacrificing. To perfect ourselves we must, as it were, forget ourselves, even the perfecting of ourselves, the saving of our own souls, and bind ourselves to a good which is not specially ours, and seek

a perfection which is out of us and independent on us, as well as in us. A truth we utter here, which the clergy themselves have taught in that maxim so offensive to some, yet veiling the profoundest philosophy, that "a man must be willing to be damned before he can be saved." Jesus was not concerned with himself. He did not seek his own perfection; he did not labor, suffer, and die to save his own soul, but to redeem the human race, and establish the kingdom of God on the earth. He is our pattern. Let the clergy insist upon it, that we follow his example. Let them proclaim from the heights of their pulpits, with all the authority of their sacred profession, that wherever social evils can be found, there is the Christian's place, there the Christian's work; and that so long as social evils exist, no man is a true Christian who has not done his best to remove them; that no man is or can be a true Christian, in the full significance of the term, who has not done all that, with the force and light he possesses, he can do, to place every brother man in a condition to enjoy all his rights as a man and a citizen, and to unfold all the moral beauty and intellectual energy which God hath wrapped up in his soul.

Once more: We ask the clergy to refrain from checking the courage, and damping the enthusiasm of the warm-hearted champions of liberty, that ever and anon spring up in all communities, and demand a social advance. Let them refrain from taking counsel with Herod to destroy the "young child's life." Let them be ever, like the Wise Men from the East, able to recognise the star of him born to be king, and ready to fall down before the babe in the manger, and present their offerings of gold, frankincense, and myrrh. Let them be ever on the side of the people; let them use all their efforts to cause every question, which comes up, to be decided in a sense favorable to the millions; let them not court the wealthy and the respectable, and shape their doctrines to the interests

and tastes of "the better sort;" but let them speak to the common mind; let them catch the inspirations of the masses, and be the organs through which the common soul of Humanity may give utterance to the divine thoughts and emotions which struggle within her. Let them do this, and they shall entwine themselves with the holiest and strongest affections of the age, resuscitate a love for religion, reverence for the church, and obedience to her commands; let them do this, and they shall again become a power sacred and legitimate, they shall realize the teachings of their Master in the sense in which those teachings are specially applicable to our times and the present wants of Christendom, make democracy an honor and not an accusation, give the people the powerful and hallowing support of the religious sentiment, baptize liberty in the font of holiness, and send her forth with a benediction to "make the tour of the globe."

ART. VI. — *American Liberties and American Slavery, morally and politically illustrated.* By S. B. TREADWELL. New York: John S. Taylor. Boston: Weeks, Jordan, and Co. 1838. 12mo. pp. 466.

MR. TREADWELL has attempted in this book to settle definitively the whole question, as to the right of the abolitionists to labor for the emancipation of the slaves. He takes up and professes to answer some forty popular objections to the proceedings of the abolitionists. He has done the thing admirably, no doubt, and to the entire satisfaction of his friends. But we are sorry to find that he has mistaken entirely the real question at issue, and paid not the least at-

tention to what we regard as the really weighty objections which may be urged against abolition proceedings.

Mr. Treadwell proceeds through his whole book, at least so far as we have read it, on the ground that the real question at issue is, Have the Northern abolitionists a right to *discuss* the abstract question of slavery? Now this is a great mistake, and this way of putting the question is altogether unpardonable. We have a right, as men and as citizens of an independent State, to discuss any question and all questions which concern any portion of the human race, and to discuss them freely and unreservedly. There is no limitation to this right, except as to the manner of exercising it. In discussing any question whatever, we are bound to show that respect for the opinions and characters of others, we exact from others for our own. Nobody objects to the mere discussion of slavery; and anybody may advocate, in the freest and ablest manner he can, the inalienable right of every man, whether black or white, to be a freeman.

We insist on this point. The abolitionists make no small outcry about the right of free discussion; they represent themselves as the champions of free discussion; and they take unwearied pains to make it believed that the whole cause of free discussion is involved in the Abolition question. Nothing is or can be more disingenuous than this. Abolitionists are in no sense whatever, either in principle or in practice, the champions of free discussion. Their conceptions of free discussion, so far as we can gather them from their publications, are exceedingly narrow and crude. In their estimation free discussion is to denounce slavery and slaveholders; and opposition to free discussion, is the free expression of one's honest convictions against abolition proceedings. A man who supports them defends the rights of the mind; he who opposes them attacks the rights of the mind. Now this sort of free discussion is altogether too one-sided to suit our taste. It is very much like our pil-

grim fathers' respect for the freedom of conscience. Our pilgrim fathers loved freedom of conscience so much, that they took it into their own especial keeping, and spurned the idea of sharing its custody with others.

Moreover, the abolitionists do not, properly speaking, discuss the subject of slavery. Nay, it is not their object to discuss it. Their object is not to enlighten the community on the subject, but to agitate it. Discussion is a calm exercise of the reasoning powers, not the ebullition of passion, nor the ravings of a maddened zeal. To discuss an important question we need not the aid of women and children, but of wise and sober men, men of strong intellects and well-informed minds. Discussion is also best carried on in one's closet, at least where one can keep cool; not in a crowd, where people of all ages and both sexes are brought together, and by the strong appeals of impassioned orators thrown into a state of excitement bordering upon insanity. When men have made up their minds, when the epoch for deliberation has gone by, and that for action has come; when their object is less to convince than it is to rouse, to quicken, to inflame; then proceedings like those of the abolitionists are very appropriate, and it is only then that they are ever adopted. It is perfect folly therefore for the abolitionists to talk about discussion. Any man, with his eyes half open, may see clearly that all this is mere pretence. Action, not discussion, is what they demand. Deeds, not words, are what they contemplate. To agitate the whole community, to inflame all hearts, to collect the whole population into one vast body, and to roll it down on the South to force the planters to emancipate their slaves, this is what they are striving to do. It is the *abolition* of slavery, not its *discussion*, they band together for, and it is idle for them to pretend to the contrary.

If any proof of this were wanted, it might be found in their treatment of every man who adopts conclu-

sions different from their own. Do they reason with him? Not they. They denounce him. They rush upon him with the fury of cannibals, and, as far as it depends on them, destroy his character, and make it impossible for him to hold up his head in the community. Do they answer the arguments urged against them? They? Mr. Garrison, we have it on good authority, stated in a public meeting in this city, that the arguments adduced against the abolitionists had never been answered, and he did not wish to have them answered. Discussion do you call this? Discussion! They know better than to stop to discuss the matter. We are right, say they. God and man are with us. We have a holy cause. Wo, wo, to whomsoever opposes us; mark him, friends of freedom; mark him, friends of the slave; he is a robber, a man-stealer, a murderer, and it requires "a pencil dipped in the midnight blackness of hell" to paint in appropriate colors the foulness of his heart. This is discussion, is it? The rights of free discussion are invaded, are they, because opposition to this method of treating our brethren is sometimes shown?

Abolitionists are merely discussing the question of slavery, are they? What mean then these thousands of Petitions to Congress, with their seven hundred thousand signers, a large portion of whom are women and children? What kind of arguments are these? What new light do they throw on the question of slavery? What understanding do they convince? What conscience do they persuade? They are merely discussing the subject of slavery, are they? What mean then these political movements they are preparing, these interrogatories they are addressing to candidates for office? Take the following from their official publications.

"The candidates presented to your choice will, of course, be nominated either by the whigs or democrats. The most prominent individual of the whig party, and probably their next candidate for the presidency, is a slave-holder, president of that stupendous imposture, the Colonization Society, author

of the fatal Missouri 'compromise,' and of the slavish resolutions against the abolitionists, lately passed by the Senate of the United States. On the other hand, the leader of the democratic party, 'the northern president with southern principles,' has deeply insulted this nation, by avowing his determination to veto any bill for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, which may be passed by a majority of the people, in opposition to the wishes of the slave States.

"No consistent abolitionist can vote for either of those individuals. It does not however follow, that he cannot vote for candidates for State offices, or for Congress, who may be their friends and supporters. If the candidate before you be honest, capable, and true to your principles, we think you may fairly vote for him, without considering too curiously, whether his success might not have an indirect bearing on the interests of Mr. Clay, or Mr. Van Buren. It is a golden maxim, 'Do the duty that lies nearest thee.' Vote for each man by himself, and on his own merits. If you attempt to make your rule more complicated, so as to include distant contingencies and consequences, it will be found perplexing and impracticable.

"The independent course in politics, which we have recommended, supposes great prudence, disinterestedness, energy of purpose, and self-control, in those who are to adopt it. May you justify our confidence in you. Do your duty. Come out, in your strength, to the polls. Refuse to support any public man who trims, or equivocates, or conceals his opinions. Beware of half-way abolitionists; and of men, who are abolitionists but once a year. Prove that you do not require the machinery of party discipline, to vote strictly according to your professed principles. Do this, and you will rapidly acquire a deserved influence. 'Such a party,' as Mr. Webster justly said, in speaking of the abolitionists, 'will assuredly cause itself to be respected.' *Within the next two years, the friends of freedom might hold the balance of power in every free State in the Union; and no man could ascend the presidential seat against their will.*"

So say the Board of Managers of the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society in their Address to Abolitionists, an address, by the way, the least exceptionable and the best written of any abolition document we have seen. But does this look like *discussing* the subject of slavery? Take also the following from the "Human Rights," published by the American Anti-Slavery Society.

"*There is but one remedy.* Men must be sent to Congress, made of sterner stuff—men who, like Senator Morris of Ohio, are not ashamed to advocate the *rights* of their constituents. Dough-faces have had their day. Let us keep them at home,—their proper vocation is to head our Northern pro-slavery squadrons, armed with brick-bats and stale eggs. State offices too, and County and Town offices must be filled with men who will at least show as much zeal for the great objects which the 'Union' was intended to secure, as for the 'Union' itself,—men who will not esteem it their duty to choke discussion and encourage mobs to please the slaveholders. We need not debate this point. Every man's conscience will show him his duty.

"What we beg is, that duty may be done *in season*. Don't wait till candidates are before the people, and the elections are at the door, and the lines of party are drawn—and its wire work all fixed. Let your voice be heard at once. Let your determination be known, not to support any man who will not unequivocally pledge himself to *free discussion, free petition, and abolition where Congress has the power*. Let the political parties have this to reflect on before they select their candidates. No candidate ought to expect the vote of an abolitionist, who is not prepared to answer the following questions in the affirmative.

"1. Are you in favor of abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia—for the honor and welfare of the nation?

"2. Are you in favor of so regulating commerce among the several states, that human beings shall not be made subjects of such trade?

"3. Are you opposed to the annexation of Texas to this Union, under any circumstances, so long as slaves are held therein?

"4. Are you in favor of acknowledging the independence of Hayti, and of establishing commercial relations with that nation on the same terms with the most favored nations?"

"But they *will* expect votes unless abolitionists bestir themselves in time. Crafty politicians always calculate on humanity's '*dying away*.' By our 'fathers' ashes' let them be disappointed henceforth and forever. Let the abolitionists meet in their societies, resolve on energetic and up-to-the-mark political action, and *publish* their resolution in the *county* as well as the abolition papers. Such demonstrations, in good time, will not be without their effect. Above all things, let the action when begun, like the good cause itself, '*die away*' *bigger and bigger*."

The abolitionists are merely *discussing* the subject of slavery, are they? What have the respective merits of

candidates for office, State or Federal, to do with the merits of slavery? What has the recognition of the independence of Hayti to do with the merits of slavery? If abolitionists are merely discussing slavery, we ask, what they have to do, *as abolitionists*, with questions like those here introduced? But we need dwell no longer upon this point. Abolitionists may say and believe what they will, but it is perfectly idle for them to dream of convincing any intelligent observer, that they are merely discussing the question of slavery. As we have said, their object is to abolish it, not to discuss it, and their means for abolishing it are not calm and rational discussion, but agitation, the agitation of the community, inflaming its passions, and directing, by means of the ballot box, the force they thus collect to bear directly on Southern institutions.

We say again, then, that Mr. Treadwell has not stated the real question at issue, and his book is therefore worthless. The real question at issue is, Have the citizens of the non-slaveholding States the right to set on foot a series of measures—no matter what measures—intentionally and avowedly for the purpose of emancipating the slaves? This is the question. Have we the right to commence a series of operations for the accomplishment of an object, and to prosecute them with strict and sole reference to the accomplishment of an object, over which we have no rightful jurisdiction?

Why is it that the abolitionists shrink from this question? Why is it that,—so far as our knowledge extends,—they have never in a single instance met this question, or even alluded to it? Shall we say, because they are conscious that they cannot meet it, without being forced to acknowledge that they are wrong in their proceedings, and ought forthwith to disband their associations?

Doubtless somebody must have the jurisdiction of the slave question. Who is it? Who has the legal right to abolish slavery? The States in which it exists, and the sole right to do it, says the constitution

of the American Anti-Slavery Society. If this be so, it is certain that the abolitionists, as citizens of non-slaveholding States, have not the right to abolish slavery. In laboring to abolish it then, they are laboring to do that which they have no legal right to do, even according to their own official confession. They then, so far as they labor to abolish it, are acting against law, are transgressors of the law, and obnoxious to its penalties. There is no gainsaying this.

This being so, on what ground will the abolitionists justify their proceedings? Will they take their stand above law, appeal from law to their individual conceptions of right, to the paramount law of Humanity — of God? We presume so. We believe this is their appeal, this the ground on which they attempt to legitimate their proceedings. Be it so. In taking this ground they set the law at defiance, and are either a mob or a band of insurrectionists. In taking this ground they justify all the lawless violence against which they have so vehemently declaimed. If one class of the community may set the laws at defiance, why may not another? If the abolitionists may set at naught the international law, which gives the slaveholding States the exclusive jurisdiction of the slave question, why may not other citizens say they have a right by mob-law to prevent them, if they can, from doing it? It were not difficult to convict the abolitionists of preaching the very doctrines the mobocrats attempt to reduce to practice. They ought not therefore to think it strange, that they have been in but too many instances the victims of lawless violence. When a portion of the community take it into their heads that they are wiser than the law, and commence the performance of acts in contravention of law, they ought to be aware that they open the door to every species of lawless violence, unchain the tiger, and must be answerable for the consequences.

Nevertheless we cheerfully admit, that, in saying

the abolitionists appeal from law as it is to what they consider it ought to be, to the paramount law of Humanity, we do not necessarily condemn them, nor even cast a shadow of a reproach upon them. There may be cases in which men shall be justified in doing this; nay, when it shall be their duty to do this. But this cannot be done without rebellion. They who do it declare the bonds of society broken, and society itself reduced to its original elements. It cannot be done in accordance with any existing social order; it therefore can be justified only in such cases as do justify rebellion, revolution. Revolutions are sometimes justifiable, and we as a nation hold to the sacred right of insurrection. If the abolitionists take the ground we suppose they do, they are in fact insurrectionists, they are revolutionists. This is their character. Now in order to justify themselves they must make out a clear case, that the present circumstances of our Republic are such as to warrant a revolution.

No doubt Justice, the paramount law of Humanity, demands the abolition of slavery. But of whom does it demand it? and on what conditions does it demand it? Does Humanity command us to abolish it in contravention of law? Is Humanity, all things considered, more interested in declaring the negroes free, than in maintaining those laws which the abolitionists violate in laboring to bring about the declaration? We say *declaring* the slaves free, and we do so designedly; for this is as far as the efforts of the abolitionists, if successful, can go. They cannot make the slaves free. The slave is never converted into a freeman by a stroke of the pen. Freedom cannot be conferred; it must be conquered. The slave must grow into freedom and be able to maintain his freedom, or he is a slave still, whatever he may be called. If then the abolitionists cannot make out clearly and beyond the possibility of cavil, that Humanity is more interested in declaring the slaves free than she is in maintaining the laws, the citizens of

non-slaveholding States must violate, before they can cause them to be declared free, they cannot make out a case that justifies revolution, nor a case that justifies their proceedings even admitting their own premises.

Slavery ought to be abolished, says the abolitionist, and what ought to be done it is right to do. It is right then to abolish slavery. This is enough for me. Ask me not to stop and consider what may be found in statute laws and paper constitutions. The tyrant's foot is on the neck of my brother; don't tell me to stop and ask whether, all things considered, it be my duty to run to his rescue. It may not be expedient to do it. But what of that? Let me alone. I will hurl the tyrant to the dust, and deliver my brother. We understand this feeling very well, and by dwelling upon it could work ourselves up, as we often have done, into a glorious passion, and become quite heroic. Still we believe harm seldom comes from stopping to consider.

We eschew expediency as a rule of action as heartily as do our friends the abolitionists. We are not among those who sneer at abstract right, and say we are not to regard it in practical life. Abstract right, as we view it, is absolute right, which is simply right, neither more nor less. Now we hold that every one is bound to consult the right and the right only, and having found it, to do it, let who or what will oppose. But we believe it is, before acting, very proper to determine what is right, not only in a general case, but in the particular case in which it is proposed to act. In determining what is right in any given case, it is necessary to take into consideration all the circumstances and bearings of that case. Right, it is true, never varies, but the action varies according to the circumstances under which it is performed. An action with certain general characteristics, performed under certain circumstances, shall be right, but performed under other circumstances shall be wrong; because in the latter case it is in fact

a different action from what it is in the former. A given action viewed in one of its relations may be right, yet viewed in all its relations it shall be improper to be done. It is therefore always necessary, in order to determine whether a particular action should be done or not, to survey it in all its relations, and to examine as far as we can all its bearings. The consequences of the action are by no means to be overlooked. True, the consequences of an action do not *constitute* its moral character, but they are necessary to be consulted in order to *ascertain* its moral character. The idea of right is unquestionably intuitive, of transcendental origin; but its proper application to practical life is a matter of experience, to be determined by the understanding.

Admit then that slavery is wrong, that it is right to abolish it, it does by no means follow that the citizens of non-slaveholding States have the right to abolish it; nor that the abolition proceedings are commanded by that law of right, to which the abolitionists so confidently appeal. A fellow citizen has wronged us. It is right that we should have redress; but it is right that we should seek redress only in conformity to the law of the land. We shall be held justifiable in morals, no more than in law, if we undertake to obtain redress ourselves, without reference to the legal method of obtaining it. The abolitionist must do more than prove that slavery is wrong, that it ought to be abolished, and that it is right to abolish it; he must prove first, that *he* has a right to abolish it, and secondly, that he has a right to abolish it in the way he proposes to do,—two things we hope he will forthwith undertake to prove, but which we fear he will be able to prove not without difficulty.

We go as strongly for liberty as the abolitionist. We protest with the whole energy of our moral being against the right of any man to hold his brother man in slavery. To the slaveholder, boasting the beauties of the slave system, its happy effects, and the sweet ties it creates between the master and slave, we have

no answer, but "Do unto others as you would they should do unto you." When we find the master willing to become, and desirous of becoming a slave, then, and not till then, will we listen to his defence of slavery. Man is born with the right to be free. Liberty is his inalienable right, and there is nothing in heaven or on earth to justify one man in depriving another of his rights. We can see, we think we do see, how God overrules slavery for good, and makes it serve to restrain or destroy other evils, which might perhaps lead to consequences still worse than those of Negro slavery itself; but this is in our judgment of the matter no excuse, no palliation of the guilt of those, by whose agency slavery was introduced and is perpetuated. On this point we have no controversy with the abolitionist. We sympathize with slavery no more than he does; and we are as far as he would be from appearing as the defender or the apologist of the slaveholder. Slavery is wholly indefensible; it ought to be abolished; it must be abolished; it will be abolished. But does it belong to us, who are citizens of non-slaveholding States, to abolish it? This is the first question we want answered.

To emancipate the slaves, viewed in itself, might be a praiseworthy deed. It were, if it could be done, a good work. But it is not therefore necessarily true that it is a work for us to perform. It is not only necessary to prove the work a good one, but that it is *our* work, before we have proved that we have a right to undertake it. Every man has, in the general allotment of Providence, his special work. Every community its special mission; and it is each man's duty to ascertain and perform his own work, each community's duty to ascertain and fulfil its own mission. Evil always results from the attempt of any one man to be that for which God and nature have not designed him, and consequently evil must always proceed from the attempt of any one to perform the task assigned another.

The emancipation of the slaves, we say, is not our work. Slavery may be a sin, — but it is not ours; and there is no occasion for us to assume the responsibility of other people's sins. We have sins enough of our own, and more than we can answer for; we have more work to perform for freedom here, within the limits of our own territory, than we can perform in many centuries, even should we direct to its performance our exclusive attention and all our energies. Slavery, it may be, is a stain, a disgrace upon the community that tolerates it; but if so, it is not a stain nor a disgrace on non-slaveholding communities. We are not disgraced because Constantinople is a slaveholding city, nor are we because Charleston is a slaveholding city. The States that hold slaves are alone responsible for the institution. If, as they pretend, it be a good and praiseworthy institution, theirs be the glory of maintaining it; if it be, as the abolitionists regard it, a disgraceful, a wicked institution, theirs be the sin and disgrace of perpetuating it. They are of age, and are responsible for their own deeds.

The abolitionist considers that it is our duty to labor for the emancipation of the slaves, because our nation is a slaveholding nation, and is therefore disgraced in the eyes of foreigners. To foreigners, who reproach us with slavery, all we have to say is, when you have done as much to elevate labor and the laboring classes, as we have, we will hear you; till then hold your peace. To the abolitionists we deny the fact in toto, that we are a slaveholding nation. We are made one nation by the constitution of the United States, and are one nation no further than that declares us to be so. Now in the sense in which these United States are one people we do not hold slaves. Slavery is not recognised by the constitution; that is, it in no sense whatever exists by virtue of the constitution. It is not established by the laws of the Union, nor is it protected by those laws. In our capacity of one people, in the sense in which we are

one nation, we have no cognizance of the subject of slavery. We deny therefore that our republic is a slaveholding republic. We deny that it tolerates slavery, and request the abolitionists not to be too ready to assume a reproach to which they are not obnoxious.

But some of the members of the Confederacy hold slaves. Granted. So does Brazil, so does Turkey, so do a great many nations. But the members of the Confederacy that hold slaves, do it not by virtue of constitutional grants, not by virtue of powers conferred on them by their sister States, but by virtue of their State sovereignty, which they did not surrender into the hands of the Union, and which they still retain in all its plenitude, at least so far as this question is concerned. They stand then in regard to this question, as we have shown on a former occasion, precisely as independent nations, and we of course are no more responsible for their deeds, or affected in our national character by their misdeeds, than by those of any independent or foreign community whatever. Let us talk no more then about a slaveholding republic. We are not a slaveholding republic.

We must again point out to our abolitionists, that the Federal Republic is limited to a very few specific purposes. The States, for their mutual convenience, for the general welfare and common defence of the whole, formed themselves into a Federal league or Union. In the constitution is specified the extent to which the States, as free, independent, sovereign nations, consented to merge their State character and sovereignty into one nation. To the extent there specified, we regard the people of the several States as one people, and no further. To the extent there specified, and for the purposes there specified, a citizen of Massachusetts is also a citizen of the United States, and has the same right to concern himself, according to the mode there pointed out, with the affairs of South Carolina that he has with the affairs of Massachusetts. But beyond this extent he has no

more right to concern himself with the affairs of any State but the one of which he is specially a citizen, than he has with the affairs of France or China. Our duty, as citizens of the United States, is to observe in good faith the stipulations into which we have entered with our sister States; and so long as the slaveholding States perform towards us all the engagements they have made to us, we have, as citizens of the United States, no fault to find with them.

Now have the slaveholding States ever entered into an engagement to emancipate their slaves? Is it in the bond? When they came into the Union, did they stipulate to abolish slavery? Not at all. They retained that matter in their own hands. What right have we then to insist upon their doing it now? In what capacity do we call upon the Southerner to free his slaves? In our capacity as citizens of the United States? But in that capacity we have no right to meddle with the matter, because slavery is not one of the matters which come under the jurisdiction of the United States. The people of the United States have no legal cognizance of it. In our capacity as citizens of Massachusetts then? But as citizens of Massachusetts, we hold no other relation with the slaveholder in South Carolina, than we do with the slaveholder in Constantinople. In what capacity then? In our capacity as men and as Christians?

We are far from denying that, as men and Christians, we have no concern with the slave question. As a man, as a Christian, I have a right to concern myself with whatever affects my brother man wherever he is. But has this concern no limitation? Limitation or not, it is no greater in the case of Southern slavery, than in the case of slavery anywhere else. Our right and our duty to labor for the emancipation of Southern slaves, rest on our general right and duty to labor for the abolition of slavery wherever it exists. Now, before the abolitionist can make out that it is my right and my duty to make any special efforts to effect the emancipation of the slaves in the

Southern States, he must show that it is my right and my duty to make special efforts for the abolition of slavery everywhere. Nay, more than this, he must prove that it is my right and my duty to make special efforts for the correction of all abuses of all countries, to abolish every bad or wrong institution of every nation, to remove all national sins of all nations. Can he do this? He can do it only by doing another thing which is yet more difficult. He must prove that every man has the right and the duty to concern himself with the whole conduct, the entire life, of every other man, and that every man has the right and the duty to see that every other man forsakes his sins and does his duty.

It is the duty of Massachusetts to educate all her children; but is it the duty of South Carolina to undertake to compel her to do it? It is the duty of the citizens of this State to abolish the barbarous law that treats poverty as a crime; but is it the duty of the citizens of Georgia to compel us to do it, or to do it for us? The Autocrat of the Russias ought to restore Poland to her national independence; but is it our duty to do it for him, or to undertake to force him to do it? England ought to abolish the laws of primogeniture and entail,—monarchy, and the hereditary peerage; but is it our duty to make special efforts to induce her to do it? Is that abolition her work, or is it ours? Universal freedom should be established throughout the earth; is it therefore our duty to become propagandists, and band our whole community together into associations for carrying on a war with all nations who have not adopted a republican form of government?

Freedom requires us to recognise in each individual certain rights, and rights which we may no more invade to do the individual good, than to do him harm. He must have a certain degree of liberty. That liberty he may abuse; but so long as he does not attack our liberty, we cannot, without sapping all liberty in its very foundation, interfere with him. So of com-

munities. They stand in relation to one another as individuals. So long as any given community respects the rights of all other communities, no other community has any right to interfere with its conduct. Its external relations are just, and its internal affairs, so far as other communities are concerned, it has a right to regulate in its own way. To deny this is to deny its independence, is to strike at its liberty; and to attempt to interfere with its internal policy, is to declare war upon it, and must, if it be a spirited community and able to fight for its independence, lead to bloodshed and incalculable sufferings. Peace among the nations of the earth is to be maintained only by each nation's attending to its own concerns, leaving all other nations to regulate their internal policy in their own way. This principle is even more imperative in the case of the States which compose this Republic, than in that of nations generally. Our relations are so multiplied, are so intimate, and our intercourse is so frequent and various, that, without the most punctilious respect for the reserved rights of each, perpetual embroilment must result, and our union instead of harmony be a source of perpetual discord. We say therefore, inasmuch as slavery is an institution over which the slaveholding States have the exclusive jurisdiction, inasmuch as we, as citizens of the United States and of non-slaveholding States, have no concern with it, we are not called upon, whatever may be our opinion of it as an institution, to labor specially for its abolition. We are not called upon to abolish it.

But even admitting we were called upon to abolish it, or to labor for the abolition of slavery wherever it exists, we should still deny that the abolition proceedings are justifiable. They are contrary to the genius of our institutions; they make war upon the relations, which it was intended by our Federal system should subsist between the States which compose the Union, and are therefore, as we have said, revolutionary in their character and tendency.

We do not say that to abolish slavery is contrary to the genius of our institutions. The genius of our institutions is liberty, and unquestionably is repugnant to every species of slavery. If the institutions subsist, they must in their gradual unfolding sweep away slavery, and every vestige of man's tyranny over man. But according to our Federal system, all the internal affairs of the several States are to be managed by the States themselves. When, therefore, the citizens of one State disregard this system, and labor to control the internal affairs of another State, in the manner we have shown the abolitionists do, they are acting in opposition to the American system of government. The citizens of slaveholding States might, if they chose, adopt all the measures our abolitionists do, without being liable to this charge, and perhaps they ought in justice to labor even more zealously than do the abolitionists for the abolition of slavery. The error of the abolitionists consists in concluding from the duty of the citizens of the slaveholding States to their own,—of concluding from the fact that it is right for South Carolina, for instance, to labor to emancipate the slaves, it is therefore right for citizens of Massachusetts to do the same. The wrong is not in the end sought, but in the persons who seek it, and the means by which they seek it.

The abolitionists are wrong as to their point of departure. They begin, consciously or unconsciously, by assuming that the people of the United States are one people, not in the restricted sense in which they are so declared by the constitution, but in all senses, to the fullest extent, as much so as the people of France or England. They regard themselves not as citizens of Massachusetts or of New York, but as citizens of the United States. The division of the territory into separate States, they regard as merely for administrative purposes, or for the convenience of transacting governmental business. They see not and understand not that the division into separate States, is a division, in point of fact and in theory especially, into

distinct communities, separate nations, afterwards to be united by a league or compact ; but a division altogether analogous to the division of a State for municipal purposes into counties, townships, and parishes. In giving the legal form to any public measure, they indeed recognise the boundaries of the States in like manner as they do the boundaries of a county, a township, or a parish ; but in all else, in preparing the measure, in urging its adoption, in the combination and direction of influences which shall lead to or compel its adoption, they know no geographical boundaries, no civil or political divisions. Here is the source of their error. They begin by denying the sovereignty of the States, and consequently the Federal Republic created by the constitution, and by asserting the system of consolidation, another and altogether different system,—a system by which we become one vast centralized republic, adopting the division into States only as a convenient regulation for facilitating the administration of the affairs of government.

We say not that the abolitionists are in general aware of this, or that they would knowingly and intentionally do all this. They are probably aware of nothing but a morbid craving after excitement, and the determination, cost what it may, to abolish slavery. But we do say that the doctrine of consolidation, which we have stated, is that which lies at the bottom of their proceedings, and which has influenced them, and led them to adopt the proceedings they have. Had they been in the habit of contemplating the American political system in its true character, had they been in the habit of seeing in the division into States something more than a municipal regulation, than an affair of internal police, had they been accustomed to see in each State a distinct, independent, and sovereign community, in all matters, except the very few specified in the constitution of the United States, they had never taken those peculiar views of their own relations with the slaveholding commu-

nities, which have led them to adopt the measures of which we complain. Anti-slavery men they might have been, but abolitionists they could not have been.

We would acquit the abolitionists also of all wish to change fundamentally the character of our institutions. They are not, at least the honest part of them, politicians ; but very simple-minded men and women who crave excitement, and seek it in abolition meetings, and in getting up abolition societies and petitions, instead of seeking it in ball-rooms, theatres, or places of fashionable amusement or dissipation. Politics, properly speaking, they abominate, because politics would require them to think, and they wish only to feel. Doubtless some of them are moved by generous sympathies, and a real regard for the well-being of the Negro ; but the principal moving cause of their proceedings, after the craving for excitement, and perhaps notoriety, is the feeling that slavery is a national disgrace. Now this feeling, as we have shown, proceeds from a misconception of the real character of our institutions. This feeling can be justified only on the supposition that we are a consolidated republic. Its existence is therefore a proof that, whatever be the conscious motives in the main of the abolitionists, their proceedings strike against our Federal system.

Well, what if they do ? replies the abolitionist. If Federalism, or the doctrine of State sovereignty, which you say is the American system of politics, prohibits us from laboring to free the slave, then down with it. Any system of government, any political relations, which prevent me from laboring to break the yoke of the oppressor and to set the captive free, is a wicked system, and ought to be destroyed. God disowns it, Christ disowns it, and man ought to disown it. If consolidation, if centralization be the order that enables us to free the slave, then give us consolidation, give us centralization. It is the true doctrine. It enables one to plead for the slave. The

slave is crushed under his master's foot ; the slave is dying ; I see nothing but the slave ; I hear nothing but the slave's cries for deliverance. Away with your paper barriers, away with your idle prating about State rights ; clear the way. Let me run to the slave. Anything that frees the slave is right, is owned by God.

We express here the sentiment and use very nearly the language of the abolitionists. They have no respect for government as such. They indeed are fast adopting the ultra-radical doctrine that all government is founded in usurpation, and is an evil which all true Christians must labor to abolish. They have, at least some of them, nominated Jesus Christ to be president of the United States ; as much as to say, in the only practical sense to be given the nomination, that there shall be no president of the United States but an idea, and an idea without any visible embodiment ; which is merely contending in other words that there shall be no visible government, no political institutions whatever. They have fixed their minds on a given object, and finding that the political institutions of the country, and the laws of the land are against them, they deny the legitimacy of all laws and of all political institutions. Let them carry their doctrines out, and it is easy to see that a most radical revolution in the institutions of the country must be the result.

Now, we ask, has a revolution become necessary ? Is it no longer possible to labor for the progress of Humanity in this country, without changing entirely the character of our political institutions ? Must we change our Federal system, destroy the existing relations between the States and the Union and between the States ? Nay, must we destroy all outward, visible government, abolish all laws, and leave the community in the state in which the Jews were, when there " was no king in Israel, and every man did that which was right in his own eyes " ? We put these questions in soberness, and with a deep feeling of their magnitude. The abolition ranks are full of in-

sane dreamers, and fuller yet of men and women ready to undertake to realize any dream however insane, and at any expense. We ask therefore these questions with solemnity, and with fearful forebodings for our country. We rarely fear; we rarely tremble at the prospect of evil to come. The habitual state of our own mind is that of serene trust in the future; and if in this respect we are thought to have a fault, it is in being too sanguine, in hoping too much. But we confess, the proceedings of the abolitionists, coupled with their vague speculations, and their crude notions, do fill us with lively alarm, and make us apprehend danger to our beloved country. We beg, in the name of God and of man, the abolitionists to pause, and if they love liberty, ask themselves what liberty has, in the long run, to gain by overthrowing the system of government we have established, by effecting a revolution in the very foundation of our Federal system?

For ourselves, we have accepted with our whole heart the political system adopted by our fathers. We regard that system as the most brilliant achievement of Humanity, a system in which centres all past progress, and which combines the last results of all past civilization. It is the latest birth of time. Humanity has been laboring with it since that morning when the sons of God shouted with joy over the birth of a new world, and we will not willingly see it strangled in its cradle. We take the American political system as our starting-point, as our primitive data, and we repulse whatever is repugnant to it, and accept, demand whatever is essential to its preservation. We take our stand on the Idea of our institutions, and labor with all our soul to realize and develop it. As a lover of our race, as the devoted friend of liberty, of the progress of mankind, we feel that we must, in this country, be conservative, not radical. If we demand the elevation of labor and the laboring classes, we do it only in accordance with our institutions and for the purpose of preserving them by

removing all discrepancy between their spirit and the social habits and condition of the people on whom they are to act, and to whose keeping they are entrusted. We demand reform only for the purpose of preserving American institutions in their real character; and we can tolerate no changes, no innovations, no alleged improvements not introduced in strict accordance with the relations which do subsist between the States and the Union and between the States themselves. Here is our political creed. More power in the Federal government than was given it by the Convention which framed the constitution would be dangerous to the States, and with less power the Federal government would not be able to subsist. We take it then as it is. The fact that any given measure is necessary to preserve it as it is, is a sufficient reason for adopting that measure; the fact that a given measure is opposed to it as it is, and has a tendency to increase or diminish its power, is a sufficient reason for rejecting that measure.

The constitution then is our touchstone for trying all measures. Not indeed because we have any superstitious reverence for written constitutions, or any overweening attachment to things as they are; but because we have satisfied ourselves by long, patient, and somewhat extensive inquiry, that the preservation of the constitution is strictly identified with the highest interests of our race. Its destruction were, so far as human foresight can go, an irreparable loss. We would preserve it then, not because it is a constitution, not because we are averse to changes, nor because we have a dread of revolutions, but because the safety and progress of liberty demand its preservation.

But can efforts in behalf of liberty be repugnant to the spirit of a constitution established avowedly in the interests of liberty? The abolitionists are in pursuit of liberty; liberty is their great idea; liberty is the soul of their movements; liberty is to be the end of their exertions; how then can their proceedings be dangerous to liberty? Very simply. In

their character of efforts merely in behalf of liberty, of course they are neither unconstitutional nor dangerous; but they may have another character than that; beside being efforts in behalf of liberty they may be efforts which strike against international law. The abolitionist would free the slave. So far so good. But he would free the slave by forgetting that slavery is an institution under the sole control of a State of which he is not a citizen. Here comes the danger to liberty. Here is a blow struck at the rights of communities, and as dangerous to liberty as a blow struck at the rights of individuals. He would free the slaves by combining the non-slaveholding States against the slaveholding States, by collecting in the non-slaveholding States a force sufficient to control the internal policy of the slaveholding States. Let him do this, and where is the independence of the States? Let him do this, and one part of the Union has the complete control of the other; and when this is done, is not our Federal system destroyed? It is possible then to pursue liberty in such a manner that the pursuit shall be in open violation of free institutions, and this is, as we allege, the case with the abolitionists.

But we can pursue the subject no farther at present. We are sorry to be compelled to separate ourselves from the abolitionists. There is something exceedingly unpleasant in being, even in appearance, opposed to the advocates of freedom. We have ever been with the movement party; our own position, the much we have suffered from things as they are, the wounds yet rankling in our heart, together with our own love of excitement, of new things, to say nothing of certain dreams we indulge concerning a golden age that is to be, strongly dispose us to join with the abolitionists, and to rush on in the career they open up to a bold and energetic spirit. There is something too in the very idea of freeing two or three millions of slaves, which, in these mechanical and money-getting times, is quite refreshing and capa-

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ble of dazzling many an imagination. It addresses itself to some of the strongest propensities of our nature, and gives us apparently an opportunity to indulge a taste for the adventurous and the chivalric. There is something almost intoxicating in the idea of going forth as a bold knight in the cause of Humanity, to plead for the wronged and the outraged, to speak for the dumb, and to do valiant battle for the weak and the defenceless. Much that is noble, that is generous, that is godlike, naturally combines itself with such an idea, and enters into the motives of him who goes forth at its bidding. It may be that we have felt something of all this. But self-denial, even in the indulgence of what we call noble impulses, or rather the subordination of our impulses to the clearest and soberest convictions of our understandings, is one of the first laws of morality.

So long as we regarded the abolitionists as merely contending for the right to discuss the subject of slavery, we were with them; we spoke in their behalf, and were willing to be reckoned of their number. Later developments on their side, and a closer examination of the bearings of their movements on the political institutions of this country, into which we have entered, have convinced us that the cause of free discussion is not now, if it ever was, at all involved in their proceedings; that the cause of liberty even, is by no means in their hands; and therefore that we ought to separate from them, and to state clearly and boldly, the reasons which we think should induce all lovers of our common country to combine to stay their progress. It may be too late. We fear it is. The ball has been set in motion. It increases in momentum and velocity with every revolution, and the result we pretend not to be able to foresee. Already is it hazardous to one's reputation in this part of the Union to oppose them; already is it nearly impossible for any political party to succeed unless it can secure their suffrages. They have become a power. It is in vain to deny it. They are not likely

to become weaker very soon. We have not, therefore, dared to keep our convictions in regard to them to ourselves. In opposing them, we have had to show as much moral courage as they profess to have shown in opposing slavery. We have not, therefore, spoken from considerations we need be ashamed to avow. We may have spoken in vain. But we have said our word, feebly we own, but in sincerity; and we leave the result to God. We see danger ahead. We tremble for the fate of our republic; there are mighty influences at work against it; the money power is seeking to bind its free spirit with chains of gold, and mistaken philanthropy is fast rending it in twain; associations, sectarian and moral espionage are fast swallowing up individual freedom, and making the individual man but a mere appendage to a huge social machine, with neither mind nor will of his own; but we do not, we will not, despair of the republic. We hope with trembling, nevertheless we hope. The destinies of individuals or of nations are not left to blind chance. There is a providence that rules them, and we will trust that in due time the clouds that lower over us shall break and disperse, and the glorious sun of freedom and Humanity shine forth in all his noonday splendors. We cannot go back to the night and gloom of the past; the irresistible law of progress does and will bear us onward; and this republic shall yet prove itself the medium through which the human race shall rise to the knowledge and enjoyment of the inalienable rights of Man.

In conclusion, we would merely add, that in our judgment the first duty of the friends of freedom, of democracy, of progress, is to secure the political institutions established by our fathers. Nothing can come but in its time and its place. There is a method to be followed in taking up and discussing the great questions which concern mankind, or the progress of society. Errors always come from the fact that we take them up in a false order. Our inquiry should be, What is the question for to-day? Having ascertained

the problem for to-day, we should bend our whole attention to its solution. The answer to the question of to-day, will of itself lead to the solution of the problem which shall come up to-morrow. The question for to-day is the currency question,—not the most interesting question in itself surely, nor a question of the first magnitude; but it is the first in the order of time. It must be disposed of before we can proceed systematically to the disposition of any other. What will be the question for to-morrow, we ask not. Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof. It will doubtless be a question of magnitude. Great questions are hereafter to be ever expected. Humanity approaches manhood, grows serious, and refuses to trifle. As it regards the slave question, we leave it to those whom it more immediately concerns. If our republic outlive the dangers to which it is now exposed, the gradual unfolding of its spirit will abolish slavery; and we believe slavery will be sooner abolished, that is, the negro race sooner elevated to the rank of freemen, by leaving the whole matter to time, to the secret but sure workings of Christian democracy, than by any violent or special efforts of abolitionists, even if successful in declaring slavery abolished. Leave the whole matter to the slaveholding States, and in proportion as the negro advances internally, the legislature will spread over him the shield of the law, and imperceptibly but surely shall he grow into a freeman, if a freeman he can become.

If we would serve him and hasten that day, we shall best do it, not by direct efforts in his behalf, but by a steady development and realization of democratic freedom within the bosom of the non-slaveholding States. Let us correct the evils at our own doors, elevate the free white laborer, and prove by our own practice, and by the state of our own society, that the doctrine of equal rights is not a visionary dream. O we have much to do here at home. The beggar full of sores lies at our own gate. In our

own dark streets, blind courts, narrow lanes, damp cellars, unventilated garrets, are human beings more degraded, and suffering keener anguish, and appealing with a more touching pathos to our compassion, and demanding in more imperative tones our succor, than is the case with the most wretched of Southern slaves. O here are objects enough for our humanity. We walk not through the streets of a single Northern city without a bleeding heart. Wash the faces of those children, Abolitionists, which meet you in our cities incrustated with filth, clothe their shivering limbs, let in light upon their darkened minds, and warm their young hearts, before it is too late, with the hope of being one day virtuous men and women. Instead of poring over the horrors of slavery, read your police reports, and see your own society as it is. You have work enough for all your philanthropy north of Mason and Dixon's line. Do this work, do it effectually, and you shall aid the cause of oppressed Humanity everywhere, and the slave a thousand times more than by your direct efforts for his emancipation.

ART. VII. — *An Address delivered before the Senior Class in Divinity College, Cambridge, Sunday Evening, 15 July, 1838.* By RALPH WALDO EMERSON. Boston: James Munroe & Co. 1838. 8vo. pp. 32.

THIS is in some respects a remarkable address, — remarkable for its own character and for the place where and the occasion on which it was delivered. It is not often, we fancy, that such an address is delivered by a clergyman in a Divinity College to a class of young men just ready to go forth into the

churches as preachers of the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Indeed it is not often that a discourse teaching doctrines like the leading doctrines of this, is delivered by a professedly religious man, anywhere or on any occasion.

We are not surprised that this address should have produced some excitement and called forth some severe censures upon its author; for we have long known that there are comparatively few who can hear with calmness the utterance of opinions to which they do not subscribe. Yet we regret to see the abuse which has been heaped upon Mr. Emerson. We ought to learn to tolerate all opinions, to respect every man's right to form and to utter his own opinions whatever they may be. If we regard the opinions as unsound, false, or dangerous, we should meet them calmly, refute them if we can; but be careful to respect, and to treat with all Christian meekness and love, him who entertains them.

There are many things in this address we heartily approve; there is much that we admire and thank the author for having uttered. We like its life and freshness, its freedom and independence, its richness and beauty. But we cannot help regarding its tone as somewhat arrogant, its spirit is quite too censorious and desponding, its philosophy as indigested, and its reasoning as inconclusive. We do not like its mistiness, its vagueness, and its perpetual use of old words in new senses. Its meaning too often escapes us; and we find it next to impossible to seize its dominant doctrine and determine what it is or what it is not. Moreover, it does not appear to us to be all of the same piece. It is made up of parts borrowed from different and hostile systems, which "baulk and baffle" the author's power to form into a consistent and harmonious whole.

In a moral point of view the leading doctrine of this address, if we have seized it, is not a little objectionable. It is not easy to say what that moral doctrine is; but so far as we can collect it, it is, that

the soul possesses certain laws or instincts, obedience to which constitutes its perfection. "The sentiment of virtue is a reverence and delight in the presence of certain divine laws." "The intuition of the moral sentiment is an insight of the perfection of the laws of the soul." These "divine laws" are the "laws of the soul." The moral sentiment results from the perception of these laws, and moral character results from conformity to them. Now this is not, we apprehend, psychologically true. If any man will analyze the moral sentiment as a fact of consciousness, he will find it something more than "an insight of the perfection of the laws of the soul." He will find that it is a sense of obligation. Man feels himself under obligation to obey a law; not the law of his own soul, a law emanating from his soul as lawgiver; but a law above his soul, imposed upon him by a supreme lawgiver, who has a right to command his obedience. He does never feel that he is moral in obeying merely the laws of his own nature, but in obeying the command of a power out of him, above him, and independent on him.

By the laws of the soul, we presume, Mr. Emerson means our instincts. In his Phi Beta Kappa Address, reviewed in this journal for January, he speaks much of the instincts, and bids us "plant ourselves on our instincts, and the huge world will come round to us." The ethical rule he lays down is then, "follow thy instincts," or as he expresses it in the address before us, "obey thyself." Now if we render this rule into the language it will assume in practice, we must say, obey thyself,—follow thy instincts,—follow thy inclinations,—live as thou listest. Strike out the idea of something above man to which he is accountable, make him accountable only to himself, and why shall he not live as he listeth? We see not what restraint can legitimately be imposed upon any of his instincts or propensities. There may then be some doubts whether the command, "obey thyself," be an improvement on the Christian command, "deny thyself."

We presume that when Mr. Emerson tells us to obey ourselves, to obey the laws of our soul, to follow our instincts, he means that we shall be true to our higher nature, that we are to obey our higher instincts, and not our baser propensities. He is himself a pure minded man, and would by no means encourage sensuality. But how shall we determine which are our higher instincts and which are our lower instincts? We do not perceive that he gives us any instructions on this point. Men like him may take the higher instincts to be those which lead us to seek truth and beauty; but men in whom the sensual nature overlays the spiritual, may think differently; and what rule has he for determining which is in the right? He commands us to be ourselves, and sneers at the idea of having "models." We must take none of the wise or good, not even Jesus Christ as a model of what we should be. We are to act out ourselves. Now why is not the sensualist as moral as the spiritualist, providing he acts out himself? Mr. Emerson is a great admirer of Carlyle; and according to Carlyle, the moral man, the true man, is he who acts out himself. A Mirabeau, or a Danton is, under a moral point of view, the equal of a Howard or a Washington, because equally true to himself. Does not this rule confound all moral distinctions, and render moral judgments a "formula," all wise men must "swallow and make away with"?

But suppose we get over this difficulty and determine which are the higher instincts of our nature, those which we must follow in order to perfect our souls, and become, — as Mr. Emerson has it, — God; still we ask, why are we under obligation to obey these instincts? Because obedience to them will perfect our souls? But why are we bound to perfect our souls? Where there is no sense of obligation, there is no moral sense. We are moral only on the condition that we feel there is something which we *ought* to do. Why ought we to labor for our own

perfection? Because it will promote our happiness? But why are we morally bound to seek our own happiness? It may be very desirable to promote our happiness, but it does not follow from that we are morally bound to do it, and we know there are occasions when we should not do it.

Put the rule, Mr. Emerson lays down, in the best light possible, it proposes nothing higher than our own individual good as the end to be sought. He would tell us to reduce all the jarring elements of our nature to harmony, and produce and maintain perfect order in the soul. Now is this the highest good the reason can conceive? Are all things in the universe to be held subordinate to the individual soul? Shall a man take himself as the centre of the universe, and say all things are for his use, and count them of value only as they contribute something to his growth or well-being? This were a deification of the soul with a vengeance. It were nothing but a system of transcendental selfishness. It were pure egotism. According to this, I am everything; all else is nothing, at least nothing except what it derives from the fact that it is something to me.

Now this system of pure egotism, seems to us to run through all Mr. Emerson's writings. We meet it everywhere in his masters, Carlyle and Goethe. He and they may not be quite so grossly selfish as were some of the old sensualist philosophers; they may admit a higher good than the mere gratification of the senses, than mere wealth or fame; but the highest good they recognise is an individual good, the realization of order in their own individual souls. Everything by them is estimated according to its power to contribute to this end. If they mingle with men it is to use them; if they are generous and humane, if they labor to do good to others, it is always as a means, never as an end. Always is the *doing*, whatever it be, to terminate in self. Self, the higher self, it is true, is always the centre of gravitation. Now is the man who adopts this moral rule,

really a moral man? Does not morality always propose to us an end separate from our own, above our own, and to which our own good is subordinate?

No doubt it is desirable to perfect the individual soul, to realize order in the individual; but the reason, the moment it is developed, discloses a good altogether superior to this. Above the good of the individual, and paramount to it, is the good of the universe, the realization of the good of creation, absolute good. No man can deny that the realization of the good of all beings is something superior to the realization of the good of the individual. Morality always requires us to labor for the highest good we can conceive. The moral law then requires us to seek another good than that of our own souls. The individual lives not for himself alone. His good is but an element, a fragment of the universal good, and is to be sought never as an end, but always as a means of realizing absolute good, or universal order. This rule requires the man to forget himself, to go out of himself, and under certain circumstances to deny himself, to sacrifice himself, for a good which does not centre in himself. He who forgets himself, who is disinterested and heroic, who sacrifices himself for others, is in the eyes of reason, infinitely superior to the man who merely uses others as the means of promoting his own intellectual and spiritual growth. Mr. Emerson's rule then is defective, inasmuch as it proposes the subordinate as the paramount, and places obligation where we feel it is not. For the present, then, instead of adopting his formula, "obey thyself," or Carlyle's formula, "act out thyself," we must continue to approve the Christian formula, "deny thyself, and love thy neighbor as thyself."

But passing over this, we cannot understand how it is possible for a man to become virtuous by yielding to his instincts. Virtue is voluntary obedience to a moral law, felt to be obligatory. We are aware of the existence of the law, and we act in reference to it,

and intend to obey it. We of course are not passive, but active in the case of virtue. Virtue is always personal. It is our own act. We are in the strictest sense of the word the cause or creator of it. Therefore it is, that we judge ourselves worthy of praise when we are virtuous, and of condemnation when we are not virtuous. But in following instinct, we are not active but passive. The causative force at work in our instincts, is not our personality, our wills, but an impersonal force, a force *we* are not. Now in yielding to our instincts, as Mr. Emerson advises us, we abdicate our own personality, and from persons become things, as incapable of virtue as the trees of the forest or the stones of the field.

Mr. Emerson, moreover, seems to us to mutilate man, and in his zeal for the instincts to entirely overlook reflection. The instincts are all very well. They give us the force of character we need, but they do not make up the whole man. We have understanding as well as instinct, reflection as well as spontaneity. Now to be true to our nature, to the whole man, the understanding should have its appropriate exercise. Does Mr. Emerson give it this exercise? Does he not rather hold the understanding in light esteem, and labor almost entirely to fix our minds on the fact of primitive intuition as all-sufficient of itself? We do not ask him to reject the instincts, but we ask him to compel them to give an account of themselves. We are willing to follow them; but we must do it designedly, intentionally, after we have proved our moral right to do it, not before. Here is an error in Mr. Emerson's system of no small magnitude. He does not account for the instincts nor legitimate them. He does not prove them to be divine forces or safe guides. In practice, therefore, he is merely reviving the old sentimental systems of morality, systems which may do for the young, the dreamy, or the passionate, but never for a sturdy race of men and women who demand a reason for all they do, for what they approve or disapprove.

Nor are we better satisfied with the theology of this discourse. We cannot agree with Mr. Emerson in his account of the religious sentiment. He confounds the religious sentiment with the moral; but the two sentiments are psychologically distinct. The religious sentiment is a craving to adore, resulting from the soul's intuition of the Holy; the moral sentiment is a sense of obligation resulting from the soul's intuition of a moral law. The moral sentiment leads us up merely to universal order; the religious sentiment leads us up to God, the Father of universal order. Religious ideas always carry us into a region far above that of moral ideas. Religion gives the law to ethics, not ethics to religion. Religion is the communion of the soul with God, morality is merely the *cultus exterior*, the outward worship of God, the expression of the life of God in the soul: as James has it, "pure religion,—external worship, for so should we understand the original,—and undefiled before God and the Father is this, To visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction, and to keep himself unspotted from the world."

But even admitting the two sentiments are not two but one, indetical, we are still dissatisfied with Mr. Emerson's account of the matter. The religious sentiment, according to him, grows out of the soul's insight of the perfection of its own laws. These laws are in fact the soul itself. They are not something distinct from the soul, but its essence. In neglecting them the soul is not itself, in finding them it finds itself, and in living them it is God. This is his doctrine. The soul then in case of the religious sentiment has merely an intuition of itself. Its craving to adore is not a craving to adore something superior to itself. In worshipping then, the soul does not worship God, a being above man and independent on him, but it worships itself. We must not then speak of worshipping God, but merely of worshipping the soul. Now is this a correct account of the religious sentiment? The religious sentiment

is in the bottom of the soul, and it is always a craving of the soul to go out of itself, and fasten itself on an object above itself, free from its own weakness, mutability, and impurity, on a being all-sufficient, all-sufficing, omnipotent, immutable, and all-holy. It results from the fact that we are conscious of not being sufficient for ourselves, that the ground of our being is not in ourselves, and from the need we feel of an Almighty arm on which to lean, a strength foreign to our own, from which we may derive support. Let us be God, let us feel that we need go out of ourselves for nothing, and we are no longer in the condition to be religious; the religious sentiment can no longer find a place in our souls, and we can no more feel a craving to adore than God himself. Nothing is more evident to us, than that the religious sentiment springs, on the one hand, solely from a sense of dependence, and on the other hand, from an intuition of an invisible Power, Father, God, on whom we may depend, to whom we may go in our weakness, to whom we may appeal when oppressed, and who is able and willing to succor us. Take away the idea of such a God, declare the soul sufficient for itself, forbid it ever to go out of itself, to look up to a power above it, and religion is out of the question.

If we rightly comprehend Mr. Emerson's views of God, he admits no God but the laws of the soul's perfection. God is in man, not out of him. He is in the soul as the oak is in the acorn. When man fully develops the laws of his nature, realizes the ideal of his nature, he is not, as the Christian would say, god-like, but he is God. The ideal of man's nature is not merely similar in all men, but identical. When all men realize the ideal of their nature, that is, attain to the highest perfection admitted by the laws of their being, then do they all become swallowed up in the One Man. There will then no longer be men; all diversity will be lost in unity, and there will be only One Man, and that one man will be God. But what and where is God now? Before all men have realized

the ideal of their nature, and become swallowed up in the One Man, is there really and actually a God? Is there any God but the God Osiris, torn into pieces and scattered up and down through all the earth, which pieces, scattered parts, the weeping Isis must go forth seeking everywhere, and find not without labor and difficulty? Can we be said to have at present anything more than the disjected members of a God, the mere embryo fragments of a God, one day to come forth into the light, to be gathered up that nothing be lost, and finally moulded into one complete and rounded God? So it seems to us, and we confess, therefore, that we can affix no definite meaning to the religious language which Mr. Emerson uses so freely.

Furthermore, we cannot join Mr. Emerson in his worship to the soul. We are disposed to go far in our estimate of the soul's divine capacities; we believe it was created in the image of God, and may bear his moral likeness; but we cannot so exalt it as to call it God. Nor can we take its ideal of its own perfection as God. The soul's conception of God is not God, and if there be no God out of the soul, out of the *me*, to answer to the soul's conception, then is there no God. God as we conceive him is independent on us, and is in no sense affected by our conceptions of him. He is in us, but not us. He dwells in the hearts of the humble and contrite ones, and yet the heaven of heavens cannot contain him. He is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever. He is above all, the cause and sustainer of all that is, in whom we live and move and have our being. Him we worship, and only him. We dare not worship merely our own soul. Alas, we know our weakness; we feel our sinfulness; we are oppressed with a sense of our unworthiness, and we cannot so sport with the solemnities of religious worship, as to direct them to ourselves, or to anything which does not transcend our own being.

Yet this worship of the soul is part and parcel of the transcendental egotism of which we spoke in com-

menting on Mr. Emerson's moral doctrines. He and his masters, Carlyle and Goethe, make the individual soul everything, the centre of the universe, for whom all exists that does exist; and why then should it not be the supreme object of their affections? Soul-worship, which is only another name for self-worship, or the worship of self, is the necessary consequence of their system, a system well described by Pope in his *Essay on Man*:

"Ask for what end the heavenly bodies shine,
Earth for whose use? Pride answers, 'T is for mine:
For me, kind nature wakes her genial power,
Suckles each herb, and spreads out every flower;
Annual for me, the grape, the rose, renew
The juice nectareous, and the balmy dew;
For me, the mine a thousand treasures brings;
For me, health gushes from a thousand springs:
Seas roll to waft me, suns to light me rise;
My footstool earth, my canopy the skies.'"

To which we may add,

"While man exclaims, 'See all things for my use!'
'See man for mine!' replies a pampered goose:
And just as short of reason he must fall
Who thinks all made for one, not one for all."

Mr. Emerson has much to say against preaching a traditional Christ, against preaching what he calls historical Christianity. So far as his object in this is to draw men's minds off from an exclusive attention to the "letter," and to fix them on the "spirit," to prevent them from relying for the matter and evidence of their faith on merely historical documents, and to induce them to reproduce the gospel histories in their own souls, he is not only not censurable but praiseworthy. He is doing a service to the Christian cause. Christianity may be found in the human soul, and reproduced in human experience now, as well as in the days of Jesus. It is in the soul too that we must find the key to the meaning of the Gospels, and in the soul's experience that we must seek the principal evidences of their truth.

But if Mr. Emerson means to sever us from the

past, and to intimate that the Christianity of the past has ceased to have any interest for the present generation, and that the knowledge and belief of it are no longer needed for the soul's growth, for its redemption and union with God, we must own we cannot go with him. Christianity results from the development of the laws of the human soul, but from a supernatural, not a natural, development; that is, by the aid of a power above the soul. God has been to the human race both a father and an educator. By a supernatural,—not an *unnatural*—influence, he has, as it has seemed proper to him, called forth our powers, and enabled us to see and comprehend the truths essential to our moral progress. The records of the aid he has at different ages furnished us, and of the truths seen and comprehended at the period when the faculties of the soul were supernaturally exalted, cannot in our judgment be unessential, far less improper, to be dwelt upon by the Christian preacher.

Then again, we cannot dispense with Jesus Christ. As much as some may wish to get rid of him, or to change or improve his character, the world needs him, and needs him in precisely the character in which the Gospels present him. His is the only name whereby men can be saved. He is the father of the modern world, and his is the life we now live, so far as we live any life at all. Shall we then crowd him away with the old bards and seers, and regard him and them merely as we do the authors of some old ballads which charmed our forefathers, but which may not be sung in a modern drawing-room? Has his example lost its power, his life its quickening influence, his doctrine its truth? Have we outgrown him as a teacher?

In the Gospels we find the solution of the great problem of man's destiny; and, what is more to our purpose, we find there the middle term by which the creature is connected with the Creator. Man is at an infinite distance from God; and he cannot by his own strength approach God, and become one with him.

We cannot see God ; we cannot know him ; no man hath seen the Father at any time, and no man knoweth the Father, save the Son, and he to whom the Son reveals him. We approach God only through a mediator ; we see and know only the Word, which is the mediator between God and men. Does Mr. Emerson mean that the record we have of this Word in the Bible, of this Word, which was made flesh, incarnated in the man Jesus, and dwelt among men and disclosed the grace and truth with which it overflowed, is of no use now in the church, nay, that it is a let and a hindrance ? We want that record, which is to us as the testimony of the race, to corroborate the witness within us. One witness is not enough. We have one witness within us, an important witness, too seldom examined ; but as important as he is, he is not alone sufficient. We must back up his individual testimony with that of the race. In the Gospel records we have the testimony borne by the race to the great truths it most concerns us to know. That testimony, the testimony of history, in conjunction with our own individual experience, gives us all the certainty we ask, and furnishes us a solid ground for an unwavering and active faith. As in philosophy, we demand history as well as psychology, so in theology we ask the historical Christ as well as the psychological Christ. The church in general has erred by giving us only the historical Christ ; but let us not now err, by preaching only a psychological Christ.

In dismissing this address, we can only say that we have spoken of it freely, but with no improper feeling to its author. We love bold speculation ; we are pleased to find a man who dares tell us what and precisely what he thinks, however unpopular his views may be. We have no disposition to check his utterance, by giving his views a bad name, although we deem them unsound. We love progress, and progress cannot be effected without freedom. Still we wish to see a certain sobriety, a certain reserve in all speculations, something like timidity about rushing off into

an unknown universe, and some little regret in departing from the faith of our fathers.

Nevertheless, let not the tenor of our remarks be mistaken. Mr. Emerson is the last man in the world we should suspect of conscious hostility to religion and morality. No one can know him or read his productions without feeling a profound respect for the singular purity and uprightness of his character and motives. The great object he is laboring to accomplish is one in which he should receive the hearty coöperation of every American scholar, of every friend of truth, freedom, piety, and virtue. Whatever may be the character of his speculations, whatever may be the moral, philosophical, or theological system which forms the basis of his speculations, his real object is not the inculcation of any new theory on man, nature, or God; but to induce men to think for themselves on all subjects, and to speak from their own full hearts and earnest convictions. His object is to make men scorn to be slaves to routine, to custom, to established creeds, to public opinion, to the great names of this age, of this country, or of any other. He cannot bear the idea that a man comes into the world to-day with the field of truth monopolized and foreclosed. To every man lies open the whole field of truth, in morals, in politics, in science, in theology, in philosophy. The labors of past ages, the revelations of prophets and bards, the discoveries of the scientific and the philosophic, are not to be regarded as superseding our own exertions and inquiries, as impediments to the free action of our own minds, but merely as helps, as provocations to the freest and fullest spiritual action of which God has made us capable.

This is the real end he has in view, and it is a good end. To call forth the free spirit, to produce the conviction here implied, to provoke men to be men, self-moving, self-subsisting men, not mere puppets, moving but as moved by the reigning mode, the reigning dogma, the reigning school, is a grand and praiseworthy work, and we should reverence and aid, not

abuse and hinder him who gives himself up soul and body to its accomplishment. So far as the author of the address before us is true to this object, earnest in executing this work, he has our hearty sympathy, and all the aid we, in our humble sphere, can give him. In laboring for this object, he proves himself worthy of his age and his country, true to religion and to morals. In calling, as he does, upon the literary men of our community, in the silver tones of his rich and eloquent voice, and above all by the quickening influence of his example, to assert and maintain their independence throughout the whole domain of thought, against every species of tyranny that would encroach upon it, he is doing his duty; he is doing a work the effects of which will be felt for good far and wide, long after men shall have forgotten the puerility of his conceits, the affectations of his style, and the unphilosophical character of his speculations. The doctrines he puts forth, the positive instructions, for which he is now censured, will soon be classed where they belong: but the influence of his free spirit, and free utterance, the literature of this country will long feel and hold in grateful remembrance.

LITERARY NOTICE.

The Nature and Extent of Religious Liberty. A Sermon preached at the Church in Brattle Square, on Sunday morning, June 17, 1838. Boston: I. R. Butts. 1838. 8vo. pp. 19.—This sermon was called forth by the prosecution and conviction of the editor of an Infidel paper, in this city, for the alleged crime of Blasphemy,—a prosecution and conviction on which the press throughout the country has very freely commented, and concerning which it has, with very few exceptions, expressed but one opinion,—that of unqualified condemnation. Our own opinion on the matter can hardly be called for, since we have given at some length, in a previous number of this journal, our views of religious liberty in general. We are decidedly opposed to all prosecutions for blasphemy. Blasphemy is an offence, if an offence, which brings along with it its own punishment, and the horror it excites is in all cases sufficient to render the blasphemers impotent to injure society.

The author of the sermon before us has been thought to take sides against religious liberty, to have by no means given a true and faithful account of its nature and extent; and certain are we that the definitions and explanations he gives are sufficient to legitimate the most perfect system of religious tyranny. Yet we are inclined to believe he is by no means the enemy of religious liberty, and not at all disposed to check freedom of inquiry or freedom of utterance. Through the whole sermon there seems to us to run a singular confusion of ideas. In the first place the author does not distinguish the moral restraints which every man should feel in regard to the formation and utterance of his opinions, from the restraints which may be imposed and enforced by civil society. In strictness a man may have no moral right to be an atheist, because it may be true that no man, who maintains a pure heart and properly exercises his intellect, can fail to find convincing proof of the existence of a God. But it does not follow from this that civil society has a right to prohibit atheism, or to punish the promulgation of atheistical opinions. A man has no moral right to hate his neighbor. Every man is bound to love his neighbor as himself; but shall civil society therefore pass penal enactments against hatred to one's neighbor, and attempt by positive law to enforce love to one's neighbor? Not all that is morally wrong can be prohibited by law, nor all that is morally right enforced by law. Civil society is restricted in its action to the suppression merely of those outward acts which interfere with the equal rights of all its members. If the belief and propagation of atheism abridged or impeded the exercise of the right to believe and propagate theism, then would it be within the duty of government to prohibit and labor to eradicate it. But such is not the case. He who adopts a given belief, and seeks to propagate it, infringes by that no one's rights, so long as others are left free to believe and maintain an opposite belief. No one's rights are injured, and therefore government has no occasion and no right to interfere.

The author of this sermon, in the second place, also seems to confound the utterance of certain opinions with the manner of their utterance. We know him too well to believe that he would in any case check free utterance; but he does not believe that men have a right under plea of religious liberty, of the right of conscience, to make gross and wanton attacks on the cherished sentiments of the community. But in this two things are confounded which should be kept distinct. First, religious liberty, the civil right to form and utter without any restraint our own opinions. This right is sacred, and the author of this sermon, we presume, would hold it so. Let it then be held so; let it not be questioned. Second, the right of a man to make gross and wanton attacks, not on public opinion merely, but on public sentiment, the most cherished sentiments of the community. Now this has no necessary connexion with the question of religious liberty, and only serves to confuse and mislead the mind when treated in connexion with it. We say at once, that no man has a right to make gross and wanton attacks on the cherished sentiments of the community, and that civil society is competent, if it be thought expedient, to pass and enforce laws against them. All we ask on this

point is, that the laws be equal, and open to the minority as well as to the majority. If it be made a penal offence to attack in a gross and wanton manner the sentiments of the majority, we insist that it shall be a penal offence to attack in a gross and wanton manner the sentiments of the minority, — that it shall be as unlawful to outrage the feelings of an infidel as of a Christian. Respect to the feelings of every man, whatever the opinions he holds, is a moral duty, the fulfilment of which every man has a right to exact, if need be, even by law.

Nevertheless the expediency of laws against gross and wanton attacks on the sentiments of others we much doubt. They could not be enforced in case of the minority, and the majority do not need them. He who attacks in a gross and wanton manner the dearest sentiments and most cherished convictions of the community, by so doing renders himself odious and powerless. The whole weight of the community is against him; the dearest sentiments and the most cherished convictions of the community are against him, bear down upon him, and crush him. He is marked and avoided, treated with neglect or contempt. What harm can he do? To be the object of general horror, of general loathing and disgust, to be treated with neglect or contempt, to feel that he is regarded no longer as a man, but as a public nuisance, is punishment enough one would think to satisfy the feelings of the most vindictive. Why seek to punish more?

If the writers on the subject of religious liberty will take care to distinguish what is our moral duty in the formation and propagation of religious opinions, from the right of civil society to interfere in the matter, and to make a complete disruption between the question of religious liberty, and the question of one's right to outrage the sentiments of the community, and leave each question to rest on its own merits, the community will very soon come to right conclusions on the whole matter, and there will be nowhere any disposition to impose any civil restraints upon the formation and the utterance of opinions. Men will seek to suppress errors of opinion by addresses to the reason and the conscience, not by fine and imprisonment, and government will restrain itself from all interference in the matter, so long as no one infringes the equal rights of another.

This number completes the first volume of our journal. We return our thanks to the public for the favor with which they have received it. Our success has not been great, but more than we looked for. We regard the Boston Quarterly Review no longer as an experiment. We shall with the year commence a new volume with new courage. Our next number may be expected to contain a somewhat elaborate exposition of the New French School of Philosophy, an article on Animal Magnetism by an Adept, besides several other articles either prepared or in a state of preparation.





